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My  task  in  this  thesis  is  to  assess  the  theological  implications  of  Herman  Melville's 
aesthetic  understanding  of  the  modern  Subject  as  a  duplicitous  self-creation.  Although 
Melville  is  obviously  not  a  theologian,  either  by  discipline  or  confession,  I  will  argue 
we  find  in  the  complex  theatricality  of  his  life  and  fiction  a  means  of  articulating  the 
potential  of  a  truly  radical  theological  thinking.  Such  a  thinking,  I  argue,  'unthinks'  all 
previous  grounds,  in  order  then  to  recast  them  imaginatively.  For  Melville,  we  shall 
see,  that  which  identifies  theology'as  theology'  is  not  simply  an  unattainable, 
transcendent  Thing-in-Itself.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  the  active  emergence  of 
unthinkable  excess  from  the  materialistic  immanence  of  its  self-characterisation.  The 
aesthetico-theological  thinking  in  view  here  highlights  the  necessity  of  a  repositioning 
of  theological  discourse  from  the  binary  perspective  that  inevitably  leads  to  self- 
present  identification,  be  it  in  a  discipline  or  a  confession,  to  the  radically  decentered  / 
desa(  ralized  interdisciplinarity  of  theology  becoming-itself. 
I  seek  to  achieve  this  end  by  situating  Melville  close  to  the  Germanic  philosophical 
climate  that  was  sweeping  across  the  American  literary  landscape  of  the  mid-19th 
century.  Melville's  ambivalent  attitude  toward  his  own  desire  for  self-destruction,  and 
thus,  too,  his  desire  for  a  non-subjective  common  pool  of  artistic  genius,  is  strictly 
parallel  to  his  misgivings  about  Transcendentalism  and  Romanticism.  It  is,  I  argue,  in 
the  dialectical  materialism  of  Friedrich  Schelling  that  we  find  Melville's  philosophical 
analogue,  in  their  respective  efforts  to  understand  the  self-becoming  of  the  Absolute  / 
God  /  Truth.  Here  we  find  an  aesthetico-theological  thinking  attuned  to  the  creative 
inadequacy  of  self-becoming,  whereby  the  finite  inadequacy  and  perspectival 
duplicity  of  theological  self-presentation  carry  the  potential  of  a  self-creativity  that 
makes  all  things  new.  As  such,  for  aesthetico-theological  thinking  there  is  truly 
nothing  behind  or  beyond  the  materiality  of  experience  -  i.  e.,  no  Ding  an  sich  or 
transcendental  determination  of  being.  And  precisely  for  this  reason  the  awareness 
and  actualisation  of  something  new,  indeed  something  miraculous  because  it  was 
previously  impossible,  is  made  possible. 3 
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Beginning  is  going  on.  Everywhere.  Amidst  all  the  endings,  so  rarely  ripe  or  ready.  They  show  up  late, 
these  beginnings,  bristling  «ith  promise,  yet  labored  and  doomed.  Every  last  one  of  them  is  lovingly 
addressed:  'in  the  beginning.  '  But  if  such  talk  -  talk  of  the  beginning  and  the  ending  -  has  produced  the 
poles,  the  boundary  markers  of  a  closed  totality,  if'the  beginning'  has  blocked  the  disruptive  infinities  of 
becoming,  then  theology  had  better  get  out  of  its  own  way. 
In  the  beginning,  theology  starts  again.  ' 
1.  On  Introductions 
An  introduction,  in  addition  to  being  a  formal  greeting  or  welcome,  is  meant  to 
set  the  tone  and  the  tenor  of  a  particular  project,  so  as  to  hint  at  the  chorus  of  voices 
and  themes  that  will  in  due  course  emerge.  In  so  doing,  a  project's  ending  is 
translated,  or,  in  the  event  of  its  malignancy,  metastasises  to  its  beginning.  Typically 
written  after  the  book's  body,  and  sometimes  even  its  conclusion,  introductions  can 
often  be  slightly  shady.  They  are,  Mark  C.  Taylor  affirms,  'awkward,  embarrassing 
affairs  coy  games  of  hide-and-seek,  revelation  and  concealment,  appearance  and 
disappearance.  '2  Which  is  to  say,  a  conclusion  is  never  far  from  its  introduction.  The 
reader  will  soon  notice  that  this  introduction  is  no  different. 
Replete  with  its  as  yet  unsubstantiated  assertions,  an  introduction  tends  to  be, 
for  no  less  an  authority  on  the  subject  than  Hegel,  'a  string  of  random  statements  and 
assurances  about  truth'.  '  The  insidious  implication  of  these  'random  statements'  and 
'assurances',  he  fears,  is  that  they  unfaithfully  portray  truth  as  some  autonomous, 
constructive  particularity,  some  Kantian  Ding-an-sich,  that  (for  Hegel)  illegitimately 
precedes  the  philosopher's  attempt  to  develop  an  argument.  In  any  narrative,  be  it 
philosophical  or  otherwise,  such  truth  might  range  from  the  writer's  historico-cultural 
1  Catherine  Keller,  Face  of  the  Deep:  A  Theology  of  Becoming  (London:  Routledge,  2003),  3. 
I  Mark  C.  Taylor,  Journeys  to  Selfhood:  Hegel  &  Kierkegaard  (Berkeley:  University  of 
California  Press.  1980),  2. 
3  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Phenornenolog  of  Spirit  (trans.  A.  V.  Miller;  New  York:  Oxford  University 
Press,  1977),  1. 6 
preconceptions  and  agendas,  to  the  intentions  and  purposes  read  into  the  absent  author 
by  his  or  her  reader.  Problems  arise,  however,  when  one  conflates  such 
preconceptions  with  (authorial)  self-conscious  immediacy.  On  this  point,  even  Soren 
Kierkegaard,  one  of  Hegel's  chief  critics,  agrees,  finding  in  it  a  rationale  for  his  use  of 
pseudonyms  and'indirect  communication': 
It  gives  me  pleasure  to  see  that  the  pseudonyms,  presumably  aware  of 
the  relation  subsisting  between  the  method  of  indirect  communication 
and  the  truth  as  inwardness,  have  themselves  said  nothing,  nor  misused 
a  preface  to  assume  an  official  attitude  toward  the  production,  as  if  an 
author  were  in  a  purely  legal  sense  the  best  interpreter  of  his  own 
words;  or  as  if  it  could  help  a  reader  that  an  author  had  intended  this  or 
that,  if  it  were  not  realized;  or  as  if  it  were  certain  that  it  was  realized 
because  the  author  himself  says  so  in  the  preface;  ...  or  as  if  an  author 
were  served  by  having  a  reader  who  precisely  because  of  the  author's 
clumsiness  knew  all  about  the  book.  ' 
For  Hegel,  following  his  signature  logic,  the  immediacy  of  truth  assumed  in 
any  given  introduction  /  preface  stands  opposed  to  its  eventual  emergence  in  and 
through  the  dialectical  Absolute  of  identity-in-difference,  and  is  the  hallmark  of  naive 
irrationalism.  Indeed,  as  he  famously  mocks  the  position  of  his  former  roommate 
Friedrich  Schelling,  it  is  to  present  the  'Absolute  as  the  night,  in  which,  as  people  say, 
all  cows  are  black'.  '  On  the  contrary,  he  continues,  'One  can  say  of  the  Absolute  that 
it  is  essentially  a  result,  that  it  is  only  at  the  end  what  it  is  in  truth'.  6  As  such, 
'  Soren  Kierkegaard,  Concluding  Unscientific  Postscript  (trans.  David  Swenson  and  Walter 
Lowrie;  Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1968),  225-226.  Cf.,  Taylor,  Journeys  to  Selfhood,  2- 
5;  90-107;  Altarity  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1987),  322-300. 
'  As  Karl  Jaspers  has  noted,  though,  Hegel's  jab  was  actually  very  similar  to  Schelling's 
critique  of  those  who  misunderstood  the  concept  of  intellectual  intuition.  He  writes:  'Most  people  see 
in  the  being  of  the  absolute  nothing  but  a  pure  night  and  are  unable  to  know  anything  in  it;  it  dwindles 
,  away  for  them  into  a  mere  negation  of  multiplicity'  (Qtd.  in  Karl  Jaspers,  Schelling;  Grösse  und 
l'c'ncOngnis  [Munich:  Piper,  1955],  302).  Jason  Wirth  notes  that  even  after  Hegel  noted  in  a  letter  that 
he  \w  as  criticizing  those  who  do  not  properly  understand  intellectual  intuition  and  not  (as  it  was 
commonly  regarded)  specifically  Schelling,  he  declined  Schelling's  request  that  he  say  as  much  in 
future  editions  of  the  Phenonrcnolog  of  Spirit.  See  Jason  Wirth,  Introduction  to  The  Ages  of  the 
l'  rld,  by  Friedrich  W.  J.  Schelling  (Albany:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  2000),  ix,  133- 
34n.  7) 
6  Ile-cl,  I'heru  omeººol  o  E'  y.  22. 7 
introductions  are  'not  only  superfluous  but,  in  view  of  the  nature  of  the  subject  matter, 
even  inappropriate  and  misleading.  ''  The  truth  of  a  philosophical  text,  Hegel  goes  on 
to  argue,  should  be  self-explanatory;  that  is  to  say,  the  immanence  of  truth  embodied 
in  the  dialectical  poetics  of  such  truth's  self-creation  [Bildting].  R  Of  course,  one  can 
but  hope  that  Hegel  appreciated  the  irony  that  his  condemnation  of  introductions  was 
written  as  a  preface  to  Phenomenology  of  Spirit,  itself  a  six-hundred-page  introduction 
to  his  vaunted  and  often  vilified  philosophical  system.  '  While  I  do  not  make  similar 
systemising  claims  for  my  project  here,  I  dare  not  miss  the  importance  of  his 
interrogative  contempt  of  introductions,  nor  its  instructive  irony.  10 
2.  An  Untimely  Intrusion 
Similarly,  and  true  to  the  original  sin  of  the  Calvinist  upbringing  weighing 
heavily  on  his  soul  from  birth,  Herman  Melville  lived  his  life  acutely  aware  of  the 
untimely  intrusion  of  its  end.  Like  several  of  his  most  famous  characters  and 
narrators,  he  believed  his  ending  to  be  somehow  out  of  place,  before  its  time.  In 
Moby-Dick,  for  instance,  Ishmael  is  sensitive,  from  the  very  beginning  of  his  journey 
7  Hegel,  Phenomenology,  1. 
8  Terry  Pinkard  describes  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  well: 
Hegel  intended  the  book  to  satisfy  the  needs  of  contemporary  (European)  humanity: 
it  was  to  provide  an  education,  a  Bildung,  a  formation  for  its  readership  so  that  they 
could  come  to  grasp  who  they  had  become  (namely,  a  people  individually  and 
collectively  'called'  to  be  free),  why  they  had  become  those  people,  and  why  that  had 
been  necessary....  [I]t  intended  to  show  its  readership  why  'leading  one's  own  life', 
self-determination,  had  become  necessary  for  'us  moderns'  and  what  such  'self- 
legislation'  actually  meant.  (German  Philosophy,  1760-1860:  The  Legacy  of  Idealism 
[Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2002],  222). 
9  See  Jacques  Derrida's  delight  in  the  crafty  paradox  of  'the  preface  that  Hegel  must  write  to 
denounce  a  preface'  (Dissemination  [trans.  Barbara  Johnson;  Athlone  Press:  London,  1981  ],  11). 
10  For  his  part,  Hegel  vw  as  deeply  ambivalent  about  the  place  of  Phenomenology  of  Spirit  in  his 
philosophical  system.  While  he  describes  it  in  the  text  as  an  'Introduction',  he  never  actually  lectured 
on  the  original  phenomenology  while  teaching  in  Berlin;  and  by  the  end  of  his  life,  in  fact,  had  gone  so 
fir  as  to  disavow  it  as  a  true  Introduction  at  all.  And  yet,  he  continued  distributing  copies  of  the  book 
to  friends  and  \  isitors.  and  e\  en  made  contractual  obligations  to  publish  a  revised  edition  (he  died 
before  he  could  do  so)  (Pinkard,  German  Philosophy,  221-22). on  the  Pequod,  to  the  fact  that  the  inevitable  end  of  Ahab's  wrathful  search  for  Nlobv 
Dick  was  suicide. 
All  that  most  maddens  and  torments;  all  that  stirs  up  the  lees  ofthings; 
all  truth  with  malice  in  it;  all  that  cracks  the  sinews  and  cakes  the 
brain;  all  the  subtle  demonisms  of  life  and  thought;  all  evil,  to  crazy 
Ahab,  were  visibly  personified,  and  made  practicably  assailable  in 
Moby  Dick.  He  piled  upon  the  whale's  white  hump  the  sum  of  all  the 
general  rage  and  hate  felt  by  his  whole  race  from  Adam  down;  and 
then,  as  if  his  chest  had  been  a  mortar,  he  burst  his  hot  heart's  shell 
upon  it.  '' 
In  a  dialectical  manoeuvre  that  will  prove  especially  significant  for  my  reading  of 
Melville,  the  inevitability  of  Ahab's  'cardiac  arrest',  as  it  were,  is  that  which  conditions 
the  very  possibility  of  the  'monomania'  of  the  Pequod's  captain  and  crew.  That  is  to 
say,  the  ending  of  Mobv-Dick  is  the  fundamental  presumption  that  makes  the  novel 
itself  at  all  possible.  Neither  such  a  manoeuvre,  nor  its  implications  for  an  aesthetic 
re-evaluation  of  subjectivity,  is  as  simple  as  it  may  at  first  seem, 
When  Melville  himself  died  in  1891  several  obituaries  expressed  shock  that  he 
had  not  died  years  earlier.  In  fact,  one  year  earlier  Edward  Bok  had  observed: 
There  are  more  people  to-day  who  believe  Herman  Melville  dead  than 
there  are  those  who  know  he  is  living....  Forty-four  years  ago,  when 
Typee  appeared,  there  was  not  a  better  known  author  than  he,  and  he 
commanded  his  own  prices.  Publishers  sought  him,  and  editors 
considered  themselves  fortunate  to  secure  his  name  as  a  literary  star. 
And  to-day?  Busy  New  York  has  no  idea  he  is  even  alive,  and  one  of 
the  best-informed  literary  men  in  this  country  laughed  recently  at  my 
statement  that  Herman  Melville  was  his  neighbor  by  only  two  city 
blocks.  'Nonsense',  said  he.  'Why,  Melville  is  dead  these  many  years!  ' 
"  Herman  Melville,  Mobr-Dick;  or,  The  Whale,  in  The  Writings  of  Herman  Melville  (eds. 
F-larrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas  Tanselle;  vol.  6;  Evanston  and  Chicago: 
Northwestern  University  Press  and  The  Newberry  Library,  1988).  184.  The  narrator  of  Pierre,  which 
was  finished  one  year  after  Mobv-Dick,  also  feels  the  prick  of  death's  prematurity  when  he  laments  his 
inability  to  change  the  course  of  Pierre's  inevitable  demise:  'Are  there  no  couriers  in  the  air  to  warn 
thee  away  from  these  emperilings....  Where  now  are  the  high  beneficences?  Whither  fled  the  sweet 
angels  that  are  alleged  guardians  to  man?  '  (Herman  Melville,  Pierre;  or,  The  Ambiguities,  in  The 
Writings  of  Herman  Melville  [eds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas  Tanselle;  vol.  7; 
Evanston  and  Chicago:  Northwestern  University  Press  and  The  Newberry  Library,  1971].  186). 9 
Talk  about  literary  fame?  There's  a  sample  of  it!  12 
For  the  New  York  Times  he  just  as  well  should  have  been  dead,  for  they  could  not 
even  remember  his  name:  in  its  two  notices  of  his  death,  his  first  name  was  reported, 
respectively,  as  'Henry'  and'Hiram'.  13  And  in  a  glaring  oversight  that  has  persisted 
until  only  recently,  The  Press  claimed  that  'he  had  done  almost  no  literary  work 
during  the  past  sixteen  years.  '14  Seemingly  silent  unto  the  end,  Melville's  death  is 
memorialised  by  a  blank  scroll  chiselled  onto  his  tombstone  in  the  Bronx,  where  he  is 
buried  next  to  his  son,  Malcolm.  " 
What,  though,  of  his  beginning?  By  all  accounts,  it  certainly  seems  innocent 
enough.  But  is  it  really?  Might  it  be  pertinent,  for  example,  that  Melville's  mother 
added  a  terminal  'e'  to  her  children's  surname  after  the  death  of  their  father  in  1832? 
A  one-letter  change  is,  of  course,  small,  inconsequential.  What  difference  does  a 
character  make?  For  her  son  Herman,  however,  the  change  would  ultimately  hint  at 
12  Qtd.  Jay  Leyda,  The  Melville  Log:  A  Documentary  of  Herman  Melville,  1819-1891  (vol.  2; 
New  York:  Gordian,  1969),  827. 
13  Laurie  Robertson-Lorant,  Melville:  A  Biography  (Amherst:  University  of  Massachusetts 
Press,  1996),  614;  Hershel  Parker,  Herman  Melville:  A  Biography,  Volume  2  [1851-1891]  (Baltimore: 
Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  2002),  911-12. 
14  'Death  of  a  Once  Popular  Author',  qtd.  Leyda,  2:  836.  In  reality,  Melville  had  written  more 
lines  of  poetry  than  Emily  Dickinson  and  almost  as  many  as  Walt  Whitman.  Moreover,  Laurence  Buell 
notes,  all  three  poets  wrote  poetry  for  roughly  the  same  amount  of  time,  a  little  longer  than  twenty-five 
years.  Melville's  career  as  a  novelist  lasted  but  a  decade  ('Melville  the  Poet'  in  The  Cambridge 
Companion  to  Herman  Melville  [ed.  Robert  S.  Levine;  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1998], 
135).  Granted,  after  Clarel  (1876),  Melville's  published  poetry  was  limited  to  two  privately  printed 
volumes,  twenty-five  copies  each,  John  Marr  and  Other  Sailors  (1888)  and  Timoleon  (1891).  For 
more  about  Melville's  status  as  a  poet,  see  Elizabeth  Renker,  'Melville  the  Poet:  Response  to  William 
Spengemann'  American  Literary  History  12  (Spring-Summer,  2000):  348-54;  William  C.  Spengemann, 
'Melville  the  Poet'  American  Literary  History  11  (Winter,  1999):  571-609;  Hershel  Parker,  'The  Lost 
Poems  (1860)  and  Melville's  First  Urge  to  Write  an  Epic  Poem'  in  Melville's  Evennoving  Dawn: 
Centennial  Essays  (eds.  John  Bryant  and  Robert  Milder;  Kent,  Oh.:  Kent  State  University  Press,  1997): 
260-75;  Stanley  A.  Goldman,  Melville's  Protest  Theism:  The  Hidden  and  Silent  God  in  Clarel  (DeKalb, 
Ill.:  Northern  Illinois  University  Press,  1993). 
15  Another  premature  death,  Malcolm  Melville  had  died  in  1867,  at  the  age  of  eighteen,  by  a 
self-inflicted  gunshot  wound.  Originally  ruled  a  suicide  'while  laboring  under  temporary  insanity  of 
Mind',  the  questions  and  uncertainty  surrounding  the  whole  affair  resulted  in  the  cause  of  death  to  soon 
thereafter  be  ruled  an  accident  (Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  2:  687-91).  See  also,  Robertson-Lorant, 
Melville,  513-17;  Parker,  Herman  Melville,  Volume  2,642-46. 10 
the  inherent  fluidity  of  his  identity,  a  notion  with  which  he  would  occasionally  play  by 
signing  letters  with  his  original  surname,  'Melvill'.  Consciously  or  not,  Elizabeth 
Renker  suggests,  these  acts  of  reversion  would  effectively  split  him  in  two.  16  Melville 
himself,  in  fact,  suggests  something  similar  when  he  concludes  a  letter  to  his  British 
publisher,  John  Murray,  whom  he  had  not  yet  met,  by  playfully  questioning  the  latter's 
persistence  'in  carrying  on  this  mysterious  correspondence  with  an  imposter  shade', 
that  is,  'the  fanciful  appellation  of  Herman  Melvin'.  " 
3.  Herman  Melville  and  the  Aesthetico-Theological  Vision 
In  this  way,  Melville's  was  a  kind  of  paradoxical  self-creation,  or  self- 
becoming,  not  dissimilar  to  that  described  by  Maurice  Blanchot: 
The  writer  only  finds  himself,  only  realizes  himself,  through  his  work; 
before  his  work  exists,  not  only  does  he  not  know  who  he  is,  but  he  is 
nothing.  He  only  exists  as  a  function  of  the  work,  but  then  how  can  the 
work  exist?  ... 
If  he  does  not  see  his  work  before  him  as  a  project 
already  completely  formed,  how  can  he  make  it  the  conscious  end  of 
his  conscious  acts?  18 
It  is  the  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  assess  the  theological  implications  of  Melville's 
presentation  of  modern  subjectivity  as  aesthetic  self-creation.  Moreover,  it  is 
precisely  because  of  the  centrality  of  the  Subject  /  subjectivity  in  modern  (i.  e.,  post- 
Kantian)  philosophy,  that  is,  its  endeavour  to  re-think  the  role  and  limits  of  subjective 
imagination  and  spontaneity,  that  my  argument  is  ultimately  an  affirmation  of  Thomas 
16  Elizabeth  Renker,  Strike  Through  the  Mask:  Herman  Melville  and  the  Scene  of  Writing 
(Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1996),  15.  For  the  clearest  example,  see  his  letter  to  Exert 
:  ý.  Duyckinck,  13  Dec.  1850  in  Herman  Melville,  Correspondence,  in  The  Writings  of  Herman  '11  '1  , ille 
(cds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas  Tanselle;  vol.  14;  Evanston  and  Chicago: 
North\\cstcrn  University  Press  and  The  Newberry  Library,  1993),  172. 
17  Melville,  Correspondence.  105.  Motivating,  this  ghostly  allusion  was  1lurrav  s  request  in  a 
previous  letter  to  'test  the  corporeality  of  Melville  by  'clapping  eyes  upon  him  in  London'. 
18  Maurice  Blanchot,  'Literature  and  the  Right  to  Death'  in  The  Station  Hill  Blanchot  Reader 
(trans.  Iv  dia  Davis.  Paul  Auster.  and  Robert  Lamberton;  BarrvtoN\  n.  N.  Y.:  Station  Hill,  1999).  361-02. J  J.  Altizer's  provocative  declaration:  'We  must  be  prepared  to  accept  the  paradox  that 
modern  philosophy  has  been  more  deeply  theological  than  modern  theology.  which  is 
perhaps  not  so  paradoxical  if  our  greatest  modem  imaginative  vision  has  been  more 
fully  theological  than  has  our  theological  thinking.  "'  For  Altizer,  this  is  true  because 
it  is  the  modern  philosophical  vision  that  allows  theological  thinking  to  rethink  its 
own  deepest  grounds,  those  of  subjectivity,  'a  re-thinking  which  is  initially  an 
unthinking  of  every  established  theological  ground'  --  only  then  is  truly  theological 
thinking  possible.  Such  is,  he  concludes,  'the  first  goal  of  radical  theology',  and  is  the 
mark  of  a  theology  that  harnesses  the  potential  of  a  united  thinking  and  creativity  / 
imagination.  20 
My  analysis  of  Melville's  presentation  of  subjectivity,  as  the  creative  duplicity 
of  self-becoming,  will  show  him  to  be  an  exemplary  model  of  Altizer's  point.  In  him 
we  will  find  theology  (not  to  mention  literature)  characterised  in  ways  hitherto 
thought  unthinkable.  As  such,  I  will  argue  that  the  truest  import  and  relevance  of 
contemporary  theology  is  contingent  on  the  aesthetics  of  its  unthought  subjectivity  - 
namely,  the  free  theological  Subject  as  a  revolutionary  poesis,  that  is,  a  creative 
emergence  from  the  unavoidable  collisions  between  religion,  literature,  and 
philosophy.  2'  As  we  will  see  with  Melville,  while  such  an  interdisciplinarity  may 
19  Thomas  J.  J.  Altizer,  'Doing  Radical  Theology',  unpublished  manuscript,  4. 
20  Altizer,  'Doing  Radical  Theology',  2.4-5. 
21  In  this  way,  the  task  of  thinking  about  theology  remains  fully  hermeneutical,  as  described  by 
Rüdiger  Bubner: 
Hermeneutics  has  become  more  and  more  of  a  key  word  in  philosophical  discussions 
of  the  most  \  aried  kind.  It  seems  as  if  hermeneutics  creates  cross-connections 
between  problems  of  different  origin.  In  linguistics  and  sociology,  in  history  and 
literary  studies,  in  theology,  jurisprudence  and  aesthetics,  and  finally  in  the  general 
theory  of  science,  hermeneutic  perspectiNes  have  been  successfully  brought  to  bear. 
In  this  wway,  the  traditional  philosophical  claim  to  universality  is  renewed  under 
another  name  (Modear  Genpan  Philosophy  [trans.  Eric  l  latthewws:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1981],  45). 12 
often  seem  peculiar,  or  perhaps  even  forced,  it  is  best  understood  not  simply  as  the 
happy  or  obvious  convergences  and  coincidences  of  different  discourses  in 
harmonious  dialogue.  On  the  contrary,  my  emphasis  here  is  on  precisely  the  forced 
peculiarity  of  what  emerges  as  its  radically  disruptive,  repressed  aesthetico- 
theological  excess.  Only  in  this  way  does  one's  thinking  about  theology  become 
theological  thinking. 
David  Jenkins  expresses  something  similar  when  he  specifies  literature  as 
theology's  forgotten  dialogue  partner:  'Theologians  need  ...  to  stand  under  the 
judgement  of  the  insights  of  literature  before  they  can  speak  with  true  theological 
force  of,  and  to,  the  world  this  literature  reflects  and  illuminates.  '--  -  Such  a  forceful 
perspective,  nevertheless,  remains  a  marginal  one.  This  is  but  one  of  the  reasons 
David  Jasper  can  candidly  sigh:  'I  am  tired  of  the  academic  game  of  proving  that  I 
have  read  this  and  this  -  one  reads  about  a  lot  of  things,  and  what  is  interesting  is  why 
some  strike  one  as  desperately  important  and  others  as  instantly  forgettable.  (Most 
"theology",  as  such,  bores  me  to  tears.  )'23  Theology,  as  understood  by  the  likes  of 
Jenkins  and  Jasper,  amongst  others,  is  as  though  an  unthought,  aesthetic  excess  that 
blurs  discursive  contours  whilst  blinding  hegemonic  systems  of  closure,  and  thus 
remains  vital  beyond  its  strictly  confessional  /  disciplinary  confines. 
This,  of  course,  is  not  to  say  that  Melville  himself  is  a  theologian.  Rather,  I 
will  contend  that  the  aesthetico-theological  potential  for  a  truly  revolutionary  freedom 
and  autonomy  emerge  from  and  sustain  the  complex  theatricality  of  his  life  and 
22  David  Jenkins,  'Literature  and  the  Theologian'  in  Theolo  N,  and  the  University:  An 
Ecumenical  Investigation  (ed.  John  Coulson;  Baltimore:  Helicon,  1964),  219. 
23  David  Jasper,  Pie  Studr  of  Literature  and  Religion:  An  Introduction  (2"d  ed.;  Basingstoke: 
Macmillan,  1992),  xv.  For  a  different,  but  related,  appraisal  of  traditional  theology's  diminishing 
cultural  role,  and  the  potential  of  cultural  and  literary  studies  to  revitalise  see  David  E.  Klemm,  'Back  to 
Literature  --  and  Theology'?  '  in  Postmodernism:  Literature  and  the  Future  of  Theologe  (cd.  DaN  id 
Jasper;  Basingstoke:  Macmillan,  1993),  180-90;  and  Michael  Grimshaw,  'Tourist,  Traveler,  or  Exile: 
Redefining  the  Theological  Endea\  or',  Journal  of  Religion  81  (April  2001):  294-70. 13 
fiction.  Contrary  to  the  most  common  postmodern  reading  of  Melville,  with  which 
my  own  will  surely  be  associated,  my  point  in  emphasizing  'theatricality'  is  not  that 
Melville  introduces  and/or  participates  in  a  counterfeit  economy,  as  it  were,  wherein 
classical  notions  of  truth  and  identity  are  forever  frustrated  by  one's  epistemic 
inability  to  see  beyond  the  mask  of  phenomenal  limitation.  His  is,  rather,  one  in 
which  the  gamble  of  faith  that  anything  at  all  exists  behind  the  phenomenal  mask  is 
itself  betrayed  as  constitutive  of  the  masquerade.  For  Melville,  that  which  identifies  a 
character'as  a  character',  for  us  the  quintessential  'theological'  Subject,  is  not  simply 
the  belief  in  an  unattainable  /  disguised  Thing-in-Itself,  i.  e.,  that  which  lies  beyond 
and  thus  guarantees  identity;  it  is,  rather,  the  unthinkable  (that  is  to  say,  repressed) 
possibility  and  freedom  that  unavoidably  emerges  from  the  material  processes  of  self- 
characterisation  /  self-becoming. 
What  Melville's  thinking  suggests  is  that  in  the  same  way  that,  for  instance, 
textuality  in  deconstruction  remains  a  necessarily  impossible  avoidance,  i.  e.  a 
primordial  condition  of  possibility,  so  does  the  idiosyncratic  eruption  of  theology  (as  a 
truly  free  Subject)  in  its  material,  objective  embodiment'as  theology'.  Furthermore, 
his  reflections  suggest  the  need  for  a  radical  repositioning  of  theology  from  the  binary 
perspective  that  leads  to  self-present  identification  - 
be  it  in  the  veins  of,  for  example, 
Spinozan  immanence,  Kierkegaardian  transcendence,  or  even  Aquinian  confession 
to  the  complexly  evolutionary,  radically  decentered  /  desacralized  aesthetic  intensity 
of  a  materialistic  theology.  In  the  aesthetic  rethinking  opened  up  by  the  likes  of 
Melville,  the  Subject  (i.  e.,  of  theology)  is  freed,  if  only  for  a  miraculous  moment, 
from  its  reflection  upon  the  destructive  desire  and  attempts  for  an  impossible 
cognisance  of  its  own  incognisancc  -  that  is,  the  excessive  moment  of  its  self- 
characterisation.  In  the  aesthetico-theological  vision  of  Herman  Melville  there  is,  in 14 
short,  truly  nothing  behind  or  beyond  the  mask  of  phenomenal  experience.  As  such,  it 
is  concerned  less  with  the  necessity  of  what  is  than  with  the  possibility  of  what  might 
be,  and  thus  with  the  self-creative  freedom  of  its  self-characterisation. 
4.  The  Polytemporal  Approach 
One  of  the  key  features  of  Bruno  Latour's  argument  in  his  provocativelti,  titled 
book  We  Have  Never  Been  Modern  is  his  insistence  on  the  reversibility  of  time.  For 
Latour,  reality  is  built  around  the  natural  proliferation  and  networking  of  'quasi- 
objects'  that  are  neither  simply  subjects  nor  objects.  Their  appearance  or  role  as 
subject  or  object  /  cause  or  effect  is,  he  argues,  dependent  upon  one's  particular 
perspective,  discipline,  or  discourse.  As  such,  he  continues,  the  modem  notions  of 
temporality  and  progress,  and  thus  discursive  possibilities  and  norms,  are  thrown  into 
a  turbulent  discord.  He  writes: 
Modernizing  progress  is  thinkable  only  on  condition  that  all  the 
elements  that  are  contemporary  according  to  the  calendar  belong  to  the 
same  time....  For  this  to  be  the  case,  these  elements  have  to  form  a 
complete  and  recognizable  cohort.  This  beautiful  order  is  disturbed 
once  the  quasi-objects  are  seen  as  mixing  up  different  periods, 
ontologies  or  genres.  Then  a  historical  period  will  give  the  impression 
of  a  great  hotchpotch.  Instead  of  a  fine  laminary  flow,  we  will  most 
often  get  a  turbulent  flow  of  whirlpools  and  rapids.  Time  becomes 
reversible  instead  of  irreversible.  24 
It  is,  therefore,  reasonable  that  some  of  today's  most  provocative  thinking  can  only  be 
thought  provocatively  at  all  insofar  as  we  recognize  its  'polytemporal'  causes  and 
effects.  25  Although  I  wish  to  ultimately  resist  the  anti-revolutionary  /  anti-apocalyptic 
24  Bruno  Latour,  We  Haie  Never  Been  Modern  (trans.  Catherine  Porter.  Cambridge,  %lass.: 
Harvard  University  Press,  1993),  73. 
'`  Cf.,  'Let  us  suppose,  for  example,  that  we  are  going  to  regroup  the  contemporary  elements 
along  a  spiral  rather  than  a  line.  We  do  have  a  future  and  a  past,  but  the  future  takes  the  form  of  a 
circle  expanding  in  all  directions,  and  the  past  is  not  surpassed  but  revisited.  repeated.  surrounded. 
protected,  recombined,  reinterpreted  and  reshuffled.  Elements  that  appear  remote  if  we  follow  the 
spiral  may  turn  out  to  be  quite  nearby  if  we  compare  loops.  Conversely,  elements  that  are  quite 15 
implications  of  Latour's  idealisation  of  the  evolutionary  adaptation  of  networks,  the 
networks  in  which  Melville  and  theology  participate,  i.  e..  their  interdisciplinary  / 
hermeneutic  connection,  are  also  anything  but  straightforward.  "  In  the  course  of  this 
thesis,  for  instance,  we  will  often  find  ourselves  straddling  generations.  To  this  end,  I 
will  seek  to  flesh  out  the  cultural-philosophical-theological  networks,  those  obvious 
and  immediately  contemporary,  as  well  as  those  not  so  obvious  and  temporally 
anachronistic.  27 
In  Chapter  One,  I  present  a  mostly  biographical  portrait  of  a  young  Herman 
Melville  consumed  by  the  questions  of  his  own  authorial  self-becoming.  His  writing, 
as  is  especially  clear  in  his  first  novel,  Typee,  has  never  been  without  the  structure  of 
duplicity  and  self-doubt,  or  the  attendant  desire  for  self-destruction.  As  such,  Melville 
echoes  the  opening  paragraph  of  Nietzsche's  Ecce  Homo,  '-  and  so  I  tell  my  life  to 
myself,  28  and  participates  in  the  autobiographical  dilemma  of  self-becoming  heralded 
in  the  eighteenth-century  by  Lawrence  Sterne  and  popularised  at  the  turn  of  the 
twenty-first  century  by  Dave  Eggers.  As  we  will  see,  it  this  tradition's  same  appetite 
for  self-destruction  that  marks  the  intensity  of  subjective  freedom  most  evident  in 
Melville's  later  novels. 
In  Chapters  Two  and  Three,  I  argue  that  the  ambivalence  regarding  self- 
destruction  and  self-assertion  can  only  be  adequately  understood  when  held  in  relief 
contemporary,  if  we  judge  by  the  line,  become  quite  remote  if  we  traverse  a  spoke.  Such  a  temporality 
does  not  oblige  us  to  use  the  labels  "archaic"  or  "advanced,  "  since  every  cohort  of  contemporary 
elements  may  bring  together  elements  from  all  times.  In  such  a  framework,  our  actions  are  recognized 
at  last  as  polytemporal'  (Latour,  We  Have  Never  Been  Modern,  75). 
26  Cf.,  Latour,  We  Have  Never  Been  Modern,  48. 
27  Obviously,  I  am  not  using  the  word  'anachronistic'  pejorati\ely;  but  rather,  in  the  -sense  that 
'reading  against  the  grain'  of  history  may  hold  potential  for  drawing  attention  to  certain  'indivisible 
remainders'  otherwise  repressed  in  every  identifying  closure,  text  or  philosophical  system.  See  e.  g., 
Slaty  of  7-i2ek,  On  Belief  (London:  Routledge,  2001).  96. 
Friedrich  Nietzsche,  On  the  Genealogy  of  Morals/  Erne  Homo  (trans.  \'\  alter  Kaufmann; 
New  York:  \'inta-c,  1969).  221. 16 
to  the  philosophical  climate  of  18th-/19th-century  Germany.  While  it  may,  initially 
seem  a  departure  from  the  narrative  begun  in  the  first  chapter,  Melville's  presentation 
of  subjectivity  throughout  his  novels  is  far  too  closely  aligned  to  the  convergence  of 
aesthetics  and  subjectivity  found  in  Kant  and  the  theory  of  the  romantic  novel 
developed  by  Early  German  Romantics  for  it  to  be  ignored.  Nevertheless,  while  main, 
of  the  formal  similarities  with  the  Romantics  outlined  in  Chapter  Two  are  often  stark 
and  the  influences  apparent,  especially  in  Mardi,  Melville's  enduring  significance  is 
his  agonistic  resistance  to  the  appropriation  of  Romantic  ideals  by  several  of  his 
American  contemporaries,  particularly  what  he  regarded  as  the  dehumanised,  spiritual 
esotericism  of  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson.  Therefore,  in  Chapter  Three,  I  contend  that  the 
transition  from  Melville's  ambivalent  embrace  of  Romantic  ideals  in  his  essay 
'Hawthorne  and  his  Mosses'  (especially  regarding  authorial  ownership  of  texts  and 
self-assertion)  to  the  complex  'apocalyptic  ism'  of  Mobv-Dick  and  Pierre  is 
symptomatic  of  Friedrich  Schelling's  aborted  philosophical  aim  of  articulating  the 
materialistic  genesis  of  God's  self-becoming. 
In  this  way,  moreover,  I  will  argue  in  Chapter  Four  that  Melville  does  not  truly 
exemplify  the  aesthetico-theological  thinking  until  after  the  apocalypticism  of  Mobv- 
Dick  and  Pierre.  As  such,  it  is  not  until  the  poetic  duplicity  of  his  final  novel,  The 
Confidence-Man:  His  Masquerade,  that  the  full  implications  of  a  fully  radical 
theology  are  realised  in  an  aesthetic  theology.  Here  I  will  demonstrate  that  in 
Melville's  masquerade  of  confidence  and  faith  the  wearing  of  masks  does  not  obscure 
or  defer  the  revelation  of  a  transcendent  truth  or  ultimate  kernel  of  self-identity,  be  it 
that  of  divine  revelation,  mystical  silence,  pantheistic  All,  or  nihilistic  void.  Rather, 
in  a  sense  perhaps  suggestive  of  Deleuzian  immanence,  and  thus  explosive  to  the 
simple  equation  of  modern  aesthetics  and  liberal  humanism,  Melville's  masquerade  is 1? 
the  characterisation  /  materialisation  of  theological  truth  as  the  aesthetic  intensity  of 
unthinkable  possibility. 18 
CHAPTER  ONE: 
MELVILLE  &  THE  PROBLEM  OF  SELF-PRESENTATION 
1.  Fresh  From  the  Sea 
Fresh  from  the  sea  at  the  age  of  twenty-five,  following  his  final  journey  as  a 
merchant  sailor  in  October  1844,  Melville  regarded  the  writing  of  his  first  novel  as  the 
very  beginning  of  his  life.  Indeed,  as  he  writes  in  a  letter  to  Nathaniel  Hawthorne, 
From  my  twenty-fifth  year  I  date  my  life,  three  weeks  have  scarcely  passed,  at  any 
time  between  then  &  now,  that  I  have  not  unfolded  within  myself.  '"'  What  is 
especially  important  to  note  here  is  that  such  an  unfolding  within  himself  is  only 
possible  in  the  very  act  of  unfolding  himself  withotit.  That  is  to  say,  if  we  are  to  take 
Melville  at  his  word,  which  he  later  insists  we  must,  any  sense  of  his  self-discovery  or 
self-consciousness  as  an  artist  and  a  free  thinker  must  be  held  in  tandem  with  the  fact 
that  such  a  discovery  is  only  possible  in  the  very  act  of  his  writing.  In  this  way,  it  is 
particularly  instructive  to  approach  our  reading  of  Melville  as  that  of  a  certain  kind  of 
self-creation  /  self-becoming. 
By  April  1845,  Melville  was  confident  enough  in  his  hastily  written 
manuscript  detailing  his  adventures  on  the  Marquesas  Islands  to  send  portions  to 
Harper  Brothers  for  possible  publication.  Though  one  editorial  assistant  favourably 
compared  what  he  read  to  Robinson  Crusoe,  Harpers  nevertheless  rejected  it  on  the 
grounds  that  'it  was  impossible  that  it  could  be  true  and  therefore  was  without  value.  "  ' 
Not  soon  thereafter,  Thomas  Nichols,  a  colleague  of  Melville's  brother  in  New  York, 
feeling'sure  that  the  reviews  of  the  English  press  would  make  its  American  success', 
advised  Melville  to  send  it  to  London.  Proclaiming  that  the  manuscript  had  held  him 
Nlely  ille,  Correspondence,  193. 
ý0  i.  cyda,  The  Al  li'ille  Log,  1:  196. 19 
rapt,  Nichols  had  no  doubt  of  its  potential  for  success,  'not  at  all  sure  that  the  process 
could  be  reversed.  i3'  Thus  galvanised,  Melville  sent  his  manuscript  to  London  with 
his  brother  Gansevoort,  who  had  recently  accepted  a  post  there  as  the  secretary  to  the 
American  legation.  By  January  1846,  with  its  acceptance  by  Wiley  &  Putnam 
Publishing  in  America32  following  directly  on  the  heels  of  its  acceptance  by  John 
Murray  for  the  British  Colonial  and  Home  Library,  33  Nichols'  assessment  had  been 
proven  true.  But  two  months  later,  Melville's  first  novel  appeared  in  England  under 
the  title  Narrative  of  a  Four  Months'  Residence  among  the  Natives  of  a  Valley  of  the 
Marquesas  Islands,  and  within  the  month  in  America  as  Typee:  A  Peep  at  Polynesian 
Life.  34 
The  beginning  of  Melville's  writing  career,  however,  was  not  without  its 
problems.  John  Murray,  for  example,  was  so  worried  about  certain  passages  that,  in 
31  Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  1:  197. 
32  The  first  edition  of  Typee  was  published  in  America  as  a  part  of  Evert  Duyckinck's  new 
series  for  Putnam's,  the  'Library  of  Choice  Reading'.  At  the  time,  there  was  not  yet  an  international 
copyright  law  on  either  side  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  As  a  result,  cheap  foreign  novels  were  often  sold  at 
the  expense  of  native  authors;  though,  as  William  Charvat  notes,  American  authors  suffered  more 
because  they  produced  fewer  works  that  appealed  to  an  international  middle-class  audience,  as  well  as 
the  immaturity  of  America's  publishing  industry  (The  Profession  of  Authorship  in  America,  1800-70: 
The  Papers  of  William  Charvat  [ed.  Matthew  J.  Bruccoli;  Columbus:  Ohio  State  University  Press, 
1978],  29).  The  fact  that  Duyckinck  wished  to  feature  exclusively  American  authors  highlights  the 
risky  and  tenuous  nature  of  his  business  venture.  For  more  information  on  the  'Library  of  Choice 
Reading'  and  the  socio-economic  conditions  of  the  early  American  publishing  industry,  see  Ezra 
Greenspan,  'Evert  Duyckinck  and  the  History  of  Wiley  and  Putnam's  Library  of  American  Books' 
American  Literature  64  (Dec.,  1992):  677-93;  and  Steven  Fink,  Prophet  in  the  Marketplace:  Thoreau's 
Development  as  a  Professional  Writer  (Princeton:  Princeton  University  Press,  1992),  143-47. 
33  John  Murray  had  been  convinced  of  the  merits  of  Melville's  novel  early  in  1846  by  no  less 
than  Washington  Irving,  who  was  currently  serving  as  the  American  minister  to  Spain. 
Serendipitously,  Irving  had  accompanied  John  Murray  to  a  business  meeting  with  Gansevoort  Melville, 
and  had  reportedly  praised  the  portions  of  the  book  read  aloud  as  'exquisite'  and  'graphic',  predicted  its 
success,  and  advised  Gansevoort  to  take  the  manuscript  to  Putnam  as  soon  as  possible.  Less  than  a 
week  later,  Putnam,  exclaiming  that  the  chapters  given  him  were  so  exciting  he  had  to  miss  church, 
agreed  to  publish  it  in  America  (Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  1:  202;  see  also,  Hershel  Parker,  Herman 
Melville:  A  Biograph,  v  [vol.  1;  Baltimore  and  London:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1996-2002], 
393-98).  For  more  on  John  Murray,  see  Angus  Fraser,  'John  Murray's  Colonial  and  Home  Library' 
Papers  of  the  Bibliographical  Society  of  America  91  (Sept.,  1997):  339-408;  and  Fraser's  'A  Publishing 
House  and  Its  Readers,  1841-1880:  The  Murrays  and  the  Miltons'  Papers  of  the  Bibliographical 
Society  of  America  90  (Mar.,  1996):  4-47. 
'a  'Typee'  was  not  affixed  to  the  British  version  until  the  Revised  Version  later  that  year. 20 
addition  to  Melville's  editorial  changes,  he  hired  a  reader  to  delete  or  change  passage 
'for  the  benefit  of  both  author  and  book'.  35  His  American  counterpart  was  even  more 
squeamish,  particularly  with  regard  to  its  frank  eroticism.  As  a  result,  the  orgiastic 
frenzy  that  the  Marquesan  girls,  in  all  their  'abandoned  voluptuousness',  excited 
onboard  the  Dolly  had  to  be  given  a  very  cold  shower  indeed  by  Wiley  &  Putnam's, 
and  then  later  once  again  in  the  Revised  Edition  by  Melville  himself.  It  was  reasoned 
that  if  Americans  were  presented  with  Tepee's  depiction  of  a  Marquesan  queen  who, 
wishing  to  display  her  tattoos,  'bent  forward  for  a  moment,  and  turning  sharply  round, 
threw  up  the  skirts  of  her  mantle',  they,  like  the  book's  Frenchman  who  is  accosted  by 
this  'unlooked-for-occurrence',  would  quickly  retreat  and  sales  would  suffer.  36  A 
similar  editorial  fate  met  the  temptation  and  sexual  insinuation  of  Melville's  bachelor- 
sailors  upon  first  meeting  the  island  girls  who  boarded  their  ship.  'How  avoid  so  dire  a 
temptation?  '  the  novel's  narrator,  Tommo,  wonders  salaciously.  'For  who  could  think 
of  tumbling  these  artless  creatures  overboard,  when  they  had  swam  miles  to  welcome 
us?  t37  Unwilling  to  extend  such  a  welcome  to  what  might  be  perceived  as  deviant, 
Melville  and  his  American  publisher  agreed  that  readers  of  Tvpee  should  not  face  any 
of  the  unbridled  'unholy  passions  of  the  crew  and  their  unlimited  gratification',  "  and 
35  Leon  Howard,  'Historical  Note'  in  Typee:  A  Peep  at  Polynesian  Life  by  Herman  Melville,  in 
The  Writings  of  Herman  Melville  (eds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas  Tanselle; 
vol.  1;  Evanston  and  Chicago:  Northwestern  University  Press  and  The  Newberry  Library,  1968),  282. 
Henry  Reader,  the  principle  editor  of  the  manuscript,  was  paid  a  little  over  half  the  amount  Melville 
himself  was  paid  for  writing  the  manuscript. 
36  Melville,  Tvpee,  8. 
37  Melville,  Tepee,  15 
;R  Melville,  Tepee,  15.  Tommo  tries  to  reassures  his  reader  that  these  indulgences  on  shore  are 
actually  for  the  sailors'  own  good,  as  they  are  far  better  than  the  sexual  temptations  of  those  sailors 
stuck  out  at  sea  without  a  woman  in  sight.  Surprisingly,  neither  publisher  found  questionable 
Mcly  ille's  unsubtle  suggestion  of  homosexuality  aboard  whaling  ships  (Melville,  Tvpee.  22-23;  346- 
47).  Cf.,  the  'plainly  phallic'  dance,  as  William  Charvat  calls  it,  which  sneaks  into  both  versions  of  the 
original  and  revised  editions.  Here,  Tommo  describes  the  dance  as  stimulating  'active,  romping. 
mischievous  c\olutions.  in  which  e\crv  limb  is  brought  into  requisition.  Indeed,  the  \larquesan  girls 
dance  all  ov  cr.  as  it  \w  ere;  not  only  do  their  feet  dance.  but  their  arms,  hands.  fingers,  av.  their  very 2I 
they  were  deleted  in  toto.  39 
Also  of  concern  was  Melville's  inflammatory  hectoring  of  missionaries.  In 
one  of  the  opening  anecdotes  of  Typee,  Tommo  tells  the  'somewhat  amusing'  story  of 
a  missionary  who,  undaunted  by  the  difficulty  of  proselytising  the  Marquesans,  and 
'believing  much  in  the  efficacy  of  female  influence',  brought  his  white  wife  with  him 
to  the  islands.  Never  before  having  seen  a  white  woman,  the  islanders  initially 
regarded  her  as  a  new  god.  When  reverence  was  eventually  replaced  with  curiosity  as 
to  what  was  behind  the  enshrining  'sacred  veil  of  calico',  the  missionary's  wife  was 
stripped  of  her  clothes.  Discovering  she  was  but  a  mere  woman  beneath  the  fabric, 
the  islanders  contemptuously  informed  her  that  such  'deception'  could  not  continue. 
Because  she  was  not,  Tommo  wryly  explains,  'sufficiently  evangelised'  to  deal  with 
this  or  the  possibility  of  whatever  might  follow,  she  summarily  'forced  her  husband  to 
relinquish  his  undertaking,  and  together  they  returned  to  Tahiti.  "" 
For  obvious  reasons,  many  American  Christians  were  not  as  amused  as 
Tommo  by  such  anecdotes.  This  is  a  'racily-written  narrative',  cries  the  New  York 
Evangelist.  It'abounds  in  praises  of  the  life  of  nature,  alias  savageism,  and  in  slurs 
and  flings  against  missionaries  and  civilization....  We  are  sorry  that  such  a  volume 
eyes,  seem  to  dance  in  their  heads.  In  good  sooth,  they  so  sway  their  floating  forms,  arch  their  necks, 
toss  aloft  their  naked  arms,  and  glide,  and  swim,  and  whirl,  that  it  was  almost  too  much  for  a  quiet, 
sober-minded  young  man  like  myself  (152;  Charvat,  The  Profession  of  Authorship  in  America,  213). 
39  It  is  interesting  to  note,  however,  those  instances  of  indulgence  that  Melville  insisted  on 
keeping.  For  instance,  immediately  following  the  passage  cited  above,  in  a  portion  not  originally 
deleted,  he  continues:  'Alas  for  the  poor  savages  when  exposed  to  the  influence  of  these  polluting 
examples!  Unsophisticated  and  confiding,  they  are  easily  led  into  every  vice,  and  humanity  ww  eeps  over 
the  ruins  thus  remorsely  inflicted  upon  them  by  their  European  civilizers.  Thrice  happy  are  they  who, 
inhahiting  some  yet  undiscovered  island  in  the  midst  of  the  ocean,  have  never  been  brought  into 
contaminating  contact  with  the  white  man.  '  The  implications  of  this  passage  are  stark,  as  Tommo 
appears  to  regard  colonial,  perhaps  even  missionary,  contact,  as  an  implicit  rape.  For  a  similar 
discussion  sec  Melville,  T.  ipee,  123-30. 
a°  \lcI\ille,  IVJ)ee,  6-7. 22 
should  have  been  allowed  a  place  in  the  "Library  of  American  Books.  ""  Though  it 
begins  similarly  -  i.  e.,  'An  apotheosis  of  barbarism.  A  panegyric  on  cannibal 
delights!  An  apostrophe  to  the  spirit  of  savage  felicity!  '-  William  Bourne's  re%  ic\w  in 
the  Christian  Parlor  Magazine  is  a  bit  more  focussed  in  its  attack.  Specifically,  he 
focuses  his  ire  on  the  statements  in  the  book'wherein  the  cause  of  MISSIONS  is 
assailed,  with  a  pertinacity  the  misrepresentation  and  degree  of  hatred,  which  can 
only  entitle  the  perpetrator  to  the  just  claim  of  traducer.  12  A  contemporary  and  friend 
of  Bourne,  Horace  Greeley's  reading  is  similar,  if  more  tempered.  In  his  assessment 
of  Tvpee  and  Omoo,  Melville's  second  book,  he  describes  Melville  as  a'born  genius, 
with  few  superiors  either  as  narrator,  a  describer,  or  a  humorist',  but  one  whose  books 
can  'fairly  be  condemned  as  dangerous  reading  for  those  of  immature  intellects  and 
unsettled  principles.  '  For  Greeley,  while  Melville's  writing  is  elusive  enough  to  avoid 
being  'positively  offensive',  his  'tone  is  bad'.  43 
With  its  sexual  innuendo,  barbs  aimed  at  missionaries  and  'civilised'  colonial 
powers  in  the  South  Seas,  not  to  mention  Melville's  typical  array  of  spelling  gaffes 
and  indecipherable  scribbles,  editorial  revisions  are  hardly  surprising.  "  What  is 
surprising,  however,  is  the  extent  to  which  he  personally  revised  the  American  edition 
tºwwice,  deleting  various  passages  deemed  scandalous,  for  the  sake  of  'wide  & 
41  Watson  G.  Branch,  ed.,  Melville:  The  Critical  Heritage  (London:  Routledge,  1974),  81. 
42  Branch,  Melville,  85-86.  Branch  notes  that  Christian  Parlor  Magazine  was  designed  by  its 
editor,  Reverend  Darius  Mead,  'to  combat  the  irreligious  and  immoral  literature  of  that  day.  ' 
a`  Branch,  Melville,  121-22.  For  a  similar  British  reaction,  see  George  Paston,  At  John 
hlºn-ruv'.  '.  Records  of  a  Literary  Circle,  1843-1892  (London:  John  Murray.  1932),  53. 
as  Elizabeth  Renker  provocatively  deals  with  the  interesting  implications  of  %lel\  ille's  career- 
long  difficulties  with  spelling  and  writing  in  her  excellent  book  Strike  Through  the  Wask:  Herman 
11chville  and  the  Scene  of  Writing.  For  examples  of  Melvillc's  penmanship,  the  Northwestern- 
Newherr\  editions  of  his  \\  ork  include  comprehensi\  e  analyses  of  extant  manuscripts. 23 
permanent  popularity  of  the  work.  ''  William  Charvat  regards  this  interest  in  'public 
taste'  as  a  mark  of  Melville's  burgeoning  professionalism  as  an  author,  and  ultimately 
what  distinguishes  his  first  two  novels  from  most  of  his  others.  "  In  this  way.  as  we 
will  see  in  more  detail  below,  a  certain  ending,  or  desired  deletion,  infringes  and 
irreducibly  alters  his  beginning  as  an  author. 
2.  Melville  and  Self-Destruction 
The  problems  with  Typee  were  always  much  deeper  than  its  editorial  issues. 
Significantly,  many  of  its  readers  refused  even  to  believe  Melville  was  its  author. 
Thinking  his  writing  too  fanciful  and  description  too  vivid  to  be  those  of  a  common 
sailor,  'Herman  Melville'  was,  they  averred,  but  a  character,  a  nom  de  plwne.  4'  Even 
John  Murray  had  accepted  the  manuscript  in  spite  of  his  reservations  that  it  seemed 
more  the  work  of  a  'practised  writer'  than  that  of  an  ordinary  sailor.  "  Apropos  such 
suspicion,  Charvat  points  out  that  this  is  the  only  time  in  his  fiction  that  Melville 
seeks  to  identify  himself  clearly  with  those  'good-for-nothing-tars',  as  he  playfully 
'  Melville,  Correspondence,  31-32.  These  changes,  Howard  suggests,  are  important  not 
simply  because  of  their  effects  on  Typee  alone  but  also  on  Melville's  writing  in  general  (Howard, 
'Historical  Note',  280). 
46  Charvat,  The  Profession  of  Authorship  in  America,  217;  cf.,  3-29.  Until  the  1820s,  with  the 
advent  of  Washington  Irving  and  James  Fenimore  Cooper,  professional,  critically  appreciated 
authorship  in  America  was  a  virtual  impossibility.  Previous  to  this,  the  American  literary  scene 
resembled  that  of  the  British  aristocracy  during  the  reigns  of  Elizabeth  and  James,  in  which  an  author 
was  supported  by  a  patron  and  would  typically  only  sell  a  novel  anonymously.  Charvat  contends  that 
in  order  to  be  considered  professional,  writing  must  be  the  main,  or  at  least  a  prolonged,  financial 
resource  for  the  author  (i.  e.,  no  anonymity).  Additionally,  because  such  writing  is  done  with  the  intent 
of  being  sold  in  an  open  market,  it  is  also  heavily  influenced  by  buyer's  tastes  and  reading  habits.  In 
spite  of  its  imperfections,  Charvat's  definition  is  helpful  in  thinking  about  what  separates  writers  like 
Irving  and  Cooper  from  their  American  predecessors  like  Susannah  Rowson  and  Charles  Brockden 
Brown. 
47  Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  2:  914.  The  London  Spectator's  unsigned  review  comes  close  to 
the  same  conclusion,  but  then  consents  that  because  the  author  was  an  American  sailor  this  doubt  is  in 
fact  unfounded.  Unlike  in  England,  the  review  rationalises,  in  America  there  is  no  disrespect  awaiting 
respectable  young  men  who  choose  to  become  sailors.  Moreover,  the  opportunities  for  education  are 
more  widespread  in  America,  affording  a  'great  familiarity  with  popular  literature  and  a  readier  use  of 
the  pen  than  is  usual  with  classes  of  the  same  apparent  grade  in  England'  (Branch,  Melville,  54). 
48  Melv  ille,  Corr-csponJence,  30-31. 24 
describes  them  in  Tvpee,  who  are  intent  on  marring  an  otherwise  peaceful  sea  journey 
of  'state-room  sailors,  who  make  so  much  ado  about  a  fourteen-days'  passage  across 
the  Atlantic'.  49  In  Omoo,  for  instance,  he  is  a  man  of  education,  in  Mardi,  a 
gentleman;  and  in  Redburn  and  Moby-Dick,  he  is  not  even  the  narrator.  "  There  are, 
however,  several  reasons  one  would  do  well  to  approach  Charvat's  suggestion  with 
caution,  not  least  of  which  being  his  incomplete  assessment  of  the  complexities 
involved  in  ever  at  all  identifying  Melville  as  narrator.  One  might  wonder,  with 
James  Duban,  if  this  common  assessment  actually  'undervalued  the  aesthetic 
dimensions  of  the  work  of  an  artist  who  was  fond  of  creating  personae  and  narrators 
whose  views  ...  cannot  in  every  instance  be  taken  as  "authorial  "'.  51  There  is,  then,  an 
appropriate  coincidence  in  the  fact  that  Melville's  initial  defence  is  not  even  his  own, 
but  that  of  Gansevoort  Melville,  who  writes  to  Murray: 
The  Author  will  doubtless  be  flattered  to  hear  that  his  production 
seems  to  so  competent  a  judge  as  yourself  that  of  a'practised 
writer'  -  the  more  so  as  he  is  a  mere  novice  in  the  art,  having  had  no 
experience;  for  it  is  within  my  personal  knowledge  that  he  has  never 
before  written  either  book  or  pamphlet,  and  to  the  best  of  my  belief  has 
not  even  contributed  to  a  magazine  or  newspaper.  In  regard  to  the 
other  point  to  which  you  allude  I  can  only  give  you  the  assurance  of 
my  full  and  entire  belief  that  the  adventurer,  and  the  writer  of  the 
adventure  are  one  &  the  same  person.  52 
Which  is  to  say,  'Herman  Melville',  the  sailor  cum  author  /  author  cum  sailor  had  only 
just  begun.  53 
49  Melville,  Ti  pee  , 
3. 
50  Charvat,  The  Profession  of  Authorship  in  America,  204,207. 
51  James  Duban,  'Clipping  with  A  Chisel:  The  Ideology  of  Melville's  Narrator's'  Special  Issue 
cof  Texas  Studies  in  Literature  and  Language  31  (1989):  342.  Nevertheless,  even  Duban  appears 
ultimately  to  fall  prey  to  the  same  insatiable  need  for  referential  stability,  «ithout  considering  the 
dynamic,,  of  the  same  'aesthetic  dimensions'  that  make  the  stability  he  assumes  (as  stasis)  impossible. 
52  Leyda,  i/ic  Melville  Log,  199-200. 
53  Gi  msc\  oort's  reply,  it  turns  out,  is  only  part  true.  As  early  as  1839,  M1eI\  ilIc's  'Fragments 
from  a  Writing  Desk'  had  appeared  in  a  local  paper,  the  Democratic  Press  and  l.  cmsingburgh 
\(Ircrri.  crr,  under  the  pseudonym  'L.  A.  V.  ';  later  that  year,  the  same  paper  also  published  'The  Death 25 
And  yet,  but  a  mere  six  years  later,  Melville  would  already  sense  what  he 
regarded  as  his  imminent  demise.  In  a  much-quoted,  professionally  disillusioned 
letter  to  Nathaniel  Hawthorne  he  writes: 
I  am  like  one  of  those  seeds  taken  out  of  the  Egyptian  Pyramids, 
which,  after  being  three  thousand  years  a  seed  and  nothing  but  a  seed, 
being  planted  in  English  soil,  it  developed  itself,  grew  to  greennness, 
and  then  fell  to  mould.  ... 
I  feel  that  I  am  now  come  to  the  inmost  leaf 
of  the  bulb,  and  that  shortly  the  flower  must  fall  to  the  mould.  " 
Five  months  later,  in  his  final  letter  before  Hawthorne  moved  from  nearby  Pittsfield, 
Massachusetts,  Melville  even  goes  so  far  as  to  absolve  the  former  of  any  obligation  to 
reply,  due  to  the  possibility  that'if  you  do  answer  it,  and  direct  it  to  Herman  Melville, 
you  will  missend  it  for  the  very  fingers  that  now  guide  this  pen  are  not  precisely 
the  same  that  just  took  it  up  and  put  it  on  this  paper'.  55  How  are  we  to  understand  this 
convergence  of  beginning  and  ending  in  apocalyptic  annihilation,  whereby  the  true 
torment  of  life  is  its  natural  desire  for  an  ending  that  can  only  ever  emerge  from  the 
impossibility  of  ever  actually  experiencing  this  ending  as  such?  Nathaniel  Hawthorne 
in  his  English  Notebooks  best  describes  the  growing  intensity  of  his  former 
neighbour's  ambivalent  preoccupation: 
Melville,  as  he  always  does,  began  to  reason  of  Providence  and 
futurity,  and  of  everything  that  lies  beyond  human  ken,  and  informed 
me  that  he  had'pretty  much  made  up  his  mind  to  be  annihilated';  but 
still  he  does  not  seem  to  rest  in  that  anticipation;  and,  I  think,  will 
never  rest  until  he  gets  hold  of  a  definite  belief.  It  is  strange  how  he 
persists  -  and  has  persisted  ever  since  I  knew  him  in  wandering  to- 
Craft',  under  the  pseudonym  'Harry  the  Reefer'  (Herman  Melville,  The  Piazza  Tales  and  Other  Prose 
Pieces,  1839-1860,  in  The  Writings  of  Herman  Melville  [eds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G. 
Thomas  Tanselle;  vol.  9;  Evanston  and  Chicago:  Northwestern  University  Press  and  The  Newberry 
Library,  1987],  191-204,424-27).  All  the  same,  it  seems  highly  unlikely  that  Gansevoort  would  risk 
his  rising  reputation  in  the  diplomatic  community  for  the  sake  of  his  younger  brother's  unproven 
writing  career.  And  NNhile  it  is  improbable  that  he  knew  nothing  about  Mclville's  previous  publications, 
for  indeed  Nick  ille  had  sent  him  a  copy  of  the  paper  with  the  first  piece  (though  he  did  not  explain  the 
pseudonym),  Ganscvoort  either  forgot  these  early  \vritings,  or  simply  regarded  them  as  insignificant 
attempts  of  a  callow  t\\cnty-year-old.  Cf.,  Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  1:  85. 
"  Mely  ill  c.  Correspondence,  193. 
Si  Melville,  Correspondence,  213. 26 
and-fro  over  these  deserts,  as  dismal  and  monotonous  as  the  sand  hills 
amid  which  we  were  sitting.  He  can  neither  believe,  nor  be 
comfortable  in  his  unbelief;  and  he  is  too  honest  and  courageous  not  to 
try  to  do  one  or  the  other.  If  he  were  a  religious  man,  he  would  be  one 
of  the  most  truly  religious  and  reverential;  he  has  a  very  high  and  noble 
nature,  and  better  worth  immortality  than  most  of  us.  " 
Melville,  as  it  were,  cannot  truly  begin  without  somehow  ending,  and  yet  neither  can 
he  come  to  his  end  without  beginning  once  again. 
Importantly,  Melville's  dialecticism  stands  opposed  to  the  modern 
phenomenological  understanding  of  death  and  apocalypse.  As  Heidegger  famously 
points  out  a  century  later,  'Dying  is  not  an  event,  [but]  a  phenomenon  to  be 
understood  existentially.  "'  As  such,  the  'being-towards-death'  that  identifies  an 
individual  as  uzt  i,  i  liviclual  is  an  impossible  gift  and  destination,  for  as  Derrida  adds, 
'every  relation  to  death  is  an  interpretive  apprehension  and  a  representative  approach 
to  death.  "'  Unwrapping  this  'gift  of  death',  we  end  up  only  playing  with  its  bows  and 
strings.  '[O]ne  never  dies  now',  the  phenomenologist  whispers  from  beyond  the 
grave,  for  'one  always  dies  later,  in  the  future  -  in  a  future  that  is  never  actual,  that 
cannot  come  except  when  everything  will  be  over  and  done'.  59  In  this  perspective,  the 
grave  matters  because  the  'beyond'  is  within,  rendering  the  Subject  forever  separated, 
from  its  beginning  and  end.  " 
The  dialectic  of  Melville's  beginning  and  ending,  though,  is  not  simply  that  of 
56  Nathaniel  Hawthorne,  The  English  Notebooks  (ed.  Randall  Stewart;  New  York:  Russell  & 
Russell,  1941),  432-33. 
57  Martin  Heidegger,  Being  and  Time  (trans.  John  Macquarrie  and  Edward  Robinson;  Ne 
York:  Harper  and  Row,  1962),  284. 
sR  Jacques  Derrida,  The  Gift  of  Death  (trans.  David  Wills;  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago 
Press,  1995),  45.  Notably,  Derrida's  title,  The  Gift  of  Death  [Donner  la  mort,  ],  equivocates  between  the 
ordinary  meaning  ascribed  to  donner,  'to  give',  and  the  idiom,  'to  put  to  death'  (as  in  se  donner  la  mart, 
'to  commit  suicide'). 
59  Maurice  Blanchot,  The  Space  of  Literature  (trans.  Ann  Smock;  Lincoln:  Uni\  ersity  of 
Nebraska  Press.  1982),  164-65. 
'0  Maurice  Blanchot.  Fa«v-  Pas  (Paris:  Gallimard,  1943),  35. ,7 
a  strict  circularity,  and  thus  not  reliant  on  phenomenologically  derived  notions  of 
presence.  Moreover,  neither  is  it  indicative  of  a  commonplace  wholeness  or  Absolute, 
whereby  beginning  and  ending  require  each  other  to  become  themselves.  In  the 
words  of  Slavoj  Zizek: 
According  to  the  standard  doxa,  the  telos  of  the  dialectical  process  is 
the  absolute  form  that  abolishes  any  material  surplus.  If,  howe\  cr,  this 
is  truly  the  case  ... 
how  are  we  to  account  for  the  fact  that  the  Result 
effectively  throws  us  back  into  the  whirlpool,  that  it  is  nothing  but  the 
totality  of  the  route  we  had  to  travel  in  order  to  arrive  at  the  Result'.  `'  ' 
As  such,  and  a  point  too  seldom  sufficiently  appreciated  or  explored  by  the 
phenomenological  tradition,  the  power  of  dialecticism  does  not  lie  in  the  hegemony  of 
its  self-reflective  completion  but  in  the  creative  imperative  of  its  inherent  / 
constitutive  failure.  As  such,  insofar  as  the  stable,  reflective  differentiation  between 
beginning  and  ending  threatens  to  radically  blur  beyond  all  redemption,  the 
assumption  of  a  correspondent  (i.  e.,  Platonic)  or  analogous  (i.  e.,  neo-Platonic) 
identification  of  self,  even  as  one  divided  from  the  impossible  experience  of  its  own 
death  (and  thus  as  a  'divided  self),  becomes  increasingly  problematic. 
Realising  this,  at  least  on  some  level,  Melville  pens  a  stammering  postscript  in 
his  valedictory  letter  to  Hawthorne: 
I  can't  stop  yet.  If  the  world  was  entirely  made  up  of  Magians,  I'll  tell 
you  what  I  should  do.  I  should  have  a  paper-mill  established  at  one 
end  of  the  house,  and  so  have  an  endless  riband  of  foolscap  rolling  in 
upon  my  desk;  and  upon  that  endless  riband  I  should  write  a  thousand 
a  million  billion  thoughts,  all  under  the  form  of  a  letter  to  you. 
The  divine  magnet  is  in  you,  and  my  magnet  responds.  Which  is  the 
biggest?  A  foolish  question  -  they  are  One.  62 
As  we  will  see,  this  unified  'One',  the  bedrock  of  a  metaphysically  stable  Absolute 
identity,  is  for  Melville  always  an  irreducibly,  and  thus  ironically,  Sisyphean  striving. 
61  Slavoj  2i2ek,  Tarrying  With  the  Negative:  Kant,  Hegel,  and  the  Critique  of  Ideology 
(Durham:  Duke  Universit\  Press.  1993),  156. 
1'2  N1c1\'ille,  Correspondence,  213. 28 
Indeed,  the  dramatic  /  tragic  implications  of  this  constitutive  failure  and  irony  are 
particularly  evident  in  the  debates  concerning  the  authenticity  of  Tvpee. 
3.  A  'Straitforward'  Presentation 
In  spite  of  its  general  popularity,  most  mid-nineteenth-century  American  and 
British  critics  considered  fiction  a  low  and  potentially  dangerous  art  form,  due  to  its 
meretricious  degradation  of  fact: 
The  infusion  of  romance  into  history  cannot,  we  think,  but  have  a  bad 
effect  on  the  reader,  by  rendering  the  dull  matter  of  fact  of  the  latter, 
tasteless  and  spiritless,  in  comparison  with  the  piquant  extravagance  of 
the  adulterated  mass,  and  weakening  at  the  same  time  that  salutary 
distinction,  which  the  mind  should  always  preserve  between  truth  and 
falsehood.  The  imagination  ought  not  to  be  pampered  thus,  at  the 
expense  of  the  other  faculties.  63 
The  imagination  provoked  by  fiction,  Samuel  Miller  warns,  poses  a  redoubtable 
danger  to  the  individual  and  society  because  it  has  'a  tendency  too  much  to  engross 
the  mind,  to  fill  it  with  artificial  views,  and  to  diminish  the  taste  for  more  solid 
reading.  '  Such  thoughts  are  actually  counterfeit,  he  warns,  and  will  only  'cheat  it  [the 
" 
mind]  of  substantial  enjoyment.  "  Therefore,  lest  one  be  foolish  enough  to  desire  such 
mental  and  spiritual  privation,  admonishes  the  Reverend  James  Gray,  one  should 
exercise  utmost  caution  'against  ever  making  the  characters  of  romance  a  standard  by 
which  to  judge  character  in  real  life.  "-`  To  Melville's  palpable  consternation,  the 
°'  American  Quarterly  Review  (1846):  46;  qtd.  Michael  Davitt  Bell,  The  Development  of 
American  Romance:  The  Sacrifice  of  Relation  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press.  1980),  20.1  am 
especially  indebted  to  Michael  Bell's  The  Development  of  American  Romance  and  Philip  Gura's  The 
lt'isdoin  of  11'ords:  Language,  Theology.  and  the  Literature  in  the  ;  'evv  England  Renaissance 
(Middletown,  Conn.:  Wesleyan  University  Press,  1981)  for  guiding  me  to  the  writings  of  Samuel 
Miller  and  likeminded  adherents  to  Scottish  'Common  Sense'  philosophy. 
°'  Samuel  Miller,  Brief  Retrospect  of  the  Eighteenth  Century  (vol.  2:  New  York:  B.  Franklin, 
1970),  179.176. 
Qtd.  Terence  Martin,  The  Instructed  Vision:  Scottish  Common  Sense  Philosophy  and  the 
Origin  of  . 
1mcrwan  Fiction  [Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1961),  67. 29 
flourishes  of  his  self-styled  'Romance  of  Real  Life'  proved  an  all  too  easy  target  for 
the  purveyors  of  the  day's  critical  opinion.  "  Although  its  reviews  were  generally  %  er} 
positive  and  in  line  with  his  novel's  overall  popularity  with  readers,  those  reviews  that 
were  not  favourable  to  Melville's  willingness  to  mix  fact  and  fiction  were  vociferous 
and  malignant  enough  to  raise  as  much  (if  not  more)  concern  than  those  that 
bemoaned  the  offensiveness  of  this  mixture's  actual  content.  67 
Tellingly,  London's  Literary  Gazette  chided  other  reviewers  who  treated  Tv  pee 
as  'real  and  authentic',  suggesting  instead  that  they  had  been  duped  by  Melville's  April 
Fool's  joke.  68  If  Melville  was  joking,  however,  he  certainly  was  not  the  one  laughing. 
On  the  contrary,  his  initial  public  reaction  in  the  21  April  1846  issue  of  the  Albany 
Argi,  s  is  notable  first  for  its  ambiguity,  as  it  is  altogether  unclear  whether  the 
newspaper  is  quoting  or  paraphrasing  him  when  it  reports: 
The  author  desires  to  state  to  the  public,  that  TYPEE  is  a  true  narrative 
of  events  which  actually  occurred  to  him.  Although  there  may  be 
moving  events  and  hairbreadth  escapes,  it  is  scarcely  more  strange  than 
such  as  happens  to  those  who  make  their  home  on  the  deep.  69 
One  month  later,  his  blank  face  proved  to  be  but  a  mask.  In  response  to  a  review  in 
the  17  April  1846  Morning  Courier  and  New-York  Enquirer  that  Melville  regarded  as 
especially  obnoxious  and  malicious,  70  he  donned  the  name  'Alexander  Bradford'  and 
66  Melville,  Correspondence,  55.  Cf.,  G.  Harrison  Orians,  'Censure  of  Fiction  in  American 
Romances  and  Magazines,  1789-1810,  '  Publication  of  the  Modern  Language  Association  52  (1937): 
195-214.  For  the  British  side  of  the  same  debate,  see  J.  M.  S.  Tompkins,  The  Popular  Novel  in 
England  1770-1800  (London:  Constable,  1932),  210-17. 
67  For  positive  and  negative  reactions  to  Tvpee,  see  Hugh  W.  Hetherington,  Melville's 
Reviewers:  British  and  American  1846-1891  (Chapel  Hill:  University  of  North  Carolina  Press,  1961), 
20-65;  and  Branch,  Melville,  3-12,53-89. 
68  Melville,  Correspondence,  86. 
69  Melville,  Correspondence,  35. 
'0  Tepee  ww  as,  according  to  this  review  in  all  essential  respects....  a  fiction,  -a  piece  of 
Munchausenism,  -  from  beginning  to  end.  It  may  be  that  the  author  visited,  and  spent  some  time  in 
the  Marquesas  Islands 
... 
But  ý\c  ha\e  not  the  slightest  confidence  in  any  of  the  details,  while  many  of 
the  incidents  narrated  are  utterly  incredible.  We  might  cite  numberless  instances  of  this  monstrous 
exaggeration;  but  no  one  can  read  a  dozen  pages  of  the  book  without  detecting  them.  This  would  be  a 30 
sent  the  paper  an  article  defending  the  good  name  of'Herman  Melville'.  -'  Although 
the  article  was  never  published  and  was  ultimately  lost,  'Bradford'  lives  on  in  an 
accompanying  letter: 
I  have  endeavored  to  make  it  appear  as  if  written  by  one  who  had  read 
the  book  &  beleived  [sic]  it  -&  moreover  -  had  been  as  much 
pleased  with  exactly  the  right  sort  of  thing.  The  fact  is,  it  was  rather  an 
awkward  undertaking  any  way  -  for  I  have  not  sought  to  present  my 
own  view  of  the  matter  (which  you  may  be  sure  is  straitforward  [sic] 
enough)  but  have  only  presented  such  considerations  as  would  be  apt 
to  suggest  themselves  to  a  reader  who  was  acquainted  with,  &  felt 
freindly  [sic]  toward  the  author.  " 
To  aid  his  defence,  Melville  once  again,  as  it  were,  returns  to  the  water.  As  we  have 
already  seen,  however,  his  intentions  remain  far  from  obvious.  In  an  unfortunate 
misspelling,  Melville  here  plunges  beneath  the  'strait'  that  he  feels  best  describes  his 
'own  view  of  the  matter',  in  such  a  way  that  it  is  not  simply  his  own  view  but  also  that 
of  'Bradford'. 
Even  the  purported  verification  of  TN  pee's  truth,  and  thus  also  the  truth  of 
Melville,  is  watered  down  by  ambiguity.  At  first,  unequivocal  vindication  seemed  at 
hand  when  Richard  Tobias  Greene  wrote  to  the  Buffalo  Commercial  Advertiser 
claiming  to  be  the  same  'Toby'  who  had  abandoned  Tommo  (or,  so  the  argument  goes, 
Melville),  and  who  the  latter  believed  had  been  killed  by  island  natives.  73  'I  am  the 
true  and  veritable  "Toby,  "  yet  living',  he  writes,  'and  I  am  happy  to  testify  to  the  entire 
matter  to  be  excused,  if  the  book  were  not  put  forth  as  a  simple  record  of  actual  experience.  It 
professes  to  give  nothing  but  what  the  author  actually  saw  and  heard.  It  must  therefore  be  judged,  not 
as  a  romance  or  a  poem,  but  as  a  book  of  travels,  -  as  a  statement  of  facts:  -  and  in  this  light  it  has,  in 
our  judgment,  no  merit  whatever  ... 
'  (Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  1:  21  1-12). 
'1  In  reality,  Alexander  Bradford  was  the  author  of  American  Antiquities  and  Researches  into 
the  Origin  and  History  of  the  Red  Race,  as  well  as  a  former  classmate  and  a  friend  of  Nlelville's  older 
brother,  Ganse\oort  Mlelville,  and  had  agreed  to  the  ruse. 
\Icl\  ille,  Correspondence,  37-38. 
73  McIv  ille.  l  vpec.  106-09. ;l 
accuracy  of  the  work,  so  long  as  I  was  with  Melville.  "  Melville's  letter  to  John 
Murray  in  the  wake  of  this  revelation  is  suggestive: 
I  have  to  inform  you  that  'Toby'  who  figures  in  my  narrative  has  come 
to  life  tho'  I  had  long  supposed  him  to  be  dead.  I  send  you  by  this 
steamer  several  pages  ...  containing  allusions  to  him.  Toby's 
appearance  has  produced  quite  a  lively  sensation  here  and'Truth  is 
stranger  than  Fiction'  is  in  every  body's  mouth.  -  In  Buffalo  where  he 
"turned  up"  the  public  curiosity  was  so  great  that  "Toby"  was  induced 
to  gratify  it  by  publishing  the  draught  of  a  letter  which  he  had 
originally  sent  to  me.  This  is  not  the  letter,  however,  which  appears  in 
the  papers  I  send  you.  -I  was  sorry  for  this  on  some  accounts,  but  it 
could  not  be  helped.  75 
Whether  Melville's  disappointment  is  directed  toward  the  publishing  of  Greene's 
letter,  or  to  the  fact  that  he  could  not  send  it  himself  to  Murray  for  publication,  is, 
once  again,  unclear.  Subsequently,  both  Greene's  letter  to  the  Buffalo  newspaper  and 
the  story  of  his  fate  on  the  island  were  heavily  reprinted,  whereas  Melville's 
addendum,  'The  Story  of  Toby',  was  almost  completely  ignored.  76  That  Melville  was 
even  pushing  his  own  version  of  events  cannot  help  but  to  compel  one  to  regard  this 
as  yet  another  instance  of  Melville's  deep  ambivalence  about  the  difference  between 
'truth'  and  'fiction'. 
As  one  might  have  expected,  John  Murray  remained  unconvinced  by 
Melville's  'straitforward'  presentation  of  truth.  While  he  accepted  Melville's 
addendum,  Murray  refused  to  incorporate  it  into  the  revised,  tamer  edition  of  Typee, 
and  published  it  instead  as  a  short  pamphlet.  Toby's  existence  was  verification 
7'  Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  1:  220;  Melville,  Correspondence,  578-79. 
75  MclviIIe,  Correspondence,  5  5. 
76  For  Greene's  letter  to  Melville,  see  Melville,  Correspondence,  579-84.  In  an  unfortunately 
lost  letter,  Greene  would  later  demand  a  share  of  Melville's  profits  for  Tepee.  He  soon  thereafter, 
though,  recanted  it  as  a  'cursed  letter',  pointing  out  that  he  did  not  compose  it,  but  merely  folloýýed  the 
lead  of  his  persuasive  friends.  He  concludes  instead:  'I  find  on  consideration  that  I  have  no  right  to  any 
such  thing.  You  must  my  dear  friend  forgive  and  forget  all,  as  an  old  ship-mate  and  friend,  you  must 
remember  human  nature  is  liable  to  err.  I  am  heartily  sorry.  that  I  e\er  penned  that  infernal  scra\%1' 
088). 32 
enough  for  that  story  alone,  he  argued,  but  not  for  Tvpee  as  a  whole.  Consequently, 
Murray  once  more  insisted  that  Melville  provide  'documentary  evidence'  of  his  time 
on  the  Marquesas  Islands.  Of  course  the  story  from  this  point  is  by  now  predictable. 
Such  a  request,  Melville  sniffs  contemptuously  in  his  response,  is  'indescribably 
vexatious',  for  only  a  'parcel  of  blockheads'  would  now  dare  question  his  book's 
veracity.  "  According  to  Melville,  the  'resurrection  of  Toby'  was  quintessential, 
irrefutable  proof  of  his  book's  truth;  not  only  was  no  other  proof  necessary,  there  was 
nothing  else  available.  '  Knowing  that  Murray  would  not  agree,  Melville's 
exasperation  is  increasingly  obvious  as  he  continues  his  letter.  Indeed,  exasperation 
leads  to  desperation,  as  exemplified  by  Melville's  curious  array  of  collected  evidence: 
a  daguerreotype  of  Greene,  a  lock  of  Greene's  hair,  and  an  unanswered  application  to 
the  owners  of  the  Acrtsh,  u't  for  proof  of  Melville's  and  Greene's  desertion.  79  The 
'documentary'  verification  Murray  seeks,  though,  Melville  insists,  is  simply 
impossible.  By  the  end  of  his  letter,  he  is  so  vexed  that  his  pen  is  literally  quaking  in 
a  panic.  In  his  psychosomatic  scrawl,  and  rushing  to  beat  the  day's  posting  deadline, 
Melville  subsumes  himself  and  his  evidence  in  the  written  page:  'Typee  however  must 
at  last  be  beleived  [sic]  on  its  own  account  they  [Americans]  beleive  [sic]  it  here 
now  -a  little  touched  up  they  say  but  trite.  "'  Not  surprisingly,  John  Murray 
remained  unconvinced. 
When  the  same  dispute  emerged  regarding  Omoo,  and  was  accompanied  by 
Melville's  growing  disappointment  at  the  money  he  was  receiving  from  Murray,  his 
77  Melville,  Correspondence,  65. 
79  Melville,  Correspondence,  55.  Cf.,  Melville's  letter  to  Evert  Duyckinck:  'Seriously,  Llv 
Dear  Sir,  this  resurrection  of  Toby  from  the  dead  -  this  strange  bringing  together  of  two  such  places 
as  Typee  and  Buffalo,  is  really  very  curious.  -  It  can  not  but  settle  the  question  of  the  book's 
genuineness'  (50). 
79  Melville,  C'orr-c°sj  ondence.  65-66. 
80  Melville,  Correspondence.  65-66. fin 
sudden  transformation  whilst  writing  his  third  novel,  Mardi,  is  not  without  reason. 
The  first  salvo  of  this,  Melville's  'virtual  declaration  of  literary  independence',  is 
openly  expressed  in  his  response  to  Murray  on  25  March  1848:  R' 
To  be  blunt:  the  work  I  shall  next  publish  will  in  downright  earnest 
[sic]  a  "Romance  of  Polynisian  [sic]  Adventure"  -  But  why  this?  The 
truth  is,  Sir,  that  the  reiterated  imputation  of  being  a  romancer  in 
disguise  has  at  last  pricked  me  into  a  resolution  to  show  those  who  may 
take  any  interest  in  the  matter,  that  a  real  romance  of  mine  is  no  Typee 
or  Omoo,  and  is  made  of  different  stuff  altogether.  '' 
His  new  direction  established,  Melville  concludes  his  letter  with  a  flat  response  to 
Murray's  repeated  requests  of  his  two  previous  books:  'I  will  give  no  evidence'. 
Realising  that  he  had  at  this  point  all  but  destroyed  his  professional 
relationship  with  his  British  publisher  without  having  a  ready  replacement,  Melville's 
prevaricating  follow-up  letter  on  19  June  1848  effectively  attempts  to  stall  for  more 
time.  It  begins  by  acknowledging  Murray's  predisposition  against  romances,  but 
shamelessly  hopes  all  the  same  that  he  will  not  only  make  an  exception  in  Melville's 
case  but  also  considerably  increase  the  amount  of  his  advance!  To  soften  the  blow  of 
his  audacity,  or  at  least  to  keep  Murray  reading,  Melville  goes  on  to  claim  that  he  has 
recently  come  upon  'two  original  documents,  evidencing  the  incredible  fact,  that  I 
have  actually  been  a  common  sailor  before  the  mast  in  the  Pacific'.  Voila,  proof!  The 
truth,  however,  is  far  more  predictable  than  Melville's  best  fiction.  On  the  heels  of 
this  revelation  he  then  bemoans  the  fact  that  even  though  he  at  present  has  somehow 
misplaced  the  most  important  of  the  documents,  his  publisher's  patience  will  be 
rewarded  as  soon  as  he  finds  them.  Of  course,  the  phantom  documents  were  never 
81  Walter  E.  Bezanson,  'Mobr-Dick:  Document,  Drama,  Dream'  MA  Companion  to.  tl(lville 
Studies  (cd.  John  Bryant;  New  York:  Greenwoord  Press.  1986),  176.  Or,  as  \Villiam  Char\at  expresses 
it.  'Sonmetinme  between  January  1  and  March  25.1848,  Melville  \\  as  transformed  from  a  journalist  to  a 
ýý  riter'  (Ch.  arv  at,  Profession  of  Authorship  in  ;1  rnerieo,  217). 
'2  I\1cIN  1  lle,  (correspondence,  106. 14 
found,  if  they  ever  existed,  and  Melville  lost  his  British  publishing  contract  eight 
months  later.  83 
4.  'And  so  I  tell  my  life  to  myself 
At  this  point  it  would  be  deceptively  easy  to  suggest  that  in  hiding  'Melville' 
behind  a  mask,  his  pseudonymous  pen  unwittingly  splits  Melville  himself,  that  is,  by 
virtue  of  his  being  a  deconstructed  'divided  self  or  ideological  'symbolic  fiction',  the 
fullness  of  Melville's  identity  is  structurally  deferred,  and  thus  he  is  never  entirely 
himself.  What  we  find  in  his  use  of  the  'Bradford'  mask,  and  the  ensuing  circularity  of 
'Melville'  actively  characterised  as  both  Subject  and  Object,  is  the  dynamic,  inherent 
excessiveness  of  self-characterisation.  In  the  complex  notion  of  self-becoming 
exemplified  by  Melville's  duplicity,  subjective  autonomy  /  freedom  is  only  ever 
actualised  as  such  in  and  by  a  self-characterisation  that  is  not  capable  of 
encompassing  or  circumscribing  that  which  it  actualises.  In  this  way,  autonomy  / 
freedom,  as  the  irreducible  excess  of  self-characterising  'duplicity',  retroactively 
initiates  its  actualisation  as  autonomy  /  freedom.  "  Such  is,  I  argue,  the  aesthetico- 
theological  intensity  of  self-becoming,  whereby  the  Subject  is  truly  itself,  and  thus 
truly  free,  only  inasmuch  as  it  miraculously  (i.  e.,  retroactively  /  autopoetically)  erupts 
from  the  immanence  of  its  duplicitous  self-characterisation.  " 
If,  as  Frank  Ken-node  has  suggested,  there  is'a  need  in  the  moment  of 
R;  Melville,  Corresppondence,  109,113-15,594. 
"  'Retroactive'  because  it  does  not  at  all  precede  its  actualisation,  but  acti\cly  and 
paradoxically  emerges  front  it. 
85  Though  certainly  related,  this  stands  in  subtle  contrast  to  the  postmodern  pessimism  of  one 
like  Michel  Fouacult,  for  \\hom'identity,  which  wie  attempt  to  support  and  unify  under  a  mask,  is  in 
itself  only  a  parody:  it  is  plural;  countless  spirits  dispute  its  possession,  systems  intersect  and  compete' 
('Nietzsclhc,  Genealogy,  History'  in  Essential  Works  oFFoucault,  I954-I9<<'-I:  Aesthetics.  Method,  and 
I'pistcinolo  v  [\ol.  2:  ed.  James  D.  Faubion;  Ne\\  York:  The  New  Press,  1994],  386). 35 
existence  to  belong,  to  be  related  to  a  beginning  and  to  an  end',  "  all  self-presence  is 
necessarily  a  presentation  whose  'subject'  is  only  ever  'becoming'.  Indeed,  he 
continues,  the  redemptive  self-presentation  of  fiction  would  be  a  necessary  one.  " 
Apropos  Nietzsche's  reflections  in  The  Will  to  Power,  Melville  carries  this  necessity 
to  its  radical,  and  ultimately  theological,  end:  i.  e.,  a  Subject  constructed  in  and  as  a 
narrative  that  is  never  sure  how  to  begin,  whose  'becoming  must  be  explained  without 
recourse  to  final  intentions 
...  must  appear  justified  at  every  moment  (or  incapable  of 
being  evaluated;  which  amounts  to  the  same  thing)'.  R8  Such  is,  we  might  say,  the 
autobiographical  dilemma  of  self-becoming,  whereby  the  Subject  echoes  Nietzsche  in 
Ecce  Homo:  '-  and  so  I  tell  my  life  to  myself"'  In  other  words,  one  cannot  begin  to 
think  about  the  beginning  and  ending  of  the  Subject  without,  at  the  minimum,  a  tacit 
acknowledgement  of  its  autobiographical  structure.  90 
86  Frank  Kermode,  The  Sense  of  An  Ending:  Studies  in  the  Theory  of  Fiction  (New  York: 
Oxford  University  Press,  1967),  4. 
87  Ken-node  goes  on  to  suggest  that  'we  may  call  books  fictive  models  of  the  temporal  world' 
(Kermode,  The  Sense  of  an  Ending,  54).  C.  f.,  '[W]e  experience  the  "fictionalization"  of  history  as  an 
"explanation"  for  the  same  reason  that  we  experience  great  fiction  as  an  illumination  of  a  world  that  we 
inhabit  along  with  the  author.  In  both  we  recognize  the  forms  by  which  consciousness  both  constitutes 
and  colonizes  the  world  it  seeks  to  inhabit'  (Hayden  White,  Tropics  of  Discourse:  Essays  in  Cultural 
Criticism  [Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1978],  99). 
88  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  The  Will  to  Power  (trans.  Walter  Kaufmann  and  R.  J.  Hollingdale;  New 
York:  Random  House,  1967),  377.  For  further  reflections  on  the  construction  of  the  'fictive  self, 
particularly  in  the  wake  of  deconstruction,  note  also  Catherine  Belsey,  Critical  Practice  (London: 
Methuen,  1980),  56-84;  James  A.  Holstein  and  Jaber  F.  Gubrium,  The  Self  We  Live  By:  Narrative 
Identity  in  a  Postmodern  World  (New  York:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000). 
89  Nietzsche,  On  the  Genealogy  of  Morals/  Ecce  Homo,  221. 
90  Insofar  as  this  is  true,  we  can  affirm  Derrida's  instructive  comment: 
And  since  what  interests  me  today  is  not  strictly  called  literature  or  philosophy,  I'm 
amused  by  the  idea  that  my  adolescent  desire  -  let's  call  it  that  -  should  have  directed 
me  toward  something  in  writing  which  was  neither  the  one  nor  the  other.  What  was 
it?  'Autobiography'  is  perhaps  the  least  inadequate  name,  because  it  remains  for  me 
the  most  enigmatic,  the  most  open,  even  today  (Jacques  Derrida,  "'This  Strange 
Institution  Called  Literature":  An  Interview  with  Jacques  Derrida'  in  Acts  of 
Literature  /Jacques  Derrida  [ed.  Derek  Attridge;  trans.  Geoffrey  Bennington  and 
Rachel  Bowlby;  New  York:  Routledge,  1992],  34). 
That  is  to  say,  the  redemptive  ambitions  of  fictive  self-presentation  mix  with  those  of  philosophy  and 
aesthetics.  It  is  precisely  in  this  very  conjunction,  I  argue  here,  similar  to  what  Maurice  Blanchot  has 
called  elsewhere  'the  space  of  literature',  that  our  theological  thinking  is  at  all  possible. 36 
Two  experimental  novels  separated  by  more  than  two  centuries  further 
illustrate  the  enigma  of  autobiography  exemplified  by  Melville's  duplicitous  self- 
presentation.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  Laurence  Sterne's  Tristram  Shandy  [  1760], 
where  the  very  possibilities  of  self-presentation  are  put  to  the  test  -  are,  in  fact, 
pressed  to  their  breaking  point  in  the  introductory  story  of  Tristram's  conception. 
Dave  Eggers,  on  the  other  hand,  in  his  recent  'memoir-y  kind  of  thing'.  A 
Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius  [2000],  grapples  with  the  material  question 
of  autobiography  in  his  frustratingly  forestalled,  best-selling  attempt  to  depict  the 
deaths  of  his  father  and  mother  -  deaths  that,  he  feels,  mark  his  own  demise  as 
tragically  immanent  in  his  life  now.  Both  books,  in  their  narratives  of  beginnings  and 
endings,  experience  (and  revel  in)  the  problematic  nature  of  writing  and  reading  these 
very  same  narratives,  and  in  this  way  further  contextualise  our  thinking  about 
Melville's  sense  of  self-becoming  and  duplicity. 
In  attempting  to  tell  the  stories  of  his  own  conception  and  birth,  Tristram 
Shandy  recognises  and  admits  a  certain  debt  to  his  uncle  Toby.  "  Tristram  is,  of 
course,  separated  from  such  events,  and  instead  must  rely  on  Toby's  avuncular 
anecdotes  to  explain,  in  roundabout  fashion,  how  he  came  to  be  called  'Tristram' 
(versus  the  proper  name  intended  by  his  father,  Trismegistus',  which  was  forgotten  by 
the  family's  chambermaid  just  prior  to  the  child's  christening)  as  well  as'son'.  92  His  is, 
in  effect,  that  most  ironic  of  Socratic  confessions:  'I  know  that  I  do  not  know'  -  i.  e., 
')1  Laurence  Sterne,  Tristram  Shandy  (ed.  Howard  Anderson;  New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  &  Co., 
1980),  3. 
`"-  Sterne,  Tristram  Shandy,  207-08.  The  misfortunate  forgetfulness  of  Susannah,  the 
chambermaid,  is  in  stark  contrast  to  the  di\  ine  association  of  the  name  'Trismegistus'  (thrice-greatest] 
\\  ith  the  Egyptian  god  of  know  ledge  and  ww  isdom,  Thoth. 37 
the  infinite,  empty  knowledge  of  one's  ignorance.  93  In  light  of  this  debt  to  his  uncle, 
the  originating,  authorial  ownership  of  Tristram's  conception  remains  a  mystery,  for  it 
is  as  much  (if  not  more)  Toby's  story  as  it  that  of  Tristram.  On  the  one  hand,  Tristram 
needs  Toby  to  fill  in  the  blanks  of  what  he  does  not  and  cannot  know  or  depict;  on  the 
other  hand,  Toby  needs  Tristram  not  only  as  his  anecdote's  physical  referent,  but  also 
for  his  anecdote  to  be  made  known,  inasmuch  as  Tristram  Shandy  (the  novel)  is  itself 
the  autobiography  Tristram  is  attempting  to  write  in  Tristram  Shandy.  Theirs  is,  like 
Melville's  dilemma  of  beginning  and  ending,  a  classic  dialectic  of  uncertain 
originality  and  authority,  as  the  legitimate  claim  of  each  is  constituted  by  its  own 
fundamental  failure  as  such  a  claim  (and,  thus,  its  relation  with  the  other).  Though  he 
claims  the  book  he  is  writing  is  his  'Life  and  Opinions',  Tristram's  'patriarchal' 
position  over  the  text,  his  inseminating  moment,  as  it  were,  is  always  interrupted.  " 
This  is  something  Walter  Shandy,  Tristram's  father,  knows  all  too  well.  A 
slave  to  precision  and  routine,  Mr.  Shandy  had  made  it  a  monthly  routine  ('on  the  first 
Sunday  night  of  every  month  throughout  the  year')  to  wind  by  hand  the  household's 
large  clock  just  prior  to  having  sex  with  his  wife  Elizabeth  -'in  order  ...  to  get  them 
all  out  of  the  way  at  one  time,  and  be  no  more  plagued  and  pester'd  with  them  the  rest 
of  the  month.  i9'  Unbeknownst  to  him,  however,  Mrs.  Shandy  had  developed  an 
93  Plato,  The  Last  Days  of  Socrates  (trans.  Hugh  Tredennick  and  Harold  Tarrant;  rev.  ed.; 
London:  Penguin,  1993),  40-45.  Soren  Kierkegaard  characterises  Socrates'  ironic  subjectivity 
similarly,  as'absolute  infinite  negativity'.  'It  is,  '  he  writes,  'negativity  because  it  negates;  it  is  infinite 
because  it  negates  not  this  or  that  phenomenon;  and  it  is  absolute  because  it  negates  by  virtue  of  a 
higher  which  is  not.  Irony  establishes  nothing,  for  that  which  is  to  be  established  lies  behind  it'  (The 
Concept  of  Irony  [trans.  Lee  M.  Capel;  Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1965],  278,  emphasis 
mine). 
94  Closely  related  to  such  interruption  is  textual  digression,  for  which  Tristram  Shandy  is  most 
famous.  For  example,  see  Tristram's  panegyric  to  digression:  'Digressions,  incontestably,  are  the 
sunshine;  -  they  are  the  life,  the  soul  of  reading;  -  take  them  out  of  this  book  for  instance,  -  you 
might  as  well  take  the  book  along  with  them;  -  one  cold  eternal  winter  would  reign  in  every  page  of 
it;  restore  them  to  the  writer;  -  he  steps  forth  like  a  bridegroom,  -  bids  All  hail;  brings  in  variety,  and 
forbids  the  appetite  to  fail'  (52). 
`''  Sterne,  Tristram  Shandy,  4-5. ;g 
'unhappy  association'  between  her  husband's  monthly  duties,  to  the  extent  that  she 
'could  never  hear  the  said  clock  wound  up,  -  but  the  thoughts  of  some  other  things 
unavoidably  popp'd  into  her  head,  &  lice  tvrsa'.  96  This,  of  course,  leads  Tristram 
to  recount  the  moment  of  his  conception  on  the  first  Sunday  of  March  1718,  where,  in 
a  comic  case  of  coitus  interruptus,  and  to  Mr.  Shandy's  puzzlement,  his  wife  enquired: 
Pray,  my  dear,  quoth  my  mother,  have  you  not  forgot  to  %vind  the 
clock?  -------Good  G----!  cried  my  father,  making  an  exclamation,  but 
taking  care  to  moderate  his  voice  at  the  same  time,  -  Did  ever-  woinan, 
since  the  creation  of  the  world,  interrupt  a  man  with  such  a  silly 
question?  `' 
Tristram's  fears  (inherited  from  his  father)  regarding  the  personal  implications 
of  this  seemingly  nonsensical  question  at  the  moment  of  his  conception  haunt  both  his 
life  and  the  telling  of  his  life's  story.  'I  wish  either  my  father  or  my  mother,  or  indeed 
both  of  them,  as  they  were  in  duty  equally  bound  to  it,  had  minded  what  they  were 
about  when  they  begot  me',  he  laments. 
Well,  you  may  take  my  word,  that  nine  parts  in  ten  of  a  man's  sense  or 
his  nonsense,  his  success  and  miscarriages  in  this  world  depend  upon 
their  motions  and  activity,  and  the  different  tracks  and  trains  you  them 
into;  so  that  when  they  are  once  set  a-going,  whether  right  or  wrong, 
'tis  not  a  halfpenny  matter,  -  away  they  go  cluttering  like  hey-go- 
mad;  and  by  treading  the  same  steps  over  and  over  again,  they 
presently  make  a  road  of  it,  as  plain  and  as  smooth  as  a  garden-walk, 
which  ... 
the  Devil  himself  sometimes  shall  not  be  able  to  drive  them 
off  it.  98 
His  is,  he  concludes,  again  parallel  to  what  we  have  seen  to  be  the  case  of  Melville, 
the  lot  of  a  cursed  man,  whose  'misfortunes  began  nine  months  before  he  ever  came 
into  the  world.  "'  As  such,  should  the  details  of  his  painful,  accidental  circumcision  by 
96  Sterne,  Tristram  Shandv,  5. 
07  Sterne,  Tristram  Shand',  2. 
98  Sterne,  l  ristrain  Shanth,  1-2. 
99  Sterne,  I  ristram  Shunth,  3. ý9 
way  of  a  falling  window  sash  surprise  us?  '°°  Considering  Tristram's  complex 
relationship  with  Toby,  should  we  be  overly  shocked  by  the  latter's  own  wounded 
groin,  'owing  to  a  blow  from  a  stone,  broke  off  by  a  ball  from  the  parapet  of  a  horn- 
work  at  the  siege  of  Namur'?  '°'  Are  not  both  instances  absolutely  appropriate?  The 
wounds  to  male  pride  a  scarred  penis,  an  interrupted  ejaculation  -  bleed  forth  into 
a  loss  of  originating  authority;  or,  in  the  specific  case  of  the  author  here,  Tristram 
Shandy,  the  loss  of  his  proper  name.  Consequently,  the  lament  of  Tristram's  father  for 
his  son  is  equally  applicable  to  his  son's  eponymous  book: 
Unhappy  Tristram!  child  of  wrath!  child  of  decrepitude!  interruption! 
mistake!  and  discontent!  What  one  misfortune  or  disaster  in  the  book 
of  embryotic  evils,  that  could  unmechanize  thy  frame,  or  entangle  thy 
filaments!  which  has  not  fallen  upon  thy  head,  or  ever  thou  camest  into 
the  world  -  what  evils  in  thy  passage  into  it!  What  evils  since!  102 
It  is  enough  for  now  simply  to  suggest  that  Tristram  Shandy's  (and  thus,  too,  Tristram 
Shandv's)  unfortunate  'weaknesses  both  of  body  and  mind,  which  no  skill  of  the 
physician  or  the  philosopher  could  ever  afterwards  have  set  thoroughly  to  rights'  are 
the  problematic,  ostensible  effects  and  emblems  (i.  e.,  'a  foundation  [that]  had  been 
laid')  of  self-presentation.  103  The  surprising  consequence  is  that  such  a  characteristic 
'weakness'  also  marks  both  the  possibility  and  the  impossibility  of  beginning  Tristram 
Shandy,  for  its  reader  and  writer  alike.  '04 
Dave  Eggers's  depiction  of  his  parents'  deaths  proves  to  be  no  less  troubled  a 
too  Sterne,  Tristram  Shandy,  264-65. 
101  Sterne,  Tristram  Shandy,  48  (emphasis  mine). 
102  Sterne,  Tristram  Shandy,  215. 
103  Sterne,  Tristram  Shandv,  3 
10'  Tristram  realises  that  his  text  is  as  broken  as  he,  and  that  its  fragility  is  what  keeps  it  in 
motion,  and  is  its  truth.  He  writes:  'This  is  Nile  ww  ork.  -  For  which  reason,  from  the  beginning  of  this. 
you  see,  I  have  constructed  the  main  ww  ork  and  the  adventitious  parts  of  it  with  such  intersections,  and 
have  so  complicated  and  involved  the  digressive  and  progressive  movements,  one  NN  heel  \N  ithin 
another,  that  the  whole  machine,  in  general,  has  been  kept  a-going;  -  and,  \N  hat's  more,  it  shall  be  kept 
,  t-going  these  forty  `ears.  if  it  pleases  the  fountain  of  health  to  bless  me  so  long  ww  ith  life  and  good 
spirits'  (Sterne.  Tristram  Shandy.  52). 40 
self-presentation.  Viciously  playful,  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius 
revels  in  its  incendiary  tendencies,  exploring  the  fissures  that  make  reading  and 
writing  possible.  For  instance,  of  its  dialogue  Eggers  writes: 
This  has  of  course  been  almost  entirely  reconstructed.  The  dialogue. 
though  all  essentially  true  except  that  which  is  obviously  not  true,  as 
when  people  break  out  of  their  narrative  time-space  continuum  to 
cloyingly  talk  about  the  book  itself  -  has  been  written  from  memory, 
and  reflects  both  the  author's  memory's  limitations  and  his 
imagination's  nudgings.  '°5 
Here,  Eggers  reflects  his  willingness  to  instil  in  his  'true  story'  a  significant  structural 
play  (i.  e.,  a  degree  of'give'  or  'slack'),  whereby  nonfictional  characters  carry  a  latent 
potential  as  fictional  creations.  10' 
Though  in  its  original  hardback  release,  real  names  (and  in  many  cases,  phone 
numbers)  were  used  'to  prove  that  one  could  be  completely  factual,  and  still  tell  a 
story  that  felt  and  read  novelistic,  somewhat  timeless,  at  least  fluid'  some  had  to  be 
changed  when  certain  friends,  those  presumably  more  squeamish  than  Eggers  about 
openly  airing  their  dirty  laundry,  requested  noms  de  guerre.  107  Eggers,  of  course,  is 
savvy  enough  to  recognise  that  nobody  wants  to  show  up  at  a  masquerade  ball  and  be 
the  only  one  in  costume,  so  he  suggests  his  readers  should  also  feel  welcome  to 
change  characters'  names.  In  fact,  he  offers  to  send,  upon  request,  a  digital  copy  of 
the  book  on  a  3.5"  floppy  disk,  suggesting  that  'using  the  search-and-replace  function 
105  Dave  Eggers,  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius  (New  York:  Vintage,  2000),  ix. 
106  Admittedly,  'play'  has  become  for  some  critics,  often  for  very  good  reason,  a  game  whose 
sense  of  novelty  has  been  effectively  played  out  (often  quite  poorly).  My  intention  in  using  it  here  is 
neither  strictly  rehabilitative  or  corrective,  but  mostly  a  resistance  to  the  notion  that  'play'  can  only  c\er 
be  understood  as  a  free,  frivolous  or  pleasurable  postmodern  watchword  that,  in  my  experience,  has  a 
tendency  to  shut  down  far  more  constructive  conversations  than  it  starts. 
107  Da%e  Eggers,  'Mistakes  We  Knew  We  Were  Making:  Notes  Corrections  Clarifications 
C'larificcations.  -1  pp<ologies  Addenda',  Appendix  to  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius,  9.  His 
rationale  for  changing  names  in  the  paperback  edition  is  that  he  had  'lost  my  taste  for  this  sort  of 
courage....  In  a  few  cases,  ww  here  I  had  originally  lashed  out  at  real  people  in  backhanded  ways.  and 
used  their  real  names  in  doing  so,  I  have  removed  or  softened  these  parts,  because  in  the  last  year,  I',.  e 
also,  almost  completely,  lost  my  taste  for  blood'  (12). 41 
your  computer  surely  features,  readers  should  be  able  to  change  all  the  names  within. 
from  the  main  characters  down  to  the  smallest  cameos.  (This  could  be  about  you! 
You  and.  vourr  pals!  )i10R  Which  is  to  say,  the  mask  Eggers  presents  his  reader  is  not 
intended  solely  for  his  book's  characters.  In  a  concession  to  those  readers  who  are 
bothered  by  the  notion  of  reading  a  memoir,  or  perhaps  simply  by  the  idea  of  reading 
his,  Eggers  invites  his  reader'to  do  what  the  author  should  have  done,  and  what 
authors  and  readers  have  been  doing  since  the  beginning  of  time:  PRETEND  IT'S 
FICTION  1.109  However,  not  unlike  the  self-destructive  apocalypticism  at  the  core  of 
the  duplicity  in  Melville's  earliest  correspondence  and  novels,  Egger's  invitation  belies 
the  deathly  excess  that  ultimately  renders  his  text  disturbingly  distended. 
The  nine-page  preface  to  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius  is  but 
one  aspect  of  Eggers'  desperate  attempt  to  stall  writing  about  his  parents'  deaths. 
Because  these  deaths  (especially  that  of  his  mother)  are  the  impetus  for  both  the  story 
he  tells  and  the  fact  that  he  is  telling  it  at  all,  identifying  the  beginning  of  Egger's  self- 
presentation,  as  we  have  seen  in  Melville  and  in  Tristram  Shandy,  is  no  easy  task. 
Prior  to  the  preface,  for  instance,  which  includes  explanatory  notes  and  passages  he 
excluded  from  the  main  text,  his  book  would  seem  to  begin  with  a  one  page  'Rules 
and  Suggestions  for  Enjoyment  of  this  Book'-  wherein,  again  like  Tristram  Shandy, 
Eggers  points  out  sections  of  the  book  that  are  perhaps  more  important  to  read  than 
others,  attesting  to  the  'nice  novella  length'  of  chapters  one  through  four,  and  how  'the 
book  thereafter  is  kind  of  uneven'.  1'  Immediately  following  the  preface,  where  one 
typically  expects  a  book's  'beginning'  to  begin  (is  it  not  normal,  in  fact,  for  many 
108  Eggers,  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius,  xxix-xxv. 
109  Eggers,  ;1  Heartbreaking  lVork  of  Staggering  Genius,  xxiii-xxivý. 
110  l  ugcrs,  /  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius,  vii.  Cf.,  Tristram's  apologies  and 
rationalisations  in  /ristrarn  Shandy  for  his  wanton  digressions  and  tedious  telling  of  details  (Sterne, 
I  ristrum  Shand  Y,  6-7;  cf..  4.203-0  5). 42 
people  to  skip  a  book's  preface,  to  consider  it  superfluous  to  the  work's  actual 
content?  ),  Eggers  unveils  a  table  of  contents,  which  belatedly  includes  the 
aforementioned  'Rules  and  Suggestions'  and  Preface  sections.  Next  is  a  self- 
consciously  rambling  twenty-five-page  Acknowledgements  section,  which  Eggers 
tries  to  explain  in  the  appendix  of  his  memoir's  paperback  edition,  'Mistakes  We 
Knew  We  Were  Making': 
[T]he  Acknowledgements  were  written  before  the  rest  of  the  book,  as 
both  an  organizational  device  and  a  stalling  mechanism.  I  was  not 
looking  forward  to  writing  the  first  chapter,  and  wasn't  sure  if  I  could 
write  those  thereafter,  so  I  had  a  nice  time  fiddling  with  the  front 
matter,  which  came  easily,  and  helped  me  to  shape  the  book  in  my 
head  before  starting  into  it.  ''' 
In  fact,  prior  even  to  the  'Rules  and  Suggestions'  that  precede  the  preface,  the 
ostensible  beginning  of  this  most  ironic  of  novels,  Eggers  goes  so  far  as  to  experiment 
with  the  copyright  page,  where  he  includes,  as  a  supplement  to  the  obligatory  legal 
information  that  details  his  (and  his  publisher's)  textual  ownership,  his  height  and 
weight,  eye  and  hair  colour,  as  well  as  descriptions  of  his  hands,  allergies,  and  sexual 
preference.  "Z 
My  point  here  is  not  to  anathematise  or  applaud  Eggers's  book,  or  to  judge  the 
merits  of  his  sarcastic  revelry  (its  reviewers  have  already  been  quick  enough  to  do 
both).  Moreover,  neither  is  it  to  contradict  his  claim  to  have  included  such  material 
and  played  with  such  structures  simply  'because  doing  so  is  fun.  '  Rather,  apropos  the 
autobiographical  dilemma  of  self-becoming  mentioned  above  in  regard  to  Melville 
IM  Eggers,  'Mistakes  We  Knew  We  Were  Making',  16. 
112  Furthering  the  point  made  above  about  characterization,  Eggers  adds  here:  'This  is  a  work 
of  fiction,  only  in  that  in  many  cases,  the  author  could  not  remember  the  exact  words  said  by  certain 
people,  and  exact  descriptions  of  certain  things,  so  had  to  fill  in  gaps  as  best  he  could.  Otherwise,  all 
characters  and  incidents  and  dialogue  are  real,  are  not  products  of  the  author's  imagination,  because  at 
the  time  of  this  writing,  the  author  had  no  imagination  whatsoe\er  for  those  sorts  of  things,  and  could 
not  conceive  of  making  uqp  a  story  or  characters'  (Eggers,  A  Heartbreaking  IVork,  copyright  page). 43 
and  Tristram  Shandy,  I  mean  only  to  point  to  the  parallel  implications  of  Eggers's 
difficulty  in  beginning  to  write  his  text  alongside  that  of  his  readers'  difficulty  in 
beginning  to  read  it. 
The  sudden  death  of  Eggers's  parents  made  him  feel  that  he,  like  Melville,  was 
marked  for  an  imminent  death;  that  death  was,  in  fact,  already  inside  him,  biding  its 
time.  Eggers  relays  this  notion  in  his  Acknowledgements  section,  under  the  section 
labeled'The  Aspect  Having  To  Do  With  (Perhaps)  Inherited  Fatalism': 
This  part  concerns  the  unshakeable  feeling  one  gets,  one  thinks,  after 
the  unthinkable  and  unexplainable  happens  -  the  feeling  that,  if  this 
person  can  die,  and  that  person  can  die,  and  this  can  happen  and  that 
can  happen 
...  well,  then,  what  exactly  is  preventing  everything  from 
happening  to  this  person,  he  around  whom  everything  else 
happened?  13 
Consequently,  not  only  is  he  convinced,  as  he  says  several  times  throughout  the 
memoir,  that  he  probably  already  has  AIDS,  that  disease,  any  disease,  is  almost 
undoubtedly  already  killing  him,  but  also  that  'each  and  every  time  an  elevator  door 
opens,  there  will  be  standing,  in  a  trenchcoat,  a  man,  with  a  gun,  who  will  fire  one 
bullet,  straight  into  [me],  killing  [me]  instantly'.  '"  In  a  perhaps  unconscious  nod  to 
Nietzsche,  with  whom  we  began  thinking  about  the  linkage  of  autobiography  and  self- 
presentation,  Eggers's  memoir  ends  as  appropriately  and  equivocally  as  it  begins. 
That  is  to  say,  in  a  self-destructive  sacrifice  to  his  readers,  the  community  with  whom 
he  wishes  to  identify  and  seek  identity.  '  15 
113  Eggers,  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius,  xxxiii. 
1  14  Eggers,  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius,  xxxiv.  Of  this  fantasy  Eggers  ww  rites: 
'I  have  no  idea  \\hy  I  fear  this,  expected  it  to  happen.  I  even  knew  how  I  would  react  to  this  bullet 
coming  from  the  cIc\ator  door,  what  word  I  would  say.  That  Nord  «as:  Finally'  ('Mistakes  We  Knew 
We  Were  Making',  17). 
1  1`  Cf.,  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  The  Birth  of  Tragedy  and  Other  Writings  (eds.  Raymond  Gruss 
and  Ronald  peirs;  trans.  Ronald  Speirs;  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1999).  In  a  frenzy 
of  modern  Dionysian  prose.  Eggers  devours  himself: 44 
Nevertheless,  as  was  the  case  with  Melville's  desire  for  annihilation,  death  is 
nothing  one  awaits  or  that  arrives.  Although  the  strained  and  digressive  self- 
presentations  (be  it  of  beginnings  and/or  endings)  of  Sterne,  Eggers,  and  Melville  are 
certainly  divided,  this  is  a  far  cry  from  the  too-hastily  announced  'impossiblity'  that  so 
many  continue  to  ascribe  to  subjectivity  -  i.  e.,  as  that  which  is  wholly  other  and 
eternally  deferred.  Though  the  parlance  may  at  first  glance  be  the  same,  my  premise 
is  fundamentally  different.  Namely,  that  the  purportedly  deferred  impossibility  of  the 
author  (and  thus,  we  might  add,  also  the  reader),  the  (still)birth  of  tragedy,  as  it  were, 
is  an  impossibility  that  happens  in  the  active  self-becoming  of  subjective 
characterisation. 
5.  The  Aesthetics  of  Duplicitous  Self-Creation 
The  precipitous  rise  and  fall  of  Melville's  eleven-year  writing  career  has  been 
well-documented,  with  most  biographers  highlighting  the  differences  between  the 
'early  Melville'  of  Typee  and  Omoo,  Melville  as  'truth-seeker'  in  Mardi  and  Moby- 
Dick,  and  Melville  as'truth-denier'  in  Pierre  and  The  Confidence-Man.  16  While  I  do 
not  mean  to  suggest  that  one  should  read  the  all-encompassing  duplicity  of  a  novel 
like  The  Confidence-Man  the  same  way  one  reads  the  (relatively)  more 
Don't  you  know  that  I  am  connected  to  you?  Don't  you  know  that  I'm  trying  to  pump 
blood  to  you,  that  this  is  for  you,  that  I  hate  you  people,  so  many  of  you 
motherfuckers  -  When  you  sleep  I  want  you  never  to  wake  up,  so  many  of  you  I 
want  you  to  just  fucking  sleep  it  away  because  I  only  want  you  to  run  under  with  me 
on  this  sand  like  Indians,  if  you're  going  to  fucking  sleep  all  day  fuck  you 
motherfuckers  oh  when  you're  all  sleeping  so  many  sleeping  I  am  somewhere  on 
some  stupid  rickety  scaffolding  and  I'm  trying  to  show  you  this,  just  been  trying  to 
show  you  this  -  What  the  fuck  does  it  take  to  show  you  motherfuckers,  what  does  it 
fucking  take  what  do  you  want  how  much  do  you  want  because  I  am  willing  and  I'll 
stand  before  you  and  I'll  raise  my  arms  and  give  you  my  chest  and  throat  and  wait, 
and  I've  been  so  old  for  so  long,  for  you,  for  you,  I  want  it  fast  and  right  through  me 
-  Oh  do  it,  do  it,  you  motherfuckers,  do  it  do  it  you  fuckers  finally  finally  finally 
(Eggers,  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius,  436-37). 
116  For  example,  see  Nathalia  Wright,  'Form  and  Function  in  Melville'  Publication  of  the 
Modern  Language  Association  67  (June  1952):  330-340. 45 
straightforward  travel  epic  Typee,  thus  subsuming  Melville's  authorial  beginning  and 
ending,  I  have  sought  in  this  chapter  to  show  that  the  intertwining  of  duplicity  and 
self-presentation  is  not  exclusive  to  his  final  novel.  "'  Indeed,  in  light  of  the  problems 
regarding  autobiographical  self-presentation  highlighted  above,  what  would  it  mean  to 
accept  Typee  (and  thus,  too,  Melville's  inaugural  self-presentation  as  an  author)  as 
Melville  says  we  must:  i.  e.,  on'its  own  account'? 
Where  might  one  begin  this  multitudinous  text,  in  which  the  author  seems  to 
prefer  outside  sources  over  his  own  experiences?  As  Charles  Anderson  notes,  this 
outside  influence  was  so  strong  that  Melville  'almost  habitually  leaned  upon  his 
authorities  even  in  matters  with  which  he  certainly  must  have  had  a  first-hand 
acquaintance.  For  some  reason,  he  preferred  to  work  from  the  descriptions  of 
previous  authors,  which  he  found  ready  at  hand 
...  sometimes  even  retaining  the 
exact  phraseology  of  his  original.  "  18  Melville  copied  so  much,  Anderson  continues, 
that  he  probably  could  have  written  his  alleged  first-person  narrative  of  adventures  on 
the  Marquesas  Islands  without  ever  having  so  much  as  seen  them.  19  Hershel  Parker, 
perhaps  the  most  noted  Melville  scholar  of  the  past  forty  years,  agrees: 
All  in  all,  the  evidence  seems  to  show  that  Melville's  last-minute 
cobbling  was  not  inspired  by  his  publisher  but  by  his  own  desire  to  eke 
117  Edgar  Dryden  comes  to  a  similar  conclusion  in  his  examination  of  Melville's  fictional  form, 
but  the  openness  he  finds  in  Melville's  early  narrators  to  their  outright  fictionalization  of  identity  is 
ultimately  diluted  because  he  unreflectively  begs  the  question.  To  say  that  a  narrator  'fictionalizes  his 
earlier  experience  in  an  attempt  to  define  its  truth  or  meaning  to  himself  and  to  his  reader',  or  that  by 
'turning  his  experience  into  a  story,  he  places  himself  outside  of  that  experience  -  in  effect,  treats  it  as 
though  it  belonged  to  someone  else'  misses  the  evolutionary,  autopoetic  dynamics  in  which  the  nuances 
of  Melville's  later  thinking  revels  (Melville's  Thematics  of  Form:  The  Great  Art  of  Telling  the  Truth 
[New  York:  Knopf,  1968],  35,36-37). 
11K  Charles  Robert  Anderson,  Melville  in  the  South  Seas  (New  York:  Dover,  1939),  146. 
Anderson  is  thinking  specifically  of  Captain  David  Porter's  Journal  of  a  Cruise  Made  to  the  Pacific 
Ocean  in  the  U.  S.  Frigate  Essex,  in  the  Years  1812,1813,  and  1814  [18151,  Charles  S.  Stewart's  A  Visit 
to  the  South  Seas,  in  the  U.  S.  Ship  Vincennes,  During  the  Years  1829  and  1830  [1831],  and  William 
Ellis'  Polynesian  Researches  [1829]  (118-19).  Ina  passage  deleted  from  the  American  revised  edition, 
the  narrator  of  Tepee  admits  having  read  Stewart  and  Ellis,  but  not  Porter  (Melville,  Tvpee,  5-6). 
1  19  Anderson,  Melville  in  the  South  Seas,  166. 46 
out  his  brief  impressions  from  his  four  weeks  among  the  Typeeans 
(rather  than  the  four  months  he  was  claiming),  plundering  sourcebooks 
for  passages  which  could  be  rewritten  as  his  own  experiences.  120 
Although  critics  like  Anderson  and  Parker  resist  charging  Melville  with  outright 
plagiarism,  "'  Elizabeth  Renker  points  out  that  their  defences  'suggest  most  forcefully 
the  felt  presence  of  the  "charge"  rather  than  its  dismissal.  ""  The  anecdotal  fact  that 
Typee's  financial  fortunes  were  significantly  diminished  by  the  widespread  British 
distribution  of  Routledge's  rogue  version  is  but  one  of  the  parallels  to  Melville's  own 
textual  piracy.  "'  Indeed,  it  was  also  in  Britain  that  the  manuscript  of  Omoo  was 
seized  as  contraband  by  a  Customs'  Officer  while  in  en  route  to  John  Murray  for  final 
approval,  'under  the  pretence  of  its  being  an  American  reprint  of  an  English  work.  '  124 
Like  a  counterfeit  coin,  Melville's  text,  from  the  beginning,  had  been  manufactured  by 
and  circulated  in  a  network  of  impropriety  that  inevitably  he  could  not  completely 
control. 
120  Hershel  Parker,  'Evidences  for  "Late  Insertions"  in  Melville's  Works'  Studies  in  the  Novell 
(1975):  413. 
121  'Melville  transformed  his  borrowings  with  such  skill  that  the  charge  of  plagiarism  is 
inadmissible',  Howard  Vincent  concludes  (The  Trying-Out  of  'Moby-Dick'  [Kent,  Oh.:  Kent  State 
University  Press,  1980],  6).  Gordon  Roper,  responding  to  similar  'borrowings'  in  Melville's  second 
book,  Omoo,  argues  that  they'were  not  those  of  a  plagiarist'.  Rather,  they  were  simply  intended  to  fill 
in  the  gaps  of  his  first-hand  experience  ('Historical  Note'  in  Omoo:  A  Narrative  of  Adventures  in  the 
South  Seas  in  The  Writings  of  Herman  Melville  [eds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas 
Tanselle;  vol.  2;  Evanston  and  Chicago:  Northwestern  University  Press  and  The  Newberry  Library, 
1968],  325). 
122  Renker,  Strike  Through  the  Mask,  3.  In  her  chapter  on  plagiarism  in  Typee,  Renker 
explores  Melville's  self-consciousness  about  his  'borrowings'  and  how  this  haunts  him  throughout  the 
book  in  the  form  of  tattooing  (1-23). 
123  See  Howard,  'Historical  Note,  297-98;  Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  2:  921.  Despite  its  general 
popularity,  Typee  was  not  an  overwhelming  bestseller  in  either  America  or  Britain.  Though  Melville 
made  $2,000  from  the  book,  this  came  over  a  span  of  forty-one  years,  leaving  Melville  in  1846-47 
scrambling  to  make  ends  meet.  Even  after  he  was  able  to  secure  a  more  lucrative  publishing  contract 
-  at  least  until  the  financial  failure  of  Moby-Dick  in  1851  and  the  complete  fallout  with  his  readers  and 
publishers  a  year  later  -  and  he  was  making  more  money  than  most  other  American  authors  of  the 
day,  Melville  had  a  propensity  for  taking  on  ill-advised  debt.  For  additional  reading  on  Melville's 
income,  see  Charvat,  The  Profession  of  Authorship  in  America,  190-203. 
124  Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  1:  236-37. 47 
Moreover,  when  Anderson  suggests  that  one  should  not  be  too  critical  of 
Melville,  because  his  'borrowings'  are  merely  the  manifestations  of  a  young  man 
'conscious  of  his  own  inexperience  as  a  writer',  "'  he  fails  to  fully  appreciate  that  the 
conscious  inexperience  that  so  distinguishes  the  beginning  of  Melville's  writing  career 
is  itself  manifested  by  the  self-destructive  appropriation  of  disparate  voices.  126  For 
Melville,  as  seen  above,  when  the  consistent  point  of  contention  is  that  of  one's 
character,  be  it  a  question  of  one's  morality  or  one's  identity,  the  true  authorial  victory 
(i.  e.,  that  of  self-assertion)  is  always  in  the  form  of  a  self-violence.  That  is  to  say,  it  is 
not  merely  that  Melville  somehow  furtively  benefits  from  this  violence.  On  the 
contrary,  the  authorial  'victory'  is  essentially  Pyrrhic  in  the  sense  that  while  it  has 
always  already  been  won,  i.  e.,  the  Subject  is  asserted  as  'Subject',  it  is  won 
retroactively,  and  thus  by  virtue  of  the  inherent  excess  of  a  duplicitous  self- 
characterisation.  As  such,  unthinkable,  impossible  freedom  erupts  from  and  disrupts 
the  closed  circularity  of  self-assertion  in  the  guise  of  self-destructiveness  (and  vice 
versa),  but  also  sustains  the  repressive  desire  for  such  closure.  What  we  find  in 
Melville,  in  other  words,  is  the  problematic  self-becoming  of  the  modem  Subject.  It 
is  precisely  in  this  relation  of  subjectivity  to  masques  and  masquerades,  I  argue,  that 
Melville  exemplifies  the  profound  possibilities  of  recasting  theology  in  the  aesthetic 
light  of  its  self-characterisation  /  autopoesis. 
That  Melville's  creative  /  poetic  disingenuousness  is  evident  as  early  as  Tvpee 
offers  then  salient  credence  to  Warwick  Wadlington's  suggested  'inchoate'  affinities 
125  Anderson,  Melville  on  the  South  Seas,  126. 
i2(  John  Bryant  notes  that  Melville's  dilemma,  and  what  I  would  contend  makes  it  peculiarly 
self-destructive,  insofar  as  this  is  possible,  is  that  'he  was  publishing  false  goods  and  knew  it'  (,  t/clti'ille 
and  Repose.  -  The  Rhetoric  of  Humor  in  the  American  Renaissance  [\e\\  York:  Oxford  University 
Press,  1993],  p.  132). 48 
between  Melville's  first  and  last  novel.  'Z'  In  this  way,  the  difference  between  the  two 
books  of  faith  that  frame  Melville's  beginning  and  ending,  "'  which  the  London 
Literary  Gazette  regarded,  respectively,  as  an  April  Fool's  joke  and  the  product  of  a 
'March  hare  with  a  literary  turn  of  mind',  129  is  not  one  simply  of  measured  degree,  but 
rather  one  of  performative  complexity.  "' 
How,  then,  does  one  accept  Typee  on'its  own  account',  in  light  of  the 
confession  that  it  has  been  "'spun  as  a  yarn,  "  not  only  to  relieve  the  weariness  of  many 
a  night-watch  at  sea,  but  to  excite  the  sympathies  of  the  author's  shipmates'?  13'  For  his 
part,  Tommo  /  Melville  rationalises  that  the  three-year  separation  of  event  and 
narration,  not  to  mention  the  'very  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  he  was  placed', 
excuses  him  from  the  normal  conventions  of  journalistic  writing.  The  narrative 
technique  employed  here,  explains  Wadlington,  is  that  of  'the  picturesque  sense  of 
127  Warwick  Wadlington,  The  Confidence  Game  in  American  Literature  (Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1975),  62.  I  consistently  refer  to  The  Confidence-Man  as  Melville's  final  novel,  due 
to  Billy  Budd's  posthumous  discovery,  editing,  and  publication,  as  well  as  my  focus  on  the  period  of 
Melville's  'professional'  writing  career.  In  terms  of  William  Charvat's  definition  of  'professional' 
writing,  Melville's  writing  career  was  finished  after  the  publication  of  The  Confidence-Man  (1857).  In 
not  considering  Billy  Budd  (or  his  poetry,  for  that  matter)  a  'professional'  work,  I  am  not  depreciating 
its  contribution  to  the  dynamic  I  find  at  work  in  Melville's  fiction.  On  the  contrary,  in  returning  to  the 
water  yet  again,  even  beyond  his  death,  one  cannot  help  but  think  Melville's  (literary)  ending  as 
troubled  as  its  beginning,  for  it  is  inasmuch  as  it  is  always  being  re-enacted  upon  the  variegated 
imbroglio  of  posthumous  perspectives  and  interactions  of  editors  and  readers  who  wish  to  regard  it  as 
Melville's  'final  word'. 
128  The  theme  of  faith,  or  confidence,  that  is  seemingly  so  forthright  in  The  Confidence-Man, 
is  also  vital  to  the  'journalistic'  integrity  of  Typee's  narrator.  Near  the  beginning  of  his  tale,  he  pledges: 
'I  may  here  state,  on  my  faith  as  an  honest  man  ... 
'  (Melville,  Typee,  23) 
129  See  n.  43.  The  Gazette's  review  of  The  Confidence-Man  goes  on  to  suggest  that  the  book 
itself  was  'a  hoax  on  the  public  -  an  emulation  of  Barnum.  Perhaps  the  mild  man  in  mourning,  who 
goes  about  requesting  everybody  to  put  confidence  in  him,  is  an  emblem  of  Melville  himself  (Branch, 
Melville,  373,375).  The  Westminster  and  Foreign  Quarterly  Review,  who,  unlike  most  reviewers, 
actually  enjoyed  Melville's  more  imaginative  fiction  over  his  'South  Pacific  travels',  suggested  that  The 
Confidence-Man's  'hero'  was  actually  much'like  Melville  in  his  earlier  works,  ask[ing]  confidence  of 
everybody  under  different  masks  of  mendicancy'  (385). 
130  This  is  where  I  part  company  with  Wadlington,  who  seems  to  regard  the  difference  as  one 
of  degree  when  he  writes:  'I  mean  to  argue  that  ... 
in  Moby-Dick  and  The  Confidence-Man  he  succeeds 
in  transposing  the  merely  rhetorical-personal  into  the  superpersonal  by  the  sheerest  and  most  durable  of 
margins'  (The  Confidence  Game  in  American  Literature,  53). 
131  Melville,  Typee,  xiii. 49 
nearness-with-distance',  whereby  Melville  creates  an  'illusion  of  unmediated 
involvement'.  "'  Indeed,  while  Typee's  Preface  ends  with  an  affirmation  that  the  book 
had  been  written  in  'the  desire  to  speak  the  unvarnished  truth',  it  is  vital  we  not  ignore 
the  self-conscious  irony  that  it  never  actually  says  it  does  so  successfully?  133  As  such, 
the  result  is  a  piece  of  writing  that  is  neither  pure  journalism  nor  pure  fiction.  1  ' 
Or,  as  Nina  Baym  argues  in  her  important  essay  on  Melville's  'quarrel'  with  the 
fictional  form,  he  not  only  effectively  breaches  his  'genre  contract'  with  journalistic 
travel  writing,  but  also  with  that  of  fiction.  '  35  While  the  finality  of  her  claim  that  'none 
of  Melville's  longer  works  are  wholly  or  even  mainly  fiction'  hints  at  a  rather  limited 
conception  of  fiction,  the  examples  she  cites  of  Melville's  repeated  ruptures  of  the 
novel,  as  form  and  genre,  are  persuasive.  In  light  of  this,  and  in  partial  agreement 
with  the  argument  developed  by  Gustaaf  van  Cromphout,  I  will  explain  in  Chapter 
Two  why  this  quarrel  with  fiction,  as  a  self-stable  genre  and  form,  is  itself  indicative 
of  Melville's  complex  engagement  with  it,  whose  importance  is  finally  borne  out  in 
the  conception  of  subjectivity  that  emerges  from  his  flirtations  with  the  early 
Romantic  conception  of  the  novel  as  the  genre  of  infinite  reflection.  136 
132  Wadlington,  The  Confidence  Game  in  American  Literature,  57,51  (my  emphasis). 
133  Typee,  xiv.  Leon  Howard  observes  this  important  detail  in  his  reflections  on  whether 
Typee  should  be  regarded  as  fact  or  fiction,  in  his'Historical  Note',  293. 
134  For  fictional  elements  and  techniques  in  Typee,  see  Howard,  'Historical  Note',  291-93; 
Wadlington,  The  Confidence  Game  in  American  Literature,  56-68;  John  Samson,  'The  Dynamics  of 
History  and  Fiction  in  Melville's  Typee'  American  Quarterly  36  (Summer  1984):  276-90;  Robert  A. 
Lee,  "'Varnishing  the  Facts":  Typee  and  the  Art  of  Melville's  Early  Fiction'  Durham  University  Journal 
72  (1980):  203-09;  Michael  Clark,  'Melville's  Typee:  Fact,  Fiction,  and  Esthetics'  Arizona  Quarterly  34 
(1978):  351-70. 
135  Nina  Baym,  'Melville's  Quarrel  with  Fiction'  PMLA  94  (October  1979),  910.  Cf.,  Brian 
Higgins  and  Hershel  Parker,  'The  Flawed  Grandeur  of  Melville's  Pierre'  in  New  Perspectives  on 
Melville  (ed.  Faith  Pullin;  Edinburgh:  Edinburgh  University  Press,  1978),  162;  R.  P.  Blackmur,  The 
Lion  and  the  Honeycomb:  Essays  in  Critique  (New  York:  Harcourt,  1955),  162.  For  a  contemporary 
re-examination  of  this  genre,  at  least  implicitly  so,  see  Jacques  Derrida,  'The  Law  of  Genre'  in  Modern 
Genre  Theory  (trans.,  Avital  Ronell;  Harlow,  England:  Longman,  2000),  219-31. 
136  Gustaaf  van  Cromphout,  'Melville  as  Novelist:  The  German  Example'  Studies  in  American 
Fiction  13  (Spring,  1985):  31-44. ;o 
CHAPTER  TWO: 
MELVILLE  AND  GERMAN  ROMANTICISM 
1.  Riding  the  'High  German  Horse' 
By  1848,  due  to  the  relative  success  of  his  first  two  novels,  Melville  was 
clearly  enjoying  the  social  circle  afforded  him  by  Evert  Duyckinck's'cellar',  in  which, 
amidst  cigar  smoke  and  copious  amounts  of  brandy,  he  kept  company  with  other  New 
York  artists  and  writers  and  discussed  the  culture  of  the  day.  137  Of  even  more 
importance,  however,  inclusion  in  this  boy's  club  also  opened  to  Melville's  disposal 
Duyckinck's  massive  library  of  sixteen  thousand  volumes.  Drawing  from  the  libraries 
of  both  Duyckinck  and  the  New  York  Society,  as  well  as  what  he  could  buy  with  his 
five  hundred  dollar  advance  from  Harpers,  Melville's  intellectual  appetite  at  this  time 
was  rapacious.  Amongst  the  volumes  he  consumed  between  1848  and  1850  were  four 
volumes  of  Thomas  Browne;  three  of  Rabelais;  Jean  Paul's  Flower,  Fruit  and  Thorn 
Pieces;  Carlyle's  Sartor  Resartus  and  the  two-volume  German  Romance;  Frithiofs 
Saga,  by  Esaias  Tegner;  David  Hartley's  Observations  on  Man;  a  volume  of 
Shakespeare;  13'  Goethe's  Autobiography  and  Wilhelm  Meister  (Carlyle's  translation); 
137  Melville's  relationship  with  Duyckinck  has  received  a  great  deal  of  attention,  most  of  it 
grounded  only  on  scant  pieces  of  epistolary  evidence.  It  remains  an  important  consideration,  however, 
because  his  presence  (and  eventual  lack  thereof)  cannot  help  but  be  noticed  throughout  Melville's 
career  as  a  novelist.  Their  relationship  is  dealt  with  at  length  in  Watson  Branch,  Hershel  Parker,  and 
Harrison  Hayford,  'Historical  Note'  in  The  Confidence-Man:  His  Masquerade,  by  Herman  Melville 
(eds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas  Tanselle;  vol.  10;  Evanston  and  Chicago: 
Northwestern  University  Press  and  The  Newberry  Library,  1984),  257-76;  Jonathan  A.  Cook,  Satirical 
Apocalypse:  An  Anatomy  of  Melville's  The  Confidence-Man  (Westport,  Conn.:  Greenwood  Press, 
1996),  133-42;  Donald  Kay,  'Herman  Melville's  Literary  Relationship  with  Evert  Duyckinck'  College 
Language  Association  Journal  18  (1975):  393-  403;  and  Daniel  A.  Wells,  "'Bartleby  the  Scrivener,  " 
Poe,  and  the  Duyckinck  Circle'  ESQ:  A  Journal  of  the  American  Renaissance  21  (First  Quarter,  1975): 
35-39. 
138  Shakespeare  made  a  particularly  strong  impression  on  Melville:  'Dolt  &  ass  that  I  am  I 
haNc  11\  cd  more  than  29  years,  &  until  a  fcNN  days  ago,  never  made  close  acquaintance  with  the  divine 
William.  Ah.  he's  full  of  sermons-on-the-mount,  and  gentle,  aye,  almost  as  Jesus.  I  take  such  men  to 
be  inspired.  I  fancy  that  this  moment  Shakspearc  [sic]  in  hea\en  ranks  with  Gabriel  Raphael  and 
Michael.  And  if  another  Messiah  ever  comes  twill  be  in  Shakespere's  [sic]  person.  ----  I  am  mad  to 
think  how  minute  a  cause  has  prevented  me  hitherto  from  reading  Shakespeare.  But  until  now,  e\erv .ýl 
Defoe's  The  Fortuulate  Mistress;  a  complete  edition  of  Burton's  Anatomy  of 
Melancholy;  Coleridge's  Biographia  Literaria;  and  one  well-thumbed  copy  of 
Seneca's  Morals  by  Way  of  Abstract. 
"' 
Much  of  Melville's  choice  of  reading,  it  should  be  noted,  was  not  primarily 
that  of  individual  whimsy.  It  was,  rather,  highly  indicative  of  the  literary  culture  into 
which  he  had  recently  thrown  himself.  If,  according  to  the  North  American  Review  in 
1840,  the  positive  reception  of  Goethe  and  Romanticism  %  is  the  likes  of  Thomas 
Carlyle14°  and  Samuel  Taylor  Coleridge"'  portended  a'German  mania'  prevailing  over 
the  American  literary  scene,  by  1848  Melville  was  downright  infected.  14'  And  while  it 
is  ultimately  impossible  to  know  the  full  extent  Melville  read  and  comprehended 
everything  he  checked  out,  purchased  or  browsed,  and  far  beyond  the  aim  of  this 
chapter  to  even  attempt  to  do  so,  it  is  certainly  the  case  that  what  he  did  read 
(especially  Carlyle  and  Coleridge)  deeply  affected  the  style  and  content  of  what  he 
wanted  to  write.  143  Indeed,  most  commentators  agree,  such  reading  should  probably 
be  credited  as  the  impetus  for  his  declaration  to  John  Murray  during  their  dispute 
about  his  novels'  historicity:  'My  instinct  is  to  out  with  the  Romance.  "" 
The  sheer  breadth  of  Melville's  reading  whilst  writing  his  third  novel,  Mardi, 
copy  unendurable  to  my  eyes  which  are  tender  as  young  sparrows.  But  chancing  to  fall  in  with  this 
glorious  edition,  I  now  exult  over  it,  page  after  page'  (Melville,  Correspondence,  119). 
139  Cf.,  Merton  M.  Sealts,  Jr.,  Melville's  Reading  (rev.  ed.;  Columbia,  S.  C.:  University  of 
South  Carolina  Press,  1988),  32-43;  cf.,  59-72. 
140  Henry  A.  Pochmann,  German  Culture  in  America:  German  Culture  in  America: 
Philosophical  and  Literary  Influences,  1600-1900  (Madison,  Wisc.:  University  of  Wisconsin  Press. 
1961),  96-100. 
141  Pochmann,  German  Culture  in  America,  96-100. 
14'  Qtd.  in  Cromphout,  'Melville  as  Novelist',  32.  By  1848,  The  Literani  World  added,  'What 
man  or  woman  of  cultivation  does  not,  at  this  epoch',  take  an  interest  in  'the  fanciful  and  fascinating 
literature  of  the  Germans'. 
143  (,  f.,  Pochmann,  German  Culture  in  America,  436-440,755-60  n.  235-65.  Pochmann's  \work 
remains  unparalleled  in  its  presentation  of  the  Germanic  influence  so  readily  available  to,  and  so 
eagerly  devoured  by,  Melville. 
144  N1clv,  illc,  Correspondence,  106. ,  1) 
is,  we  find,  strikingly  parallel  to  its  sophomoric  aspirations.  Though  the  novel  is  tilled 
with  instances  of  profound  beauty,  as  well  as  many  moments  of  drama  and  comedy 
reminiscent  of  his  first  two  novels,  it  is  difficult  not  to  find  it  a  very  frustrating  book 
actually  to  read.  George  Ripley's  review  for  the  New  York  Tribune  sums  up  the 
general  opinion  at  the  time: 
We  have  seldom  found  our  reading  faculty  so  near  exhaustion,  or  our 
good  nature  as  critics  so  severely  exercised,  as  in  an  attempt  to  get 
through  this  new  work  by  the  author  of  the  fascinating  Tepee  and 
Omoo.  If  we  had  never  heard  of  Mr.  Melville  before,  we  should  soon 
have  laid  aside  his  book,  as  a  monstrous  compound  of  Carlyle,  Jean- 
Paul,  and  Sterne.  '45 
If  the  first  forty  chapters  were  at  all  representative  of  the  rest  of  the  book,  Mardi 
undoubtedly  would  have  gone  on  to  become  another  seafaring  success.  In  these  early 
chapters  (i.  e.,  volume  one  of  the  first  British  edition),  the  action  is  fast  and  furious. 
The  narrator  and  his  'chummy'  shipmate,  Jarl,  jump  ship  from  the  whaler  Arcturion, 
taking  refuge  for  sixteen  days  in  a  small  boat  out  on  the  open  seas;  whereupon  they 
encounter  another  ship,  the  Parki,  abandoned  save  for  an  argumentative  Polynesian 
couple,  Samoa  and  his  ill-tempered  wife  Annatoo,  who  recount  the  dramatic  story  of 
having  survived  the  massacre  of  their  shipmates  by  islanders;  a  storm  sinks  the  Parki, 
killing  Annatoo  and  forcing  the  three  men  back  to  the  small  boat;  they  happen  upon 
another  small  boat  filled  with  natives,  where  a  beautiful  woman  named  Yillah  is  held 
captive  as  a  sacrifice;  the  three  men  rescue  her  and  kill  the  head  priest;  Yillah 
inexplicably  transforms  from  a  olive-skinned  brunette  into  a  blue-eyed  blonde,  and 
just  as  inexplicably  disappears.  Though  Melville's  use  of  the  supernatural  at  this  point 
of  an  otherwise  straight  forward  'travel  narrative'  was  risky,  and  would  undoubtedly 
lose  a  few  readers  here  and  there,  lack  of  any  real,  substantive  plot  from  Chapter  Forty 
ýa  Branch,  Melville,  161,  cf.  139-82. 1j 
on  would  effectively  alienate  those  who  remained.  It  did  not  take  readers  long  to 
realise  that  the  ensuing  quest  for  Yillah,  which  for  long  portions  of  the  massive  novel 
is  not  even  mentioned,  was  simply  a  means  for  Melville  to  process  all  too  openly  the 
new  intellectual  world  his  reading  and  reflecting  had  disclosed  to  him.  "' 
If  the  reviewers  of  Mardi,  like  Fitz-James  O'Brien  in  a  retrospective  analysis 
of  Melville  in  1857,  had  hoped  that  a  voyage  to  the  'Old  World'  might  cure  him  and 
his  writing  of  the  dreaded'German  disease',  i.  e.,  that  upon  his  return  he  would  be 
ready  once  again  'to  give  us  pictures  of  life  and  reality',  "'  he  was  set  to  disappoint 
them  greatly.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  but  two  days  into  such  a  journey  in  1849,  Melville 
was  introduced  to  the  respected  German  scholar  George  Adler,  who  was  travelling 
abroad  to  recuperate  from  the  completion  of  his  multi-volume  English-German 
lexicon,  a  project,  it  was  said,  that  had  nearly  driven  him  insane.  148  For  forty  days, 
Melville's  journals  report,  he  and  the  'Coleridgean'  Adler  were  almost  inseparable, 
eating  breakfast  with  one  another  in  the  mornings,  walking  the  deck  of  the 
Southampton  or  touring  London  and  Paris  during  the  afternoon,  and  drinking  whiskey 
while  talking  'high  German  metaphysics'  late  into  the  evening.  In  one  entry,  Melville 
writes: 
146  The  result  was,  not  surprisingly,  a  financial  disaster.  Melville's  new  English  publisher, 
Richard  Bentley,  sums  up  the  result  in  a  letter  to  Melville:  'the  first  volume  [the  first  forty  chapters] 
was  eagerly  devoured,  the  second  was  read  -  but  the  third  was  not  perhaps  altogether  adapted  to  the 
class  of  readers  whom  "Omoo"  and  "Typee",  and  the  First  Volume  of  "Mardi"  gratified'  (Melville, 
Correspondence,  596).  For  specific  sales  figures,  see  Charvat,  The  Profession  of  Authorship  in 
America,  231,  and  Elizabeth  Foster,  'Historical  Note'  in  Mardi  and  Voyage  Thither,  by  Herman 
Melville  (eds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas  Tanselle;  vol.  3;  Evanston  and 
Chicago:  Northwestern  University  Press  and  The  Newberry  Library,  1970),  670. 
147  Branch,  Melville,  367. 
'  It  should  be  noted,  incidentally,  that  upon  returning  to  New  York  in  1852,  Adler's 
hallucinations  and  paranoia  soon  returned,  and  ultimately  led  in  1853  to  his  permanent 
institutionalisation.  Cf.,  George  J.  Adler,  Letters  of  a  Lunatic:  or,  A  Brief  Exposition  of  My  Universitti 
Life,  during  the  Years,  1853-54  (New  York:  privately  published,  1854).  For  additional  biographical 
information  on  Adler,  see  Herman  Melville,  Journals,  in  The  Writings  of  Herman  Melville  (ed. 
Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas  Tanselle;  vol.  15;  Evanston  and  Chicago: 
Northwestern  University  Press  and  The  Newberry  Library,  1989),  251-52;  Sanford  E.  Marovitz,  'More 
Chartless  Voyaging:  Melville  and  Adler  at  Sea'  Studies  in  the  American  Renaissance  (1986):  373-84. 54 
I  forgot  to  mention,  that  last  night  about  9  1l2  P.  M.  Adler  &  Taylor 
came  into  my  room,  &  it  was  proposed  to  have  whiskey  punches, 
which  we  did  have,  accordingly.  Adler  drank  about  three  table  spoons 
full  -  Taylor  4  or  five  tumblers  &c.  We  had  an  extraordinary  time  & 
did  not  break  up  till  after  two  in  the  morning.  We  talked  metaphysics 
continually,  &  Hegel,  Schlegel,  Kant  &c.  were  discussed  under  the 
influence  of  the  whiskey.  '49 
Such  was  the  pattern,  set  early  in  the  voyage,  of  Melville's  intoxicated  excursions  of 
mind  aboard  what  he  called  'the  high  German  horse'.  "O 
In  the  rest  of  this  chapter,  I  will  demonstrate  that  in  the  explicit  manoeuvres  / 
declarations  of  works  like  Mardi  and'Hawthorne  and  his  Mosses',  as  xell  as  the 
implicit  structure  of  self-destruction  /  self-creation  described  in  Chapter  One,  Melville 
shares  with  early  German  Romanticism  in  particular  a  similar  conceptualisation  of  the 
Self  and  the  Absolute.  In  what  follows  here  and  in  Chapter  Three,  the  theoretical  and 
aesthetic  perspectives  of  Romantic  subjectivity,  as  embodied  in  and  articulated  by  the 
Romantic  theory  of  the  novel,  are  read  in  terms  of  their  philosophical  and  historical 
context  -  specifically,  the  critical  philosophy  of  Kant,  and  then  the  speculative 
idealism  of  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel.  15'  In  this  way,  the  profound  similarities,  and 
ultimately  differences,  between  Melville  and  early  German  Romanticism  will  become 
explicit,  and  will  form  the  basis  for  our  thinking  in  Chapter  Four  of  Melville's  vital 
role  as  an  exemplar  for  contemporary  aesthetico-theological  awareness. 
2.  Kantian  Apperception  and  the  Art  of  Schematism 
The  purpose  of  critical  philosophy,  according  to  Kant,  was  maturity,  as 
opposed  to  the  'self-incurred  immaturity'  evident  in  the  all-too-common  'inability  to 
149  Melville,  Joournals,  8. 
tso  Ic]  vi  lie,  Journals,  9. 
151  1  confine  my  reflections  in  the  present  chapter  to  early  Romanticism's  philosophical 
forebears,  Kant  and  Fichte.  Both  Schelling  and  Hegel,  however,  will  prose  pivotal  in  Chapter  Three  to 
the  re-contextualisation  of  Melville's  reserNations  about  the  Romantic  project. 55 
use  one's  understanding  without  the  guidance  of  another.  "52  Moreover,  he  continues, 
'For  enlightenment  of  this  kind,  all  that  is  needed  is  freedom.  ""  In  the  end,  then,  all 
that  was  necessary  for  mature  thinking  was  courage  -  the  willingness  truly  to  think 
freely.  Kant  envisioned  the  intellectual  progression  as  analogous  to  the  stages  of  life, 
from  the  infancy  of  dogmatism  to  the  maturity  of  scepticism  (optimistically  omitting, 
Melville  would  surely  point  out,  the  fourth  stage  of  life,  decay): 
The  first  step  in  matters  of  pure  reason,  marking  its  infancy,  is 
dogmatic.  The  second  step  is  sceptical;  and  indicates  that  experience 
has  rendered  our  judgment  wiser  and  more  circumspect.  But  a  third 
step,  such  as  can  be  taken  only  by  fully  matured  judgment,  based  on 
assured  principles  of  proved  universality,  is  now  necessary,  namely,  to 
subject  to  examination,  not  the  facts  of  reason,  but  reason  itself,  in  the 
whole  extent  of  its  powers,  and  as  regards  its  aptitude  for  pure  a  priori 
modes  of  knowledge.  This  is  not  the  censorship  but  the  criticism  of 
reason,  whereby  not  its  present  bounds  but  its  determinate  [and 
necessary]  limits,  not  its  ignorance  on  this  or  that  point  but  its 
ignorance  in  regard  to  all  possible  questions  of  a  certain  kind,  are 
demonstrated  from  principles,  and  not  merely  arrived  at  by  way  of 
conj  ecture.  'sa 
It  is  not,  Kant  continues,  that  scepticism  is  a  'permanent  settlement',  or  an  end  unto 
itself;  rather,  it  is  a'resting-place'  [Wohnplatz]  that  affords  a  critical  perspective  on 
that  which  one  holds  to  be  dogmatically  true.  "' 
152  Immanuel  Kant,  'An  Answer  to  the  Question:  "What  is  Enlightenment?  "'  in  Kant's  Political 
Writings  (ed.  Hans  Reiss;  trans.  H.  B.  Nisbet;  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1991),  54. 
153  Kant,  'An  Answer  to  the  Question',  55. 
154  Immanuel  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (trans.  Norman  Kemp  Smith;  New  York: 
Macmillan,  1929),  607  (A761  /  B789).  Kant  published  two  editions  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  in 
1781  and  1787.  There  were  substantial  changes  in  the  second  edition,  and  scholars  continue  to  argue 
about  the  ways  some  very  crucial  issues  seem  to  be  treated  differently  in  the  two  editions,  which  in  turn 
leads  to  arguments  about  the  alleged  superiority  of  one  edition  over  another,  their  mutual  consistency 
or  lack  of  consistency,  and  so  forth.  In  the  footnotes,  I  follow  the  well-established  practice  of  citing 
both  editions,  the  1781  edition  as  the  A  edition,  and  the  1787  edition  as  the  B  edition. 
155  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  607  (A761  /  B789).  Cf.,  'Reason  must  in  all  its 
undertakings  subject  itself  to  criticism;  should  it  limit  freedom  of  criticism  by  any  prohibitions,  it  must 
harm  itself,  drawing  upon  itself  a  damaging  suspicion.  Nothing  is  so  important  through  its  usefulness, 
nothing  so  sacred,  that  it  may  be  exempted  from  this  searching  examination,  which  knows  no  respect 
for  persons.  Reason  depends  on  this  freedom  for  its  every  existence.  For  reason  has  no  dictatorial 
authority'  (593  [A739  /  B767]). ýfý 
For  Kant,  because  its  focus  is  on  what  must  first  be  the  case  for  the  Subject 
truly  to  understand  the  status  of  its  knowledge  about  the  world,  the  critical  perspective 
has  priority  over  all  attempts  to  speak  definitively  about  the  world.  Knowledge,  or 
understanding,  he  explains,  is dependent  on  the  conceptual  linkage  of  perceptions  / 
representations  (i.  e.,  the  'manifold  of  experience')  in  rule-bound  judgments.  For  any 
given  intuition,  such  as  that  of  a  rock  or  a  dog,  we  make  a  conceptual  judgment  when 
we  identify  it  as  such  (as  'a  rock'  or  'a  dog')  due  to  the  features  it  shares  with  other 
intuitions  also  deemed  either  'rock'  or  'dog'.  In  this  way,  any  given  instance  or  object 
of  conceptual  judgment  is:  (1)  mediated  knowledge  -'the  representation  of  a 
representation'  and  (2)  a  synthesis  of  representations  'In  every  judgment  there  is 
a  concept  which  holds  of  many  representations,  and  among  them  of  a  given 
representation  that  is  immediately  related  to  an  object'.  15'  Without  the  conceptualising 
synthesis  of  intuition,  that  is,  if  there  was  nothing  but  sensuous  experience  without 
conceptual  judgement,  Kant  points  out  that  there  would  only  be  the  insane  chaos  of 
endlessly  undifferentiated,  and  thus  literally  unthinkable,  particularity. 
Kant's  obvious  first  hurdle  was  to  avoid  the  fallacy  of  a  logical  regress, 
whereby  one  is  left  to  wonder  emptily  about  the  origin  or  grounds  of  the  first 
conceptual  rule,  or  the  ultimate  foundation  of  knowledge,  because  whatever  was 
established  as  the  first  rule  would  itself  require  a  conceptualising  rule  in  order  for  it  to 
be  identified  as  'the  first  rule'.  Kant,  thus,  ascribes  the  basis  of  conceptual  judgment  to 
a  'peculiar  talent'  of  the  Subject  (which  is  also  to  say,  a  talent  peculiar  to  the  Subject 
alone): 
156  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  105  (A68  /  B93).  Following  the  example  of  Terry  Pinkard, 
as  well  as  Beatrice  Longuenesse.  1  am,  it  should  be  noted,  treating  the  A  (1781)  and  B  (1787)  versions 
of  Kant's  Transcendental  Deduction  as  reasonably  harmonious.  See  Pinkard,  German  Philosophy,  27 
n.  12,  and  Beatrice  Longuencssc.  Kant  and  the  Capacity  to  Judge:  Sensibility  and  Diseursivity  in  the 
Transcendental  Analytic  of  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (trans.  Charles  T.  Wolfe,  Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press,  1998),  9-10,33-34.59-64.109-11. 7  5 
If  [judgment]  sought  to  give  general  instructions  how  we  are  to 
subsume  under  these  rules,  that  is,  to  distinguish  whether  something 
does  or  does  not  come  under  them,  that  could  only  be  by  means  of 
another  rule.  This  in  turn,  for  the  very  reason  that  it  is  a  rule,  again 
demands  guidance  from  judgment.  And  thus  it  appears  that,  though 
understanding  is  capable  of  being  instructed,  and  of  being  equipped 
with  rules,  judgment  is  a  peculiar  talent  which  can  be  practised  only, 
and  cannot  be  taught.  It  is  the  specific  quality  of  so-called  mother-wit; 
and  its  lack  no  school  can  make  good.  15' 
Kant  calls  this  innate  talent  to  connect  images  with  their  concept,  and  thus  to  actually 
see  something  as  something,  'schematism',  and  attributes  it  to  the  art  of  the 
individual's  'reproductive  imagination'.  158  The  schema  of  any  sensible  concept,  he 
explains.  'is  a  product  ...  of  pure  a  priori  imagination,  through  which,  and  in 
accordance  with  which,  images  themselves  first  become  possible.  i159  In  this  way,  it  is 
not  images  that  underlie  one's  conceptual  categories,  but  the  schematic  activity  of 
one's  own  imagination. 
Though  it  may  not  seem  so  immediately,  the  implications  of  this  for 
subjectivity  prove  to  be  profound.  For  schematism  as  an  innate  art  to  make  any  sense 
at  all,  Kant  realised  he  must  first  presuppose  the  necessity  of  a  unified  /  unifying  self- 
consciousness,  or  what  he  calls  'the  synthetic  unity  of  apperception'.  That  is  to  say, 
echoing  Terry  Pinkard,  'any  representation  of  a  multiplicity  as  a  multiplicity  involves 
not  merely  the  receptivity  of  experience;  experiencing  it  as  one  experiential 
multiplicity  requires  the  possibility  of  there  being  a  single  complex  thought  of  the 
experience.  '  For  such  a  thought  to  occur,  he  continues,  'requires  a  single  complex 
157  Kant.  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  177  (A  133  /B  172). 
1  `'  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  181-83  (A  139-142  /B  178-181). 
159  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  183  (A  142  /  B181) ;8 
subject  to  think  it'.  "'  Indeed,  as  Kant  famously  writes  in  the  second  edition  of  The 
Critique  of  Pure  Reason: 
It  must  be  possible  for  the  'I  think'  to  accompany  all  my 
representations;  for  otherwise  something  would  be  represented  in  me 
which  could  not  be  thought  at  all,  and  that  is  equivalent  to  saying  that 
the  representation  would  be  impossible,  or  at  least  would  be  nothing  to 
me.  '6' 
Importantly,  the  unifying  self-consciousness  that  accompanies  each  thought,  and  thus 
makes  it  nnv  thought,  is  not  that  of  the  Cartesian  cogito,  in  which  the  thinking  and  the 
being  of  the  subject  are  identical  (what  Kant  calls  the  'analvtic  unity  of  apperception'). 
Rather,  for  Kant,  this  kind  of  awareness  of  oneself  as  a  unified  Subject  is  similar  to 
one's  intuition  of  any  other  sensible  object,  and  thus  is  dependent  on  the 
conceptualising  synthesis  of  different  moments  of  consciousness.  Such  is,  in  Kant's 
terms,  the  very  condition  of  possibility  for  the  'empirical  consciousness'  of  oneself: 
For  the  empirical  consciousness,  which  accompanies  different 
representations,  is  in  itself  diverse  and  without  relation  to  the  identity 
of  the  subject.  That  relation  comes  about,  not  simply  through  my 
accompanying  each  representation  with  consciousness,  but  only  in  so 
far  as  I  conjoin  one  representation  with  another,  and  am  conscious  of 
the  synthesis  of  them.  Only  in  so  far,  therefore,  as  I  can  unite  a 
manifold  of  given  representations  in  one  consciousness,  is  it  possible 
for  me  to  represent  to  myself  the  identity  of  the  consciousness  in  [i.  e. 
throughout]  these  representations.  '"' 
In  contrast,  the  pure  self  of  synthetic  apperception  -  what  Kant  calls  the  'I  think' 
is  a  free  act  of  unmediated  'spontaneity';  that  is,  it  is  purely  self-created,  the  self  in- 
itself,  and  thus  is  not  dependent  on  its  representation  in  time  and  space. 
160  Pinkard,  German  Philosophy,  30. 
161  Kant  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  152-53  (B131-132) 
162  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  193  (B133).  Kant  famously  adds  to  this:  In  other  Nvords, 
only  in  so  far  as  I  can  grasp  the  manifold  of  the  representations  in  one  consciousness.  do  I  call  then 
one  and  all  mine.  For  otherwise  I  should  ha\  c  as  many-coloured  and  di\  erse  a  sclf  as  I  ha\e 
representations  of  which  I  am  conscious  to  myself  (154  [B134]). 59 
Inasmuch  as  the  self  of  pure  apperception  is  both  the  unity  of  perception  that 
synthesises  all  manner  of  intuitions  according  to  the  rules  of  conceptual 
understanding,  as  well  as  the  very  thought  /  synthesising  process  that  thinks  this  unity, 
it  never  appears  as  such  (i.  e.,  in  the  empirical  limits  of  self-presentation).  As  such,  the 
Kantian  subject  can  never  truly  know  and  apprehend  itself  as  the  pure  thing-in-itself: 
[I]n  the  synthetic  original  unity  of  apperception,  I  am  conscious  of 
myself,  not  as  I  appear  to  myself,  nor  as  I  am  in  myself,  but  only  that  I 
am.  This  representation  is  a  thought,  not  an  intuition....  Accordingly, 
I  have  no  knowledge  of  myself  as  I  am  but  merely  as  I  appear  to 
myself.  163 
Pure  apperception,  rather,  remains  but  a  necessary,  but  ultimately  empty,  thought.  In 
this,  Kant  concludes,  apperception  is  the  condition  of  possibility  for  empirical  self- 
consciousness. 
This,  consequently,  becomes  the  basis  for  Kant's  withering  critique  of 
traditional  metaphysics,  as  represented  in  and  by  those  various  philosophical  and 
theological  strongholds  devoted  to  'pure'  and  'transcendent'  notions,  i.  e.,  experientially 
ineffable  and  yet  nevertheless  thinkable,  such  as  God  and  the  soul.  For  Kant,  it  is  not 
the  case  that  such  notions  are  logically  contradictory  or  impossible.  Rather,  they  are, 
in  the  words  of  Slavoj  Zizek'empty  notions  devoid  of  their  (intuited  objects)....  The 
problem  is  precisely  that  while  it  is  easy  to  imagine  them,  we  can  never  fill  out  their 
notion  with  positive,  intuited  content.  ""  For  this  reason,  Kant  deemed  them 
antinomies  i.  e.,  objects-of-thought  [Gedankendinge],  and  thus  not  capable  of  being 
experienced  or  represented  as  such.  In  short,  then,  because  knowledge  is  by  definition 
16'  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  169  (Bl  57-158).  Cf.,  'I  exist  as  an  intelligence  which  is 
conscious  solely  of  its  power  of  combination;  but  in  respect  of  the  manifold  which  it  has  to  combine  I 
am  subjected  to  a  limiting  condition  (entitled  inner  sense),  namely,  that  this  combination  can  be  made 
intuitable  only  according  to  relations  of  time,  which  lies  entirely  outside  the  concepts  of  understanding, 
strictly  regarded.  Such  an  intelligence,  therefore,  can  know  itself  only  as  it  appears  to  itself  in  respect 
of  an  intuition  \v  hich  is  not  intellectual  and  cannot  be  given  by  the  understanding  itself  (169  [B159]). 
Ziük.  Lciri  "ing  UA  the  , A'cu,  ative,  109. 60 
finite,  it  can  only  circumscribe  the  limits  of  the  knowable,  without  denying  or 
affirming  that  which  necessarily  is  outside  such  a  limit.  165 
3.  The  Absolute  Subject  as  Self-Positing  I 
The  Kantian  enquiry  of  and  about  truth  /  identity  cuts  to  the  core,  too,  of 
Melville's  musings  in  Mardi.  When,  for  instance,  the  journalistically-inclined  Mohi 
sceptically  wonders  whether  a  legend'seems  a  credible  history',  suggesting  instead 
that  it  had  been  'invented',  the  philosopher  Babbalanja  cautions  that  this  is  no  reason 
to  dismiss  it: 
Truth  is  in  things,  and  not  in  words:  truth  is  voiceless....  [W]hat  are 
vulgarly  called  fictions  are  as  much  realities  as  the  gross  mattock  of 
Dididi,  the  digger  of  trenches;  for  things  visible  are  but  conceits  of  the 
eye:  things  imaginative,  conceits  of  thF;  fancy.  If  duped  by  one,  we  are 
equally  duped  by  the  other.  166 
Undaunted,  Mohi  asks  the  question  that  ultimately  haunts  Melville  and  his  readers, 
and  indeed  many  of  Kant's:  'if  all  things  are  deceptive  [or,  apropos  Kant,  merely 
phenomena],  tell  us  what  is  truth.  '  To  this  Babbalanja  can  only  answer,  sounding  not 
unlike  Kant  with  regard  to  his  antinomies:  'The  old  interrogatory;  did  they  not  ask  it 
when  the  world  began?  But  ask  it  no  more....  [T]hat  question  is  more  final  than  any 
answer.  t167 
Indeed,  the  Kantian  problematic  of  the  antinomies,  i.  e.,  as  finally  and  fully 
ineffable  and  uncertain,  is  indistinct  from  that  of  the  character  of  the  Subject  in  Mardi. 
165  Again  quoting  Zizek,  By  saying  "the  Thing  is  non-phenomenal,  "  we  do  not  say  the  same  as 
"the  Thing  is  not  phenomenal";  we  do  not  make  any  positive  claim  about  it,  we  only  dra\\  a  certain 
limit  and  locate  the  Thing  in  the  wholly  nonspecified  void  beyond  it  (Tarrying  With  the  , \`egatMe.  II  ).  I 
Consequently,  and  strictly  analogous  to  his  understanding  of  pure  apperception,  both  God  and  the  soul, 
though  unthinkable,  would  become  for  Kant  the  very  conditions  of  possibility  for  one's  ethical 
judgments. 
1611  N1ck  ille,  Mardi,  283-84. 
1e0  Melville,  Mardi.  284. 61 
Perhaps  reflective  of  Melville's  own  character  having  been  called  into  question  by 
critics  of  Typee,  in  Mardi  we  find  a  discordant  chorus  of  characters  holding  all 
manner  of  contradictory  opinions,  and  each  generally  regarding  the  opinion  of  the 
others  to  be  either  immature,  insane,  or  irresponsible.  All  of  these  voices,  however, 
are  themselves  problematised  by  the  narrator's  silence  regarding  his  identity  -  which 
is  to  say,  his  character.  16'  After  all,  even  when  the  inhabitants  of  the  island  Odo 
finally  provide  a  name  for  the  narrator  in  Chapter  Forty,  'Taji',  it  is  but  a  case  of 
mistaken  identity,  for  they  only  do  so  after  mistaking  him  for  their  sun  god.  169  As 
William  Charvat  notes,  in  his  becoming  'Taji',  the  hitherto  first-person  narrator  of 
Mardi  essentially  vanishes: 
The  'I'  of  the  first  chapters  becomes  'we'  in  the  allegory,  and  even  the 
'we'  often  becomes  the  voice  of  authorial  omniscience  released  from 
the  control  of  the  grammatical  first  person.  Sometimes  within  the 
space  of  a  page  or  two,  Taji  speaks  as  'we',  is  addressed  by  the  author 
as  'you',  and  is  referred  to  by  his  companions  in  the  third  person  as  if 
he  were  not  there.  170 
In  short,  his  status  as  omniscient  commentator  is diffused  through  his  new  travel 
companions:  i.  e.,  Yoomy,  the  poet;  Mohi,  the  storyteller;  Babbalanja,  the  philosopher; 
and  King  Media,  the  demigod.  "'  In  this,  Melville  seems  to  be  saying  by  the  end  of 
168  For  a  discussion  of  this  ambiguity  of  character,  both  of  Taji  (as  character)  and  (the  nature 
of)  Mardi,  see  Christopher  S.  Durer,  'Melville's  "Synthesizing"  Narrator:  Mardi,  Fichte,  and  the 
Fruhromanticker'  Romanticism  Past  &  Present  10  (Winter  1986):  45-60;  Russ  Pottle,  'The  Monkey 
Before  the  Whale:  "Signifyin(g)"  and  Melville's  Mardi'  Journal  of  Narrative  Technique  23  (Fall  1993): 
136-53;  John  Wenke,  'Melville's  Mardi:  Narrative  Self-Fashioning  and  the  Play  of  Possibility'  Texas 
Studies  in  Literature  and  Language  31  (Fall  1989):  406-425. 
169  This  is,  of  course,  reminiscent  of  Typee,  where  'Tommo'  is  also  a  kind  of  pseudonym  -  i.  e., 
not  simply  because,  biographically,  'Tommo'  is  purportedly  standing  in  for  Melville,  but  because  of  the 
inability  of  the  Typeeans  to  successfully  pronounce  'Tom'  (which  was  not  his  real  name  either!  ).  In 
this,  'Tommo'  is  a  pseudonym  of  a  pseudonym  (Melville,  Typee,  72).  As  was  the  case  with  Tommo,  the 
truth  that  we  generally  assume  lies  behind  a  character  (that  is,  where  their  characteristic  identities  begin 
and  end)  thus  remain  as  elusive  as  that  of  Melville. 
170  Charvat,  The  Profession  of  Authorship  in  America,  221-22. 
171  After  the  murder  of  the  high  priest  and  the  transformation  of  the  narrator  into'Taji',  Charvat 
writes,  'the  physique  becomes  insubstantial  and  translucent,  and  the  continuing  solidity  of  Jarl  and 
Samoa  are  embarrassing  to  the  story'.  As  such,  Melville  found  it  necessary  to  fade  them  out  of  his 
story  -  and,  indeed,  ultimately  even  killed  them  off.  Melville,  Charvat  continues,  may  actually  have 02 
Mardi,  it  is  altogether  fitting  that  Taji's  search  for  Yillah  should  culminate  in  his 
literal  suicide. 
Melville  here,  I  would  suggest,  touches  on  the  shared  concern  of  Kant  and 
early  German  Romanticism:  namely,  in  the  words  of  Piotr  Parlej,  for  'the  production 
of  the  subject  in  its  proper  form,  the  production  of  the  subject  as  this  subject's 
subject.  '"Z  Similar  to  Kant's  'peculiar  talent',  peculiar  to  the  autonomous  Subject, 
then,  we  find  in  Schlegel  the  Subject's  'spiritual  viewing'  [An.  schaucig]  of  itself,  1'  i.  e., 
its  self-presentation  as  its  own  subject.  In  his  emphasis  on  circularity  and  reflection, 
however,  Schlegel's  (and,  we  will  see,  Melville's)  understanding  of  subjectivity  is 
even  more  deeply  indebted  to  the  speculative  idealism  of  Johann  Gottlieb  Fichte,  for 
whom  philosophy  was  essentially  a  pure  thinking  about  thinking.  1'  The  pure  I  of 
Fichte's  philosophy,  as  such,  'looks  at  itself,  and  in  this  looking  penetrates 
'immediately  all  that  it  is'.  15  Or,  as  Hegel  characterises  it,  an  'artistic  consciousness 
[künstliche  Bewußtsein],  the  consciousness  about  consciousness,  so  that  I  have  the 
consciousness  of  what  my  consciousness  is  doing'.  1' 
realised  that  much  of  his  reading  audience  would  ultimate  leave  with  them,  'for  among  his  alternative 
explanations  of  Samoa's  refusal  to  continue  the  search  (he  was  "not  the  first  man,  who  had  turned  back, 
after  beginning  a  voyage  like  our  own")  was  his  distaste  for  Babbalanja's  "disquisitions"  (which  were 
indeed  distasteful  to  most  reviewers),  and  for  a  Mardi  [the  island]  which  had  not  met  his  expectations' 
(The  Profession  of  Authorship  in  America,  220). 
172  Piotr  Parlej,  The  Romantic  Theory  of  the  Novel:  Genre  and  Reflection  in  Cervantes, 
Melville,  Flaubert,  Jorce,  and  Kafka  (Baton  Rouge,  La.:  Louisiana  State  University  Press,  1997),  19. 
173  Schlegel,  Dialogue  on  Poetry  and  Literary  Aphorisms  (trans.  Ernst.  Behler  and  Roman 
Struc;  University  Park,  Penn.:  Pennsylvania  State  University  Press,  1968),  102. 
"'  lt  is  for  this  precise  reason  that  Friedrich  Schlegel  characterises  Fichte  in  Athenaeum 
Fragment  181  as  'a  Kant  raised  to  the  second  power',  whose  'theory  of  knowledge  is  always 
simultaneously  philosophy  and  philosophy  of  philosophy.  '  In  his  philosophy,  Schlegel  continues,  'one 
has  to  look  as  [Fichte]  does  -  without  paying  attention  to  anything  else  -  only  at  the  whole  and  at  the 
one  thing  that  really  matters'  (Schlegel,  'Lucinde'  and  the  Fragments,  202). 
175  Johann  Gottlieb  Fichte,  Werke,  1797-1798,  in  J.  G.  Fichte  -  Gesamtausgabe  der 
Bayerischen  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften  (eds.,  Reinhard  Lauth  and  Hans  Gliv,  itzky;  vol.  4: 
Stuttgart:  Friedrich  Frommann  Verlag,  1964),  196. 
176  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Torlesungen  über  die  Geschichte  der  Philosophie  III,  in  Werke  (eds.  Eia 
Moldenhauer  and  Karl  Markus  Michel;  vol.  20;  Frankfurt:  Suhrkamp,  1986),  393. 63 
For  Fichte,  Kant's  elusive  'I  think'  is  only  coherent  on  the  condition  that  'prior 
to  all  positing  in  the  self,  the  self  itself  is  posited.  '"  Unlike  Kant,  however,  the 
unified  Self  is  not  simply  a  fact  that  can  or  should  be  presupposed  as  necessarily  true. 
On  the  contrary,  Dieter  Henrich  points  out,  there  is,  in  fact,  no  Fichtean  'Subject-Self 
prior  to  self-consciousness'.  On  the  contrary,  'the  subject,  too,  first  emerges  at  the 
same  time  as  the  whole  consciousness  expressed  in  the  identity  "I  =  I".  '"R  That  is  to 
say,  alongside  Fichte's  fundamental  thesis,  'the  Self  posits  itself  absolutely  and 
unconditionally'.  1'  As  such,  the  'I'  can  only  realise  itself  as  such  in  the  activity  of  the 
'I'  being  itself;  that  is,  in  the  'deed-act'  of  reflection  upon  itself,  'through  which  I  know 
something  because  I  do  it'.  18°  For  Fichte,  then,  the  Self  is  precisely  the  act  of  self- 
positing  /  self-presentation,  i.  e.,  'through  which  a  Subject-Self  becomes  aware  of  itself 
as  an  Object-Self""  In  this  way,  the  Kantian  distinction  between  self-consciousness 
as  an  intuition  and  concept  is  breached,  and  becomes  instead  a  spontaneous,  unitary 
awareness  (or,  in  Fichte's  terms,  'intellectual  intuition').  182 
The  most  obvious  difficulty  that  strains  Fichte's  philosophical  idealism, 
though,  is  the  matter  of  subjective  particularity.  That  is,  if  the  'I'  is  unlimited,  endless 
activity,  how  do  we  account  for  the  feeling  of  limitation,  or  differentiation,  that 
constitutes  individuality?  Fichte's  response  is  that  limitation  /  differentiation  (what  he 
177  Johann  Gottlieb  Fichte,  Fichte's  Werke  1:  Zur  Theoretischen  Philosophie  (Berlin:  Walter 
de  Gruyer,  1971),  95.  Unless  otherwise  noted,  all  translations  of  Fichte  are  my  own,  with  the 
assistance  of  Science  of  Knowledge  (Wissenschaftslehre),  with  First  and  Second  Introductions  (ed.  and 
trans.  Peter  Heath  and  John  Lachs;  New  York:  Appleton-Century-Crofts,  1970). 
I7  Dieter  Henrich,  'Fichte's  Original  Insight,  '  in  Contemporary,  German  Philosophy  (trans. 
Da\  id  R.  Lachterman;  vol.  1;  University  Park,  Penn.:  Pennsylvania  State  University  Press,  1982),  25. 
179  Fichte,  lt  c'rke  I,  98. 
180  Fichte,  lV(,  ke  1,463.  As  Henrich  simplifies,  'the  Self  posits  itself  absolutely  as  positing 
itself,  or  alternatively,  self-consciousness  is  a  'look  that  sees  itself  and  in  each  case  is  already  this  act  of 
seeing  ('Fichte's  Original  Insight',  29,33). 
181  Henrich,  'Fichte's  Original  Insight',  25. 
"2  Frederick  Neuhouser,  Fichte's  Theory  of  Subjectivity  (Ne\ý  York:  Cambridge  University 
Press,  1990),  84:  Henrich,  'Firhte's  Original  Insight',  29-30. 64 
calls  Anstoss  or'check')  is  itself  necessary  for  the  activity  of  self-positing  to  be 
unlimited.  'This  makes  sense',  Andrew  Bowie  comments,  'in  as  much  as  a  feeling  of 
compulsion  has  as  its  prior  condition  that  which  can  feel  compelled,  which  must 
therefore  be  aware  of  its  freedom.  ""  Were  there  no  resistance  or'check',  i.  e.,  no'not- 
I',  there  would  be  no  'infinite  striving'  to  overcome  such  resistance  or  limitation,  no 
reflective  activity  of  self-positing,  and  thus  no  T.  In  this  way,  then,  the  Fichtean  'I',  as 
infinite  striving,  is  prevented  from  ever  being  finally  objectivised  as  a'knowing 
subject'.  "4 
Reason  steps  into  the  method  (from  which  Reflection  arises)  and 
determines  [the  imagination]  to  receive  B  [i.  e.,  the  'not-I']  into  the 
determinate  A  (the  subject):  but  now  the  A  presented  as  determinate 
must  be  once  again  restricted  by  an  infinite  B,  at  which  the  imagination 
proceeds  exactly  as  above;  and  so  it  goes  on,  until  the  (here  theoretical) 
reason  is  a  complete  determination  of  itself,  where  the  imagination 
requires  no  restrictive  B  other  than  reason  -  that  is,  until  it  reaches  the 
representation  of  what  represents  [Vorstellung  des  Vorstellenden].  In 
the  practical  sphere,  imagination  goes  on  into  the  infinity,  up  to  the 
absolutely  indeterminable  idea  of  the  highest  unity,  which  would  be 
possible  only  after  a  completed  infinity,  which  is  itself  impossible.  "' 
In  effect,  Bowie  concludes,  Fichte's  argument  requires  both  'a  relative  I  and  not-I 
within  an  Absolute  which  is  still  conceived  of  as  I',  but  never  fully  explains  why  the 
'Absolute  I'  should  ever  have  split  itself  in  the  first  place.  "' 
Walter  Benjamin  argues  in  his  dissertation  on  the  early  German  Romantics 
that  it  is  here  that  the  similarities  between  the  idealism  of  Fichte  and  the  romanticism 
193  Andrew  Bovvie.  Schelling  and  Modern  European  Philosoph  r:  An  Introduction  (London 
and  New  York:  Routledge,  1993),  18.  Cf.,  Pinkard,  German  Philosophy,  1760-1860,1  12-20. 
"'  Cf.,  '[l]f  every  item  of  knowledge  really  had  a  subject,  the  subject  itself  could  not  be  an 
item  of  knowledge.  Otherwise,  we  would  have  to  assume  a  subject  of  this  subject  and  thus  surrender  to 
the  infinite  regress  that  Fichte  feared  so  much.  The  idea  of  the  Self  xti  ould  sink  into  the  abyss.  The 
paradox  of  the  subject-less  knowing  is  preferable  to  that'  (Henrich,  'Fichte's  Original  Insight',  36). 
1R5  Fichte,  Werke  1,217. 
186  13o\\  1c,  Sc-helling  and  Modern  F:  uropeuin  Philosophy,  18. 65 
of  Friedrich  Schlegel  are  overwhelmed  by  their  fundamental  differences.  "'  Whereas 
for  Fichte,  self-positing  presupposes  the  ontological  determination  /  reflection  of  the 
'I',  188  'the  Romantics  start  from  thinking-oneself,  as  a  phenomenon;  proper  to 
everything,  for  everything  is  a  self""  That  is  to  say,  in  contrast  to  the  intuitive 
immediacy  of  Fichte's  self-knowing  and  self-positing  Absolute,  whereby  'thinking  as 
the  thinking  of  thinking 
...  achieves  completion  in  the  self-positing  I',  19°  early 
German  Romanticism  denies  the  intuitive  /  sensory  role  of  the  'not-I',  and  instead 
posits  the  conceptual  immediacy  of  the  Absolute  as  an  infinitization  of  the  finite 
subject's  self-consciousness  and  reflection.  Or,  as  Benjamin  describes  it,  'the  thinking 
of  thinking  of  thinking  (and  so  forth)'.  19'  In  this  'third-level  reflection',  versus  the  first 
level  of  epistemological  'sense'  and  the  second  level  of  Fichtean  'reason',  Benjamin 
explains,  the  'thinking  of  thinking'  can  be  either  (indeed,  ultimately,  is  both)  the  object 
of  thought,  i.  e.,  thinking,  or  the  'thinking  subject  (thinking  of  thinking)  of  thinking'.  192 
The  result,  he  concludes,  are  infinite  levels  of  possible  reflection,  and  thus  an  infinite 
plurality  of  meaning.  In  this  way,  he  continues,  the  Romantics  redefined  the  sense  of 
infinity,  from  Fichte's  notion  of  infinite  advance  or  striving,  to  that  of  the  'full 
infinitude  [erfüllte  Unendlichkeit]  of  interconnection',  193  whereby  'reflection  expands 
18'  Walter  Benjamin,  'The  Concept  of  Criticism  in  German  Romanticism'  in  Selected  Writings, 
Volume  1,1913-1926  (ed.  Marcus  Bullock  and  Michael  W.  Jennings;  Cambridge,  Mass.:  Belknap 
Press  of  Harvard  University  Press,  1996),  120-35.  All  translations  of  Benjamin's  dissertation  have  been 
checked  against  the  original  German  in  Gesammelte  Schriften  (ed.  Rolf  Tidemann  and  Hermann 
Schweppenhäuser;  volume  1;  Frankfurt:  Suhrkamp,  1974,9-122. 
'"  Fichte,  Werke  I,  530n. 
189  Benjamin,  'The  Concept  of  Criticism  in  German  Romanticism',  128. 
190  Rodolphe  Gasche,  'Thc  Sober  Absolute:  On  Benjamin  and  the  Early  Romantics'  in  Walter 
Benjamin  and  Romanticism  (ed.  Beatrice  Hanssen  and  Andrew  Benjamin;  New  York:  Continuum, 
2002).  56. 
191  Benjamin,  'The  Concept  of  Criticism  in  German  Romanticism',  128;  cf.  139-40. 
192  Benjamin,  'The  Concept  of  Criticism  in  German  Romanticism',  129. 
193  Benjamin,  'The  Concept  of  Criticism  in  German  Romanticism',  120. 66 
without  limit  or  check,  and  the  thinking  given  form  in  reflection  turns  into  formless 
thinking  which  directs  itself  upon  the  Absolute'.  194  Where  Fichte  located  the  Absolute 
teleologically  in  the  deed-act  of  positing,  the  Romantics  regarded  the  Absolute 
immediately  as  the  infinite  staging  of  reflection  /  thinking.  19'  Consequently,  much  to 
the  disapproval  of  Benjamin,  the  Absolute  of  early  German  Romanticism  can  be 
distinguished  from  lower  forms  of  reflection  'only  in  quantity  and  not  in  qualitv.  i19b 
4.  The  Literary  Absolute 
It  is  not  hard  to  imagine  how  and  why  Melville  found  much  of  Romanticism 
so  immediately  engaging.  Like  Melville,  Friedrich  Schlegel  (arguably,  the  most 
important  philosophical  voice  of  early  German  Romanticism)  was  also  deeply 
ambivalent  about  the  novel.  Indeed,  it  is  precisely  this  ambivalence  that  lends  his 
engagement  with  the  novel  its  self-admitted  theological  proportions.  This  is  perhaps 
most  illustrated  when  Schlegel  writes:  'Only  through  religion  does  logic  become 
philosophy;  only  from  it  comes  everything  that  makes  philosophy  greater  than 
science.  And  instead  of  an  eternally  rich,  infinite  poetry,  the  lack  of  religion  gives  us 
194  Benjamin,  'The  Concept  of  Criticism  in  German  Romanticism',  129. 
195  Cf.,  'To  take  thinking  ...  merely  as  mediate  and  only  intuition  as  immediate  is  a  totally 
arbitrary  procedure  on  the  part  of  those  philosophers  who  assert  an  intellectual  intuition  [i.  e.,  Kant  and 
Fichte].  The  properly  immediate,  it  is  true,  is  feeling,  but  there  exists  also  an  immediate  thinking' 
(Friedrich  Schlegel,  Philosophische  Vorlesungen  (1804  bis  1807)  in  Kritische  Friednch-Schlegel- 
Ausgabe  (ed.  Jean-Jacques  Anstett*,  vol.  12;  Munich:  Sch6ningh,  355-56). 
196  Parlej,  The  Roniantic  Theorl,  of  the  Novel,  28.  For  further  elaboration  on  Benjamin's  strong 
reserý  ations  about  the  'sobriety'  of  the  Romantic  Absolute  (i.  e.,  its  profanation  /  loss  of  transccndence). 
scc  Gjasch6,  'The  Sober  Absolute',  63-68  (e.  g.,  'In  short,  the  Romantic  theory  according  to  which  the 
centres  of  reflection  can  be  elevated  to  the  medium  of  reflection  itself  through  reflexive  inten  s  ifi  cation 
condemns  the  medium  of  reflection,  or  the  Absolute,  to  being  only  the  enhanced  reflection  of  ýý  hatcý  er 
is  reflcctl\,  ely  raiscd  to  that  higher  level....  Such  an  understanding  of  the  Absolute  (or  of 
consciousness)  critails  a  loss  of  the  force  of  transcendence  and  the  relatl\  ization  of  difference  ...... 
reflection  that  knows  only  intensification,  and  not  the  possibility  of  diminishing,  presupposes  Lind 
ýisscrts  a  continuity  between  the  profane  and  the  Absolute  that  can  only  make  the  Absolute  tangible  as 
soinething  protane'  [63]). 67 
only  novels  or  the  triviality  that  now  is  called  art.  i197  Elsewhere,  Schlegel  writes  of  his 
disdain  for  the  modern  tendency  to  regard  the  novel  as  a  separate  genre:  'It  must  be 
clear  to  you  why,  according  to  my  views,  f  insist  that  all  poetry  should  be  romantic 
and  why  I  detest  the  novel  insofar  as  it  wants  to  be  a  separate  genre.  ""  As  Parlej 
notes,  on  one  hand,  Schlegel  is  compelled  to  condemn  the  novel  as  a  genre;  and  yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  he  invokes  its  'etymological  derivative',  romantic,  as  the  privileged 
characteristic  of'all  poetry'.  "'  For  Schlegel,  however,  such  ambiguity  is  itself 
constitutive  of  the  term  der  Roman,  for  it  'denotes  both  the  presence  of  the 
transcendental  subject  to  itself,  as  postulated  by  Kant's  philosophy,  and  a  literary 
genre  inherited  from  antiquity.  i20°  In  short,  then,  one  can  only  understand  the  nature  of 
Romantic  resistance  to  the  identifying  taxonomy  of  genre  (be  it  Melville's  or 
Schlegel's  resistance)  in  light  of  its  Kantian-inspired  conception  of  the  'transcendental' 
Subject. 
According  to  Schlegel  the  'subject-work,  i.  e.,  the  subject  in  the  process  of 
becoming,  cannot  be  bound  by  any  preexisting  aesthetic  rules,  or  even  the  intentions 
of  its  artist  or  author.  On  the  contrary,  in  the  infinite  play  of  the  poetic  absolute,  20' 
each  work  must  be  considered  separately  on  the  basis  of  its  own  immanent  laws.  He 
writes  in  Athenaeum  Fragment  51: 
197  Friedrich  Schlegel,  Tucinde'and  the  Fragments  (trans.  Peter  Firchow;  Minneapolis: 
University  of  Minnesota  Press,  1971),  242.  For  this  and  all  subsequent  citations  of  Critical  Fragments, 
Athenaeum  l,  'ragments,  and  Ideas  I  have  consulted  the  original  text  in  Charakteristiken  und  Kritiken  1, 
1796-  1801  in  Kritische  Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe  (ed.  Hans  Eichner;  vol.  2,  Munich:  Sch6ningh, 
1967). 
198  Friedrich  Schlegel,  Dialogue  on  Poetry,  101. 
199  Parlej,  The  Romantic  Theory  of  the  Novel,  2-3 
200  Parlej,  The  Romantic  Theory  of  the  Novel,  3.  Cf,  Hans  Eichner.  'Germany:  Romantisch- 
Roniantik-Roniantiker'  in  'Ronzantic-'and  Its  Cognates:  The  European  Histon,  of  a  Word  (ed.  Han-s 
Eichner,  Toronto:  University  of  Toronto  Press,  1972).  98-1-56. 
201  '.  All  the  sacred  plays  of  art  are  only  a  remote  imitation  of  the  infinite  play  of  thc  universe. 
the  work  of  art  \\  hich  cterrially  creates  itself  ane\\'  (Schlegel,  Dialogue  on  PoetrY.  89). 68 
The  beautiful,  poetical,  ideal  naive  must  combine  intention  and 
instinct.  The  essence  of  intention  in  this  sense  is  freedom,  though 
intention  isn't  consciousness  by  a  long  shot.  There  is  a  certain  kind  of 
self-infatuated  contemplation  of  one's  own  naturalness  or  silliness  that 
is  itself  unspeakably  silly.  Intention  doesn't  exactly  require  any  deep 
calculation  or  plan.  Even  Homeric  naivete  isn't  simply  instinctive. 
there  is  at  least  as  much  intention  in  it  as  there  is  in  the  grace  of  lovely 
children  or  innocent  girls.  And  if  Homer  himself  had  no  intentions,  his 
poetry  and  the  real  author  of  that  poetry,  Nature,  certainly  did.  202 
Such,  then,  is  the  goal  of  Schlegel's  proposed  'transcendental  poetry',  which  Maurice 
Blanchot  gracefully  describes  as  the  'the  site  wherein  poetry  will  no  longer  be  content 
to  produce  beautiful  determinate  works,  but  rather  will  produce  itself  in  a  movement 
without  term  and  without  determination'.  203  Indeed,  as  Ernst  Behler  notes,  this 
understanding  of  the  term  'transcendental'  is  truer  to  its  original  Kantian  sense  than  it 
was  to  Fichte.  204  Inasmuch  as  Kant  regarded  knowledge  as  'transcendental'  when  it  'is 
occupied  not  so  much  with  objects  as  with  the  mode  of  our  knowledge',  205  he 
effectively  bound  together  the  subject  of  knowledge  and  its  object.  Schlegel's 
contribution  to  the  term  is,  thus,  to  remove  any  determinate  distinction  between 
philosophy  and  poetry,  and  pull  into  the  latter  the  transcendental  /  reflective  activity 
of  the  former.  "' 
Hence,  Schlegel  writes  in  Athenaeum  Fragment  238,  'There  is  a  kind  of  poetry 
whose  essence  lies  in  the  relation  between  ideal  and  real,  and  which  therefore  by 
202  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'  and  the  Fragments,  167  [Athenaeum  Fragment  51]. 
203  Maurice  Blanchot,  The  Infinite  Conversation  (trans.  Susan  Hanson;  Minneapolis: 
University  of  Minnesota  Press,  1993).  354. 
204  Ernst  Behler,  German  Romantic  Literary  Theory  (Nc\\  York:  Cambridge  University  Press. 
1993),  138-39. 
205  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  59  (B25) 
206  (,  f-  'Transcendental  is  what  is,  should  be,  and  can  be  high  up,  transcendent  what  trics  to  be 
gh  tip,  but  can't  or  shouldn't  be.  It  would  be  slanderous  nonsense  to  belcNe  that  humanjtý  could  hig 
exceed  its  own  alm,  o\  crtax  its  o\\  n  powers,  or  that  philosophy  oughtn't  to  be  able  to  do  something  it 
wants  to  do  and  can  do'  (Schlegel,  'Lucinde'and  the  Fragments.  225  [Athenaeum  Fragment  388]). 69 
analogy  to  philosophical  jargon,  should  be  called  transcendental  poetry'.  20'  Such 
poetry,  he  continues,  must  'represent  the  producer  along  with  the  product'. 
Consequently,  he  concludes,  'this  poetry  should  describe  itself,  and  always  be 
simultaneously  poetry  and  the  poetry  of  poetry.  ',  08  The  emphasis,  then,  is  on  poetry  as 
radicalised  poesis  (i.  e.,  production),  rather  than  poetry  as  simply  a  product.  In  this 
way,  as  Philippe  Lacoue-Labarthe  and  Jean-Luc  Nancy  note  in  The  Literary  Absolute, 
Romantic  poetry  embodies  the  truth  of  poesis,  and  thus,  too,  the  truth  of  its  autopoesis 
/  self-production:  'And  if  it  is  true  ...  that  auto-production  constitutes  the  ultimate 
instance  and  closure  of  the  speculative  absolute,  then  romantic  thought  involves  not 
only  the  absolute  of  literature,  but  literature  as  the  absolute.  Romanticism  is  the 
inauguration  of  the  literary  absolute.  11209 
Apropos  the  Romantic  Absolute  as  a  'literary  absolute',  Schlegel's  classic 
formulation  of  Romantic  poetry  is  that  of  a  'progressive  universal  poetry'. 
Other  kinds  of  poetry  are  finished  and  are  now  capable  of  being  fully 
analysed.  The  romantic  kind  of  poetry  is  still  in  the  state  of  becoming; 
that,  in  fact,  is  its  real  essence:  that  it  should  forever  be  becoming  and 
never  be  perfected.  It  can  be  exhausted  by  no  theory  and  only  a 
divinatory  criticism  would  dare  try  to  characterise  its  ideal.  It  alone  is 
infinite,  just  as  it  alone  is  free;  and  it  recognizes  as  its  first 
commandment  that  the  will  of  the  poet  can  tolerate  no  law  above  itself. 
The  romantic  kind  of  poetry  is  the  only  one  that  is  more  than  a  kind, 
that  is,  as  it  were,  poetry  itself:  for  in  a  certain  sense  all  poetry  is  or 
should  be  romantic.  210 
Here,  the  aim  is  not  simply  to  find  interesting  connections  and  correlations  between 
poetry,  philosophy,  and  rhetoric  which  even  today  exemplifies  the  most  banal  sort 
207  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'  and  the  Fragments,  195. 
209  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'  and  the  Fragments,  195. 
209  Philippe  Lacoue-Labarthe  and  Jean-Luc  Nancy,  The  Lite  ra  rv  ,I  bsolute:  The  Theor.  11  of 
Literature  in  German  Romanticism  (trans.  Philip  Barnard  and  Cheryl  Lester;  Albany:  SUNY  Press. 
1989),  12. 
210  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'  and  the  Fragments,  175-76  [Athenaeum  Fragment  116]. 70 
of  interdisciplinarity 
-  but  actively  to  'fuse  poetry  and  prose,  inspiration  and 
criticism,  the  poetry  of  art  and  the  poetry  of  nature;  and  make  poetry  lively  and 
sociable,  and  life  and  society  poetic,  poeticize  wit  and  fill  and  saturate  the  forms  of 
and  with  every  kind  of  good,  solid  matters  for  instruction,  and  animate  them  with  the 
pulsations  of  humour.  ''" 
For  Schlegel,  because  it  can,  more  than  any  other  form,  'hover  at  the  midpoint 
between  the  portrayed  and  the  portrayer',  the  ideal  form  of  Romantic  poetry  /  poesis  is 
that  of  the  classical  epic.  21'  Elsewhere,  Schlegel  pronounces  that  where  the  lyrical  is 
'only  subjective',  and  the  dramatic  is  'only  objective',  the  epic  is  'subjective-objective' 
that  is,  neither  purely  subjective  nor  purely  objective.  213  Only  the  epic,  he  writes, 
in  accord  with  his  presentation  of  the  Absolute  in  Romantic  poetry,  is  'free  of  all  real 
and  ideal  self-interest,  and  can  raise  that  reflection  again  and  again  to  a  higher  power, 
can  multiply  it  in  an  endless  succession  of  mirrors.  ''14  The  closest  modern 
correspondence  to  the  epic,  in  its  self-realisation  as  infinite  reflection,  he  continues 
elsewhere,  is  the  novel.  "'  For  indeed,  'just  as  our  literature  began  with  the  novel,  so 
the  Greek  began  with  the  epic  and  dissolved  in  it'.  216 
I  would  suggest  that  Melville's  inability  to  contain  in  the  pages  of  Mardi  the 
full  scope  of  his  intellectual  development  is  perfectly  in  line  with  the  infinite 
reflective  aspirations  of  a  Romantic  novel.  Concerning  this,  Elizabeth  Foster's 
211  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'  acid  the  Fragments,  175. 
212  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'  and  the  Fragments,  175. 
213  Friedrich  Schlegel,  Literarv  Notebooks,  1797-1801  (ed.  Hans  Eichner;  Toronto.  University 
of'Toronto  Press,  1957),  48.  Cf.,  Laco  ue-Labarthe  and  Nancy,  The  Literan,  Absolute,  91-96,  and  Peter 
Szondi,  'Friedrich  Schlegel's  Theory  of  Poetical  Genres:  A  Reconstruction  from  the  Posthumous 
Fragnicrits'  in  On  Textual  Untlerstanding  and  Other  Essay  (trans.  Harvey  Mendelsohn;  %Minneapolis. 
Uni\ci-sity  of  Minnesota  Press,  1986),  75-94. 
214  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'  and  the  1'ragnºents,  175. 
215  Szondi,  'Friedrich  Schlegel's  Theory  of  Poetical  Genres',  89. 
216  Schlegel,  Dialogue  on  Poetry,  101. 71 
comment  is  particularly  apt: 
As  Mardi  deepened,  in  the  travelogue  chapters,  into  an  intermittent 
symposium  on  religion,  philosophy,  science,  politics,  and  the  poet's  art, 
on  faith  and  knowledge,  on  necessity  and  free  will,  on  time  and  death 
and  eternity,  Melville's  reading  and  also  his  writing  were  rushing  him 
into  such  an  intellectual  expansion  and  exhilaration  that  his  i,  ery  being 
was  ringing  with  the  voices  of  the  great  dead.  217 
Consequently,  Mardi  is  both  about  a  fantastical  journey  and  is  a  journey  into  itself. 
'From  first  to  last',  William  Charvat  very  astutely  writes,  'Melville  was  a  trial-and- 
error  experimental  writer  who  never  quite  knew  what  he  wanted  to  do  -  or  did  not 
want  to  do  -  until  he  did  It.  12  1X  What  begins,  then,  much  like  its  predecessors,  with  its 
stated  intention  intact,  i.  e.,  a  story  of  the  whaling  industry  in  the  South  Seas,  "' 
becomes  an  open  invitation  for  readers  to  join  him  on  an  exploratory  voyage 
unfettered  by  the  constraints  of  journalistic  fact:  "'Oh,  reader,  list!  I've  chartless 
voyaged.  With  compass  and  the  lead,  we  had  not  found  these  Mardian  Isles.  Those 
who  boldly  launch,  cast  off  all  cables"'.  22°  A  journalistic  travel  narrative  moored  by 
the  Aristotelian  confines  of  beginning,  middle,  and  ending  is,  thus,  effectively 
replaced  by  an  expedition  through  the  uncharted  'world  of  mind;  wherein  the 
wanderer  may  gaze  round,  with  more  of  wonder  than  Balboa's  band  roving  through 
the  golden  Aztec  glades.  t22'  As  we  noted  in  Nina  Baym's  argument  discussed  above  in 
Chapter  One,  where  Melville  is  regarded  as  breaching  his  'genre  contract'  with 
217  Foster,  'Historical  Note',  661  (emphasis  mine). 
218  Charvat,  The  Profession  of  Authorship  in  Anierica,  223.  In  this  Melville's  journey  as  the 
author  of  Mardi  is  not  at  all  unlike  that  of  the  poet  Lombardo,  as  described  in  Mardi:  'When  Lombardo 
sct  about  his  work,  he  knew  not  what  it  would  become.  He  did  not  build  himself  in  with  plans;  he 
wrote  on;  and  so  doing,  got  deeper  and  deeper  into  himself-,  and  like  a  resolute  traveler,  plunging 
through  baffling  woods,  at  last  was  rewarded  for  his  tolls'  (Melville,  Mardi,  595). 
2  19  Early  in  the  writing  of  Mardi,  Melville  wrote  to  John  Murray,  indicating  that  he  ýýas 
writing  it  scquei  to  Oinoo  ('a  bona-fide  narrativc  of  my  adventures  in  the  Pacific,  continued  from 
"Ornoo'")  (Mel\rille,  Correspondence,  98,106). 
220  M1rl\villc.  Mardi,  SS6. 
221  Melville,  Mardi,  557. 72 
journalistic  writing  in  Tvpee  and  Omoo,  in  Mardi  we  find  him  beginning  a  self- 
conscious  trend  of  doing  the  same  with  that  of  fiction  as  well.  222  What  Baym  fails  to 
note,  however,  is  that  this  resistance  to  fictive  protocol  is,  in  the  Romantic  novel,  the 
very  mark  of  this  fiction's  truth. 
As  Benjamin  notes,  if  the  Romantic  novel  is  the  'comprehensible 
manifestation'  [lassbare  Erscheinung]  of  the  Absolute,  i.  e.,  as  both  'poetry  and  the 
poetry  of  poetry',  it  is  so  precisely  because  their  notion  of  transcendental  poetry  'has 
found  its  individuality 
... 
in  the  form  of  prose;  the  early  Romantics  know  no  deeper 
or  better  detennination  for  it  than  "prose"'.  223  On  its  most  proper  level,  prose  refers  to 
ordinary  speech  not  bound  by  meter  or  rhythm  [ungebundene  Rede];  and  yet,  as 
Gasche  points  out,  on  another,  more  figural  /  improper  level,  prose  indicates  that 
which  is  plain,  ordinary,  or  prosaic.  Importantly,  though,  for  the  Romantics  there 
could  be  no  such  definitive  differentiation.  "'  On  the  contrary,  Gasch6  writes,  'it  is  this 
very  lack  of  differentiation,  this  ambiguity  of  meaning,  that  predestines  prose  to 
become  the  comprehensible  manifestation  of  the  Absolute'.  225  In  other  words, 
inasmuch  as  prose  marks  the  failed  distinction  of  proper  and  improper  /  subject  and 
object,  the  untold  ambiguity  of  its  self-becoming  in  the  novel  (i.  e.,  a  'writing  as 
infinite  scripting  (of)  scripting  itself)  gives  fonn  to  the  Infinite  reflection  of  the  poetic 
Absolute.  226 
222  Baym,  'Melville's  Quarrel  with  Fiction',  912-13. 
223  Benjamin,  'The  Concept  of  Criticism',  173. 
224  Cf.,  Athenaeum  Fragment  395:  'In  true  prose  everything  has  to  be  underlined'  (Schlegel, 
Tiwiflde'and  the  1"ragments,  227). 
5  Gasche,  'The  Sober  Absolute',  65. 
226  Parlej,  The  Romantic  Theory,  of  the  Novel,  34. I 
5.  Romantic  Irony  and  the  Duplicity  of  Self-Assertion 
Furthen-nore,  in  his  subsequent  declaration  that  every  'theory  of  the  novel  must 
itself  be  a  novel  which  would  reflect  imaginatively  every  eternal  tone  of  the 
imagination',  "'  Schlegel  radicalises  the  existing  concept  of  irony  to  the  point  of 
making  it  his  own.  "'  Traditionally,  irony  had  been  merely  the  rhetorical  trope 
whereby  a  speaker's  meaning  and  intention  are  opposed  to  what  he  or  she  actually 
says  . 
22"  Aristotle,  for  example,  highlights  the  irony  of  self-deprecating  humour, 
regarding  its  use  as  both  wise  and  polite  . 
2"  For  him,  in  contrast  to  Plato,  in  whose 
presentation  irony  is often  regarded  as  hypocritical  or  duplicitous,  the  quintessence  of 
irony  as  a  noble  trope  is  the  elusive  and  often  humorous  self-deprecation  of 
Socrates.  "'  indeed,  for  Aristotle,  it  was  precisely  this  ironic  elusiveness  that  made 
Socrates  such  an  effective,  exemplary  communicator. 
Schlegel  would  certainly  affirm  this,  albeit  with  a  twist;  namely,  that  the  full 
truth  and  nobility  of  Socrates'  ironic  rhetoric  cannot  be  reduced  simply  to  his  ability  to 
disguise  himself  and  his  intentions.  "'  On  the  contrary,  apropos  the  problems  of  self- 
227  Schlegel,  Dialogue  on  Poetr  v,  102-03.  Piotr  Parlej  sums  this  up  nicely:  'The  romantic 
novel  reflects  (works)  on  itself  to  produce  itself  (the  work)  and,  in  this  production,  to  accomplish  itself 
as  itself  (The  Romantic  Theory  of  the  Novel,  19). 
22  '  Behler,  German  Romantic  Theor 
, 
v,  141-43;  cf.,  Ernst  Behler,  lronY  and  the  Discourse  of 
Modernitv  (Seattle:  Univ.  of  Washington  Press,  1990),  73-110. 
229  Cicero,  De  Oratore,  I  (Loeb  Classical  Library;  trans.  E.  W.  Sutton;  Cambridge,  Mass.; 
Harvard  University  Press,  1942),  2.67.270-272.1  am  for  much  that  follows  here  indebted  to  Ernst 
Behler's  elaboration  of  the  historical  rise  and  development  of  irony  in  his  German  Romantic  Theorv. 
143-46. 
230  Cf.,  'Some  of  the  forms  befit  a  gentleman,  and  some  do  not;  irony  befits  him  more  than 
does  bufoonery.  The  jests  of  the  ironical  man  are  at  his  own  expense;  the  buffoon  excites  laughter  at 
others'  (Rhetoric  of  Aristotle  [trans.  Richard  Claverhouse  Jebb;  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University 
Press,  1909],  115  [3.18.14]9b7l);  'Irony  is  the  contrary  to  boastful  exaggeration,  it  is  a  self-deprecating 
conccalment  of  one's  powers  and  possessions  -  it  shows  better  taste  to  deprecate  than  to  exaggerate 
one's  virtucs  (Niconzachcan  Ethics  [trans.  Terence  Irwin;  Indianapolis:  Hackett  Publishing,  19851, 
1108a]9-23,1127a2O-26. 
Aristotle,  Nic  omaehean  Ethics,  1  127b22-6. 
232  Such  N\  as  the  explanation  of  Alcibiades,  in  Plato's  Svniposhim:  '[Socrates]  spends 
his  whole 
life  pretending  and  playin-g  with  people,  and  I  doubt  whether  anyone  has  c\cr  seen  the  treasurcs  that  are 74 
presentation  already  seen  in  the  work  of  Hen-nan  Melville,  for  Schlegel  the  truth  of 
Socratic  irony  is  precisely  that  self-reference  /  self-presentation  necessarily  carries 
one  beyond  oneself  and  one's  intentions.  He  writes  in  Critical  Fragment  108: 
Socratic  irony  is  the  only  involuntary  and  yet  completely  deliberate 
dissimulation.  It  is  equally  impossible  to  feign  it  or  divulge  it.  To  a 
person  who  hasn't  got  it,  it  will  remain  a  riddle  even  after  it  is openly 
confessed.  It  is  meant  to  deceive  no  one  except  those  who  consider  it  a 
deception  and  who  either  take  pleasure  in  the  delightful  roguery  of 
making  fools  of  the  whole  world  or  else  become  angry  when  they  get 
an  inkling  they  themselves  might  be  included....  It  contains  and 
arouses  a  feeling  of  indissoluble  antagonism  between  the  absolute  and 
the  relative,  between  the  impossibility  and  the  necessity  of  complete 
communication.  It  is  the  freest  of  all  licenses,  for  by  its  means  one 
transcends  oneself;  and  yet  it  is  also  the  most  lawful,  for  it  is  absolutely 
necessary.  It  is a  very  good  sign  when  the  harmonious  bores  are  at  a 
loss  about  how  they  should  react  to  this  continuous  self-parody,  when 
they  fluctuate  endlessly  between  belief  and  disbelief  until  they  get 
dizzy  and  take  what  is  meant  as  ajoke  seriously  and  what  is  meant 
seriously  as  a  joke.  "' 
That  is  to  say,  Socratic  irony  mediates  the  Absolute,  as  a  convergence  of  the 
impossible  (i.  e.,  stable  self-reference)  and  the  necessarv  (Le.,  unavoidable  self- 
reference),  in  a  self-presentation  whose  truth  is  precisely  that  it  is  neither  complete 
nor  stable.  Thus  we  have,  he  argues,  novels  like  Tristram  Shandy,  Don  Qiii'Xote,  and 
Wilhelin  Meister  (and,  we  might  add,  A  Heartbreaking  Work  of  Staggering  Genius), 
which  attempt  to  present  their  own  self-becoming,  but  realise  it  only  as  a  structural 
excess  that  cannot  be  completely  presented.  Such  novels,  in  fact,  'are  the  Socratic 
dialogues  of  our  time;  that  is,  the  unendingly  ironic  accounts  of  their  own  self- 
revcýiled  when  he  grows  serious  and  exposes  what  he  keeps  inside'(Plato,  Symposium  [trans. 
Chrisopher  Gill;  New  York:  Penguin,  1999],  55  [216d]). 
233  Schlegel,  Tucinde'and  the  Fragments,  15  5.  Soren  Klerkegaard  characterises  Socrates' 
ironic  Sub 
, 
jectivity  (i.  e.,  'I  know  that  I  do  not  know')  similarly,  as  'absolute  infinite  negati\  ity'.  'it  is.  '  he 
rites,  'negativity  because  it  negates,  it  Is  infinite  because  it  negates  not  this  or  that  phenomenon-,  and  it 
is  absolute  because  it  negates  by  N  irtue  of  a  higher  which  is  not.  Iron 
,v 
establishes  nothing,  for  that 
which  is  to  be  established  hes  bchind  it'  (The  Concel7t  of  Irony  [trans.  Lee  M.  Capel;  Bloomington: 
Indiana  Uni\ci-sity  Press,  1965],  278,  emphasis  mine). 75 
production  in  the  face  of  infinite  reflectivity.  and,  thus,  only  truly  themselves  in  the 
active  critique  of  their  constitutive  failures.  2' 
It  is  in  light  of  Romantic  irony  that  the  profound  importance  of  Melville's 
review  of  Nathaniel  Hawthorne's  Mossesfrom  an  Old  Manse  becomes  apparent.  Of 
course,  Melville's  review,  'Hawthorne  and  His  Mosses'  [  1850],  is  already  enveloped 
by  a  certain  mythos  of  importance  that  has  been  created  for  it  by  contemporary 
scholarship.  'The  action  of  "Hawthorne  and  His  Mosses"',  Richard  Brodhead 
suggests,  'is  of  Melville's  first  thinking  a  new  idea  of  authorship,  then,  on  the  basis  of 
that  thought,  emboldening  himself  to  assert  his  own  literary-prophetical  vocation.  "" 
Brodhead's  assessment  represents  a  norm,  as  is  also  the  case  regarding  Mardi,  to  read 
the  essay  as  a  re-articulation  of  Melville's  sense  of  independence  as  a  writer.  "'  What  I 
wish  to  suggest,  though,  is  that  to  miss  the  complex  irony  of  Melville's  'Independence' 
as  a  writer  is  also  to  miss  most  of  what  sustains  the  aesthetic  vitality  of  his  works. 
What  we  should  not  fail  to  notice  in  our  reading  offlawthome  and  His 
Mosses'  is  that  even  after  having  written  five  major  novels  Melville  remains  as  though 
a  character.  Indeed,  he  is  so  immersed  in  his  texts  that  one  reviewer  for  The  Home 
Journal  notes:  'Herman  Melville  with  his  cigar  and  his  Spanish  eyes,  talks  Typee  and 
Omoo,  just  as  you  find  the  flow  of  his  delightful  mind  on  paper.  Those  who  have  only 
read  his  books  know  the  man  -  those  who  have  only  see  the  man  have  a  fair  idea  of 
2ý4  Schlegel,  Tucinde'and  the  Fragments,  14S  [Critical  Fragment  26]. 
235  Richard  H.  Brodhead,  The  School  of  Hawthorne  (Nc\N  York:  Oxford  Unkersity  Press. 
1986),  29. 
23  "  For  traditional  readings  in  this  Ncin,  see  Gilliam  Brown,  Individualism:  Iniagilling  Self  ill 
Niiieteetith-('(,  iitiii-.  i,,,  Iitiei-i(-ei  (Berkeley  and  Los  Angeles:  Unk  crsity  of  California  Press,  1990),  138- 
fI  is  inceton:  43,  Wai-clice  Dirnock,  Empirejor  Libertv:  Melville  and  the  Poetics  o  Ind'vidual'  ill  (Pri 
Princeton  Uni\  ersity  Press,  1989),  140-4  1,  and  James  R.  Mello\\,  Nathaniel  Hentthome  in  His  Tunes 
(Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin,  1980),  333-36. 76 
his  books.  ""  If  Melville  the  author  cannot  be  unambiguously  differentiated  f'rom  the 
'Melville'of  page  and  pen,  the  problems  of  beginning  and  ending  highlighted  in 
Chapter  One  recur  endlessly,  and  his  declarations  of  authorial  /  creative  independence 
must  necessarily  be  re-thought. 
Only  with  this  in  mind  can  we  fully  appreciate  the  irony  of  duplicitous  self- 
characterisation  in'Hawthome  and  His  Mosses',  whose  purported  author,  'A  Virginian 
Spending  July  in  Vermont',  "'  we  know  from  letters  to  and  from  Evert  Duyckinck,  "' 
was  Melville,  a  New  Yorker  living  in  Massachusetts.  240  We  have  seen  this  kind  of 
behaviour  in  Melville  before,  of  course,  but  nowhere  is  it  as  significant.  For,  indeed, 
as  Ellen  Weinauer  points  out,  inasmuch  as  here  Melville  disguises  himself  when 
declaring  his  creative  autonomy,  he  is  also  in  essence  'disclaiming  ownership  of  his 
own  text'.  241  That  is  to  say,  we  have  Melville  at  a  distant  remove  from  his  declared 
freedom  -  i.  e.,  Melville  playing  'Melville'  playing  'a  Virginian'  declaring  his 
authorial  freedom.  "'  And  thus  returns  the  formative  problem  of  all  of  Melville's 
237  Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  1:  320  (emphasis  his). 
238  Melville,  The  Piazza  Tales,  239. 
239  Melville,  Correspondence,  165-68.  Duyckinck  published  the  two-part  essay  in  the  17 
August  and  24  August  editions  of  the  Literary  World. 
240  Melville's  identity  remained  a  secret  to  Hawthorne  for  a  few  weeks  after  publication,  until 
Melville  admitted  his  authorship  during  his  first  visit  to  Hawthorne's  home.  Of  this  tendency  of 
Melville  to  communicate  more  through  silence  and  secrecy,  see,  Sophia  Hawthorne's  letter  to  her  sister: 
[Melville]  told  me  he  was  naturally  so  silent  a  man,  that  he  was  complained  of  a  great 
deal  on  this  account;  ... 
He  said  Mr  Hawthorne's  great  but  hospitable  silence  drew 
him  out  -  that  it  was  astonishing  how  sociable  his  silence  was....  He  said 
sometimes  they  would  walk  along  without  talking  on  either  side,  but  that  even  then 
they  seemed  to  be  very  social.  (Leyda,  The  Melville  Log,  2.924-25) 
"'  Ellen  Weinauer,  'Plagiarism  and  the  Proprietary  Self.  Policing  the  Boundaries  of 
Authorship  in  Herman  Melville's  "Haxvthorne  and  His  Mosses...  American  Literature  69  (Dec.,  1997), 
701. 
242  Yet  another  layer  of  duplicity,  or  at  least  ironic  ambiguity,  is  the  Virginian's  claim  to  have 
never  met  Hawthorne.  Whatever  one  wishes  to  make  of  such  a  claim  when  it  comes  from  a  fictional 
narrator,  the  general  consensus  of  Melville's  biographers  is  that  ,t  most  II  kely  was  not  true  ot'him. 
Nlelville's  meeting  with  Ha\\thorne  has  taken  on  epic  proportions  in  %lei\  ille  /  Hawthorne  studies.  The 
iliceling  took  place  on  5  August  1850,  at  a  picnic  on  Monument  Mountain,  \0en  Bert  Duvckinck 
introduced  him  to  Hawthorne  and  Oliver  W'endell  Holmes,  among  others.  For  the  best  discussion  of 77 
previous  novels:  to  whom  should  we  accredit  a  novel  whose  author  suggests  'the 
names  of  all  fine  authors  are  fictitious  ones'? 
For  Schlegel,  the  infinite  unfolding  of  this  question  -  that  of  the  relationship 
between  propriety  and  impropriety,  universal  poetry  and  prose  -  is  the  task  of  a 
philosophical  thinking  that  is  also  a  progression  of  mind.  "'  Such  irony,  he  adds 
elsewhere,  is  'logical  beauty'.  "'  As  Andrew  Bowie  explains,  this  is  because  it  Is 
dependent  on  an  assertion  (logos)  that  'negates  itself  without  leading  to  a  final 
opposed  positive  position.  The  final  position  is,  for  Schlegel,  only  ever  pointed  to  by 
the  failure  of  attempts  to  ground  a  philosophical  system.  ""  Therefore,  for  Schlegel 
and  the  early  Romantics,  it  is  only  in  an  ironic  failure  of  self-assertion  that  the  world 
is  ever  meaningful  at  all.  "' 
the  events  surrounding  the  composition  and  publication  of  the  essay,  see  Hershel  Parker,  Herman 
Melville:  A  Biography:  Volume  1,1819-1851  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  University  Press,  1996),  752- 
81.  For  a  range  of  insights,  see  Merton  M.  Sealts,  Jr.,  'Historical  Note',  The  Piazza  Tales  and  Other 
Prose  Pieces  1839-1860,  by  Herman  Melville  (eds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thomas 
Tanselle;  vol.  9  of  The  Writings  of  Herman  Melville;  Evanston  and  Chicago:  Northwestern  University 
Press  and  The  Newberry  Library,  1987),  471-76;  Leon  Howard,  Herman  Melville:  A  Biography 
(Berkeley  and  Los  Angeles:  University  of  California  Press,  1951),  154-58;  Edwin  Haviland  Miller, 
Melville  (New  York:  Venture  Books,  1975),  19-36.  Laurie  Roberton-Lorant  is  one  of  the  remaining 
voices  of  dissent  who  maintain  that  Melville  wrote  the  essay  prior  to  meeting  Hawthorne;  see  her 
Melville:  A  Biography,  244-55. 
243  Melville,  The  Piazza  Tales,  239. 
244  Cf.,  'The  philosophy  of  a  human  being  is  the  history,  the  becoming,  the  progression  of  his 
mind,  the  gradual  formation  and  development  of  his  thoughts'  (Friedrich  Schlegel,  Wissenschaft  der 
Europäischen  Literatur:  Vorlesungen,  Aufsätze  und  Fragment  aus  der  Zeit  von  1795-1804  in  Kritische 
Friedrich-  Schlegel-Ausgabe  [cd.  Ernst  Behler;  vol.  11;  Munich:  Sch6ningh,  1958],  118).  Ernst  Behler 
cites  Platonic  /  Socratic  'dialectics'  as  the  most  technical  example  of  this  for  Schlegel  (German 
Romantic  Literary  Theory,  147).  Indeed,  Schlegel  notes,  for  Platonever  finished  with  his  thought,  and 
this  constant  further  striving  of  his  thought  for  completed  knowledge  and  the  highest  cognition,  this 
eternal  becoming,  forming,  and  developing  of  his  ideas,  he  has  tried  to  shape  artistically  in  dialogues' 
(Schlegel,  Wissenschaft  der  Europäischen  Literatur,  120). 
245  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'and  the  Fragments,  148  [Critical  Fragment  42]. 
246  Andrew  Bowie,  From  Romanticism  to  Critical  Theoq:  The  Philosopkv  of  German  Literar.  y 
Theorý,  (London  and  New  York:  Routledge,  1997),  86-87.  Cf,  'A  work  is  cultivated  when  it  is 
everywhere  sharply  delimited  but  within  those  limits  limitless  and  inexhaustible;  when  it  is  completely 
faithful  to  itself,  entirely  homogenous,  and  nonetheless  exalted  above  itself  (Schlegel,  Tucinde'and  the 
Fragments,  204  [Athenaeum  Fragment  297]). 
247  Although  they  agree  that  it  heralds  the  infinite  unfolding  of  temporal  meaningfulness, 
Schlegel's  assessment  of  Socratic  irony  stands  in  significant  contrast  to  that  of  Wayne  Booth,  for  whom 
it  is'infinite  but  somehow  stable'.  As  'the  ironist  of  infinities',  Booth  asserts,  the  lesson  of  Socratic 78 
As  such,  meaningfulness,  beauty,  and  truth  are  bound  together  in  the  early 
Romantics'  characterisation  of  irony  as  the  continuous  fluctuation  'between  self- 
creation  and  self-destruction'.  "'  In  a  manner  at  first  similar  to  what  we  have  already 
seen  in  Chapter  One  regarding  Melville's  sense  of  self-assertion  as  self-violence, 
Schlegel  holds  this  as  the  ideal  (i.  e.,  'naive')  counterpoint  to  the  self-consciousness  of 
intention  or  instinct,  that'the  most  intense  passion  is  eager  to  wound  itself,  if  only  to 
act  and  to  discharge  its  excessive  power'.  "'  Here,  truth  emerges  only  in  its  continual 
recontextualisation  and  the  necessary  rejection  of  any  teleological  notion  of  its  being 
'absolute  truth'. 
Truth  arises  when  opposed  errors  neutralise  each  other.  Absolute  truth 
cannot  be  admitted;  and  this  is  the  testimony  for  the  freedom  of 
thought  and  of  spirit.  If  absolute  truth  were  found  then  the  business  of 
spirit  would  be  completed  and  it  would  have  to  cease  to  be,  since  it 
only  exists  in  activity.  "' 
irony  is  'that  there  is,  after  all,  a  Supreme  Ironist,  truth  itself,  standing  in  his  temple  above  us,  observing 
all  authors  and  readers  in  their  comic  or  pathetic  or  tragic  efforts  to  climb  and  join  him'  (A  Rhetoric  of 
Irony  [Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  19741,268-69).  Schlegel,  however,  cannot  abide  any 
sense  of  truth  as  an  'untouched'  transcendence;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  either  already  involved  in  the  ironic 
play  of  infinite  reflectivity,  or  it  is  not  truth  at  all. 
248  Schlegel,  'Lucinde'and  the  Fragments,  167  [Athenaeum  Fragment  51];  cf,  , 
146-47  [Critical 
Fragment  37]. 
249  Friedrich  Schlegel,  Studien  des  Klassischen  Altertums  in  Kritische  Friedrich-Schlegel- 
Ausgabe  (ed.  Ernst  Behler;  vol.  1;  Munich:  Sch6ningh,  1979),  403.  In  other  contexts,  Schlegel 
describes  irony  as  'permanent  parabasis',  those  digressive  moments  in  ancient  Greek  dramas  and 
comedies  where  the  chorus  interrupts  the  action  of  the  play  and  addresses  the  audience  (Philosophische 
Lehrjahre,  1796-1806:  nebst  Philosophischen  Manuskripten  aus  den  Jahren  1796-1828  in  Kritische 
Friedrich-  Schlegel-Ausgabe  [ed.  Ernst  Behler;  vol.  18;  Munich:  Sch6ningh,  1963],  85).  As  such,  his 
comments  on  parabasis  in  the  comedies  of  Aristophanes  are  especially  appropriate  to  his  overall  theory 
of  irony:  'This  self-infliction  is  not  ineptitude,  but  deliberate  impetuousness,  overflowing  vitality,  and 
often  has  not  a  bad  effect,  indeed  stimulates  the  effect,  since  it  cannot  totally  destroy  the  illusion.  The 
most  intense  agility  of  life  must  act,  even  destroy;  if  it  does  not  find  an  external  object,  it  reacts  against 
a  beloved  one,  against  itself,  against  its  own  creation.  This  agility  then  injures  in  order  to  excite,  not  to 
destroy'  (Schlegel,  Studien  des  Klassischen  Altertums,  30). 
250  Friedrich  Schlegel,  Transcendentalphilosophie  (ed.  Michael  Els5sser;  Hamburg:  F.  Meiner. 
1991),  93. 79 
As  with  the  'prosaic'nature  of  the  Romantic  Absolute  discussed  above,  then,  Schlegel 
describes  'all-  highest  truths'  as  'thoroughly  trivial';  that  is,  only  absolute  insofar  as  they 
are  infinitely,  and  thus  contradictorily,  expressed  anew.  "' 
6.  The  Poet  and  Author  as  Romantic  Ideal 
For  Schlegel,  the  problem  with  modem  literature  is,  in  effect,  that  it  had  lost 
its  soul.  In  his  Dialogue  on  Poetry,  he  writes: 
I  will  go  right  to  the  point.  Our  poetry,  I  maintain,  lacks  a  focal  point, 
such  as  mythology  was  for  the  ancients;  and  one  could  summarize  all 
the  essentials  in  which  modem  poetry  is  inferior  to  the  ancients  in 
these  words:  We  have  no  mythology.  "' 
By  'mythology',  Schlegel  refers  here  to  the  'firm  basis'  of  poetic  activity,  i.  e.,  a 
communal  matrix  of  metaphor,  image,  and  allegory  through  which  an  age 
communicates  truth  and  beauty.  The  absence  of  this,  he  argues,  is  the  saddest 
philosophical  and  cultural  legacy  of  the  Enlightenment.  Inasmuch  as  it  lost  sight  of 
infinite  thought,  he  reasoned,  it  also  lost  the  deep  meaningfulness  of  beauty  and  truth. 
Schlegel,  nevertheless,  can  but  speak  only  in  the  broadest  of  terrns  when  it  comes  to 
his  prophetic  conviction  that'we  are  close  to  obtaining  one  [a  mythology];  or,  rather, 
251  Schlegel,  'Llicinde'and  the  Fragments,  263  ['On  Incomprehensibility'].  This  is  illustrated 
perhaps  best  in  the  aphoristic  nature  of  Schlegel's  'Critical  Fragments',  'Athenaeum  Fragments',  and 
'Ideas'.  Although  many  of  the  individual  fraginents  make  universal  claims,  the  Romantic  Absolute  can 
only  be  understood  through  the  juxtaposition  of  such  fragments  with  others  that  often  intimate 
contradictory  universal  claims.  Hence,  Bowie  points  out,  the  Romantic  philosophical  disposition 
toward  literature:  'Literature  depends  on  the  freedom  of  the  imagination  to  move  beyond  any  particular 
determination,  without  any  obligation  to  arrive  at  a  conclusion,  and  its  goal  ...  is  continually  to  render 
the  world  meaningful  by  connecting  its  aspects  in  new  constellations'  (Bowie,  From  Romanticism  to 
Critical  7'heor 
, 
v,  78).  The  obvious  danger  of  this,  of  course,  is  that  such  an  emphasis  on  indi  ý  iduality 
and  freedom  might  degenerate  into  incoherence,  whereby  each  person  is  freed  to  craft  his  or  her  own 
nicaning.  Schlegel  avoids  the  nihilism  of  this  trap,  however,  by  maintaining  that  Romantic  poetry  is 
focused  on  an  aesthetic  truth,  whose  infinite,  active  unfolding  of  itself  asfragnientar  ,v 
allows  conflict 
or  differentiation  between  meanings  to  be  recognisable  as  such.  Andrew  Bowie  likens  this  to  the 
shattering  of  metaphysical  correspondence  theories  of  truth  in  the  early  Heideggerian  sense  of'world- 
disclosure'.  See  From  Romanticism  to  Critical  Theorv,  138-44,170-82. 
,  -S2  Schlcgcl,  Dialogue  on  Poetr.  v,  8  1. 80 
it  is  time  that  we  earnestly  work  together  to  create  one  . 
'25'  Later  in  his  Dialogue  on 
Poetr.  N,,,  he  describes  this  hope  for'an  age  of  rejuvenation',  that  moment  in  time  in 
which'all  disciplines  and  all  arts  will  be  seized  by  the  great  revolution' 
: 
254 
And  thus  let  us,  by  light  and  life,  hesitate  no  longer,  but  accelerate, 
each  according  to  his  own  mind,  that  great  development  to  which  we 
were  called.  Be  worthy  of  the  greatness  of  the  age  and  the  fog  will 
vanish  from  your  eyes;  and  there  will  be  light  before  you.  All  thinking 
is  divining,  but  man  is only  now  beginning  to  realize  his  divining 
power.  What  immense  expanse  will  this  power  experience,  and 
especially  now!  It  seems  to  me  that  he  who  could  understand  the  age 
-  that  is,  those  great  principles  of  general  rejuvenation  and  of  eternal 
revolution  -  would  be  able  to  succeed  in  grasping  the  poles  of 
mankind,  to  recognize  and  to  know  the  activity  of  the  first  men  as  well 
as  the  nature  of  the  Golden  Age  which  is  to  come.  Then  the  empty 
chatter  would  stop  and  man  would  become  conscious  of  what  he  is:  he 
would  understand  the  earth  and  the  sun.  255 
Schlegel's  goal  in  and  for  Romanticism,  as  such,  is  nothing  less  than  the  creation  of  a 
new  heaven  and  a  new  earth. 
By  the  mid-  I  830s  in  the  United  States  no  one  took  upon  himself  the 
revolutionary  zeal  of  Romanticism  quite  like  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson.  Indeed,  if 
Melville  were  to  have  an  equal,  and  quite  possibly  a  greater,  in  terms  of  his  Germanic 
philosophical  disposition,  it  would  be  found  in  Emerson.  "'  Drawing  deeply  from  his 
readings  of  Coleridge  and  Carlyle,  and  then  the  likes  of  Kant,  Schelling,  Schlegel,  and 
Hegel  (amongst  others),  "'  Emerson's  Transcendentalism  is  a  perfect  embodiment  of 
the  Romantic  spirit  that  would  both  attract  and  repel  Melville. 
253  Schlegel,  Dialogue  on  Poetry,  8  1. 
254  Schlegel,  Dialogue  on  PoetrY,  83. 
255  Schlegel,  Dialgoue  on  Poetty,  88. 
256  Cf.,  Pochmann,  German  Culture  in  America,  158-207-,  Gura,  The  wisdom  of  Words.  75- 
105. 
257  Pochmann,  German  Culture,  172. 81 
As  with  Schlegel,  Emerson's  aesthetic  inquiries  are  charged  with  his 
theologico-revolutionary  language  and  intentions.  He  begins  his  essay'The  Poet' 
[  1844],  for  example,  with  a  radical,  aesthetic  redefining  of  the  Trinity: 
For  the  Universe  has  three  children,  bom  at  one  time,  which  reappear, 
under  different  names,  in  every  system  of  thought,  whether  by  be 
called  cause,  operation,  and  effect;  or,  more  poetically,  Jove,  Pluto, 
Neptune;  or,  theologically,  the  Father,  the  Spirit,  and  the  Son,  but 
which  we  will  call  here,  the  Knower,  the  Doer,  and  the  Sayer.  These 
stand  respectively  for  the  love  of  truth,  for  the  love  of  good,  and  for  the 
love  of  beauty.  These  three  are  equal.  258 
Emerson's  point  is  reiterated  throughout  the  essay:  the  poet  is  as  Christ,  and  Christ  is 
as  the  poet.  Like  Christ,  the  poet  is  'the  [sovereign]  representative  of  man',  the  one 
who'stands  among  partial  men  for  the  complete  man.  "'  While  exploring  this 
thought,  as  Philip  Gura  writes,  'Emerson  sounds  as  though  he  were  making  a  narration 
of  the  influence  of  saving  grace  upon  his  soul.  ""  For,  indeed,  as  Emerson  writes, 
poets  are  'liberating  gods',  who  'in  any  forin,  whether  in  an  ode,  or  in  action,  or  in 
looks  and  behavior,  [have]  yielded  us  a  new  thought.  He  unlocks  our  chains,  and 
admits  us  to  a  new  scene.  '26' 
The  purpose  of  Emerson's  theologising,  as  such,  remains  very  much  in  the 
vein  of  Schlegel's  'new  mythology'.  In  contrast  to  the  mystic,  who  mistakes  'an 
accidental  and  individual  symbol  for  an  universal  one',  the  poet  knows  that  'all 
symbols  are  fluxional;  all  language  is  vehicular  and  transitive,  and  is  good,  as  ferries 
25  8  Ralph  Waldo  Emerson,  'The  Poet'  in  Self-  Relim  z  ce  and  Other  Essays  (Ncýý  York:  Dover, 
1993),  67. 
'5() 
Emerson,  'The  Poet',  66-67. 
2""  Gura,  The  Wisdom  Words,  101.  Cf.,  'With  what  joy  I  begin  to  read  a  poem,  which  I 
confide  in  as  an  inspiration!  And  now  my  chains  are  to  be  broken-,  I  shall  mount  above  these  clouds 
and  opaque  airs  in  which  I  fiN  c.  --  opaque  though  they  seem  transparent,  --  and  from  the  heaNcris  of 
truth  I  shall  scc  and  comprehend  my  relations.  That  will  reconcile  me  to  life,  and  renovate  nature,  to 
scc  trif1cs  miniated  by  a  tendency,  and  to  kno\\  \\hat  I  am  doing'  (Emerson,  'The  Poet',  69). 
261  Enierson,  'The  Poet'.  77,78. 82 
and  horses  are,  for  conveyance,  not  as  fanns  and  houses  are,  for  homestead. 
1-262  As  a 
result,  then,  the  beauty  and  truth  of  poetry  is  not  in  its  being  written  or  spoken. 
For  poetry  was  all  written  before  time  was,  and  whenever  we  are  so 
finely  organized  that  we  can  penetrate  into  that  region  where  the  air  is 
music,  we  hear  those  primal  warblings,  and  attempt  to  write  them 
down,  but  we  lose  ever  and  anon  a  word,  or  a  verse,  and  substitute 
something  of  our  own,  and  thus  miswrite  the  poem.  "' 
As  'the  Sayer',  the  poet  represents  primordial  beauty.  For  it  is  not  the  case,  Emerson 
writes,  that  God  simply'made  some  beautiful  things'.  Rather,  in  line  with  his 
Trinitarian  aesthetic,  the  world'is  from  the  beginning  beautiful',  and  thus'Beauty  is 
the  creator  of  the  universe'.  "' 
The  parallel  between  Emerson'sThe  Poet'and  Melville's  'Hawthorne  and  His 
Mosses',  like  that  between  Melville's  self-violent  subjectivity  and  that  of  early 
Gen-nan  Romanticism,  is at  first  striking.  For  instance,  regarding  Hawthorne's  short 
story'The  Master  Genius',  Melville  vmtes: 
May  it  not  be,  that  this  commanding  mind  has  not  been,  is  not,  and 
never  will  be,  individually  developed  in  any  one  man?  And  would  it, 
indeed,  appear  so  unreasonable  to  suppose,  that  this  great  fullness  and 
overflowing  may  be,  or  may  be  destined  to  be,  shared  by  a  plurality  of 
men  of  genius?  "' 
Here,  both  Emerson  and  Melville  suggest  a  common,  collective  pool  of  originality. 
However,  what  'The  Poet'  explores  abstractly  as  a  deferred  Ideal,  'Hawthorne  and  The 
Mosses'  anatomises  materially  as  an  immanent  Reality.  That  is,  while  Emerson 
262 
Emerson,  'The  Poet',  79. 
263  Emerson,  'The  Poet',  67.  Cf.,  'All  the  classical  poems  of  the  ancients  are  coherent, 
inseparable;  they  form  an  organic  whole,  they  constitute,  properly  viewed,  only  asI  ngle  poem,  the  only 
one  in  which  poetry  itself  appears  in  perfecfion.  In  a  similar  way,  in  a  perfect  literature  all  books 
should  be  only  a  single  book,  and  in  such  an  eternally  developing  book,  the  gospel  of  humanity  and 
culture  will  be  revealed'  (Schlegel,  'Lucinde'and  the  Fragments,  249-50  [Idea  95]). 
2(,  4  Emerson,  'The  Poet',  67. 
265  Melville,  The  Piazza  Tales,  2-52 83 
'look[s]  in  vain  for  the  poet',  declaring  that'we  have  yet  had  no  genius  in  America',  "' 
Melville  suggests  the  primordial  pool  of  originality  /  genius  actually  makes  it 
possible,  advisable  even,  to  regard  Shakespeare  and  Hawthorne  as'on  the  same  page'. 
Melville,  however,  goes  one  step  further,  when  he  writes:  'There  are  minds  that  have 
gone  as  far  as  Shakespeare  into  the  universe.  And  hardly  a  mortal  man,  who,  at  some 
time  or  other,  has  not  felt  as  great  thoughts  in  him  as  any  you  will  find  in  Hamlet 
Believe  me,  my  friends,  that  Shakespeares  are  this  day  being  born  on  the  banks  of  the 
Ohio. 
v267  In  a  sense  of  material  immanence  that  Emerson's  essay  and  sense  of  genius 
does  not  exhibit,  "'  Shakespeare  is  thus  separated  from  his  creations,  and  is  replaced 
by  a  more  generic  sense  of  aesthetic  autonomy  that  encapsulates  individual  acts  of 
creative  gen 
IUS. 
269  Which  is  to  say,  for  Melville,  we  need  not  avt,  ait  the  poetic  or  the 
genius,  because  it  is already  here. 
7.  An  Ambivalent  Embodiment 
It  is,  in  fact,  what  he  regarded  as  their  highlighting  of  immateriality  that  made 
Melville  especially  wary  of  whole-heartedly  embracing  either  Emerson's 
Transcendentalism  or  Schlegel's  Romanticism.  Though  he  appreciated,  for  instance, 
the  'nobility'  of  Emerson's  intellect,  "'  and  obviously  noted  the  similanty  between  their 
266 
Emerson,  'The  Poet,  80. 
267  Melville,  The  Plazza  Tales,  245. 
268  Cf.,  'if  I  have  not  found  that  excellent  combination  of  gifts  in  my  countrymen  which  I  seek, 
neither  could  I  aid  myself  to  fix  the  idea  of  the  poet  by  reading  now  and  then  in  Chambers's  collection 
of  fivc  centurics  of  English  poets.  These  are  wits,  more  than  poets,  though  there  ha\c  been  poets 
among  then.  But  when  we  adhere  to  the  ideal  of  the  poet,  we  ha%  c  our  difficulties  even  .ý  ith  Milton 
and  Homer.  Milton  is  too  literary,  and  Homer  too  literal  and  historical'  (Emerson,  'The  Poet',  80). 
269  Ellen  Weinauer  makes  this  explicit  in  her  excellent  essay  on  the  'proprietary  self,  that  is  the 
sense  of  identity  wrought  by  possession.  See  Ellen  Weinauer,  'Plagiarism  and  the  Proprietary  Self 
. 
697-717. 
2'0  1n  the  margins  of  his  copy  of  'The  Poet',  N  lei  vi  IIe  Nýrites:  'All  this  is  nobly  \ýritten,  and 
proceeds  fi-oni  noble  thinking,  and  a  natural  sympathy  \\It  h  greatness'  (qtd.  \U  I  am  Bras\\c  IL\.  I  cI  ýi  IIe 
as  Critic  Offinersol"Amet-icaii  Litei-ature  9  [Nov.  1937]:  32  1). 84 
respective  philosophical  dispositions,  he  could  not  help  but  find  him  cold  and  SMUg.  271 
In  a  letter  to  Duyckinck,  whose  disdain  for  every  shade  of  Transcendentalism  caused 
him  to  revile  Emerson,  Melville's  ambivalent  response  ('I  was  very  agreeably 
disappointed')  upon  hearing  Emerson  lecture  in  Boston  is  stark.  "' 
[flor  the  sake  of  the  argument,  let  us  call  him  a  fool;  -  then  had  I 
rather  be  a  fool  than  a  wise  man.  -I  love  all  men  who  dive.  Any  fish 
can  swim  near  the  surface,  but  it  takes  a  great  whale  to  go  down  stairs 
five  miles  or  more;  &  if  he  don't  attain  the  bottom,  why,  all  the  lead  in 
Galena  can't  fashion  the  plummet  that  will.  "' 
Notwithstanding  this,  Melville  continues,  the'gaping  flaw'of  this'Plato  who  talks 
thro'  his  nose'  is all  too  apparent;  namely,  the  insinuation  'that  had  he  lived  in  those 
days  when  the  world  was  made,  he  might  have  offered  some  valuable  suggestions.  Q74 
Just  as  damning  for  Melville,  though,  is  Emerson's  emotional  stuffiness  and  absolute 
absence  of  any  'convivial'  spirit.  He  writes: 
271  Once  again,  in  the  marginalia  of  his  copy  of'The  Poet',  Melville  writes:  'This  is  admirable, 
as  many  other  thoughts  of  Mr.  Emerson's  are.  His  gross  and  astonishing  errors  &  illusions  spring  from 
a  self-conceit  so  intensely  intellectual  and  calm  that  at  first  one  hesitates  to  call  it  by  its  right  name. 
Another  species  of  Mr.  Emerson's  errors,  or  rather  blindness,  proceeds  from  a  defect  in  the  region  of  his 
heart'  (qtd.  Braswell,  'Melville  as.  Critic  of  Emerson',  33  1). 
272  Like  the  debate  surrounding  Melville's  relationships  to  Duyckinck  and  Hawthorne,  no  less 
ink  has  been  exhausted  detailing  Melville's  opinion  of  Emerson.  Though  the  two  men  apparently  never 
met  or  corresponded,  weaned  as  he  was  by  Evert  Duyckinck  and  his  New  York  coterie,  Melville  could 
not  have  avoided  the  former's  sometimes  hyperbolic  dislike  for  Transcendentalism.  For  a  discussion  of 
Melville's  relationship  to  Emerson  see  Braswell,  'Melville  as  Critic  of  Emerson',  317-34;  Merton  M. 
Sealts,  Jr.  'Melville  and  Emerson's  Rainbow'ESQ:  A  Journal  of  the  American  Renaissance  26  (2  nd 
Quarter,  1980):  53-78;  Hershel  Parker,  'Melville's  Satire  of  Emerson  and  Thoreau:  An  Evaluation  of 
the  Evidence'American  Transcendental  Quarterly  7  (Summer  1970):  61-67;  Elizabeth  Foster, 
Introduction  and'Explanatory  Notes'in  The  Confidence  Man:  His  Masquerade,  by  Herman  Melville 
(New  York:  Hendricks  House,  1954),  lxxv-lxxxii,  350-52;  and  Watson  Branch,  et  al,  'Historical  Note', 
257-59,285-90. 
273  Melville,  Correspondence,  121. 
274  Melville,  Correspondence,  12  1.  Cf. 
,a  similar  criticism  of  philosophers  like  Plato,  Spinoza, 
and  Goethe,  who,  in  their  claims  to  have  found  the  'Talismanic  secretof  life,  which  would  reconcile 
the  world  with  one's  soul:  '  Certain  philosophers  have  time  and  again  pretended  to  have  found  it;  but  if 
they  do  not  in  the  end  discover  their  own  delusion,  other  people  soon  discover  it  for  themselves.... 
Plato,  and  Spinoza,  and  Goethe,  and  many  more  belong  to  this  guild  of  self-imposters,  with  a 
preposterous  rabble  of  Muggletonian  Scots  and  Yankees,  whose  vile  brogue  still  the  more  bestreaks  the 
stripedness  of  their  Greek  or  German  Neoplatonical  originals.  That  profound  Silence,  that  only  Voice 
of  our  God,  which  I  before  spoke  of;  from  that  divine  thing  without  a  name,  those  imposter 
philosophers  pretend  somehow  to  have  got  an  answer;  which  is  as  absurd,  as  though  they  should  say 
they  had  got  water  out  of  stone,  for  how  can  a  man  get  a  Voice  out  of  Silence'  (Melville,  Pierre;  or, 
The  Ambiguities,  208) 85 
You  complain  that  Emerson  tho'  a  denizen  of  the  land  of  -  ingerbread, 
is  above  munching  a  plain  cake  in  company  of  jolly  fellows.  &  swiging 
[sic]  off  his  ale  like  you  &  me.  Ah,  my  dear  sir,  that's  his  misfortune, 
not  his  fault.  His  belly,  sir,  is  in  his  chest,  &  his  brains  descend  down 
into  his  neck,  &  offer  an  obstacle  to  a  draught  of  ale  or  a  mouthful  of 
cake.  "' 
In  short,  there  remains  in  Emerson  a  very  problematic  lack  of  anything  resembling  the 
vitality  and  intensity  of  humanity  and  life. 
And  yet,  we  should  note  once  again,  Emerson  is  merely  exemplary  of  the 
greater  malaise  Melville  sees  in  the  very  philosophical  disposition  even  he  often 
entertains.  Like  the  preacher  in  Melville's  White-Jacket,  Melville,  too,  had  tasted'the 
mystic  fountain  of  Plato';  his  head,  as  well,  'had  been  turned  by  the  Germans',  and, 
indeed,  with  Adler  at  his  side,  one  could  well  imagine  him  walking  the  deck  of  a  ship 
with  Coleridge's  Biographia  Literaria  in  hand.  Perhaps,  then,  there  is  little  surprise 
that  Mardi  had  proven  as  unpalatable  to  its  readers  as  the  preacher's  sermons  had  been 
'111  calculated  to  benefit  the  crew'.  276  Ultimately,  however,  Melville  bristles  at  the 
blindness  to  the  material  realities  of  life  exhibited  in  Romantic  maxims  like  that  of 
Goethe's'Live  in  the  all'.  He  writes  in  a  letter  to  Hawthorne:  'What  nonsense!  Here  is 
a  fellow  with  a  raging  toothache.  "My  dear  boy,  "  Goethe  says  to  him,  "you  are  solely 
afflicted  with  that  tooth;  but  you  must  live  in  the  all,  and  then  you  will  be  happy! 
fv  C77 
As  Lewis  Mumford  notes,  the  disembodied  idealism  of  writers  like  Emerson  and 
Goethe  was  naturally  at  odds  with  Melville's  first-hand  experience  of  nature's  horrific 
and  violent  design,  where  'though  in  many  of  its  aspects  this  visible  world  seems 
275  Melville,  Correspondence,  122. 
276  Herman  Melville,  White  Jacket:  or,  The  World  in  a  Man-of-War,  in  The  Writtligs  of 
Herman  Ifelville  (eds.  Harrison  Hayford,  Hershel  Parker,  and  G.  Thoma's  Tanselle-,  wl.  S.  Evanston 
and  Chicago:  Northwestcrn  UnIvcrsIty  Press,  1970).  155,  cf,  Sealts.  Jr.,  'Melville  and  Emerson's 
RainhoW,  66. 
277  j%lel\lllc.  Cori-cspondence.  193-94. ý6 
fori-ned  in  love,  the  invisible  spheres  were  formed  in  fright'.  "'  Mumford  writes* 
Emerson  was  the  perpetual  passenger  who  stayed  below  in  bad 
weather,  trusting  that  the  captain  would  take  care  of  the  ship.  \Iel\  ille 
was  the  sailor  who  climbed  aloft,  and  knew  that  the  captain  was 
sometimes  drunk  and  that  the  best  of  ships  might  go  down.  '79 
Melville's  complex  relationship  with  the  aims  of  Romanticism  and  Transcendentalism 
is,  we  will  see  more  fully  in  Chapter  Three,  strictly  parallel  to  that  of  Ahab,  in  his 
monomaniacal  desire  to  strike  through  the  'pasteboard  mask'  of  reality  to  reveal  'some 
unknown  but  still  reasoning  thing  [that]  puts  forth  the  mouldings  of  its  features  from 
behind  the  unreasoning  mask.  '  For  indeed,  as  Ahab  admits,  'Sometimes  I  think  there's 
naught  beyond.  "" 
Where  Emerson's  reading  of  Gennan  philosophy  led  him  to  affirm  the 
transcendental  unity  of  Yes,  Melville  found  in  it  the  ironic  materiality  of  No.  2"  'What 
plays  mischief  with  the  truth',  he  concludes  of  Goethe,  'is  that  men  will  insist  upon  the 
universal  application  of  a  temporary  feeling  or  opinion'.  "'  As  such,  then,  in 
'Hawthorne  and  His  Mosses',  authorial  identity  is  neither  wholly  affirmed  nor  denied, 
but  is  instead  regarded  as  authorial  identity  only  inasmuch  as  it  is  materially 
embodied  in  the  necessarily  duplicitous  oscillation  between  his  self-assertion  and  self- 
denial.  Why  duplicitous?  For  if  the  story  of  its  composition  and  publication  shows 
anything  clearly  at  all,  it  demonstrates  Melville's  unease  about  being  divided  too  far 
from  his  own  work.  The  surviving  fair-copy  manuscript  of  the  essay,  for  instance, 
'78  1  Melville,  Moby-Dick,  195. 
279  Lewis  Mumford,  Herincin  Melville:  A  Study  of  His  Life  and  Vision  (London:  Secker  and 
Warburg,  1929),  143. 
280  Melville,  Moln-DIck,  164.  Cf.,  By  vast  pains  we  mine  Into  the  pyramid,  by  horrible 
gropings  we  come  to  the  central  room,  with  joy  we  espy  the  sarcophagus;  but  we  lift  the  lid  -  and  no 
hody  is  there!  -  appallin.  gly  vacant  as  vast  is  the  soul  of  a  man!  '  (Melville,  Pierre,  285). 
281  Ilochniatin,  German  Culture  in  America,  439-40. 
Nlci\illc,  Correspondence,  194. 87 
indicates  that  Melville's  mysterious  'Virginian'  was  actually  an  afterthought  included 
only  after  a  draft  had  already  been  written.  "'  Moreover,  even  within  the  text  itself, 
the  narrator,  fictive  or  not,  cannot  help  but  maintain  his  priority.  Most  notable  Is  his 
admission:  'I  have  more  served  and  honored  myself,  than  him  [Hawthorne] 
'.  2"  An 
author,  be  it  Melville  or  a  Virginian,  cannot,  in  spite  of  and  because  of  such  a  self- 
conscious  desire,  complete  the  separation  from  /  self-denial  of  his  or  her  texts. 
Indeed,  pivotal  to'Hawthome  and  His  Mosses'  is  the  nationalistic  expression  of  pride 
that  American  writers  are  as  good  as,  if  not  better  than,  those  of  the  rest  of  the  ývorld. 
[W]e  want  no  American  Goldsmiths;  nay,  we  want  no  American 
Miltons.  It  were  the  vilest  thing  you  could  say  of  a  true  American 
author,  that  he  were  an  American  Tompkins.  Call  him  an  American, 
and  have  done;  for  you  can  not  say  a  nobler  thing  of  him.  -  But  it  is 
not  meant  that  all  American  writers  should  studiously  cleave  to 
nationality  in  their  writings;  only  this,  no  American  writer  should  write 
like  an  Englishman,  or  a  Frenchman;  let  him  write  like  a  man,  for  then 
he  will  be  sure  to  write  like  an  American.  Let  us  away  with  this 
Bostonian  leaven  of  literary  flunkeyism  towards  England.  If  either 
must  play  the  flunkey  in  this  thing,  let  England  do  it,  not  US.  285 
Consequently,  James  Mellow  notes  that  inHawthome  and  his  Mosses'  Melville's 
attempts  at  a  universally-accepted  common  pool  of  originality  is  tempered 
considerably  by  his  desired  inclusion  in  the  inner  circle  of  the  American  literary 
masters  he  was  touting. 
286 
The  important  insight  to  be  gained  from  this  discussion  of  irony,  duplicity,  and 
disguise  is  that  Melville  himself  goes  out  of  his  way  to  highlight  it.  The  complexity 
of  his  assurances  and  suggestions  about  Hawthorne  -  and  thus,  too,  about  himself 
are  self-consciously  masked  in  an  intricate  and  ultimately  paradoxical  scheme. 
2'3  Merton  M.  Sealts,  Jr.  'Historical  Note',  471.  For  a  detailed  analysis  of  extant  copies,  see 
the  'Notes  On  Individual  Prose  Pieces'  section  in  Meh-ille,  Pjazza  Tales,  652-690. 
'84  Melville,  Piazza  Tales,  249. 
'8i  Nickille,  Piazza  Tales,  248. 
286  Nlcllo\N,  Nathaniel  Hawthorne  in  His  Times,  ',  36. 88 
Consider  the  following  two  sentences: 
7,  lie  truth  seems  to  be,  that  like  many  other  geniuses,  this  Man  of 
Mosses  takes  great  delight  in  hoodwinking  the  world,  --  at  least,  with 
respect  to  himself' 
'[I]t  is  certain  that  some  of  [Hawthome's  titles]  are  directly  calculated 
to  deceive  -  egregiously  deceive,  the  superficial  skimmer  of  the 
pages.  1'87 
Melville,  as  we  have  seen,  is  deeply  aware  of  the  necessity  of  self-presentation  in  any 
conception  of  subjectivity.  In  the  self-presentation  of  his  own  genius,  then,  Mel-ville 
is not  unlike  the  proverbial  Cretan  liar,  who  confesses  that  the  only  certal  I  in  truth  is  that 
he  is in  fact  a  liar.  As  an  author,  Melville  is  tom:  he  wants  to  assert  his  genius  by 
freeing  his  text,  but  never  so  much  that  it  is  no  longer  his  text  to  free.  Moreover,  as 
readers  of  Melville,  we  have  no  sure  way  of  knowing  where  or  how  to  enter  his  texts; 
or,  for  that  matter,  which  texts  are  truly  his  own.  Which  is  to  say,  the  reader,  too,  is 
tom:  she  needs  a  text  to  engage  in  order  to  be  a  reader,  but  can  engage  a  text  of 
Melville  only  insofar  as  she  is  uncertain  where  or  how  to  begin  it.  As  we  will  see  in 
Chapter  Three,  this  paradoxical  dilemma,  that  of  the  niaterialistic  genesis  of  self- 
becoming  (i.  e.,  as  a  reader  or  as  an  author),  situates  our  understanding  of  Melville 
very  close  to  the  theologically  explosive  philosophy  of  Fnedrich  Schelling. 
297  Nick  Me,  Piazza  Tales,  250-51  (my  emphasis).  In  December  1849,  in  a  letter  to 
Mlyckinck,  one  can  see  Nilel\  ille's  progression  to  such  an  admission.  as  \\  ell  as  his  understanding  of  the 
implications:  'What  -a  madness  &  anguish  it  is,  that  an  author  can  ne\  er  -  under  no  circumstances  - 
be  at  all  frank  \\  ith  his  readers  (Correspondence,  149). 89 
CHAPTER  THREE: 
THE  DIALECTICAL  MATERIALISM  OF  MELVILLE  AND  SCHELIANG 
1.  The  Decision  to  Begin 
Thus  far,  we  have  established  a  striking  symmetry,  however  ambivalent, 
between  the  ironic  literary  manoeuvres  of  Hennan  Melville  and  the  phIlosophical 
ambitions  of  early  Gen-nan  Romanticism.  We  have  not  yet,  however,  explicitly 
addressed  the  key  theological  implications  of  Melville's  contnbution  to  that 
symmetry.  I  am  here  referring  specifically  to  the  apocalyptic  self-presentation  that 
unfolds  in  most  of  his  novels.  Such  an  inquiry,  we  will  see  below,  is  profoundly 
theological  in  its  scope,  if  not  in  its  genre.  We  will  recall  Thomas  J.  J.  Altizer,  who 
identifies  theological  thinking  not  as  a  discipline,  but  as  that  which  'truly  re-thinks  the 
deepest  ground  of  theology,  a  re-thinking  which  is  initially  an  unthinking  of  every 
established  theological  ground'.  Only  in  this  'unthinking',  he  adds,  'can  a  clearing  be 
established  for  theological  thinking,  and  that  is  the  very  clearing  which  is  the  first  goal 
of  radical  theology.  ""  In  this,  apropos  the  ironic  dissolution  of  genre  In  Romanticism, 
radical  theological  thinking  is  not  confined  strictly  to  religious  or  confessional 
discourses,  but  defined  by  its  implications  for  the  thinking  of  theology's  self- 
becoming  /  self-presentation  as  theology. 
Religion,  so  goes  the  common  wisdom,  is  siti  generis,  and  is  thus  inherently 
distinguishable  from  modem,  secular  culture.  Edward  Said,  for  example,  asserts 
without  any  supplemental  argument  that  'beginning  is  basically  an  activity  which 
ultimately  implies  return  and  repetition  rather  than  simple  linear  accomplishment,  that 
2X'S'  Mtizcr,  'Doing  Radical  Theology',  2. 90 
begintung  and  beginning-again  are  historical  whereas  origins  are  divine'.  "'  Not 
content  with  Said's  simplistic  privileging  of  the  secular,  Catherine  Keller  argues  that 
theology,  too,  has  classically  abided  by  the  same  logic,  albeit  with  a  reversal  of  its 
binary  fortune.  According  to  traditional  theology,  she  argues,  the  divinity  of  origin 
subordinates  and  ontologically  precedes  the  historicity  of  'beginning',  thus  securing 
'God's  unfettered  sovereignty'.  "'  For  her  part,  Keller  finds  this  notion  of  origin  ex 
nihilo,  the  whim  of  a  wholly  autonomous,  omnipotent  God,  as  problematic  as  Said's 
secular  reductionism: 
This  dogma  of  origin  has  exercised  immense  productive  force.  It  has 
become  common  sense.  Gradually  it  took  modem  and  then  secular 
form,  generating  every  kind  of  western  originality,  every  logos  creating 
the  new  as  if  from  nothing,  cutting  violently,  ecstatically  free  of  the 
abysms  of  the  past.  But  Christian  theology,  I  argue,  created  this  ex 
iiihilo  at  the  cost  of  its  own  depth.  It  systematically  and  symbolically 
sought  to  erase  the  chaos  of  creation.  Such  a  maneuver  ...  was  always 
doomed  to  a  vicious  cycle:  the  nothingness  invariably  returns  with  the 
face  of  the  feared  chaos  -  to  be  nihilated  all  the  more  violently.  "' 
As  noted  above,  this  tragic,  absolute  originality  is  not  exclusive  to  theology  proper. 
Contemporarily,  the  secular  and  the  sacred  blur.  most  clearly  In  the  modem 
conceptions  of  the  artistic  genius  and  the  avant-garde,  wherein'the  purer,  the  more 
abstract,  the  creativity,  the  more  fully  it  replaces  the  divine  originality,  the  freedom  of 
a  creator  a  se,  unconstrained  by  creaturely  interdependence.  ""  On  this  issue  Clement 
Greenberg  is  even  more  explicit: 
It  has  been  in  search  of  the  absolute  that  the  avant-garde  has  arrived  at 
'abstract'  or  'nonobjective'  art  -  and  poetry,  too.  The  avant-garde  poet 
or  artist  tnes  in  effect  to  imitate  God  by  creating  something  valid 
solely  on  its  own  terms,  in  the  way  nature  itself  is  valid,  in  the  way  a 
289  EdNý  ard  Said,  Beginnings:  Intention  and  Method  (Neýý  York:  Columbia  Um  ý  ersity  Prcss, 
1985),  xiii  (emphasis  mine). 
2')"  Keller,  Face  of  flie  Deep.  159. 
291  Kellci-,  Face  of  the  Deep,  xvi. 
2"2  KcIler,  Face  (?  fthe  Deep,  160. 91 
landscape-not  a  picture  -  is  aesthetically  valid;  something  given, 
increate,  independent  of  meanings,  similars  or  originals.  Content  is  to 
be  dissolved  so  completely  into  form  that  the  work  of  art  or  literature 
cannot  be  reduced  in  whole  or  part  to  anything  not  Itself... 
Arising  from,  and  perfect  unto,  itself  and  its  own  purpose,  absolute  /  divine  originality 
has  made  an  indelible  claim  on  our  understanding  of  beauty  and  art.  "'  it  is,  however, 
a  claim  that,  before  we  can  proceed  further,  we  must  vigorously  challenge. 
In  contrast  to  origins,  be  they  divine,  secular,  or  both  at  once,  beginnings  are 
an  exercise  in  learning  how  to  lose.  Indeed,  when  we  attempt  to  think  beginning  and 
theology  together,  the  loss  at  first  may  seem  irreparable.  The  decision  to  begin,  to 
exist,  Keller  counsels,  is  one  of  profound,  inevitable  violence  and  guilt:  'A  cloud  of 
missed  possibilities  envelops  every  beginning:  it  is  always  this  beginning,  this 
universe  and  not  some  other.  Decision  lacks  innocence.  Around  its  narrations  gather 
histories  of  grievance:  what  possibilities  were  excluded?  ""  In  the  face  of  the 
unthinkable  absolute  singularity  that  beckons  us  to  begin,  the  decisions  we  make  cut 
us  off  from  all  the  other  decisions  and  stories  that  might  have  been  enacted  or  narrated 
with  the  best  of  intentions.  "'  Nevertheless,  what  we  find  in  Melville  is  that  the  so- 
293  Clement  Greenberg,  'Avant-Garde  and  Kitsch'  in  The  Collected  Essays  (ed.  John  O'Brian; 
vol.  I  -,  Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1986),  8. 
294  See  Immanuel  Kant  on  the  work  of  art  as'self-propagative'  and  organic  'purposiveness 
without  purpose'  in  his  The  Critique  of  Judgement  (trans.  J  H.  Bernard;  New  York:  Hafner,  1951),  218- 
31. 
295  Keller,  Face  of  the  Deep,  160. 
296  Cf.,  Jacques  Derrida's  description  of  the  ethical  dilemma  at  the  core  of  religious  and  secular 
responsibility  and  decision-making: 
I  am  responsible  to  the  other  as  other,  I  answer  to  him  and  I  answer  for  what  I  do 
before  him.  But  of  course,  what  binds  me  thus  in  my  singularity  to  the  absolute 
singularity  of  the  other,  immediately  propels  me  into  the  space  or  risk  of  absolute 
sacrifice.  There  are  also  others,  an  infinite  number  of  them,  the  innumerable 
generality  of  others  to  whom  I  should  be  bound  by  the  same  responsibility,  a  general 
and  uni  \  ersal  responsibility  (what  Kierkegaard  calls  the  ethical  order).  I  cannot 
respond  to  the  call,  the  request,  the  obligation,  or  c\  en  the  love  of  another  ý%  ithout 
sacrificing  the  other  other,  the  other  others....  As  soon  as  I  enter  into  a  relation  \%  Ith 
the  other,  I  kno\ý  that  I  can  respond  only  by  sacrificing  ethics.  that  is.  by  sacrificing 
\\  lime\  er  obliges  me  to  also  respond,  in  the  same  way,  in  the  same  instant.  to  all  the 
others.  (The  Gift  (?  f  Death,  68) 92 
called  'undecidable'  violence  of  his  beginning  (i.  e.  his  self-presentation)  is  not  merely 
a  description  of  infinite  ethical  uncertainty;  rather,  at  its  most  primordial,  it  is  the 
active,  albeit  necessanly  repressed,  condition  for  the  creative  /  poetic  possibility  of 
beginning  at  all. 
2.  An  'UnfoldedSubjectivity 
As  we  noted  in  Chapter  One,  if  it  is  true  for  Melville  that,  from  the  age  of 
twenty-five,  'three  weeks  have  scarcely  passed  ...  that  I  have  not  unfolded  within 
myself,  this  is  only  possible  in  the  unfolding  of  himself  without  in  the  act  of  writing.  "' 
The  result  of  this'unfolded'  subjectivity  is  a  latent  violence,  which,  as  we  have  already 
hinted,  leads  him  perilously  close  to  the  self-destructive  condition  of  several  of  his 
most  famous  characters. 
For  instance,  we  learn  at  the  beginning  of  Moby-Dick  that  Ishmael,  like 
Melville,  is  drawn  to  the  water.  When  he  recounts  the  suicidal  thoughts  that  lead  him 
to  sea  and  his  dangerous  flirtations  with  the  fate  of  Narcisuss,  'who  because  he  could 
not  grasp  the  tonrienting,  mild  image  he  saw  in  the  fountain,  plunged  into  it  and  was 
drowned',  "'  it  is important  to  recall  that  Ishmael's  confession  is  that  of  a  narrator 
distanced  from  himself  as  a  narrated  character.  Much  of  the  enduring  significance  of 
Moby-Dick,  in  fact,  is  missed  if  one  overlooks  the  paradox  of  its  reflective 
complexity,  whereby  Ishmael  -as-character  retroactively  /  anachronistically  informs 
his  own  characterisation  by  Ishmael-as-narrator.  Hence  the  latter's  Yealisation'  as  he 
begins  his  tale  that  the  same  perception  of  self  that  draws  him  to  the  water  is  also  'the 
IQ7 
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image  of  the  ungraspable  phantom  of  life;  and  this  is  the  key  to  it  all.  ""  Which  is  to 
say,  the  phantom  of  life  for  Ishmael-as-narrator,  that  which  makes  him  vvhat  he  is,  is 
the  incessant,  suicidal  return  to  the  sea  of  his  story's  retelling.  Ishmael-as-narrator 
(i.  e.,  as  Subject)  is  truly'alive',  then,  only  inasmuch  as  he  is  characterised  (i.  e.,  as 
Object)  as  plunging  toward  his  death. 
Indeed,  it  is  the  miraculous  'resurrection'  of  Ishmael-as-character  in  the  novel's 
epilogue  that  effectively  conditions  the  possibility  of  his  suicidal  narration  in  the 
novel's  beginning.  Moreover,  it  marks  the  site  of  Ishmael's  subjective  autonomy  as  a 
production  /  eruption  of  excess  from  the  self-violent  circularity  of  his  necessarily 
being  a  Subject  that  is also  an  Object.  Suicidal  desire  hints  at  this  subjective  surplus, 
though,  not  because  it  somehow  precedes  or  motivates  Ishmael-as-narrator.  In 
Ishmael,  rather,  such  a  desire  itself  is  the  Subject's  sublimation  of  the  immanent  self- 
violence  that  emergesfrom,  but  cannotfinally  be  cowained  its  (subjective) 
narration.  It  is,  in  fact,  precisely  the  excessiveness  of  his  narrated  (suicidal)  desire, 
and  thus  the  absolute  necessity  of  its  failure  as  such,  that  makes  Ishmael-as-narrator 
what  he  is in  and  through  his  endless  self-narration. 
A  similar  dynamic  is  at  work  in  Pierre;  or  The  Ambiguities,  Melville's  follow- 
up  to  Moby-Dick,  whose  eponymous  protagonist  attempts  to  write  the  story  of  his  life, 
in  order  to  fill  the  void  left  after  he  rejects  the  memory  of  his  formerly  idealised  father 
and  his  mother  rejects  him  as  a  son.  The  first  half  of  the  novel  is  a  slow-burning  dark 
Romance.  Here,  the  idyllic  love  between  the  rich,  handsome  Pierre  and  the  equally 
Z,  rich,  beautiful  Lucy  is  suddenly  darkened  by  the  revelation  that  a  broodim-,  brunette 
299  Peter  Bellis  and  John  lr\\  in  read  this  passage  similarly.  See  Peter  Bellis.  No  AlYsterl  . es  Olt/ 
of  Oursehvs.  -  Went1tv  wid  Form  in  the  Novels  Herman  Meh,  "Ite  (Philadelphia:  UniNersity  of  0,  4r 
Pciinsyk  ania  Press,  1990)\  W4,  and  John  T.  lr\\  In,  Amch  . can  Hierogývplucs:  The  Symbol  of  the 
Egypitan  Hterogývphws  bi  theAmerican  RenalSsatice  (\i'c\\  Ha\en:  Yale  Unjvcr,  ýIt\  Press,  1980).  288 
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named  Isabel  is  the  illegitimate  daughter  of  Pierre's  revered  father.  Rationalising  that 
he  must  make  reparations  for  his  father's  sin,  whilst  protecting  his  family's  name, 
Pierre  rejects  Lucy  and  takes  upon  himself  the  protection  of  his  sister,  albeit  in  the 
disguise  of  their  being  instead  husband  and  wife.  Rejected  by  his  mother,  Isabel  and 
Pierre  move  to  the  city,  where  the  narrative  takes  an  abrupt  turn  and  Pierre  endeavours 
to  write  a  novel  like  no  other,  that  is,  a  trite  one. 
Pierre's's  melodramatic  attempt  to  re-construct  his  identity  in  tritth,  in  lieu  ot 
the  identity  and  self-presentation  that  he  had  discovered  was  false  when  faced  with  the 
revelation  about  his  father,  is  fraught  with  problems.  The  narrator,  for  instance,  notes 
that  in  trying  to  rewrite  himself,  at  times  both  figuratively  and  literally,  Pierre  must 
first  break  ground  so  that  he  might  mine  the  marble  for  the  temple  of  the  self: 
[I]t  is often  to  be  observed,  that  as  in  digging  for  precious  metals  in  the 
mines,  much  earthy  rubbish  has  first  to  be  troublesomely  handled  and 
thrown  out;  so,  in  digging  in  one's  soul  for  the  fine  gold  of  genius, 
much  dullness  and  common-place  is  first  brought  to  light.  Happy 
would  it  be,  if  the  man  possessed  in  himself  some  receptacle  for  his 
own  rubbish  of  this  sort:  but 
... 
[n]o  common-place  is  ever  effectually 
got  rid  of,  except  by  essentially  emptying  one's  self  of  it  into  a  book; 
for  once  trapped  in  a  book,  then  the  book  can  be  put  into  the  fire,  and 
all  will  be  well.  "' 
Pierre's  writing,  in  other  words,  is  nothing  but  the  emptying  of  the  rubbish  that  does 
tiot  compose  his  identity.  And  yet  when  the  narrator  surreptitiously  peers  over 
Pierre's  shoulder  to  see  what  he  is  wnting,  the  frenzy  of  wet  ink  reveals  that'he  seems 
to  have  directly  plagiarized  from  his  own  experience.  "  Inasmuch  as  plagiansm,  the 
stealing  of  words,  is  related  to  abduction,  Ellen  Weinauer  points  out,  Pierre's  self- 
300  WIN  111c,  Plcrre,  258. 
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plagiarism  is  an  attempt  to  write  himself  away.  "'  The  narrator,  however,  is  quick  to 
see  the  inherent  problem  this  creates: 
For  though  he  naked  soul  of  man  doth  assuredly  contain  one  latent 
element  of  intellectual  Productiveness;  yet  never  was  there  a  child  born 
solely  from  one  parent;  the  visible  world  of  experience  being  that 
procreative  thing  which  impregnantes  the  muses;  seýflreciprocall.  y 
efficient  hennaphrodites  being  but  a  fable.  "' 
That  is  to  say,  when  the  representative  self  (i.  e.,  Pierre-as-narrator-as-abductor)  is 
generated  by  self-abduction,  one's  sense  of  self  is  simultaneously  trapped  and  made 
free  in  an  apparent  tautology  that  knows  no  end.  "' 
In  Melville's  essay'Hawthome  and  His  Mosses,  the  excess  that  is  a  void 
generated  by  this  inherent,  paradoxical  tautology  Is  characterised  as  the  'blackness  of 
darkness  beyond',  around  which  even  Hawthorne's  most  diaphanous  allegorles'but 
fringe,  and  play  upon  the  edges  of  thunder-clouds'.  "'  Michael  Bell  describes  the 
writing  of  Hawthorne  similarly: 
302  Weinauer,  'Plagiarism  and  the  Self,  699.  Plagidre,  Weinauer  points  out,  is  the  Latin  verb 
meaning  'to  kidnap',  and  a  plagidrius  is  a  kidnapper  or  seducer. 
303  Melville,  Pierre,  259  (emphasis  mine).  Cf.,  'If  a  man  be  told  a  thing  wholly  new,  then  - 
during  the  time  of  its  first  announcement  to  him  -  it  is  entirely  impossible  for  him  to  comprehend  it. 
For  -  absurd  as  it  may  seem  -  men  are  only  made  to  comprehend  things  which  they  comprehended 
before  (though  by  in  the  embryo,  as  it  were).  Things  new  it  is impossible  to  make  them  comprehend, 
by  merely  talking  to  them  about  it.  True,  sometimes  they  pretend  to  comprehend;  in  their  own  hearts 
they  really  believe  they  do  comprehend;  outwardly  look  as  though  they  did  comprehend,  wag  their 
bushy  tails  comprehendingly;  but  for  all  that,  they  do  not  comprehend.  Possibly,  they  may  afterward 
come,  of  themselves,  to  inhale  this  new  idea  from  the  circurnambient  air,  and  so  come  to  comprehend 
it-,  but  not  otherwise  at  all  (209). 
304  See  Parlej,  The  Romantic  Theory  of  the  Novel,  114-56.  Melville's  tautology,  Parlej 
suggests,  'no  longer  follows  the  metaphysical  model  of  language;  it  reveals,  as  repetition,  the  subject  of 
repetition  as  such.  This  subject  occurs  only  in  repetition,  as  the  non-objective  content  of  the  act  of 
repetition'(]  2  1). 
305  Melville,  The  Piazza  Tales,  243.  Traditionally,  Melville  and  Hawthorne  are  contrasted, 
with  Melville  representative  of  the  symbolist,  and  Hawthorne  the  allegorist.  For  classic  examples,  see 
F.  0.  Matthiessen,  Renaissance:  Art  and  Expression  in  the  Age  of  Emerson  and  Whitman  (New  York: 
Oxford  UP,  1941),  242-315;  and  Charles  Fiedelson,  Jr.,  Symbolism  and  American  Literature  (Chicago: 
Univ.  of  Chicago  Press,  1953),  esp.  pp.  14-15,32.  Michael  Bell's  discussion  of  the  proposed  contrast 
is  one  of  the  most  helpftil  at  questioning  what  had  become  an  assumption.  See  his  The  Development  of 
American  Romance,  130-42. 96 
His  plots  are  not  didactically  generated  by  his  efforts  to  tell  us  what  his 
symbols  mean,  what  abstract  notions  they  picture  forth;  they  grow 
instead  out  of  his  characters'  efforts  to  find  out  what  the  symbols  mean 
or  at  all  events  to  make  them  mean  something.  It  is  these  characters 
who  are,  in  intention,  the  allegonsts.  Moreov,  er,  their  allegorical 
tendency  almost  alvt,  a 
, 
vs  leads  to  a  distortion  of  life,  a  reflisal  tojace  it 
directlY  in  itsfidl  complexit 
, 
N,.  Hawthorne  thus  apparently  adopts  the 
allegorical  mode  in  order  to  turn  it  against  allegorical  intentions.  306 
For  Melville,  it  is  from  this  darkness  and  distortion  of  life  that  characters  like  Hamlet, 
Timon,  Lear,  and  lago  emerge.  In  them,  Melville  celebrates  tlie'sane  madness  of  vital 
truth'  and  the  outlet  they  offer  Shakespeare  to  say  or  insinuate  those  thing,,,  'we  feel  to 
be  so  terrifically  true,  that  it  were  all  but  madness  for  any  good  man,  in  his  own 
proper  character,  to  utter,  or  even  hint  of  them.  "" 
What  I  wish  to  suggest  in  what  follows  is  that  Melville's  emphasis 
(particularly  in  Moby-Dick  and  Pierre)  on  embodiment,  i.  e.,  his  sense  that  there  is  no 
free  Subject  prior  to  its  being  'plagiarized'/  to  its  materialisation  as  such,  and  his 
consequent  realisation  of  the  'sane  madness'  at  the  heart  of  this  paradox,  brings  out  his 
close  affinity  to  Friedrich's  Schelling's  'dialectical  materialism'. 
3.  The  Real  as  Spoken  Unspeakability 
From  his  earliest  days  as  a  teenage  philosopher,  Schelling's  philosophical 
reflections  were  infonned  by  his  theological  concerns.  By  the  early  1840s,  though, 
while  teaching  at  the  Berlin  lectern  that  made  Hegel  famous,  his  theological  bend  had 
become  even  more  apparent.  Here,  as  recorded  in  The  Philosophy  of  Rei,  elation,  he 
described  to  his  students  the  aim  of  what  he  called'positive  philosophy': 
I  do  not  begin  with  the  concept  of  God  in  the  positive  philosophy,  as 
former  metaphysics  and  the  ontological  argument  attempted  to,  but  I 
must  drop  precisely  this  concept,  the  concept  of  God,  in  order  to  begin 
30"  Bcll,  The  Development  ofAinerican,  134  (my  emphasis). 
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with  that  whichJust  exists,  in  which  nothing  more  is  thought  thanjust 
this  existing  -  in  order  to  see  if  I  can  get  from  it  to  the  di'vinity.  Thus 
I  cannot  really  prove  the  existence  of  God  (by,  for  instance,  beginning 
with  the  concept  God)  but  instead  the  concept  of  that  which  exists 
before  all  possibility  and  thus  without  doubt  -  is  given  to  MC.  308 
Much  of  Schelling's  philosophy  at  this  point  of  his  life  and  career  was  Justly  criticized 
by  many  of  his  contemporaries,  such  as  Soren  Kierkegaard  (I  have  totally  given  up  on 
Schelling')  and  Karl  Marx's  friend  Arnold  Ruge  ('To  still  consider  Schelling  as  a 
philosopher  is  the  dumbest  thing  one  could  do').  "'  The  aim  of  the  positive  philosophy 
was  truly  ambitious:  to  develop  a  philosophically  viable  religion  by  radically 
reengaging  and  refuting  the  ontological  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  (in  the  spirit  of 
Kant's  Religion  Within  the  Limits  of  Reason  Alone),  and  thus  also  reinterpreting  the 
historical  /  mythological  development  of  Christianity.  "'  Nevertheless,  as  Andrew 
Bowie  notes,  'it  was  not  least  Schelling's  failure  to  achieve  this  latter  aim  that  led  to 
many  of  the  valid  aspects  of  the  later  philosophy's  being  ignored.  ""'  And  yet,  it  must 
be  asked  ftirther,  to  what  extent  might  it  be  possible  to  say  that  Schelling's  lasting 
insight  -  i.  e.,  'that  philosophy  cannot  arrive  at  a  conceptually  determinate  prii 
IS, 
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actually  emerges  from  this  very  failure? 
As  early  as  1804,  in  his  Philosophy  and  Religion,  Schelling  had  already 
introduced  the  problem  that  would  beset  him  the  rest  of  his  career  and  still  faces  us 
today: 
308  F.  W.  J.  Schelling,  Philosophie  der  Offenbarung,  in  Friedrich  Wilhelm  Joseph  von 
Schelling's  Sämmtliche  Werke  (ed.  Karl  F.  A.  Schelling;  vol.  13  [Part  2,  band  3]),  Stuttgart:  Cotta, 
1856-61),  158. 
309  F.  W.  J.  Schelling,  Philosophie  der  Offenbarung,  1841142  (ed.  Manfred  Frank,  Frankfurt 
am  Main:  Suhrkamp,  1977),  455,464. 
31  0  For  one  of  the  best  assessment  of  Schelling's  late  philosophy,  see  Andreýý  Bowic, 
Introduction  to  On  the  HistorN,  of  Modern  Philosophy,  by  F.  W.  J.  Schelling  (trans.  Aridrexý  Bowie; 
Nc\ý  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1994),  1-37. 
311  BoNN  1c,  Introduction  to  On  the  Histon,  of  Modet-n  Philosophy,  3 
3  12  llo\N  ic,  Schelling  awl  Modeiw  Em-opean  Philosophy,  18  1. 98 
[T]here  is  no  constant  transition  from  the  Absolute  to  the  Real,  the 
origin  of  the  world  of  the  senses  can  only  be  thought  as  a  complete 
breaking  off  from  absoluteness,  by  a  leap.  If  philosophy  is  to  deduce 
the  origin  of  real  things  in  a  positive  manner  from  the  Absolute,  then 
there  would  have  to  be  a  positive  ground  in  the  Absolute.  ...  Philosophy  only  has  a  negative  relationship  to  things  that  appear,  it 
rather  proves  that  they  are  not  than  that  they  are....  The  Absolute  is 
all  that  is  real:  finite  things,  on  the  other  hand,  are  not  real;  their 
ground  cannot  lie  in  a  communication  of  reality  to  them  or  to  their 
substrate,  which  would  have  emanated  from  the  Absolute,  it  can  onlýý 
lie  in  a  move  avva.  v,  In  afall  [Abfall]  from  the  Absolute.  '  13 
What  makes  this  explication  of  the  Absolute  so  theologically  profound  is  the 
materialistic  spin  Schelling  ultimately  puts  on  its  most  fundamental  terrns  in  his 
largely  unfinished  masterpiece,  Die  Weltalter  [Ages  of  the  World]  [  1811/15].  The 
question  he  poses  here,  apropos  what  we  have  seen  repeatedly  in  Melville,  is  that  of 
the  self-becoming  /  self-presentation  of  the  Absolute.  For  Schelling,  as  for  Melville, 
the  most  fundamental  question  is  'Where  to  begMT 
Schelfing's  'creation  myth',  as  Judith  Non-nan  appropriately  calls  it,  begins  in 
the  primal  chaos  of  'potencies'.  "'  In  the  potency  Schel  ling  calls  'A=  B',  the  being  of 
primordial  Freedom  (A)  can  only  be  realised  as  Absolute  Indifference  (B)  --  or,  as 
Schelling  calls  it,  potentiality  In-Itself"'  That  is  to  say,  the  In-itself  of  Freedom  qua 
Absolute  Indifference  cannot  tolerate  any  positive,  developmental  content;  and, 
moreover,  is  itself  only  in  a  'will-to-contraction'  that  wants  nothing.  For  this  potency 
to  play  itself  out,  however,  the  will-to-contraction  that  wants  nothing  is  necessarily 
countered  by  a  latent'will-to  expansion'that  actively  wants  this  'nothing',  which 
31  1  F.  W.  J.  Schelling,  Sihnintliche  Werke,  1804  (ed.  K.  F.  A.  Schelfing;  vol.  6  [Part  1,  Band  6]. 
Stuttgart:  Cotta,  1856-61),  38. 
314  Judith  Norman,  'The  Logic  of  Longing:  Schelling's  Philosophy  of  Will'British  Journalfor 
.f 
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315  F.  W.  J.  Schel  I  ing,  , I,  i,,  cs  of  the  lVorld  [2nd  draft]  (trans.  Judith  Norman-,  Ann  Arbor: 
Uni  \  ersity  of  NI  ichigan  Press,  1997).  13  1-33,143.  Unless  noted  othem  ise,  rný  citations  of  Ages  of  the 
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232  Schelling  calls  A.  "  The  clear,  contradictory  antagon'sm  between  A=B  and  A,  and 
thus  between  the  affirmation  of  Freedom  as  Indifference  (A)  and  the  negative  force  of 
Freedom  actually  being  as  Indifference  (B),  he  explains,  is  overcome  by  their 
2) 
1  necessary  unity  in  A'.  "  Once  'predicative  being'  (A  is  established,  though,  the 
'pronominal  being'  of  A=B  becomes  the  negative  force,  inasmuch  as  the  aim  of  the 
latter  is  to  maintain  Absolute  unity  against  the  differentiation  implicit  in  the  will-to- 
expansion  (i.  e.,  the  Fichtean  necessity  of  'not-A'  for  the  assertion  of  W) 
Consequently,  the  unity  of  A3  is  one  of  inherent,  necessary  conflict,  whereupon  the 
I  result  is  the  primordial  madness  of  rotary  repetition.  As  a  result,  in  Slavoi  Zi2ek's 
graphic  description,  God  (or  the  Absolute  Subject,  the  True,  etc.  ) 
repeatedly  dashes  himself  against  His  own  wall:  unable  to  stay  within, 
He  follows  His  urge  to  break  out,  yet  the  more  He  strives  to  escape,  the 
more  He  is  caught  in  His  own  trap.  Perhaps  the  best  metaphor  for  this 
rotary  motion  is  a  trapped  animal  which  desperately  strives  to 
disengage  itself  from  a  snare:  although  every  spring  only  tightens  the 
snare,  a  blind  compulsion  leads  it  to  make  a  dash  for  it  again  and  again, 
so  that  it  is  condemned  to  an  endless  repetition  of  the  same  gesture.  "' 
With  regard  to  this  impasse,  the  problem  of  beginning  is  not  that  of  classic  Idealism, 
whereby  the  Absolute  In-Itself,  sans  detenninate  phenomena,  is  somehow  (mystically 
/  philosophically  /  eschatologically)  ascertained  as  such;  Schelling's,  rather,  is  the  far 
more  material,  'flesh  and  blood',  "'  question  of  how  and  why  the  Absolute  split  from 
316  Schelling,  Ages  of  the  World,  176-78. 
317  To  avoid  possible  confusion,  Judith  Norman  points  out,  it  is  helpful  to  remember  that,  'in  a 
sense,  the  potencies  really  are  identical,  but  appear  under  different  powers  (hence  the  term  'potency'); 
their  differences  consist  not  in  their  compositional  structure  so  much  as  which  aspect  they  manifest. 
(To  state  the  case  in  terms  of  Schelling's  formulae,  the  potencies  are  all  A.  The  first  potency  ...  posits 
the  one  cssciicc  (A)  in  concealment,  the  second  potency,  (A),  posits  the  essence  (A)  in  expansion,  and 
so  forth)'(Nornian,  'The  Logic  of  Longing,  92  n.  5). 
119  slm  o1  Mek,  The  Indivisible  Rema  i  title  r.  -  An  Essav  on  Schelling  and  Related  Alam  rý 
(London:  Vcrson,  1996),  23. 
319  F.  W.  J.  Sclicl  ling,  Philosophical  Inquiries  Into  the  Nature  of  Hunian  Freedom  and  Matters 
Connected  Therewith  [  1809]  (trans.  Jarnes  Gutman,  Chicago:  Open  Court,  1936).  30, 100 
itself  in  the  first  place.  "o 
Such,  then,  is  the  pertinence  of  dialectical  materialism  as  articulated  in  the 
philosophy  of  Schelling  and  the  fiction  of  Herman  Melville.  For  both  are  concerned 
with,  in  the  words  of  Schelling,  the  singularity  of  the'primordial  [i.  e.,  groundless] 
deed',  in  which  the  Absolute  Subject  contracts  (in  the  double  sense  of  'condenses'  and 
'catches'  [as  though  a  disease])  its  individual,  contingent  consciousness  of  being:  " 
That  primordial  deed  which  makes  a  man  genuinely  himself  precedes 
all  individual  actions;  but  immediately  after  It  Is  Put  into  exuberant 
freedom,  this  deed  sinks  into  the  night  of  unconsciousness....  For 
man  to  know  of  this  deed,  consciousness  itself  would  have  to  return 
into  nothing,  into  boundless  freedom,  and  would  cease  to  be 
consciousness....  Likewise  that  will,  posited  once  at  the  beginning 
and  then  led  to  the  outside,  must  immediately  sink  into 
unconsciousness.  Only  in  this  way  is  a  beginning  possible,  a  beginning 
that  does  not  stop  being  a  beginning,  a  truly  eternal  beginning.  For 
here  as  well,  it  is  true  that  the  beginning  cannot  know  itself.  ffiat  deed 
once  done,  it  is  done  for  all  eternity....  If,  in  making  a  decision, 
somebody  retains  the  right  to  reexamine  his  choice,  he  will  never  make 
a  beginning  at  all.  "' 
The  crucial  thing  here  is  that  the  deed  is  accomplished  in  the  'beginning  that  does  not 
stop  being  a  beginning,  a  truly  eternal  beginning'.  That  is  to  say,  that  which  is  done  as 
the  very  foundation  of  the  present  is  eternally  (i.  e.,  always-already)  done;  moreover,  it 
belongs  to  a  past  that  was  itself  as  such  never  present.  The  free  Subject  (Self  /  God) 
that  emerges  from  the  maddening  deadlock  of  the  rotary  drive,  via  the  primordial 
deed,  effectively  speaks  itself  into  Existence.  Indeed,  for  Schelling,  it  is  only  in'the 
Word',  or  deed,  that  God  and  humanity  are  at  all.  Consequently,  prior  to  the  Word  of 
God,  i.  e.,  the  'disclosure'  of  Creation,  and  thus  prior  to  Existence  as  such,  there  is  only 
320  Zi2ek,  Pic  Indivisible  Remainder,  14. 
'2'  Scliciling,  . 
Iiýcs  (?  f  the  World.  12  3-14. 
Schel  ling,  A  gcs  of  the  Wor/d,  181-82.  Cf.,  Schelling,  Philosophical  Inqu'r'es  Into  the 
Nature  (?  f  Human  Freedom,  63-04. 101 
'the  will  that  wills  nothing',  "'  the  non-subjective,  Dionysian  void  and  inert 
indifference  of  absolute  freedom.  Stnctly  speaking,  prior  to  the  Word,  God,  as  the 
Absolute  In-Itself,  does  not  exi 
St.  324 
When  in  search  of  Truth  unvarnished,  we  are  not  unlike  Pierre,  who  seeks  his 
identity  outside  the  authority  of  his  father's  name:  'we  mine  into  the  pyramid;  by 
horrible  gropings  we  come  to  the  central  room;  with  joy  we  espy  the  sarcophagus;  but 
we  lift  the  lid  -  and  no  body  is  there!  -  appallingly  vacant  as  vast  is  the  soul  of  a 
man!  ""  Which  is  to  say,  like  Ishmael  of  the  Whale,  the  In-Itself  of  that  which  is 
sought  is  but  a  'vague,  nameless  horror'.  "'  And  yet,  unlike  Pierre,  Ishmael  is 
compelled  to  explain  himself-  'But  how  can  I  hope  to  explain  myself  here;  and  yet,  in 
some  dim,  random  way,  explain  myself  I  must,  else  all  these  chapters  might  be 
naught'.  "'  What  distinguishes  Ishmael  from  the  tragic  passivity  of  Pierre,  then,  and 
thus  ultimately  keeps  him  creating  himself  /  becoming  himself  anew  in  the  telling  of 
his  tale  as  mirrator,  is  his  understanding  that  the  formless  abyss  must  be  given  shape; 
or,  in  the  case  of  the  Whale,  colour. 
Ishmael  begins  by  describing  the  whiteness  of  the  Whale  with  a  litany  of 
1  -length  positive  metaphors  denoting  beauty  or  grandeur.  But,  by  the  end  of  his  page 
sentence,  we  learn  what  he  has  in  mind  is  in  fact  none  of  these:  'yet  for  all  these 
accumulated  associations,  with  whatever  is sweet  and  honorable  and  sublime,  there 
yet  lurks  an  elusive  something  in  the  innermost  idea  of  this  hue,  which  strikes  more  of 
;  23  Schel  ling,  A  ges  of  the  World,  132. 
324  Schelling-Ages  of  the  World,  149-50,156. 
325  Nlek  ille,  Pierre,  284-85;  cf.,  339. 
'2"  McIville,  Mobv-Dick,  188. 
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panic  to  the  soul  than  the  redness  which  affrights  in  blood.  ""  For  Ishmael,  the 
ultimate  horror  of  the  Whale's  whiteness  is  that  it  is  simultaneously  surface  and  depth, 
emptiness  and  fullness,  life  and  death;  both  the'very  veil  of  the  Christian's  deity'and 
the  defining  mark  of  this  deity's  absence: 
Is  it  that  by  its  indefiniteness  it  shadows  forth  the  heartless  voids  and 
immensities  of  the  universe,  and  thus  stabs  us  from  behind  with  the 
thought  of  annihilation,  when  beholding  the  white  depths  of  the  milky 
way?  Or  is  it,  that  as  in  essence  whiteness  is  not  so  much  a  color  as  the 
visible  absence  of  color,  and  at  the  same  time  the  concrete  of  all  colors, 
is  it  for  these  reasons  that  there  is  such  a  dumb  blankness,  full  of 
meaning,  in  a  wide  landscape  of  snows  -a  colorless,  all-color  of 
atheism  from  which  we  shrink?  "' 
As  Peter  Bellis  argues,  the  whiteness  of  Moby  Dick  is  analogous  to  the  empty  page  on 
which  the  purportedly  ineffable  Whale  is  described  assitch.  "'  In  this,  Ishmael 
realises  what  neither  Ahab  nor  Pierre  can  accept:  that  the  truth  itself  is  not  elusive, 
i.  e.,  hidden  behind  the'pasteboard  mask'of  reality  and  phenomena,  but  is  precisely 
the  immanent,  intensifying  excess  of  its  charactensation  as  elusive. 
Likewise,  Schelling  describes'the  Real'not  as  some  noumenal  Thing-as-such, 
but  as  'the  incomprehensible  basis  of  reality  in  things,  the  irreducible  remainder  which 
cannot  be  resolved  into  reason  by  the  greatest  exertion  but  always  remains  eternally  in 
the  depths'.  "'  The  provocative  thing  to  note  here  is  that  the  materiality  of  Ishmael's 
sense  of  whiteness  and  Schelling's  sense  of  the  Real  are  similar  in  their  dialectical 
materiality:  that  is,  both  are  ineffable  voids  that  emerge  in  realitY,  rather  than  an 
external  limit  somehow  divined  by  mystical  silence  or  eschatological  solicitation. 
I Z12ek's  clarity  is  particularly  helpful  in  this  regard: 
328  Melville,  MobY-Dick,  189. 
IN  Nlcl\,  Ille,  Mobv-Dick,  195. 
330  Bcllis,  No  Alysterics  Out  of  Ourselvcs,  124-25. 
331  Schelling.  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  the  Essence  of  Human  Freedom.  34.  Cf.  Sclielling, 
I  , ý,  cs  of  Ille  I'Vo  rld,  15  1 103 
[T]he  Real  is  not  the  abyss  of  the  Thing  that  forever  eludes  our  grasp.. 
and  on  account  of  which  every  symbolization  of  the  Real  is  partial  and 
inappropriate;  it  is,  rather,  that  invisible  obstacle,  that  distorting  screen, 
which  always  'falsifies'  our  access  to  external  reality,  that  'bone  in  the 
throat'  which  gives  a  pathological  twist  to  every  symbolization,  that  is 
to  say,  on  account  of  which  every  symbolization  misses  its  object.  Or 
with  reference  to  the  notion  of  the  Thing  as  the  ultimate  traumatic 
unbearable  Referent  that  we  are  unable  to  confront  directly,  since  its 
direct  presence  is  too  blinding:  what  if  this  very  notion  that  defusiVe 
everyday  reality  is a  veil  concealing  the  Horror  of  the  unbearable 
Thing  is  false,  what  if  the  ultimate  veil  concealing  the  Real  is  the  -,,,  cry 
notion  of  the  horrible  Thing  behind  the  veil'.  )"' 
When  the  Real  is  the  inherent  excess  of  reality,  i.  e.,  when  the  'radical  antinomy  that 
seems  to  preclude  our  access  to  the  Thing  already  is  the  Thing  itse 
1f,  333 
the  very  bases 
and  media  of  one's  monomaniacal  quests  (be  they  of  Ahab,  Pierre,  or  the  late- 
Schelling)  are  always  already  perverted  from  within.  In  this  way,  the  Unspeakable 
end  of  such  quests  emerges  only  after  it  is  first  spoken. 
4.  A  Necessaty  Madness 
According  to  Schelling,  at  least  before  his  confessional  turn  later  in  life,  this 
perversion  of  ontology  goes  beyond  the  scepticism  of  Kant  and  is  the  basis  for'the 
veil  of  sadness'  he  espied  'spread  over  all  of  nature,  the  deep,  unappeasable 
melancholy  of  all  life'.  "'  And  yet,  for  Schelling  and  Melville  alike,  the  failure  to  own 
up  to  life's  deep  melancholy  provoked  by  the  general  insanity  at  the  heart  of  reality 
and  reason  is  symptomatic  of  the  walking  dead.  Schelling  writes: 
Nothing  great  can  be  accomplished  without  a  constant  solicitation  of 
madness,  which  should  always  be  overcome,  but  should  never  be 
utterly  lacking.  One  might  do  well  to  assess  people  as  follows.  One 
should  say  that  there  is  a  kind  of  person  in  which  there  is  no  madness 
112  Sln  oj  7-i2ek,  The  1"lippet  and  the  Dwaif.  -  The  Penvi-se  Core  of  Christianit.  v  (Cambridge: 
MIT  Press,  2003).  67. 
333  Mck,  Ae  Puppet  and  the  Dwaýf  77. 
334  Schelling.  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  the  Essence  of  Human  Freedom,  79. 104 
whatsoever.  These  would  be  the  uncreative  people  incapable  of 
procreation,  the  ones  that  call  themselves  sober  spints....  But  where 
there  is  no  madness,  there  is  certainly  no  proper,  active,  living  intellect 
(and  consequently  there  is  just  the  dead  intellect,  dead  intellectuals.... 
Hence  the  utter  lack  of  madness  leads  to  another  extreme,  to  imbecility 
[Bl5dsinn]  (idiocy),  which  is  an  absolute  lack  of  all  madness.  "' 
Melville,  of  course,  had  been  flirting  with  such  darkness  since  his  earliest  novels.  By 
April  1849,  one  year  prior  to  the  ironically  self-assertive  'Hawthorne  and  His  Mosses', 
his  flirtations  had  become  overt  advances.  Here,  in  a  letter  to  Duyckinck  discussing 
the  insanity  of  Charles  Fenno  Hoffman,  Duyckinck's  short-term  successor  as  editor  at 
The  bterarýy  World,  Melville's  pity  is  infused  with  Schellingian  understanding  and 
empathy.  He  wntes: 
Poor  Hoffman  -I  remember  the  shock  I  had  when  I  first  saw  the 
mention  of  his  madness.  -  But  he  was  just  the  man  to  go  mad 
imaginative,  voluptuously  inclined,  poor,  unemployed,  in  the  race  of 
life  distanced  by  his  inferiors,  unmarried,  -  without  a  port  of  haven  in 
the  universe  to  make....  This  going  mad  of  a  friend  or  acquaintance 
comes  straight  home  to  every  man  who  feels  his  soul  in  him,  -  which 
but  few  men  do.  For  in  all  of  us  lodges  the  same  fuel  to  light  the  same 
fire.  And  he  who  has  never  felt,  momentarily,  what  madness  is  has  but 
a  mouthful  of  brains.  336 
As  would  be  demonstrated  further  later  in  Melville's  life,  the  artistic  greatness 
described  by  Schelling  comes  at  a  potentially  high  pnce.  For  indeed  not  only  do  his 
next  two  novels,  Moby-Dick  and  Pierre,  feature  two  of  the  most  memorable  madmen 
of  the  American  Renaissance,  rivalling  those  even  of  Poe,  it  would  not  be  long  before 
335  F.  W.  J.  Schelling  Ages  of  the  World  [Third  Draft]  (trans.  Jason  Wirth;  Albany:  State 
University  of  New  York,  2000),  103.  As  Jason  Wirth  points  out,  though,  Schelling's  point  is  not  to 
advocate  'an  utter  surrender  to  madness',  but  that  'Reason  remains  at  the  disposal  of  madness,  enchanted 
by  it,  humbled  by  it,  continually  solicitous  of  it,  but  not  such  that  this  drunken  ground  annihilates 
Reason  (Jason  Wirth,  Introduction  to  The  Ages  of  the  World  [Third  Draft],  xiv).  Cf,  'Stupidity  is  not 
error  or  a  tissuc  of  errors.  There  are  imbecile  thoughts,  imbecile  discourses,  that  are  made  up  entirely 
of  truths,  but  these  truths  are  base,  they  are  those  of  a  base,  heaý  y  and  laden  soul....  In  truth,  as  in 
error,  stupid  thought  only  disco\  ers  the  most  base  -  base  errors  and  base  truths  that  translate  the 
triumph  of  the  sla\  c,  the  reign  of  petty  \  alues  or  the  power  of  an  established  order'  (Gilles  Deleuze, 
Niet,  -,  sche  and  Philosol)hy  [trans.  Hugh  Tomlinson,  New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1983)]. 
105). 
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Melville  himself  was  feared  insane.  "'  Though  it  is  questionable  he  was  ever 
examined  for  mental  illness,  as  was  once  suggested  by  Merton  Sealts,  Jr.,  "'  his  wife's 
fears  for  her  own  safety  were  all  too  real.  If  the  actual  evidence  of  Melville's  spousal 
abuse  remains  highly  circumstantial,  the  relative  silence  on  the  subject  until  recently, 
as  in  many  instances  of  modem  abuse,  was  not  wholly  indicative  of  domestic  bliss.  "' 
For  instance,  though  she  refused  to  participate  in  a  fake  kidnapping  scheme  in  May 
1867,  which  was  intended  to  get  her  away  from  what  she  had  described  in  previous 
letters  to  Rev.  Henry  Bellows  as  her  husband's  insanity  and  ill  treatment,  that  there 
was  such  a  plan  at  all  speaks  volume.  "'  Although  the  full  extent  of  this  treatment  and 
the  manifestation  of  his  purported  insanity  are  not  at  all  definite,  alcohol  likely  played 
a  significant  role.  "' 
337  While  most  reviewers  of  Moby-Dick  simply  did  not  know  how  to  take  it,  and  thus  wrote  it 
off  as  bad  fiction,  many  reviewers  of  Pierre  went  several  steps  further  and  regarded  it  as  the  work  of  an 
insane  author.  Of  the  latter,  one  reviewer  writes:  'That  Herman  Melville  has  gone  "clean  daft",  is  very 
much  to  be  feared;  certainly,  he  has  given  us  a  very  mad  book....  The  sooner  this  author  is  put  in  ward 
the  better.  If  trusted  with  himself,  at  all  events  give  him  no  further  trust  in  pen  and  ink,  till  the  present 
fit  has  worn  off.  He  will  grievously  hurt  himself  else  -  or  his  very  amiable  publishers'  (Branch, 
Melville,  31). 
338  See  Merton  M.  Sealts,  Jr.  's  classic  essay  on  Melville's  possible  mental  examination  just 
after  completing  Pierre  in  'Herman  Melville's  "I  and  My  Chimney"'  American  Literature  13  (May, 
1941):  142-54.  Also  see  his  rejoinder  to  two  decades  of  scholarship  that  took  his  suggestion  as  rock- 
solid  fact  in  'Melville's  Chimney,  Reexamined'  in  Themes  and  Directions  in  American  Literature: 
Essays  in  Honor  of  Leon  Howard  (ed.  Ray  B.  Browne  and  Donald  Pizer,  Lafayette,  Ind.:  Purdue 
University  Studies,  1969),  80-102.  According  to  Lewis  Mumford,  one  of  Melville's  early  twentieth- 
century  critics,  Pierre  marked  the  beginning  of  a  full-blown  psychosis.  See  his  Herman  Melville,  17  1, 
176. 
339  Parker,  Herman  Melville,  Volume  2,628-35. 
340  Dr.  Henry  Whitney  Bellows  was  the  minister  of  the  All  Souls  Unitarian  Church  in  New 
York  City,  where  the  Melvilles  had  been  renting  a  pew  since  1849.  See  Walter  D.  Kring  and  Jonathan 
S.  Carey,  'Two  Discoveries  Concerning  Herman  Melville',.  in  The  Endless,  Winding  Wqv  in  Melville: 
New  Charts  b*N,  Kring  and  Care 
'v 
(eds.  Donald  Yanella  and  Hershel  Parker.  Glassboro,  N.  J.:  Melville 
Society,  1981),  11-15.  The  two  letters  from  Samuel  S.  Shaw  and  Elizabeth  Melville  to  Bellows  are 
reprinted  in  Herman  Melville,  Correspondence,  857-60.  Elizabeth  Renker's  treatment  of  the  letters  is 
easily  the  most  comprehensive  to  date.  See  Strike  Through  the  Mask,  49-68. 
34  '  After  the  failure  of  Mobv-Dick,  Melville's  increasing  consumption  of  alcohol  became  more 
of  a  silent  'solace'  than  it  was  social.  See  Eleanor  Melville  Metcalf,  Herinall  Mell'ille:  O'cle  and 
Epic 
, 
vele  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  1953),  215-,  and  Edwin  Haviland  Miller, 
Herman  MeNille,  32  1. 106 
As  much  as  Schelling  always  ultimately  privileges  Reason  over  madness,  due 
to  the  fact  that  madness  can  never  be  actualised  as  such  without  being  embodied  in 
Reason,  i.  e.,  as  Reason's  ground,  at  times  Melville  (in  his  life  and  in  his  fiction) 
exemplifies  the  potential  danger  of  this  logic.  In  characters  like  Ahab  and  Pierre, 
Melville  thinks  the  Truth  of  this'world  of  lies'  as  only  ever  caught  in  glimpses, 
perhaps  even  in  madness  -  be  it  clinically  or  chemically  induced.  3'2  And  yet,  I  argue, 
the  significance  of  Melville's  sense  of  madness  arises  from  his  related  notion  of  the 
'Great  Art  of  Telling  the  Truth',  and  thus  the  mark  of  true  genius  like  that  of 
Shakespeare,  as  the  art  of  the  mask.  "'  In  this,  the  'sane  madness  of  vital  truth' 
described  above  is  not  simply  the  Truth  that  eludes.  On  the  contrary,  the  very 
elusiveness  of  this  Truth  deferred  is  but  a  retroactive  projection  of  a  Truth  far  more 
harrowing: 
And  perhaps,  after  all,  there  is  no  secret.  We  incline  to  think  that  the 
Problem  of  the  Universe  is  like  the  Freemason's  mighty  secret,  so 
terrible  to  all  children.  It  turns  out,  at  last,  to  consist  in  a  triangle,  a 
mallet,  and  an  apron,  -  nothing  more!  We  incline  to  think  that  God 
cannot  explain  His  own  secrets,  and  that  He  would  like  a  little 
information  upon  certain  points  Himself  We  mortals  astonish  Him  as 
much  as  He  us.  But  it  is  this  Being  of  the  matter;  there  lies  the  knot 
with  which  we  choke  ourselves.  As  soon  as  you  say  Me,  a  God,  a 
Nature,  so  soon  you  jump  off  from  your  stool  and  hang  from  the  beam. 
Yes,  that  word  is  the  hangman.  Take  God  out  of  the  dictionary,  and 
you  would  have  Him  in  the  street.  "' 
142  For  more  on  Melville  and  madness,  as  a  theme  in  his  literature  and  his  life,  see  especially 
Paul  McCarthy,  'The  Twisted  Mind':  Madness  in  Herman  Melville's  Fiction  (Iowa  City:  University  of 
Iowa  Press,  1990).  See  also,  Allsa  von  Brentano,  'Herman  Melville  and  "The  Sane  Madness  of  Vital 
Truth...  in  Dion  vsus  in  Literature:  Essays  on  Literary  Madness  (ed.  Brammir  M.  Rieger;  Boýý  ling 
Green,  Oh.:  Popular,  1994).  149-67-,  Marty  Roth,  'Melville  and  Madness',  Arizona  Quarterl 
, 
ý..  -  A 
ýIoiirnal  ofAmerican  Literature,  Culture,  and  Theory  41  (Summer  1985):  119-30;  Jean  Magretta, 
'RadicA  Disunities:  Models  of  Madness  in  Pierre  and  The  Idiot',  Studies  in  the  Nove/  10  (1978):  234- 
50-,  Bellis,  No  MYsteries  out  of  Ourselves,  136-40. 
,41NIcI\II  le,  The  Pitizza  Tales,  244. 
144  Mcklile,  Correspondence,  186. 107 
It  is  here  that  the  'sane  madness'  of  Melville  and  Schelling  meet.  For,  indeed,  in  the 
words  of  Perry  Miller,  writers  like  Melville  and  Hawthome'do  not  inaugurate  a 
11renaissance"  in  American  literature:  they  constitute  a  culmination,  they  pronounce  a 
fitneral  oration  on  the  dreams  of  their  youth,  they  intone  an  elegy  of 
disenchantment.  1 
;  45 
Moreover,  I  argue,  they  represent  in  literature  the  explosive  theological 
implications  of  Schelling's  thinking.  For  here  the  eternal  suie  qua  non  of  God,  the 
Absolute,  or  the  True,  as  it  were,  only  is  inasmuch  as  it'contracts'  (finite)  Existence  in 
the  act  of  freedom;  that  is,  the  decisive  moment  of  'eternity  in  time'  that  thus  opens 
time  and  represses  the  egoistic  madness  of  its  Ground.  In  radical  contrast  to  the 
traditional  notions  of  time  (i.  e.,  as  the  distortion  of  an  eternal  Order,  or  as  a  particular 
mode  of  temporality)  'eternitY  begets  time  in  order  to  resolve  the  deadlock  it  becaine 
entangled  m.  "'  This  is  to  say,  using  David  L.  Clark's  succinct  unpacking  of  the 
'fantastic  logic'  that  structures  this  entanglement: 
[PIrimal  longing  excites  in  'man'  and  'animal'  a  craving  for  that  which 
they  already  need  to  be  in  order  to  respond  to  its  call:  namely, 
creatures.  'It'  -  primal  longing  -  somehow  triggers  in  the  creature  a 
desire  to  become  what  it  in  fact  is.  The  creature  surges  up,  stirs  into 
life,  but  this  upsurgence  and  stirring  must  always,  in  some  minimal 
way,  have  already  happened  and  thus  is  always  happening  -  an 
originary  event  that  beckons  from  the  'future'  because  it  recedes  into  a 
'past'  that  could  never  be  present  as  such.  347 
ý,  4  5  Perry  Miller,  Natitre's  Nation  (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard  University  Press,  1967),  255 
(emphasis  mine). 
,  4o  2i2ck,  The  Indivisible  Remainder,  3  1.  Cf.,  It  is  therefore  misleading  to  conce]N  e  the 
constitutive  displacement  of  man  as  the  division  between  the  finitude  of  his  bodily  existence  and  the 
infinity  of  the  Spirit.  The  Infinite  becomes  actual,  living  Spirit  only  when  it  'attains  itself,  when  it 
becomes  aware  of  itself,  in  a  finite  creature  'raised  from  the  creaturely  to  the  super-creaturely'.  That  is 
to  say:  \\hat  is  Spirit'!  The  domain  of  signification,  of  the  symbolic;  as  such,  it  can  emerge  only  in  a 
creature  that  is  neither  constrained  to  its  bodily  finitude  nor  directly  infinite,  but  in  bemeen.  a  finite 
entity  in  N\  hich  tile  Infinite  resounds  in  the  gulse  of  a  shado\ý  y  phantasmagoria,  a  presentiment  of 
Another  World'  (00-61). 
147  I)imd  L  Clark.  'Heldeggcr's  Craving  Being-On-  Schell  i  ng'  Diacritics  27.3  (1997).  19. 
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Fhe  groundless  deed,  then,  is  the  actualisation  of  Absolute  potentiality  and  freedom; 
in  this  unconscious  act  that  always  already  precedes  and  conditions  any  self- 
generative  presentation  or  characterization,  the  free  subject  is  witness  to  and 
necessarily  represses  the  Ungaind  (the  Non-Ground,  Void)  of  Absolute 
Indifference.  "'  With  this  in  mind,  Melville  and  Schelling  come  face-to-face  with  the 
self-characteri  sing  /  self-embodying  materialism  at  the  heart  of  natural  theology. 
5.  Self-Creation  as  an  Act  of  Love 
The  key  difference  we  are  descnbing  here  is  that  between  desire  and  love.  For 
Schelling,  as  noted  above,  at  the  heart  of  the  insane  cyclical  movement  that  precedes 
the  Beginning  of  being  and  time  is  'mere  craving  or  desire',  that  is,  the  desire  for  / 
addiction  to  the  In-itself  of  contractive  identity  . 
34'  Before  the  Word  or  Logos,  David 
Clark  notes,  'there  was  the  hunger  for  the  Word';...  or,  alternatively,  what 
psychoanalysis  would  designate  'the  drive  whose  true  aim  is  the  endless  reproduction 
of  its  circular  movement'.  "'  Drive,  then,  is  desire  In-Itself,  unactualised  in  the 
'subjectless'  ftiry  of  the  Absolute,  in  which  there  is only  the  indifferent  flux  of 
348  Cf 
., 
'[I]t  is  a  well-known  fact  that  nobody  can  be  given  character,  and  that  nobody  has 
chosen  for  himself  the  particular  character  he  bears.  There  is  neither  deliberation  nor  choice  here,  and 
yet  everyone  recognizes  and  judges  character  as  an  eternal  (never-ceasing,  constant)  deed  and  attributes 
to  a  man  both  it  as  well  as  the  action  that  follows  from  it.  Universal  moral  judgment  thus 
acknowledges  that  every  man  has  a  freedom  in  which  there  is  neither  (explicit)  deliberation  nor  choice 
[Grulltfl....  But  most  men  shy  away  from  this  freedom  that  opens  like  an  abyss  before  them,  just  as 
they  are  frightened  when  faced  with  the  necessity  of  being  wholly  one  thing  or  another....  They  feel 
themselves  crushed  by  this  freedom,  as  by  an  appearance  from  an  incomprehensible  world,  from 
eternity,  from  a  place  entirely  devoid  of  any  ground  at  all  [  Ungrund]'  (Schell  ing,  Ages  of  the  World, 
175-76). 
,49  Schelling,  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  the  Nature  of  Human  Freedom,  38. 
'-ýO  Clark,  'Craving  Being-On-  Schell  ing',  16.  Cf.,  '[T]he  Logos  appears  mysteriously  and 
precipitously  out  of  this  longing  like  a  word  out  of  the  random  lettering  of  an  anagram,  the  latter  a 
figure  for  the  meaningicss,  differential  markings  that  form  the  condition  of  the  possibilit\  of  language. 
(it  is  as  If  God  \\  crc  always,  already  hooked  on  phonics.  )'  (n.  10) 
;51  ? 
-Ikk, 
Pic  Indivisible  Remainder,  87  n.  69. 109 
Freedom,  but  no  free  Subject  as  such.  "'  With  theeternally  past'advent  of  the  Word, 
the  embodied  spirit  (Self)  that  emerges  is  free  only  inasmuch  as  it  is  not  completely 
itself;  it  is,  rather,  an  embodied  spirit,  marked  by  finitude,  death,  and  decay.  "'  Insofar 
as  it  is  not  itself,  the  spirit  is  made  ravenous  flesh: 
The  spirit  is  consequently  nothing  but  an  addiction  to  Being....  The 
base  form  of  the  spirit  is  therefore  an  addiction,  a  desire,  a  lust. 
Whoever  wishes  to  grasp  the  concept  of  spirit  at  its  most  profound 
roots  must  therefore  become  fully  acquainted  with  the  nature  of  desire 
.. 
for  [desire]  is  a  hunger  for  Being,  and  being  satiated  only  gives  it 
renewed  strength,  i.  e.,  a  more  vehement  hunger.  "' 
Constituted  as  a  free  subject  by  virtue  of  its  inherent  lack  of  self-presence,  the 
desirous-Self  cannot  be  satisfied.  On  the  contrary,  its  desire,  embodied  in  history  and 
subjectivity,  is  'always  and  by  definition  unsatisfied,  metonymical,  shifting  from  one 
352  Cf.,  'Drive 
... 
involves  a  kind  of  inert  satisfaction  that  always  finds  its  way;  drive  is 
nonsubjectivized  (acephalous').  Perhaps  its  paradigmatic  expressions  are  the  repulsive  private  rituals 
(sniffing  at  one's  own  sweat,  sticking  one's  finger  into  one's  nose,  etc...  )  that  bring  us  intense 
satisfaction  w/out  us  being  aware  of  it,  or,  insofar  as  we  are  aware  of  it,  w/out  us  being  able  to  do 
anything  about  it,  to  prevent  it'  (Slavoj  2i2ek,  'The  Abyss  of  Freedom'  in  The  Ages  of  the  World,  by  F. 
W.  J.  von  Schelling  [Ann  Arbor:  University  of  Michigan  Press,  1997],  80). 
353  This  perspective  is  not  limited  to  its  philosophical  articulation  in  Schelling  and  literary 
embodiment  in  Melville.  Indeed,  even  that  most  sentimental  of  Romantics,  Goethe,  is  ambivalent 
about  the  nature  he  had  very  nearly  divinized: 
Nature!  We  are  surrounded  and  embraced  by  her  -  without  being  able  to  exit  from 
her  or  to  enter  into  her  more  deeply.  Unasked  and  unwarned,  we  are  taken  up  into 
the  circuitry  of  her  dance;  she  has  her  way  with  us,  until  we  grow  weary  and  sink 
from  her  arms.... 
We  live  in  the  midst  of  her  and  are  foreign  to  her.  She  speaks  to  us 
ceaselessly  and  does  not  betray  her  secret  to  us.  We  work  our  endless  effects  on  her, 
yet  have  no  dominion  over  her. 
She  seems  to  have  invested  all  her  hopes  in  individuality,  and  she  cares 
nothing  for  the  individuals.  Always  she  builds,  always  she  destroys,  and  we  have  no 
access  to  her  workshop. 
She  lives  in  a  profusion  of  children,  and  their  mother,  where  is  she?  - 
She  squirts  her  children  out  of  nothingness,  and  does  not  tell  them  where 
they  came  from  and  where  they  are  going.  Their  task  is  to  run;  hers  is  to  know  the 
orbit  (qtd.  in  David  Farrell  Krell,  Contagion:  SexualitY,  Disease,  and  Death  in 
German  Idealism  and  Romanticism  [Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  19981, 
3). 
354  F.  W.  J.  Schelling,  'Stuttgart  Seminars'  in  Idealism  and  the  Endganle  of  Theory:  Three 
Essa 
, 
vs  b*vFWJ.  Schelling  (trans.  and  ed.  Thomas  Pfau;  Albany:  State  University  of  New  York  Press, 
1994),  230. 110 
object  to  another  since  I  do  not  actually  desire  what  I  want.  "  Be  careful  of  what  you 
wish  for,  so  the  saying  goes,  because  youjust  might  get  it.  The  same  logic  is  at  work 
here:  'What  I  actually  desire  is  to  sustain  desire  itself,  to  postpone  the  dreaded 
moment  of  its  satisfaction.  "' 
If  desire  is related  to  Schelling's  will-to-contraction,  and  thus  to  the  impossible 
singularitY  of  one's  desire,  i.  e.,  identity  and  wholeness,  love  is  related  to  the  will-to- 
expansion,  the  emergence  of  the  free  Self  that  is not  itself  Or,  as  /12ek  explains: 
[L]ove  is  to  be  opposed  here  to  desire:  desire  is  always  caught  in  the 
logic  of  'this  is  not  that',  it  thrives  in  the  gap  that  forever  separates  the 
obtained  satisfaction  from  the  sought-Jbi-  satisfaction,  while  love 
FULLY  ACCEPTS  that'this  IS  that'-  that  the  woman  with  all  her 
weaknesses  and  common  features  IS  the  Thing  I  conditionally  love; 
that  Christ,  this  wretched  man,  IS  the  living  God.  Again,  to  avoid  a 
fatal  misunderstanding:  the  point  is  not  that  we  should  'retioLince 
transcendence'  and  fully  accept  the  limited  human  person  as  our  love 
object,  since  'this  is  all  there  is':  transcendence  is  not  abolished,  but 
rendered  ACCESSIBLE  -  it  shines  through  in  this  very  clumsy  and 
miserable  being  that  I  love.  1357 
In  love,  according  to  Schelling,  the  impossible,  the  wholly  other,  is  what  cannot  be, 
what  never  has  been,  nor  never  will  be;  and  yet,  nevertheless,  it  remains  the 
paradoxical  excess,  the  Real,  which  emerges  from  the  contingency  of  reality. 
Schelling's  point  is  not  nearly  as  obscure  as  it  may  at  first  seem.  Again,  we 
need  only  think  back  to  the  insane  rotary  repetition  described  above,  wherein  the  pure 
will  that  wills  nothing  (God)  contracts  being: 
[T]here  were  from  the  very  beginning  two  different  though  not 
distinguishable  aspects  of  the  will  that  willed  nothing.  First,  It  was 
pure  will  in  itself,  but  as  such,  it  was  also  the  will  that  willed  nothing. 
Now  only  this  second  aspect  has  become  a  positively  negating  will; 
besides  this,  it  still  remains  a  pure  will,  and  this  quality  of  being  a  will 
cannot  be  destroyed.  It  is  even  impossible  that  another,  opposed,  ýýrill 
355  ýIýck,  'The  Abyss  of  Freedom'.  80. 
356  ? 
-Iýck, 
Mic  Abyss  of  Freedom',  80. 
. 157  212ek,  On  B(,  Ii(:  I',  90. not  produce  itself  in  it,  to  the  extent  that  it  remains  a  will,  and  precisely 
because  it  became  a  positively  negating  will.  This  opposed  will  is  one 
that  actually  wills  itself  as  what-is,  and  as  being.,  it  is,  in  a  word,  an 
affirming  will,  a  ývill  of  love  that  does  not  will  nothing  blit  rather  vvill 
something.  "' 
The  insanity  of  the  rotary  motion  Schelling  describes  here  is  that  of  a  'psychotic'  God 
unable  to  tolerate  any  Otherness;  such  is  theTury  of  his  egotism'that  this  includes, 
especially,  any  actualised  notion  of  Himself  as  either  Free  or  Creator.  For  Schelling, 
however,  the  groundless  deed,  'as  a  will  of  love,  disrupts  the  contractive  dominance 
of  the  egoistic  Ground,  "'  thereby  actualising,  in  the  'Word',  the  Groundless, 
inexpressible  potentiality  and  freedom  that  unites  the  contradictory  potencies  of  will- 
to-contraction  and  will-to-expansion.  "'  Schelling's  logic  is  a  paradox  of  materiality: 
It  is  apparent  that  none  of  these  -  not  the  negating,  not  the  affirming 
will,  and  not  the  merely  potentially  extant  will  that  is  their  unity  -  is 
that  absolute  I  of  divinity  as  it  was  before  the  activation;  but  precisely 
because  it  is  none  of  these  and  yet  is  all  three,  precisely  thereby  it 
appears  as  actual,  as  what  is  in  principle  inexpressible.  "' 
In  other  words,  the  God  of  Creation  is  not  the  Absolute  In-Itself,  the  purity  of 
indifferent  and  undifferentiated  freedom.  For  God  to  create  freely,  divine  freedom 
itself  must  be  actuallsed  as  such.  It  is  only  in  the  pnmordial  deed  that  the  Absolute 
actualises  itself  as  the  free  Creator-God;  and  thus,  consequently,  actuallses  the  abyssal 
void  of  Absolute  Freedom  inherent  to  self-creation.  The  In-and-For-Itself  endeavour 
of  Freedom's  autopoetic  self-becoming,  according  to  Schelling,  is  the  quintessential 
359  Schelling,  Ages  of  the  World,  169  [emphasis  mine]. 
359  (7f 
., 
'if  the  force  of  individuality  \ý  ere  alone,  there  would  be  nothing  but  the  eternal  state  of 
closing  oneself  off  and  being  closed  off.  Nothing  could  live  in  this  state,  created  things  would  be 
impossible,  and  the  concept  of  a  being  of  beings  would  be  lost.  For  this  force  of  self-riess  or 
individuality  in  God  is  ciiptured  in  that  barbaric  term  aseitY.  This  force  is  the  white  heat  of  purity, 
intensified  to  all  created  things,  and  would  rage  against  every  creature  like  ruinous  firc.  an  eternal 
\\  nith  that  tolerates  nothing,  fatall 
,v 
contracting  butfor  the  resistance  of  love'  (Schell  ing,  Ages  of  the 
World,  171  [emphasis  mine]). 
300  Schel  ling,  A,  ý,,  cs  of  the  World,  129-30,169-78. 
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act  of  love.  "' 
Of  course  the  comedy  of  love  here  is  that,  in  the  Word,  God  is  no  longer 
(simply)  Himself.  In  fact,  in  even  more  theologically  scandalous  terms,  It  Is  only  in 
loriginal  sin'  (qua  the  decision  to  act)  --  the  Fall  of  God,  as  it  were  -  that  God  is  at 
all.  Schelling  is  unambiguous  on  this  point,  at  least  in  this  period  of  his  philosophy. 
The  God  that  makes  reality  intelligible  in  the  decisive  act  of  love,  i.  e.,  of  free  creation, 
he  reasons,  must  also  relate  to  the  'contracted'  Ground  of  his  own  existence. 
Therefore,  the  God  of  Creation'is  not  God  viewed  as  absolute,  that  is,  insofar  as  he 
exists.  For  it  [the  Ground  of  existence  contracted  by  the  deed]  is  only  the  basis  of  His 
existence,  it  is  nature  -  in  God,  inseparable  from  him,  to  be  sure,  but  nevertheless 
distinguishable  from  Him'.  363  In  short,  then,  after  the  primordial  deed,  the 
quintessential,  eternally  past  moment  of  love  and  freedom,  the  (contractive)  desire  for 
wholeness  can  only  ever  be  frustrated  by  the  (expansive)  love  that  must,  in  effect, 
lose.  It  is in  this  sense  of  love  as  loss  that  we  find  the  basis  of  a  truly  radical  gospel, 
in  which  salvation  of  self  is  theologically  less  redemptive  than  the  fall  that  sets  it  free. 
The  latter  is  a  only  slightly  more  provocative  way  of  rearticulating  the  critical 
implications  of  Schelling's  related  discussion  of  Evil.  Evil,  he  argues,  is  only  truly 
possible  in  a  free  subject  that  'loses'  itself,  as  such,  Evil  must  be  freely  chosen.  "'  For 
302  Schelling,  Ages  of  the  World,  137-38. 
361  Schelfing,  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  the  Essence  of  Hunian  Freedom,  32.  As  2,2ek  aptly 
notes  in  his  commentary  on  Schelling's  understanding  of  Freedom,  'either  a  thing  is  not  yet  itself  and 
dwells  in  the  state  of  virtual  proto-existence,  or  it  becomes  itself,  is  "posited  as  such",  but  this  positing 
is  achic\  ed  by  the  supplernent  of  the  Word  -  that  is,  the  thing  is  already  re-marked,  no  longer  merely 
itself  (Die  Indivisible  Remainder,  60).  Cf.,  Andrcvý  Bowie,  Introduction  to  On  the  History  of  Modern 
PhilosophY,  20. 
364  Cf-.,  'On  the  one  hand,  nature  can  spiritualize  itself,  it  can  turn  into  the  medium  of  Spirit's 
self-manifestation,  on  the  other  hand,  with  the  emergence  of  the  Word,  the  obscure  principle  of.  Ground 
ýind  Selfhood  which  hitherto  acted  as  an  anonymous,  impersonal,  blind  force  is  itself  spiritualized, 
illuminated,  it  becomes  a  Person  aware  of  itself,  so  that  we  are  now  dealing  with  an  Evil  which,  in  full 
im-arencs's  of  itself,  wills  itself  as  Evil  -  \ýhich  is  not  merely  indifference  toward,,  the  Good  but  an 
ýicn\  c  striving  for  F\  il'(2i2ek,  The  Indi0sible  Remainder,  64). 113 
Schelling,  the  possibility  of  this  choice  vconsists  in  the  fact  that,  instead  of  kcepln-, 
-, 
his 
selfbood  as  the  ground  or  the  instrument,  man  can  stnve  to  elevate  it  to  be  the  ruling 
or  universal  will,  and,  on  the  contrary,  try  to  make  what  is  spiritual  in  him  into  a 
meansi.  365  Evil,  therefore,  emerges  from  the  Subject's  misguided  sense  of  having 
'fallen'  from  (the  truth  of)  itself,  and  thus  believing  It  has  lost  something  that  can  be 
regained.  This,  Schelling  notes,  is  the  root  of  the  free  Subject's  'spiritualized'  desire  to 
'return'  to  its  status  as  (contractive)  Universal  /  Ideal: 
For  even  he  who  has  moved  out  of  the  center  retains  the  feeling  that  he 
has  been  all  things  when  in  and  with  God.  Hence  there  springs  the 
hunger  of  selfishness  which,  in  the  measure  that  it  deserts  totality  and 
unity  becomes  even  needier  and  poorer,  but  just  on  that  account  more 
ravenous,  hungrier,  more  poisonous.  366 
Thus,  Schelling  effectively  explodes  from  within  the  traditional  notion  of  Evil  as 
imperfection  or  privation.  For,  on  the  contrary,  Evil  is  constitutive  of  the  free 
Subject's  actual  (sinful)  existence,  insofar  as  this  existence  is  the  material  embodiment 
of  the  Subject's  ongoing  duplicitous  attempt  to  present  as  'essential  truth'  that  which  is 
necessarily  a  retroactive  characterisation  /  projection.  "' 
365  Schelling,  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  the  Nature  of  Human  Freedom,  68. 
366  Schelling,  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  the  Nature  of  Human  Freedom,  69.  Cf.,  212ek,  The 
Indivisible  Remainder,  63-70;  Clark,  'Heidegger  Being-On-  Schel  ling',  21-23. 
367  On  this  point  Schelling  could  not  be  any  more  clear:  'the  mere  consideration  of  the  fact  that 
man,  the  most  perfect  of  all  visible  creatures,  is  alone  capable  of  evil,  shows  that  [the  ground  of  evil] 
can  by  no  means  consist  of  insufficiency  or  deprivation'.  (Schelling,  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  the 
Nature  of  Human  Freedom,  44).  Cf.,  Jean  Baudrillard's  similar  thoughts  in  an  intcrý  1cw  with  Der 
Spiegel:  'Good  and  evil  are  inextricably  bound  together,  this  is  fatal  in  its  original  meaning:  an  integral 
part  of  our  fatc  and  destiny....  Evil  was  interpreted  as  misfortunate  because  misfortune  can  be  fought 
against:  povertv,  injustice,  oppression,  etc.  This  is  how  the  humanitarian  ,  iexN-s  things,  the  emotional 
and  sentimental  vision,  the  permanent  empathy  for  the  suffering.  Evil  is  the  world  as  it  is  and  has 
always  been.  Misfortune  is  the  Ný  orld  as  it  never  should  have  been.  The  transformation  of  eN  il  into 
misfortune  is  the  most  profitable  business  of  the  twentieth  centurv'  (Das  ist  der  vierte  %\*eltkrieg'  Der 
Spicgel  Onlinc  [1 
-5 
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6.  Khora  and  the  Masquerade  of  Femininiýv 
The  repercussions  of  Schelling's  and  Melville's  dialectical  materialism  become 
radically  apocalyptic  in  the  complex  relationship  they  describe  bevveen  the  embodied 
Self  /  Absolute  and  that  which  is  more  profound  than  Good  or  Evil  (and  thus,  too, 
God).  Schelling  writes: 
If  we  wish  to  bring  this  Being  nearer  to  us  from  a  human  standpoint, 
we  may  can  say:  It  is  the  longing  which  the  eternal  Onefieels  to  gille 
birth  to  itself.  This  is not  the  One  itself,  but  is  co-etemal  with  it.  This 
longing  seeks  to  give  birth  to  God,  i.  e.,  the  fathomable  unity;  but  to 
that  extent  it  has  not  yet  the  unity  in  its  own  self...  Man  is  fon-ned  in 
his  mother's  womb;  and  only  out  of  the  darkness  of  unreason  (out  of 
feeling,  out  of  longing,  the  sublime  mother  of  understanding)  grow 
clear  thoughts.  We  must  imagine  primal  longing  in  this  way  -  turning 
toward  reason,  indeed,  though  not  yet  recognizing  it.  ... 
This  primal 
longing  moves  in  anticipation  like  a  surging,  billowing  sea,  similar  to 
the'matter'of  Plato,  following  some  dark,  uncertain  law,  incapable  in 
itself  of  forming  anything  that  can  endure.  "' 
Schelling's  maternal  imagery  in  this  passage  is  not  unlike  that  of  Plato's  Timaelts,  on 
which  Schelling  had  provided  a  commentary  in  1794.  "' 
In  the  Timaeus  Plato  calls  this  characterless  non-place  from  which  everything 
that  exists  arises  -  in  thought  as  well  as  in  material  form  -  khora,  'the  receptacle 
and,  as  it  were,  the  nurse  of  all  becoming  and  change'.  "'  As  such,  he  continues, 
that  which  is  going  to  receive  properly  and  uniformly  all  the  likenesses 
of  the  intelligible  and  eternal  things  must  itself  be  void  of  all  character. 
Therefore  we  must  not  call  the  mother  and  receptacle  of  visible  and 
sensible  things  either  earth  or  air  or  fire  or  water  ... 
but  we  shall  not 
be  wrong  if  we  describe  it  as  invisible  and  formless,  all  embracing, 
possessed  in  a  most  puzzling  way  of  intelligibility,  yet  very  hard  to 
grasp.  371 
Khora,  in  short,  is  'eternal  and  indestructible',  'provides  a  position  for  everything  that 
368  Schelling,  Philosophical  Inquiries  into  the  Nature  of  Huniall  Freedom  35. 
369  Sec  David  Farrell  Krell,  'Female  Parts  in  Tiniaeus'Arion  2/3  (1975):  400-2  1. 
370  -  Plato.  Timaeus  tiIIII  Critias  (trans.  Desmond  Lcc,  London.  Pengwn,  1965),  49. 
,  .71  Plato,  Timaeus,  50-51. I  15 
comes  to  be',  and'is  apprehended  without  the  senses  by  a  sort  of  spurious  reasoning 
and  is  so  hard  to  believe  in  -  we  look  at  it  indeed  in  a  kind  of  dream'.  "' 
Schelling's  anthropomorphic  images  of'pnmal  longing'-  such  as'womb', 
'billowing  sea',  'gravity'  (Schvt,  ere),  'feeling',  'the  ruleless'(das  Regellose),  'the  sublime 
mother  of  knowledge',  'the  darkness  of  unreason'-  are  striking  in  their  similar 
intertwining  of  femininity,  violence,  and  mystery.  "'  Though  I it  would  be  fooli  sh  to 
attribute  it  solely  and  directly  to  Schelling,  such  images  are  highly  suggestive  of 
Isabel's  role  -  as  sister,  as  wife,  as  enigma  -  in  Melville's  Pierre.  In  her,  the 
narrator  suggests,  Pierre  finds  the  most  fundamental  question  of  litC,  placing  the 
'unraveled  plot'  of  her  life  on  par  with  all  other  mysteries  throughout  the  ages,  of  all 
history  and  all  peoples,  even  that  of  'the  unravelable  inscrutableness  of  God' 
. 
37'  As 
she  tells  the  inquisitive  Pierre,  who  wishes  to  discover  and  uncover  the  truth,  'far 
sweeter  are  mysteries  than  sunnises:  though  the  mystery  be  unfathomable,  it  is  still 
the  unfathomableness  of  fullness;  but  the  surmise,  that  is  but  shallow  and  unmeaning 
emptiness.  ""  Her  words  not  only  foreshadow  Pierre's  failure,  but  forrn  the  basis  of 
his  love  for  Isabel  -  be  it  that  of  a  brother  or  that  of  husband.  "' 
Is  Isabel  victim  or  victimizer;  passive  or  active;  knowing  or  unknowing;  sister 
372 
Plato,  Timaeus,  52. 
373  See  Clark,  'Heidegger  Being-On-Schelling',  14.  For  a  more  thorough  analysis  of 
Sclicl  I  ing's  anthropomorphizing  of  the  Ground,  including  that  derived  from  the  Tiniaeus,  also  see  David 
L. 
, 
Clark,  "'The  Necessary  Heritage  of  Darkness":  Tropics  of  Negativity  in  Schelling,  Derrida,  and  de 
Man'  in  Intersections:  Nineteen  th-  Ceti  tit  r"N,  Philosoph 
*v 
and  Contemporar-N,  Theorý,  (eds.  David  L.  Clark 
and  Tilottama  Rajan,  Albany:  State  University  of  New  York  Press,  1995),  79-146.  Also  see,  John 
Sallis,  Chorology:  On  Beginning  in  Plato's  Tiniaeus  (Bloomington:  Indiana  University  Press,  1998). 
374  Melville,  Pierre,  141. 
375 
Mel%  ille,  Pierre,  153. 
376  Cf.,  Pierre's  description  of  love  built  on  the  necessary  bedrock  of  secrecy:  'For,  ývhate,,  er 
sonic  IoN  ers  may  sometimes  say,  love  does  not  always  abhor  a  secret,  as  nature  is  said  to  abhor  a 
N  acuuni.  Love  is  built  upon  secrets,  as  lovely  Venice  upon  inN  isible  and  incorruptible  piles  in  the  sea. 
Love's  secrets,  being  mysteries,  ever  pertain  to  the  transcendent  and  the  infinite:  and  so  thcN  are  as  airv 
bridges,  by  Ný  hich  our  further  shadows  pass  o\  cr  into  the  regions  of  the  golden  mists  and  exhalation,,. 
N\  hen  all  poetical.  lovely  thoughts  are  engendered.  and  drop  into  us,  as  though  pearls  should  drop  from 
raltibo\\s'  (Nlcl\ille,  P'wrre,  81). 116 
or  wife?  Ultimately,  neither  Pierre  nor  the  narrator  is  ever  quite  sure.  As  Wilma 
Garcia  writes: 
As  for  their  blood  relationship,  and  the  suggestions  of  incest  that 
possibility  raises,  Isabel  seems  to  believe  she  is  Pierre's  sister,  and 
Pierre  believes  it  enough  to  forsake  his  mother  and  his  bright  future  for 
her  sake,  or  perhaps  his  sacrifices  are  for  the  sake  of  his  own  heroic 
self-image....  He  is  never  so  sure  of  the  truth  of  her  story  again.  But 
Isabel  does  not  change;  she  follows  Pierre  wherever  he  leads  her,  even 
to  the  grave.  In  her  mysterious  being  are  the  merging  images  of  the 
prize  of  the  hero's  quest  -  helpmate,  lover,  damsel  in  distress,  perhaps 
even  passive  temptress  -  yet  all  of  these  imaoes  are  so  tinged  with 
irony  and  ambiguity  that  we  are  never  really  sure  of  who  or  what  she 
is.  177 
In  revealing  herself  as  his  half-sister,  no  matter  how  ambiguous  the  evidence,  Isabel 
marks  the  femininity  of  the  decisive  moment  and  mysterious  ground  of  Pierre's  tragic 
self-presentation.  "'  That  is  to  say,  upon  her  revelation  and  his  decision,  neither  he  nor 
Pierre  is  recognizable  as  what  had  come  before.  Consequently,  one  need  not  appeal 
strictly  to  biographical  details  to  understand  the  sudden  change  of  course  that  occurs 
in  the  novel;  it  is,  in  fact,  explained  within.  "'  For  in  Isabel  remains  the  absolute 
mystery  of  Self,  from  which  emerges  Pierre's  (and  Melville's)  disastrous  decision  to 
claim  her  as  his  own 
: 
390 
Ay,  Pierre,  now  indeed  art  thou  hurt  with  a  wound,  never  to  be 
completely  healed  but  in  heaven;  for  thee,  the  before  undistrusted 
moral  beauty  of  the  world  is  forever  fled;  for  thee,  thy  sacred  father  is 
no  more  a  saint;  all  brightness  hath  gone  from  thy  hills,  and  all  peace 
from  thy  plains;  and  now,  now,  for  the  first  time,  Pierre,  Truth  rolls  a 
377  Wilina  Garcia,  Mothers  and  Others:  M'  whs  of  the  Feniale  in  the  Works  of  Melville,  Twain, 
and  Heiningwav  (New  York:  Peter  Lang,  1983),  85. 
379  Indeed,  even  Isabel  says  of  her  mother:  'I  never  knew  a  mortal  mother.  If,  indeed,  mother 
of  mine  hath  livcd,  she  is  long  gone,  and  cast  no  shadow  on  the  ground  she  trod....  I  seem  not  of 
wonian  born'(Mel\  ille,  Plerre,  114). 
379  Brian  Higgins  and  Hershel  Parker  make  the  convincing  argument  that  this  inexplicable  and 
cry  cynical  turn  in  Pierre  is  primarily  attributable  to  the  very  poor  sales  and  savaging  re\  ie\ýs  of 
Mob 
' 
v-Dick,  \N  hich  probably  came  to  light  while  Melville  was  writing  his  follow-up  novel.  See  their 
Tlic  I-']a\\  ed  Gr.  indeur  of  Nlel\  ille's  Pierre',  162-96. 
390  Judith  Fryer,  Ae  h'tlces  of  Eve:  Women  in  the  Niiieteetith-Cetititi-ý,,,  Inierl(-titi  Novel  (Ne\ý 
York:  O\ford  Uni\ersity  Press,  1976),  49-50. 117 
black  billow  through  thy  soul!  Ah,  miserable  thou,  to  whom  Truth,  in 
her  first  tides,  bears  nothing  but  wrecks!  "' 
Her  dying  words,  thus,  are  a  fitting  final  assessment  of  Pierre's  poisoned  self- 
presentation:  'All's  o'er,  and  ye  knew  him  not!  "" 
It  is,  I  would  argue,  regarding  this  notion  of  the  mysterious  Ground  of  self- 
presentation  (or  khora)  as  an  undifferentiated  femininity  that  Richard  Kearney's 
otherwise  brilliant  critique  of  the  postmodern  fetish  of  absolute  Otherness  is 
inadequate.  "'  Khora  is,  Kearney  suggests,  'neither  identical  with  God  nor 
incompatible  with  God  but  marks  an  open  site  where  the  divine  may  dwell  and  heal', 
moreover,  this  is  why  'God  and  khora,  like  theism  and  atheism,  are  two  sides  of  the 
same  coin.  If  God  without  khora  risks  dogmatism,  khora  without  the  possibility  of 
God  risks  desolation.  Perhaps  khora  could  be  reinterpreted  as  the  primordial  matrix 
of  the  world  which  God  needs  to  become  flesh.  ""  Kearney's  motivation  for  such  a 
position  is  his  deep  suspicion  of  the  'postmodem  obsession  with  absolutist  ideas  of 
exteriority  and  otherness',  which  he  finds  in  the  likes  of,  amongst  others,  Lyotard, 
Baudrillard,  Derrida,  Zi2ek,  and,  in  passing,  Schelling.  Theirs  is,  he  argues,  an 
obsession  that  ultimately  leads  to  an  ethically  problematic  idolatry:  'that  of  the 
immemorial,  ineffable  Other',  in  which  there  Is  no  discernible  difference  between  the 
A 
divine  Good  and  the  horrific  Abject.  "'  The  key,  on  the  contrary,  is  to  acknowledge 
the  division  between  the  self  and  the  other  without  separating  them  so  far  that  there  is 
no  relation  at  all.  To  do  otherwise  is  to  make  ethical,  responsible  -  and,  for  Kearney, 
ticcessarY  --  discemment  impossible. 
-181  Melvillc,  Plerre,  65. 
382 
Mel\  ille,  Pierre,  362. 
383  Keanicy,  Strangers,  Gods  and  Monsters,  193-211. 
Kc-,  imey,  Strangers,  Gods  and  Monsters,  194,211. 
,  't  "5  Kcamey,  Strangers,  Gods  andllonstcrs,  229. 118 
The  problem  with  this  lies  not  in  Kearney's  ethical  appeal  to'diacritical 
hen-neneutics',  wherein  the  other  is  not  'so  exterior  or  so  unconscious  ...  that  it  cannot 
be  at  least  minimally  interpreted  by  a  self.  (In  fact,  his  hermeneutical  spirit  resonates 
in  my  own  project  here.  )  Neither  does  he  necessarily  privilege  the  redemptive  desire 
of  wholeness  and  salvation;  for  him,  rather,  otherness  is a  debt  'inscribed  within  me  as 
an  uncontainable  call  from  beyond'.  386  The  weakness,  on  the  contrary,  is most 
strikingly  apparent  in  Kearney's  odd  claim  that  neither  Plato's  notion  nor  its 
psychoanalytic  (and  thus,  implicitly,  Schellingian)  reappraisals,  specifically  those  of 
Z12ek  and  Julia  Kristeva,  regard  khora  'as  an  explicit  player  in  the  religious  drama.  ""' 
Kearney's  rationale  for  this  assessment  is  based  on  the  crucial  difference  between  his 
privileged  notion  of  a  disembodied  God  who  simply'may  be'and  Schelling's 
dialectically  embodied  God  who'actually  is'.  "'  For  the  former,  God  is  Good  a  priori, 
and  thus  knowable  only  in  a  hermeneutic  /  interpretive  engagement;  whereas,  for  the 
latter,  God  is  Good  only  in  the  primordial  pronouncement  of  His  Word  that  creates 
order  out  of  chaos,  and  can  thus  only  be  known  in  and  as  a  materialistic  self- 
presentation,  i.  e.,  'as  God'.  "'  In  this  precise  sense,  God  /  the  Absolute  Subject,  as 
motherly  khora,  gives  birth  to  itself 
The  effects  of  this  on  our  thinking  about  sexual  differentiation  and  gender  are 
386  Keamey,  Strangers,  Gods  and  Monsters,  8  1. 
397  Kearney,  Strangers,  Gods,  and  Monsters,  204;  cf.  194-97.  On  Schelling's  profoun 
id  influence  on  aspects  of  crucial  aspects  of  psychoanalysis,  especially  his  notion  of  the  Unconscious  and 
Uncanny,  see  Dale  Snow,  'The  Role  of  the  Unconscious  in  Schelling's  System  of  Transcendental 
Idealism'  Idealistic  Studies  19.3  (1989):  23  1  -50.  Cf.,  Bowie,  Schelling  and  Modet-n  European 
Phllosoj)hy,  96-97,156. 
389  Cf.,  Richard  Kearney,  The  God  Who  May  Be:  A  Hermeneutics  of  Religion  (Bloomington: 
Indiana  Uni%crsity  Press,  2001). 
389  This  is  the  important  difference  bctNýeen  God  and  humanity.  that  God,  as  cN  idenced  by  the 
unconsciOLIs  deed  of  Creation,  inc\itably  chooses  the  (expansive)  Good,  \ýhereas  humanity  inewably 
suffers  tile  Fall  (sin).  As  2i2ek  puts  it,  in  both  cases,  the  choice  is  sjmultaneouslý  free  and  "forced... 
(The  Indivisible  Reniainder,  33). 119 
by  no  means  peripheral.  This  comes  to  light  most  clearly  in  the  sharp  sexual 
distinction  Schelling  seeks  to  make  between  his  dialectical  materialism  and  the  strict 
Idealism  of,  for  instance,  Hegel.  "O  In  this,  he  agrees  with  Friedrich  Schlegel,  his 
brother-in-law  once  removed,  who  writes  in  Lucinde:  'Mystenes  are  female,  flicy  like 
to  veil  themselves  but  still  want  to  be  seen  and  discovered.  ""  In  effect,  as  has  been 
well  rehearsed  by  David  Farrell  Krell,  both  regard  femininity  as  fullness  aiid  lack, 
fecundity  and  emasculation,  the  In-Itself  of  Absolute  Freedom  and  the  sign  of 
necessary  weakness.  Femininity,  as  such,  is  regarded  as  a  lack  -  i.  e.,  inasmuch  as  it 
must  be  actualised,  made  real,  in  the  (male)  Word,  it'still  wants  to  be  seen'-  and  as 
the  inaccessible  ('veiled),  fecund  Ground  of  its  own  being. 
Schelling's  point  is  easy  to  misunderstand.  On  the  one  hand,  212ek  points  out 
'[I]nsofar  as  "subject"  is  the  Ground  that  asserts  itself  "as  such",  in  the  very  medium  of 
Existence,  against  every  detenninate  fonn  of  actual  existence,  subject  is  a  potentiality, 
never  fully  actualized,  and  the  feminine  Ground  asserted  against  the  "masculine" 
existence  -logos.  ""  On  the  other  hand,  insofar  as  femininity  can  only  ever  be 
actualised  /  embodied,  and  thus  desired,  as  that  which  is  not  itself,  it  is  itself  only  in 
the  masquerade  of  masculinity.  "'  In  its  disavowal  of  corporeal  nature  and  desire  for  a 
390  The  following  discussion  is  indebted  to  David  Farrell  Krell,  'The  Crisis  of  Reason  in  the 
Ninctcenth-Century:  Schelling's  Treatise  on  Human  Freedom'  in  The  Collegiuni  Phaenomenologicuni: 
Dic  First  Teti  Years  (eds.  John  Sallis,  Giuseppina  Moneta,  and  Jacques  Taminiaux;  Dordrecht:  Kluwer 
Academic  Publishers,  1988),  13-32,  and  David  L.  Clark,  'Mourning  Becomes  Theory:  Schelling  and 
the  Absent  Body  of  Philosophy'  Romantic  Circles  Praxis  Series:  Scheffing  and  Romanticisni  (June 
2000):  16  pars.  PURL:  http:  //www.  i-c.  ui-nd.  edu/praxis/schelling/clark/clark.  html 
39  1  Friedrich  Schlegel,  Tucinde'and  the  Fragments,  253.  For  more  on  Schlegel's  sense  of 
femininity  and  its  rclation  to  that  of  Hegel's,  see  Philippe  Lacoue-Labarthe,  'The  Unpresentable'  in  The 
Subject  (11'Philosophy  (trans.  Claudette  Sartiliot;  Minneapolis:  Uni\  ersity  of  Minnesota  Press,  110-57. 
392  21ýck,  The  Abyss  of  Freedom',  7-8. 
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Ae  Indivisible  Remainder,  158-67.  Cf.,  Judith  Butler's  argument  that  desire,  the 
very  heiirt  of  this  masquerade,  jis  marked  by  a  pursuit  of  mastery  (through  consumption  or  negat,  on)  of 
'\\hat  is  different  or  unassimilable  in  the  Other',  and  is  typically  engendered  as  masculine  Mesire'  in 
0-ifical  T(Ymsfior  Litcrar.  v  Stud.  v  feds.  Frank  Lentricchia  and  Thomas  McLaughlin-,  Chicago: 
University  of  Chicigo  Press,  1995],  377,379). 120 
spiritual  Absolute  that  reflects  itself  back  to  itself,  Schelling  reasons,  Idealism 
renounces  its  own  actualisation  /  embodiment.  "'  Consequently,  as  Krell  points  out, 
'precisely  when  the  (masculine)  philosopher  ignores  (feminine)  nature  he  sacrifices 
his  own  (masculine)  nature""  -  i.  e.,  by  excluding  the  feminine  potency  of  nature,  the 
manly  men  of  Idealism  actually  reveal  themselves  to  be  decidedly  'girly'. 
Mark  Lloyd  Taylor  illustrates  this  brilliantly  in  his  analysis  of  gender  and  the 
theological  roles  of  God  and  Jesus  in  Moby-Dick.  "  Ishmael's  narration,  Taylor 
argues,  blurs  the  distinction  between  Reformed  Christianity  and  Emersonian 
Transcendentalism. 
In  the  former,  one  has  a  God  of  absolute  doing;  in  the  latter,  a  God  of 
absolute  being.  In  both  cases,  the  world  and  the  human  self  cease  to 
have  any  real  meaning  or  value.  The  God  of  absolute  doing  and  the 
God  of  absolute  being  collide,  merge,  and  cancel  each  other,  leaving 
the  all-powerful,  all-present,  indefinite  blackness  that  swims  behind 
Moby  Dick,  both  the  whale  and  the  book.  This  white  God  is 
existentially  useless,  for  no  inferences  concerning  human  life  can  be 
drawn  from  such  indifferent  power  and  inscrutable  presence.  "' 
In  Ahab's  inscrutable  God,  for  instance,  there  is  but  the  inevitability  of  destruction,  'of 
being  rammed  or  crushed  or  penetrated',  whereas  the  Transcendentalist  God  of 
absolute  being,  that  which  preys  on  those  who  idealise  the  'gentle,  dreamy 
participation  of  the  individual  self  in  the  divine,  oceanic  All  as  the  source  of  human 
equality  and  the  banishment  of  discord  and  evil',  destroys  by'swallowing  or 
dissolving  or  drowning  the  human  self  in  its  awful  reality.  "'  Although  both  forms  of 
destruction  in  Moby-Dick  are  repeatedly  identified  as  masculine,  in  contrast  to  the 
394  Much  of  what  I  say  here  owcs  a  debt,  n  sp,  rIt  if  not  in  \ý  ord,  to  David  Farrell  Krell's 
discussion  of  hermaphroditism  in  Hegel.  See  Krell,  Contagion,  126-44. 
395  Krell,  'The  Crisis  of  Reason',  18. 
396  Mark  Lloyd  Taylor,  'Ishmael's  (ni)Other:  Gender,  Jesus,  and  God  in  Me]  %  ille's  'Alobý- 
Dick...  Jow-nal  (ýf  Relýql()n  72  (July  1992):  325-50- 
397  Taylor,  'Ishmael's  (m)Other',  146. 
39'  Taylor,  'Islimael's  (m)Other',  346. 121 
stifling  weakness  of  femininity  of  life  on  the  shore,  Taylor  notes  Ishmael's 
unwillingness  to  abide  by  either.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  his  transition  to  the  sea, 
Ishmael  is  not  so  much  moving  away  from  women  as  he  is,  in  the  words  of  Jennifer 
Wing,  'delving  deeper  into  his  own  struggle  to  create  a  definitive  image  of  "woman" 
that  like  the  'pasteboard'  mask  does  not  exist.  """  That  is  to  say,  an  unthinkable  image 
of  Woman  as  hermaphroditic  'Other-as-  Same',  as  that  which  'exists  solely  as  a  nurror 
to  reflect  back  the  image  of  the  male  self  to  himself.  ""' 
The  'manly'  descnption  of  the  Idealist  philosopher/  seeker  of  truth  in 
Schelling  and  Melville  is  once  again  not  unlike  the  young  protagonist  of  Licinde, 
Julius,  who  in  the  act  of  writing  sublimates  (through  what  is  described  by  Martha 
Helfer  as  'an  ideational  erection")  his  'mental  lust'  and  'sensual  spirituality'  for  his 
beloved  Lucinde: 
These  words  are  dull  and  turbid.  ...  A  great  future  beckons  me  to  rush 
deeper  into  infinity:  each  idea  opens  its  womb  and  brings  forth 
innumerable  new  births.  The  farthest  reaches  of  unbridled  lust  and 
silent  intimation  exist  simultaneously  in  me.  I  remember  everything, 
even  my  sufferings,  and  all  my  former  and  future  thoughts  bestir 
themselves  and  arise  against  my  will.  Wild  blood  rages  in  my  swollen 
arteries,  my  mouth  thirsts  for  union,  and  my  imagination,  alternately 
choosing  and  rejecting  among  the  many  forms  of  joy,  finds  none  in 
which  desire  can  finally  fulfil  itself  and  be  at  peace  at  last.  'O' 
What  at  first  appears  as  strict,  'straight'  heterosexuality,  however,  is  really  anything 
399  Jennifer  Wing,  'Defining  Women  in  Moby-Dick'in  Misogynism  in  Literature:  AnY  Place, 
AnY  Thne  (ed.  Britta  Zangen;  Frankfurt:  Peter  Lang,  2004),  122. 
400  Taylor,  'Ishmael's  (m)Other',  348  (emphasis  mine).  Taylor  regards  the  presence  of  Jesus  in 
Mob 
, 
v-Dick  as  an  alternative  to  the  traditional  male-female  binary.  Nevertheless,  his  interpretation  of 
\ý  hat  this  means  is  not  radical  enough  to  be  adequate  for  our  purposes  here.  Taylor  is  content  that  this 
Jcsus  remain  'subversive  of  the  God  of  absolute  power  and  absolute  presence'by  playing  the  functional 
rolc  of  'Othcr-ýis-Same;  but,  in  truth,  he  is  'truly  other,  never  merely  our  reflection,  and  thus  ne\  er 
rezilly  Other,  nevcr  Separated  from  us,  since  she  is  beyond  the  structures  that  constitute  such  reflecti  \  ity 
and  separation  in  the  first  place'  (350).  Ultimately,  Taylor  cannot  submit  to  the  scandalous  implications 
of  the  diaicctically  materialistic  Christ,  whose  functional,  subversive  role  cannot  be  differentiated  from 
his  being  as  such. 
401  Martha  B.  Helfer,  "'Confessions  of  an  Improper  Man":  Friedrich  Schlegel's  Lucinde'  in 
Outing  Goethe  and  His,  A,  ýc  (ed.  Alice  A.  Kuzmar,  Stanford:  Stanford  Univers1tv  Press,  1996),  177. 
402'  Tucinde'and  the  Fragments,  46-47. 1'" 
but.  Julius'  'autoerotic  narcissism'is  unabashed:  "'  'I'm  not  afraid  to  admire  and  love 
myself  in  such  a  mirror  [i.  e.,  Lucinde].  Only  here  do  I  see  myself  complete  and 
han-nonious,  or  rather,  see  all  of  humanity  in  me  and  in  you.  ""'  Helterdrav,,  sour 
attention  to  a  surprisingly  stark  homoeroticism  that  runs  throughout  ba-inde,  where 
Julius  continually  wishes,  in  both  senses  of  the  phrase,  tofind  himself  inside  the 
female  : 
1115 
[H]Is  narcissism  is an  expression  of  the  self-positing  subject,  'I  am  F, 
he  overcomes  the  male  subject's  limitations  both  by  defining  itself 
homoerotically  as  a  woman  and  by  extending  his  self-love  to  Lucinde, 
hence  rewriting  the  male  subject's  self-positing  as'l  am  woman'.  This 
homoerotic  substitution  ...  allows  Julius  to  conclude  'I  am  mother', 
therefore'l  am  poet'and'  I  can  define  myself  as  poesy.  ... 
His 
vicarious  appropriation  of  Lucinde's  matemal  status  then  allows  him  to 
complete  his  apprenticeship  with  the  statement  that  just  as  his  painting 
has  reached  perfection,  his  life  has  become  'a  created  story',  a  'work  of 
art':  in  the  self-reflexive  act  of  writing  his  autobiography,  Julius 
actually  transforms  himself  into  poesy.  "' 
In  his  provocative  'camp  reading'  of  Pierre,  James  Creech  finds  Pierre's 
apparently  heterosexual,  incestuous  relationship  with  Isabel  following  a  similar 
path.  "'  From  the  beginning  of  the  novel,  Creech  notes,  Pierre  proleptically  mourris 
for  the  sister  he  never  had,  "'  when  in  fact  his  life's  real  loss  was  that  of  his  father 
403  Helfer,  "'Confessions  of  an  Improper  Man"',  177. 
404  Schlegel,  Tucinde'and  the  Fragments,  46. 
4()s  'Almost  paradoxically,  Julius'  self-love  becomes  synonymous  with  homoerot,  cism  when  he 
engages  in  heterosexual  intercourse  with  Lucinde'  (Helfer,  "'Confessions  of  an  Improper  Man"',  189). 
For  a  similar  reading  of  Novalls'  Heinrich  von  Ofterdingen,  see  Alice  A.  Kuzmar,  'Labor  Pains: 
Romantic  Theories  of  Creativity  and  Gender'  in  The  Spirit  of  Poes 
, 
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Nýs  on  Jewish  and  German 
Literature  and  Thought  in  Honor  of  Gýza  t,  on  Mollicir  (eds.  Richard  Block  and  Peter  Ferives, 
Evýinston,  Ill.:  Northwestern  University  Press,  2000),  74-88. 
406  Hefler,  "'Confessions  of  an  Improper  Man"',  190. 
407  James  Creech,  Closet  Writing  /  Gay  Reading:  The  Case  of  Melville's  Pierre  (Chicago: 
UniNci-sity  of  Chicago  Press,  1993),  114-18. 
409  Cf.,  'So  perfect  to  Pierre  had  long  seemed  the  illuminated  scroll  of  his  life  thus  far,  that 
only  hiatus  N\  ýis  disco\  crable  by  him  in  that  s\\  cctly-\ýrlt  manuscript.  A  sister  had  been  ornitted  from 
the  text.  He  mourned  that  so  delicious  a  feeling  as  fraternal  love  had  been  denied  him'  (Nlcl\  dle. 
Merre'  11). 123 
when  he  was  twelve.  '09  Pierre's  'strange  yearning  for  a  sister',  the  narrator  suggests, 
had  part  of  its  origin  in  that  still  stranger  feeling  of  loneliness  he 
sometimes  experienced,  as  not  only  the  solitary  head  of  his  family,  but 
the  only  surnamed  male  Glindinning  extant.  A  powerful  and  populous 
family  had  by  degrees  run  off  into  the  female  branches;  so  that  Pierre 
found  himself  surrounded  by  numerous  kinsmen  and  kinswomen,  yet 
companioned  by  no  surnamed  Glindinning,  but  the  duplicate  one 
reflected  to  him  in  the  mirror.  "' 
Creech  does  not  fail  to  notice  that  Pierre's  desire  for  a  sister  is  built  around  his  desire 
for  a  male  companion.  "'  As  such,  'homosexuality  is  explored  from  the  perverse 
perspective  of  its  impossible  place,  and  thus  its  closeted  space,  within  the  still-sacred 
configuration  of  the  family.  "" 
Nevertheless,  by  the  end  of  both  Lucinde  and  Pierre,  heterosexuality 
overcomes  the  seductive  force  of  homoerotic  self-creation  /  self-presentation. 
Because  men  are  obviously  not  women  and  cannot  bear  children,  Schlegel's 
Bildungsroman  concludes,  the  narcissism  of  homoeroticism  leaves  one  utterly  alone 
and  barren.  "'  For  his  part,  too,  Melville  was  deeply  aware  (if  subtly  critical)  of 
societal  nonns  and  institutions,  and  ultimately  serves  up  in  Pierre  a  dark,  cautionary 
409  Creech,  Closet  Writing,  115-16. 
410  Melville,  Pierre,  12. 
411  Creech's  reading  ultimately  assumes  Melville's  own  repressed  incestuous  desire  and  its 
origin  in  the  desire  for  homosexual  incest.  This  argument,  however,  is  neither  necessary  nor  assumed 
in  my  development  here.  For  other  accounts  of  homosexuality  in  Pierre,  see  Henry  A.  Murray, 
Introduction  to  Pierre;  or,  the  Ambiguities,  by  Herman  Melville  (New  York:  Hendricks  House,  1949), 
xci-xcii;  John  D.  Seelye,  "'Ungraspable  Phantom'  Reflections  of  Hawthorne  in  Pierre  and  The 
Confidence-Man',  Studies  in  the  Novel  I  (Winter  1969):  436-43. 
412  Creech,  Closet  Writing,  120.  Cf.,  'The  straight  mind  continues  to  affirm  that  incest,  and  not 
homosexuality  represents  its  major  interdiction.  Thus,  when  thought  by  the  straight  mind, 
homosexuality  is  nothing  but  heterosexuality'  (Monique  Wittig,  The  Straight  Mind  and  Other  Essay 
[Boston:  Beacon,  1992],  28). 
413  Compare  to  Schelling's  discussion  of'sexless  bees'in  the  university:  'Whatever  cannot  be 
incorporated  into  this  active,  living  whole  [i.  e.,  the  ideal  university]  is  dead  matter  to  be  eliminated 
sooner  or  later  -  such  is  the  law  of  all  living  organisms.  The  fact  is,  there  are  too  many  sexless  bees  in 
the  hive  of  the  sciences,  and  since  they  cannot  be  productive,  they  merely  keep  reproducing  their  own 
spiritual  barrenness  in  the  form  of  inorganic  excretions.  (F.  W.  J.  Schelling,  On  University  Studies 
[trans,  E.  S.  Morgan,  ed.  Norbert  Guterman;  Athens,  Oh.:  Ohio  University  Press.  19661,11.  (Qtd.  Clark, 
'Mouming  Becomes  Theory',  n.  6) 124 
tale  of  the  disembodied,  solipsistic  end  of  finally  'finding'  the  truth.  Indeed,  in  a 
perverse  twist  of  ambiguous  morality,  Pierre's  innocence  -  i.  e.,  his  desire  to  follow 
his  heart,  to  find  and  assert  the  truth  of  himself  -  ultimately  incites  moral 
indignation,  social  and  familial  exile,  economic  downfall,  professional  failure,  and 
even  death.  "' 
The  difficult  point  being  made  here  is  that  because  the  feminine  is,  in  effect, 
the  subject  par  excellence,  the  Absolute  Ground  from  which  the  subjective  decision  to 
begin  emerges,  she  has  never  been  spoken  as  such.  For,  as  Schelling  writes: 
Uninhibited  being  is always  that  which  does  not  know  itself,  as  soon  as 
it  becomes  an  object  to  itself  it  is  also  already  inhibited.  Apply  these 
remarks  to  the  issue  in  hand  and  the  subject  is,  in  its  pure 
substantiality,  as  nothing  -  completely  devoid  of  attributes  -  it  is 
until  now  only  Itself,  and  thus,  as  such,  a  complete  freedom  from  all 
being  and  against  all  being  (Seyn);  but  it  inescapably  attracts  itself 
[sich  aii-Jeht,  with  the  sense  of  'putting  on'  and  thus  being  inauthentic, 
and  of'drawing  itself  to'  itself].  ... 
But  the  subject  cannot  grasp  itself 
as  what  it  Is,  for  precisely  in  attracting  itself  (im  sich  Anziehen)  it 
becomes  an  other,  this  is  the  basic  contradiction,  we  can  say  the 
misfortune,  in  all  being  -  for  either  it  leaves  itself,  then  it  is  as 
nothing,  or  it  attracts  itself,  then  it  is  an  other  and  not  identical  with 
itself  "' 
Which  is  to  say,  then,  in  a  crucial  supplement  to  its  presentation  in  Plato,  the 
'uninhibited  ground'/  motherly  khora  can  only  ever  be  when  as  'characterized  by  an 
original  "masquerade",  in  so  far  as  all  her  features  are  artificially  "put  on".  "'  This  is 
not,  though,  a  case  of  simple  male  chauvinism.  Rather,  what  we  find  in  Schelling  and 
Melville  is  the  primordiality  of  duplicitous  self-charactensation  -  of  the  masquerade 
parexccllence.  Consequently,  from  the  emergence  of  'straight'  males  like  Pierre,  who 
ferninise  themselves  in  the  course  of  their  male,  heterosexual  pursuits,  to  the 
...  Creech,  Closet  Writing,  122-23.  For  a  slightly  different  perspecfive,  focusing  on  Pierre", 
inability  to'fulfill  the  promise  of  his  manhood',  see  Garcia,  Mothers  and  Others,  80-86. 
415  Friedrich  W. J.  Schelling,  On  the  History  of  Modern  Philosophy:  Munich  Lectures  [ca. 
IN3.14S.,  '41  (trans.  Andrew  Bo\\  ic,  New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press.  1994),  115-16. 
""  ? 
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masculine  characterisation  of  femininity  as  'Other'  and  'veiled',  the  modem  Subject  is 
marked  as  such  by  its  constitutive  contingency  and  artifice.  "' 
As  we  will  see  in  Chapter  Four,  it  is  precisely  in  his  recognition  of  the  inherent 
duplicity  of  the  Subject's  search  for  the  truth  about  itself  that  Melville  most  fully 
embodies  the  aesthetic  vitality  and  intensity  immanent  to  theological  thinking.  My 
contention  will  be  that  the  full,  most  radical  implications  of  the  apocalypticism  of 
MobY-Dick  and  Pierre  are  fully  realised  only  in  his  final  novel,  The  Cmifiden  ce-Man: 
His  Masquerade.  As  we  will  see,  in  this  Masquerade  all  self-presentation  is  as  though 
a  disguise,  but  one  that  conceals  no  hidden  truth  or  identity.  In  Melville's 
Masquerade,  we  find  a  theological  thinking  attuned  to  the  creative  duplicity  of  self- 
presentation,  whereby  the'apocalypse  of  self  immanent  to  self-presentation  in  his 
earlier  novels  carries  with  it  the  potential  of  a  self-becoming  that  is  a  self-creation. 
Here,  the  radical  theological  vision  of  Melville  becomes-itself  in  and  as  the  intensity 
of  an  aesthetico-theological  awareness  of  an  immanent  freedom  to  make  all  things 
new. 
417  In  this  way,  212ek  adds,  the  female  is,  in  fact,  'more  subject  than  man,  since  according  to 
Schelling,  Ný  hat  ultimately  characterizes  the  subject  is  this  very  radical  contingency  and  artificiality  of 
her  cvcry  posit]\  e  feature,  that  is,  the  fact  that  'she'  in  herself  is  a  pure  void  that  cannot  be  Identified 
with  any  of  tlicsc  features'  (Ae  Indivisible  Remainder,  160-61). 1 
-1  () 
CHAPTER  FOUR: 
MELVILLE  AND  AESTHETIC  THEOLOGY 
1.  Secrecy  and  Self-Becoining 
Enveloped  in  its  pseudonyms,  plagiarism,  and  hoaxes,  Melville's  fiction,  from 
its  beginning  to  its  end,  bears  the  dubious  marks  of  that  which  has  secrets  to  tell  and 
faces  to  disclose.  His  is,  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapters,  something  like  a 
puppet-show  proscenium,  a  perfon-nance  with  strings  attached;  or,  more  fittingly,  the 
secretive  silence  of  a  masquerade. 
Before  fully  considering  the  theological  implications  of  Melville's 
Masquerade,  though,  it  is  important  also  to  recall  Jacques  Derrida's  famous  discussion 
of  secrecy,  In  all  its  ambiguity,  in  his  essay  'D,  &ýgations:  Comnient  ne  pas  parler' 
[Denials:  How  to  Avoid  Speaking].  "'  Here  Derrida  asks:  'How  not  to  divulge  a 
secret?  How  to  avoid  saying  or  speaking?  ""  That  is  to  say,  how  does  one  speak  a 
secret  in  such  a  way  that  it  maintains  its  secrecy?  A  secret  does  not  remain  a  secret  as 
such  if  it  is  untold;  and  yet  the  condition  of  its  possibility,  i.  e.,  the  telling  of  the  secret, 
undermines  its  secrecy.  In  light  of  his  essay's  title,  what  exactly  is  Derrida  trying  to 
'deny'?  Indeed,  is  he  denying  anything  at  all? 
As  Mark  C.  Taylor  points  out,  perhaps  the  problem  is  in  the  translation.  "O 
...  Jacques  Derrida,  'How  to  Avoid  Speaking:  Denials'  in  Derrida  and  Negatiý,  e  Theology 
(eds.  Harold  Coward  and  Toby  Foshay;  trans.  Ken  Frieden-,  Albany,  N.  Y.:  State  University  of  New 
York,  1992),  73-142. 
419  Dcrrida,  'How  to  Avoid  Speaking',  94. 
420  For  Derrida,  what  isn't  a  problem  of  translation'?  Philosophy  is,  he  contends  'tile  fixation  of 
a  certain  concept  and  project  of  translation....  What  does  philosophy  say'!  What  does  the  philosopher 
say  when  fie  is  being  a  philosopher?  He  says:  What  matters  is  truth  or  meaning,  and  since  meaning  is 
t1cfore  or  beyond  language,  it  follo\ý  s  that  it  is  translatable.  Meaning  has  the  commanding  role,  and 
conscquently  one  must  be  able  to  fix  its  univocality  or,  in  any  case,  to  master  its  plurivocality.  If  this 
plun  \  ocality  can  be  mastered,  then  translation,  understood  as  the  transport  of  a  semantic  content  into 
another  signlfý  ing  form,  is  possible.  There  is  no  philosophy  unless  translation  in  this  latter  scnsc  is 
possible'  (Jacques  Derrida,  Ae  Ear  of  the  Other:  Otobtograph.  v,  Transference,  Translation:  tind 
01scus,  vtol's  with  Jacques  Ocrrithi  [cd.  Christie  V.  McDonald,  trans.  Pcgggý  KamLif-.  NeýN  York: 
S'cllockcil  Books,  1985],  120)  (emphasis  mine). 127 
D&ýgations,  Taylor  explains,  is  also  the  French  translation  of  Freud's  Verneinting, 
which  is  typically  translated  into  English  as  'negation'.  The  latter  translation, 
however,  is  also  problematic  because  Verneinung  suggests  both  the  presence  and 
absence  of  negation,  or'an  affirmation  that  is a  negation  and  a  negation  that  is  an 
affirmation'.  "'  Consequently,  Taylor  is  not  alone  in  his  contention  that  it  mi,,  ht  be 
better  to  follow  the  French  translation  and  render  it  simply  'denegations'.  "' 
To  de-negate  is  to  un-negate,  a  peculiarity  that  in  his  essay  Derrida  argues 
differentiates  it  from  the  implicit  apophasis  of'negative  theology.  His  point  is  that 
we  are  left  confounded  by  the  'impossibility'  of  the  secret.  It  is,  on  the  one  hand,  that 
which  cannot  be  spoken  if  it  is  to  remain  a  secret;  and  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  without 
it  having  always  already  been  spoken,  i.  e.,  mediated  by  language  as  a  secret,  there  is 
no  secret  to  keep.  As  such,  for  Derrida,  the  final  /  phenomenological  truth  of  the 
secret  effectively  annuls  the  secret,  unsaying  all  saying  by  rendering  all  spaces  empty 
and  all  words  hollow.  "'  In  this,  Derrida  locates  his  provocatively  theological  point: 
[A]t  the  moment  when  the  question  'How  to  avoid  speaking'  arises,  it  is 
already  too  late.  There  was  no  longer  any  question  of  not  speaking. 
Language  has  started  without  us,  in  us,  and  before  us.  This  is  what 
theology  calls  God,  and  it  is  necessary,  it  will  have  been  necessary  to 
speak.  This'it  is  necessary'  (ilfaut)  is  both  the  trace  of  undeniable 
necessity  -  which  is  another  way  of  saying  that  one  cannot  avoid 
denying  it,  one  can  only  deny  it  -  and  of  a  past  injunction.  Always 
already  past,  hence  without  a  past  present.  Indeed,  it  must  have  been 
possible  to  speak  in  order  to  allow  the  question  'How  to  avoid 
1  Mark  Taylor,  Nots  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1993),  36. 
422  Cf,  Jean-Luc  Marion:  'I  have  chosen  to  render  the  French  "D&6gations"  as  "Denegations" 
rather  than  "Denials"  because  this  seems  to  better  capture  the  sense  intended  by  the  author  of  the 
present  study-,  namely,  it  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  denying  that  one,  be  it  deconstruction  or  "negative 
thcology",  does  something,  be  it  predicates  God  or  "negative  theology";  rather,  at  issue  is ýN  liether  or 
not  in  claiming  not  to  speak  about  X,  or  in  denying  that  they  do  Y,  negative  theology  and/or 
deconstruction  are  in  fact  speaking  about  X,  doing  Y'  (Jean-Luc  Marion,  'In  the  Name:  Hoýý  to  Avold 
Speaking  of  "Negative  Theology...  in  God,  the  Gift,  and  PostnioderniSin  [ed.  John  D.  Caputo  and 
Robert  Scanlon;  Bloomington,  Ind.:  Indiana  University  Press,  1999],  48-49  n.  7). 
423  N  lark  C.  Taý  lor,  About  Religion:  Economies  of  Faith  in  Virtual  Culture  (Chicago: 
Uni\  ersity  of  Chic.  too  Press,  1999),  42:  sec  also  Jacques  Derrida,  Disscinination  (trans.  Barbara 
Johnson,  ChIcal-o.  University  of  Chicago  Prcss,  1981),  168. 
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speaking?  'to  arise.  Having  come  from  the  past,  language  before 
language,  a  past  that  was  never  present  and  yet  remainS  unforgettable 
-  this  'it  is  necessary'  thus  seems  to  beckon  toward  the  event  of  an 
order  or  of  a  promise  that  does  not  belong  to  what  one  currently  calls 
history;  the  discourse  of  history  or  the  history  of  discourse.  "' 
Appropriate  to  my  discussion  in  this  chapter,  therefore,  Derrida  ultimately  ends  up 
critiquing  onto-theology,  specifically  negative  theology,  but  only  by  attempting  to 
avoid  doing  so. 
Ultimately,  however,  Derrida's  notion  of  the  secret  as'impossible'  is 
weakened  by  the  disembodied  status  of  his  phenomenological  requirements,  in  a 
manner  not  unlike  Schelling's  criticism  of  Idealism.  For  the  more  strictly  materialistic 
Melville,  though,  where  there  is an  inequality  of  knowledge  between  two  or  more 
parties,  there  is a  secret.  Such  is  the  difference  between  playing  a  game  and  being 
played  for  the  fool.  As  we  have  seen  in  the  previous  chapters,  even  the  complex 
masquerade  of  subjective  consciousness  Melville  enacts  in  his  novels  does  not 
preclude  the  happening  (or  becoming)  of  cognition  and  sensibility.  On  the  contrary, 
the  character  T  emerges  as  the  unavoidable,  retroactive  agent  of  its  own  self- 
characterisation.  We  are,  in  the  words  of  Philip  Goodchild,  who  is  drawing  deeply 
from  Gilles  Deleuze, 
already  immersed  in  fields  of  subjectivity,  where  thoughts  and  passions 
are  shaped  by  dominant  strategies  of  subjectification,  xe  are  immersed 
in  fields  of  signification,  where  meanings  are  regulated  by  hegemonic 
discourses;  and  we  are  immersed  in  fields  of  organization,  where 
segments  of  bodies  and  materials  are  distributed  through  machinic 
interactions  with  segments  of  discourse.  "' 
In  short,  Melville's  masquerade  of  subjective  consciousness  is  a  giving  and  a  taking, 
truth  and  lie,  disclosure  and  duplicity.  Moreover,  in  agreement  with  Derrida,  it  is  thus 
424  Derrida,  flow  to  Avoid  Speaking',  99. 
425  Philip  Goodchild,  Ctipitalism  and  Religion:  The  Price  of  Piety  (London  and  \e\ý  York: 
Routledg,  2002),  159-,  Gilles  Dcleuze  and  Filex  Guattarl-A  [housand  Plateaus:  Capitalism  and 
ýchizophrcnia  (trans.  Brian  Massumi,  London:  Athlone,  1988),  159. 129 
closely  parallel  to  the  character,  i.  e.  the  being-itself,  of  theology,  and  thus  the 
condition  of  confidence  and  faith  in  others,  in  oneself,  and  in  one's  God.  Contra 
Derrida,  though,  it  is  also  the  immanent,  materialistic  condition  of  theology's  self- 
characterisation  /  self-becoming,  whose  aesthetic  potency  and  truth  is precisely  the 
intensity  of  its  creative  potential  to  make  all  things  new.  "' 
Such  is,  I  wish  to  suggest,  the  aesthetico-theological  impulse  that  propels  the 
steamship  Fidýle  down  the  Mississippi  River  in  Melville's  final  novel  The 
Corifildence-Man:  His  Masquerade,  towards  the  city  of  the  American  Mardi  Gras, 
New  Orleans.  The  novel  begins  on  April  Fool's  Day,  with  a  blinclingly  white  stranger 
boarding  the  FiMe,  and  ends  in  an  uncertain,  by  no  means  absolute  darkness,  as  the 
steamer's  final  candle  is  snuffed  out  for  the  evening.  But  this  is  a  day  in  the  life  of  a 
black  and  white  world  only  insofar  as  it  arises  from  Melville's  paper  and  pen.  Asits 
seemingly  random  episodes  of  peddlers  and  beggars  of  uncertain  character  and  intent 
accumulate,  one's  confidence  is  strained.  That  is  to  say,  although  Melville's  novel 
ostensibly  pulls  the  wool  over  its  readers'  eyes,  with  nothing  ever  fully  denied  or 
affirmed,  completely  stable  or  unstable,  his  reader  is  never  entirely  sure  who  the  joke 
is  on,  or  whether  there  is  in  fact  ajoke  at  all.  In  this  way,  Melville  takes  on  the 
equivocal  character  of  character  itself:  that  of  the  nature  of  his  novel,  of  himself  as  an 
author,  as  well  as  that  of  those  on  board  his  fictional  vessel.  What  one  discovers  in 
the  midst  of  the  novel's  multifaceted  irony  and  reflective  vertigo  is  that  the  very  mask 
Melville  had  self-consciously  suffered  behind  for  years  is  now  shared  by  his  reader.  427 
421,  Cf-'Frorn  "impossible  TO  HAPPEN"  we  thus  pass  to  "the  impossible  HAPPENS  ... 
I 
2i2ek 
pronounces.  'This,  and  not  the  structural  obstacle  forever  deferring  the  final  resolution,  is  the  most 
difficult  thing  to  accept'  (Mek,  On  Belief,  84). 
4  -'  7  See  Baviiiý  'NICI\  111C'S  QLiarrel  \N  ith  Fiction',  917-918.  In  her  essay  on  its'unreadibility'. 
Elizabeth  Renker's  summation  of  The  Confulence-Man's  place  in  Melville's  oeuýre  1.  s  apt:  'The 
Coqflelence-  A  1,  in  ...  presents  a  fundamental  reconception  of  the  author's  relation  to  his  text  and.  in 
tLirn,  to  his  rcýidcrs.  Nlcl\  ilic  no  lon,,  cr  burns,  with  Ahab,  to  strike  through  the  mask  of  the  dead.  blind 130 
Though  loving  his  novel  and  his  role  as  its  author,  as  we  saw  in'Ha-ýý,  thorne  and  His 
Mosses',  Melville  now  would  set  both  adrift  down  the  mighty  Mississippi  Riý'cr,  and 
neither  it  nor  his  contemporary  readers  would  ever  return.  Indeed,  with  The 
Cot#idence-Man  Melville  effectively  ends  his  professional  writing  career, 
notwithstanding  the  novel's  final  words:  'Something  ftirther  may  follow  of  this 
Masquerade.  "" 
In  Melville's  Masquerade,  similar  in  some  ways  to  Derrida's  analysis  of  the 
secret,  we  find  asked  the  all-too-often  neglected  question  of  a  truly  modem  theology: 
What  is  the  character  of'theology?  Such  a  question,  of  course,  is  riddled  by  its 
equivocality,  for  the  'of  may  just  as  well  be  objective  as  subjective  genitive.  Is  this 
the  question  asked  of  theology,  or  is it  the  question  theology  asks?  When  one  dares  to 
think  about  the  character  of  theology  theologicalýy,  a  radically  'transcendental' 
analysis  in  so  far  as  we  are  thinking  about  the  beginnings  and  endings  that  condition 
our  understanding  of  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  and  thus  when  the  questions  we  ask 
in  and  of  this  enquiry  proliferate  beyond  their  neo-Platonic  /  Kantian  tethers,  how  do 
we  begin  at  all?...  Divorced  from  its  metaphysical  stability,  the  question  of  theology 
functions  like  a  Melvillian  masquerade  of  faith,  and  can  only  ever  beg  to  be  asked 
wall;  instead,  he  turns  the  mask  on  a  bewildered  reader  and  delights  in  its  obscuring  powers'  (  ...  A 
!  ":  Unreadibility  in  The  Confidence-Man'in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Herman  Melville 
[ed.  Robert  S.  Levine;  Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1996],  116-17). 
429  Melville,  The  Confidence-Man:  His  Masquerade,  251.  For  a  few  commentators,  Melville's 
esoteric  conclusion  suggests  his  hope  to  write  a  sequel.  See  Howard  Horsford,  'Evidence  of  Melville's 
Plan  for  a  Sequel  to  The  Confidence-Man'American  Literature  24  (March  1952):  85-89. 
429  Immanuel  Kant  defines  the  'Transcendental  Analytic'  in  the  First  Critique  as  'the  hitherto 
rarely  attempted  dissection  of  theJacult 
,v 
of  the  understanding  itself,  in  order  to  inNestigate  the 
possibility  of  concepts  a  priori  by  looking  for  them  in  the  understanding  alone,  as  their  birthplace,  and 
by  analysing  the  pure  use  of  this  faculty.  This  is  the  proper  task  of  a  transcendental  philosophy' 
(Critique  of  Pure  Reason,  103  [A65-66-,  B90-91  In  other  words,  the  analysis  of  the  mind's 
necessarily  unifying  contribution  to  the  intelligibility  of  sensual  experience.  Kant  distinguishes  this 
fi-oni  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic,  which  concerns  itself  with  the  a  priori  conditions  ofsensation  (i.  e. 
time  and  spacc),  and  the  Transcendental  Dialectic,  NN  hose  object  is  the  unconditioned  metaphysical 
realities  outside  'pure'  human  sensation,  experience,  and  understanding  (i.  e.  the  nouniena  -  God,  the 
\\  orld,  the  Self). 131 
again.  Such  is,  we  might  suggest,  the  dilemma  of  theological  reflection's  creative 
consideration  of  its  problematic  beginning:  i.  e.,  it  finds  itself,  like  the  early  Gen-nan 
Romantics  mentioned  above,  beginning  in  the  middle,  'like  an  epic  poem'.  "'  But,  as 
we  will  see  below,  theology  is  neither  stymied  nor  rendered  absolutely  (or  mystically) 
silent  in  the  face  of  its  impossible  task;  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  radically  opened  to  the 
creative  awareness  and  freedom  of  theology  speaking-itself  /  becoming-itself. 
2.  The  Character  of  The  Conridence-Man 
For  a  book  so  decisively  rejected  by  readers,  the  earliest  English  reviews  of 
The  Confidence-Man  were  actually  not  as  negative  as  one  might  imagine.  The 
Athenwimi,  for  instance,  pronounced  it'full  of  thought,  conceit,  and  fancy,  of  affection 
and  originality',  calling  Melville  the  master  of  his'luxuriously  picturesque' 
narrative.  "'  The  Leader,  though  not  as  lavish  in  its  praise,  regarded  the  book  as 
channing  and  original,  due  to  'its  constant  flow  of  descriptions,  character-  sketching, 
and  dialogue,  deeply  toned  and  skilfully  contrasted.  1132  The  Westminster  and  Foreign 
Quarterl-v  Review  eagerly  awaited  the  story's  continuation,  hailing  'the  first  part'  as  a 
'remarkable  work',  and  praised  Melville  as  the  quintessence  of  American  writing.  433 
Melville's  countrymen,  however,  were  neither  as  enthusiastic  nor  as  thoughtftil 
in  their  assessments.  Indeed,  all  but  three  of  the  reviews  are  fewer  than  three 
sentences  long,  while  the  rest  seem  to  have  been  based  upon  the  reading  of  other 
reviews  rather  than  the  book  itself  For  example,  one  month  after  the  Boston  Puritan 
Recorder  suggested  that  the  book  was  a  possible  cure  for  dyspeptics,  the  Newark 
430  Schlegel,  Tucinde'and  the  Fragments,  171  [Athendeum  Fragment  84]. 
43  1  Branch,  Melville,  371-72. 
43  2  Branch,  Melville,  172-73). 
33  Branch,  Melville, 
-185-86. 11)" 
Dally  Advertiser  suspiciously  suggested  that  Melville  himself  had  dyspepsia  when  he 
wrote  it.  According  to  Philadelphia's  North  American,  actually  finishing  the  book  is 
regarded  as  the  equivalent  of  'being  choked  off  ... 
like  the  audience  of  a  Turkish 
story  teller'.  "'  And  The  Chicimiati  Enquirer  minces  no  words  nor  pulls  any  punches: 
[Melville's]  last  production,  "The  Confidence  Man,  "  is  one  of  the 
dullest  and  most  dismally  monotonous  books  we  remember  to  have 
read,  and  it  has  been  our  unavoidable  misfortune  to  peruse,  in  the 
fulfillment  of  journalistic  duty,  a  number  of  volumes  through,  \ý  hich 
nothing  but  a  sense  of  obligation  would  have  sustained  us.  "Typee,  " 
one  of,  if  not  the  first  of  his  works,  is  the  best,  and  "The  Confidence 
Man"  the  last,  decidedly  the  worst.  So  Mr.  M's  authorship  is  toward 
the  nadir  rather  than  the  zenith,  and  he  has  been  progressing  in  the 
form  of  an  inverted  climax.  435 
If  the  book's  English  and  Amencan  reviews  were  a  mixed  bag,  its  receipts 
certainly  were  not.  Of  the  one  thousand  copies  published  in  England,  only  343  were 
sold  during  the  first  fifteen  months.  After  two  years,  386  copies  were  sold,  thirty-two 
presented  (three  to  Melville),  sixty-six  disposed  of  at  a  trade  sale,  and  5  16  sold  as 
scrap  paper  -  and  even  then  its  English  publisher  did  not  break  even.  436  In  America, 
however,  things  were  even  direr.  Less  than  a  month  after  cheekily  releasing  The 
Confidence-Man  on  Apnl  Fool's  Day  in  1857,  its  American  publisher,  Dix,  Edwards, 
&  Co.,  went  out  of  business,  taking  with  it  what  little  chance  of  success  the  novel  ever 
had. 
437 
414  Branch,  et  al,  'Historical  Note',  319.  The  three  most  complete  sources  of  reviews  are 
Branch's  Melville,  369-87  and  Hetherington's  Melville's  Reviewers,  255-64. 
435  Hershel  Parker,  ed.,  'Reviews'  in  The  Confidence  Man:  His  Masquerade,  by  Herman 
Me]  %  dle  (New  York:  W.  W.  Norton  &  Co.,  1971),  279. 
43o  For  the  most  thorough  research  on  publishing  records  in  England,  see  Branch,  et  al., 
'H  istorical  Note',  3  17.  In  an  interesting  note  that  I  have  not  seen  corroborated  anywhere  else,  the 
editors  of  this  edition  note:  'These  figures  account  for  the  full  1,000,  but  after  the  Longman's  buildings 
in  Paternoster  Row  were  burned  down  in  1861  someone  added  a  memorandum  to  the  closed-OUt  ledger: 
"6  Copies  cl[oth]  Burnt.  "  If  these  were  not  phantom  copies,  they  had  at  least  an  apter  fate  than  the 
ýN  asted  quires  -  si  \  heretical  N  olumes  consumed  in  flames.  ' 
, 
financial  panic  of  1857'  as  the  reason  for  the  firm's  437  Elizabeth  Foster  citcs  the  'gathering 
dissol\  ing;  N\  hereas  John  Seelyc.  more  proN  ocatl\  cly,  and  perhaps  more  fittingly.  suggests  it  \%  as  'due 
to  the  1-1nýn-din-  of  one  of  the  partners'.  See  her  Introduction  to  The  Confltlent-c-Alan  (  1954),.  xxxi.  and 13)  3 
The  revival  of  interest  in  Melville  that  began  in  the  1920s  did  ý'ery  little  at  first 
to  change  the  book's  fortunes.  For  his  first  biographer,  Raymond  Wee-ver,  it  was  a 
'posthumous  work';  "'  for  John  Freeman,  not  only  was  it  'negligible  in  quality'  and  a 
'failure  in  intelligence',  but  it  was  also  'an  abortion'.  "'  Once  again,  as  It  were,  Melville 
is  unable  to  escape  the  prematurity  of  death.  "'  Indeed,  if  Melville  was  dead  before  his 
time,  for  Newton  Arvin  he  most  likely  was  also  damned,  for  he  had  penned'one  of  the 
most  iiýfidel  books  ever  written  by  an  American,  one  of  the  most  completely  nihilistic, 
morally  and  metaphysically.  ""  And  so  went  the  funeral  march  of  critical  comments 
for  at  least  half  of  the  twentieth-century. 
Richard  Chase,  in  his  simply  titled  Herman  Melville,  almost  single-handedly 
changed  the  course  of  Melville's  sunken  ship  of  a  novel.  According  to  Chase,  The 
Confidence-Man  was  unquestionably  Melville's  'second  best  book'Oust  behind  MobY- 
Dick),  for  'more  than  any  of  his  other  writings,  it  establishes  Melville's  claim  to  moral 
intelligence'.  442  Chase's  assessment  subsequently  proved  to  be  a  rallying  cry  for  a  new 
generation  of  scholars  in  the  last  half  of  the  twentieth  century  who  sought  to  vindicate 
John  Seelye,  Introduction  to  The  Confidence-Man:  His  Masquerade,  by  Hen-nan  Melville  (San 
Francisco:  Chandler,  1968),  xiv. 
43  8  Raymond  Weaver,  Hernian  Melville:  Mariner  and  MAstic  (New  York:  George  H.  Doran, 
192  1),  348.  Fourteen  years  hindsight  would  do  little  to  change  Weaver's  opinion  of  the  book,  as  he 
then  regarded  it  as  an  instance  of  Melville's  'perverse  self-indulgence  of  the  "spontaneous  Me"' 
(Introduction  to  Journal  up  the  Straits:  Oct.  11,1856  -  May  5,1857  [New  York:  The  Colophon,  1935], 
xx.  ). 
439  John  Freeman,  Herman  Melville  (London:  Macmillan,  1926).  62,141.  One  year  later,  Van 
Wyck  Brooks  would  echo  Freeman,  calling  the  book  'an  abortion  ... 
broken  off  in  the  middle, 
apparently,  but  not  before  the  author  has  lost  the  thread  of  his  original  idea',  which  is  nothing  less  than 
the  'product  of  premature  artistic  senility'  (Emerson  and  Others  [London:  J.  Cape,  1927),  177-79). 
""  Interestingly,  the  pessimism  of  these  early  critics  may  be  more  understandable  than  one 
today  might  \v  ish  to  credit  it.  After  all,  as  late  as  1953  the  novel  had  yct  to  be  reprinted  in  America, 
and  only  once  in  London,  in  1923,  as  Volume  X11  of  in  the  Constable  Edition  of  %lelville's  WOrks. 
44  1  Newton  Ar\  in,  Herman  Melville  (London:  Methuen  &  Co.,  1950).  250-5  1 
442  Richard  Chase,  Herman  Melville:  A  Critical  StmA,  (New  York:  Macmillan,  1949).  185, 
20-5. 134 
the  novel's  place  in  America's  literary  canon. 
443 
No  sooner  was  The  Conjidence-Man  highly  valued  as  an  important  piece  of 
literature,  and  thus  worthy  of  academic  appreciation,  than  this  value  was  assessed  and 
declared  most  fervently  by  a  'standard  line'  of  scholarship,  led  by  its  doyenne 
Elizabeth  Foster.  Hershel  Parker  first  invoked  this  label  to  describe  those  like  himself 
who  subscribe  to  Foster's  assumption  'that  Melville  tried  to  write  a  coherent  book 
and  [who]  look  for  interpretations  that  satisfy  every  detail  of  the  text  and  fit  into  a 
self-consistent  whole'.  "'  While  the  editors  of  the  Northwe  stem  -Newberry  edition, 
which  has  been  generally  considered  the  authoritative  edition  of  the  text  since  its 
publication  in  1984,  attempt  to  represent  faithfully  the  divergent,  non-standard  lines  of 
interpretation  that  have  arisen  since  the  late  1960s,  they  remain  openly  whimsical 
about  the  good  old  days.  'The  single  most  important  study  to  date  is  that  of  Elizabeth 
S.  Foster,  in  the  comprehensive  introduction  and  notes  to  her  1954  Hendricks  House 
edition',  they  conclude,  just  before  drawing  a  strict  line  of  distinction  between  the 
'scholarship'  of  old  and  the  'critical  commentary'  that  has  since  tended  to  margmalize 
Foster's  commentary. 
445 
Clearly,  for  Melville's  contemporaries  as  much  as  his  modem  commentators, 
The  Confidence-Man  is  many  things  to  many  different  people.  For  some  of  its  earliest 
critics,  it  was  not  even  a  novel.  'A  novel  it  is not',  the  LiterarN,  Gazette  wryly  notes, 
unless  a  novel  means  forty-five  conversations  held  on  board  a  steamer, 
conducted  by  personages  who  might  pass  for  the  errata  of  creation,  and 
so  far  resembling  the  Dialogues  of  Plato  as  to  be  undoubted  Greek  to 
443  The  apotheosis  of  this  contemporary  reassessment  is  likely  that  of  Roelof  Overmeer,  who 
asserts  without  any  hint  of  apparent  hyperbole  that  The  Confidence-Man  is'a  novel  whose  modernity 
no  twentieth-century  novelist  has  yet  surpassed'  (  ...  Something  Further":  The  Confidence  Man  and 
Writing  as  Disinterestcd  Act'  Etudes  de  Lettres  4  [1987]:  43). 
444  -  cf.,  Parker,  Foreword  to  Ille  Foster,  Introduction  to  The  Confidence-Man  (  1954),  x  I\  1, 
Cotifidence-Man  (1971  ),  ix. 
445  Branch,  et  al.,  'Historical  Note',  335. 13  5 
ordinary  men.  "' 
The  reviewer  for  London's  Iffitstrated  Times  sums  up  the  only  real  agreement  to 
which  most  of  the  novel's  readers  could  come,  that  is,  that  they  found  it  incoherent 
and  unreadable.  The  frustration  of  the  reviewer  in  London's  Illustrated  Times,  for 
example,  is  palpable: 
We  can  make  nothing  of  this  masquerade,  which,  indeed,  savours  "'ery 
much  of  a  mystification....  After  reading  the  work  forwards  for 
twelve  chapters  and  backwards  for  five,  we  attacked  it  in  the  middle, 
gnawing  at  it  like  Rabelais's  dog  at  the  bone,  in  the  hopes  of  extracting 
something  from  it  at  last.  But  the  book  is  without  form  and  void.  447 
The  temptation  of  the  contemporary  reader  of  The  Confidence-Man,  however,  is  to 
conclude  much  the  same  about  the  modem  scholarship  and  criticism  that  now 
surrounds  the  novel.  Like  many  works  that  have  been  deemed  'Important'  or 
'canonical',  most  of  the  contemporary  scholarship  on  The  Confidem-e-Man  is  in  fact 
about  the  scholarship  itself...  This,  however,  is  hardly  surprising,  and  indeed  perhaps 
ultimately  even  appropriate,  for  as  William  Ramsey  notes,  though'Melville  failed  to 
find  a  popular  'audience'  for  the  book 
... 
he  succeeded  cleverly  in  capturing  multiple 
and  divergent  "audiences".  ... 
[W]hat  Melville's  book  has  to  say  to  us  is  what  we  say 
about  it.  ""  Which  is  to  say,  whatever  one  brings  to  Melville's  most  duplicitous  of 
44  '  Branch,  Melville,  373. 
447  Branch,  Melville,  379,380.  The  decidedly  mixed  review  in  Mrs.  Stephens'Nevv  Monthl.  v 
Magazine  would  also  make  use  of  this  image  of  a  confused  beginning  and  ending,  and  come  to  a  very 
similar  conclusion:  'The  book  ends  where  it  begins.  You  might,  without  sensible  inconvenience,  read  it 
backwards.  You  are  simply  promised  in  the  last  line,  that  something  further  shall  be  heard  of  the  hero-, 
until  which  consummation,  the  riddle  must  continue  to  puzzle  you  unsolved'(384).  Elizabeth  Foster, 
too,  notes  the  same  thing,  but  regards  it  as  a  positive  tautology.  See  her  Introduction  to  The 
Cmifidence-Man  (1954),  xci-xcii.  For  more  on  Melville  and  tautology,  see  Renker,  Strike  Through  the 
Mask,  178-99. 
...  For  txN  o  of  the  most  explicit  examples  of  this,  see  Lawrence  Graunian,  Jr..  'Sugucstions  on 
tile  Future  of  The  Coiifitleii(-(,  -A4tiii'Ptil)ei-s  on  English  Language  and  Literature  I  (Summer  1965). 
`4  1-49-,  and  Marc  Dolan,  'Four  Faccs  of  the  Confidence  Man:  An  Academic  Blind  Man's  Zoo'  ESQ:  A 
Journal  oftheAnierican  Renaissance  39  (2  nd  and  3  rd  QuartCF  1993):  133-60. 
449  William  M.  Raniscy,  'Audicilces  of  The  Coifidence-Man:  Consensus  %er-,  U-s  Ititerpretativc 
Communities'  Melville  Society  Extracts  72  (February  1988):  9. 136 
texts  ultimately  determines  what  one  finds  there. 
Ramsey's  observation  in  his  short  article  has  more  critical  importance  than  he 
likely  intended.  By  privileging  the  reader's  observations,  assumptions,  and 
expectations  about  the  book,  the  priority  of  the  most  significant  interpretive  questions 
is reversed.  In  a  traditional  mystery  novel,  for  instance,  the  operaw,  ýe  question  is 
'Who  did  it"'  The  mystery  is  not  the  nature  of  the  crime,  be  it  murder  or  theft  or 
otherwise,  but  the  identity  of  he  or  she  who  committed  the  act.  Here,  the  author 
and/or  narrator  have  privileged  information  that  the  reader  is  attempting  to  glean  by  a 
careful  reading.  Only  from  the  identity  is  it  finally  possible  to  know  the  true  nature  of 
the  crime,  the  criminal,  and  the  mystery  itself  -  i.  e.,  was  the  crime  that  of  passion,  of 
revenge;  how  did  the  criminal  hide  his  or  tracks,  etc.?  When  priority  is  switched  to 
the  reader,  though,  so  too  is  the  priority  of  the  questions  switched.  No  longer  is  the 
secret  information  of  an  author  or  narrator  primary;  the  onus,  rather,  is  on  the  reader 
to  locate  the  nature  of  the  mystery  itself,  that  is,  whether  and/or  where  there  is  a 
mystery  at  all.  With  regard  to  The  Confidence-Man,  then,  the  operative  question  is  no 
longer  'Who  is  the  Confidence  Man?  'but  'What  is  the  Confidence  ManT. 
As  already  noted,  Ramsey's  analysis  itself  does  not  explore  the  critical 
significance  of  his  observation.  Far  more  adequate  to  the  task  are  the  respective 
readings  of  Roelof  Ovenneer  and  Edward  Mitchell.  "'  For  Ovenneer,  the  Confidence 
Man  is identified  as  such  -  if  not  wholly  identified'as  whom'-  by  the  use  of 
duplicitous  stratagems,  in  which  'speech  acts  are  strategies  of  a  role'.  '5'  In  this  way, 
450  ON  crmeer,  "'Something  Further"',  43-53,  Edward  Mitchell,  'From  Action  to  Essence:  Some 
Notes  on  the  Structure  of  Melville's  The  Coizfi(leti(,  e-Altiti'Atitericati  Literature  40  (March  1968):  27- 
37.  For  variations  on  this  emphasis  see  Charles  Feidelson,  Jr.,  SYmbolisin  andAmerican  Literature 
(Chicago.  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1953),  207-211,  John  Wenke,  Melville's  Wusc:  Literar), 
Creation  and  the  Fornis  (?  f  Philosophical  Fiction  (Kent,  Oh.:  Kent  State  UmN  ersity  Press,  1995).  205- 
16. 
4ý1  0\  crnieer,  'Sonieth,  ng,  Further',  51- 117 
and  much  in  keeping  with  the  standard  line  interpretation,  Overmeer  identifies  as 
swindlers  a  variety  of  characters  from  the  first  half  of  the  novel,  regarding  each  as 
'avatars  of  the  Confidence  Man'.  Such,  then,  is  the  power  of  the  Confidence  Man,  that 
he  alone  recognises  that  language  is  always  strategic,  and  not  the  representation  of  an 
essence.  "'  Oven-neer  writes: 
That  which  makes  the  Confidence  Man  a  sign:  his  name,  his  dress,  his 
speech,  his  actions,  never  give  his  interlocuter  access  to  a  kno\\,  Iedge 
of  how  he  will  act.  He,  on  the  contrary,  once  he  has  found  out  what  a 
prospective  victim  takes  himself  to  be  a  sign  of,  knows  exactly  what  it 
will  take  to  have  him  or  her  act  in  the  way  that  he  desires,  and  he  plans 
his  strategy  accordingly....  The  different  avatars  of  the  Confidence 
Man  are  signs  whose  appearances  do  not  correspond  to  an  essence  but 
to  a  strategy;  his  victims,  on  the  other  hand,  are  all  appearances  from 
- 
453 
which  it  may  be  deduced  what  they  think  their  essence  i  S. 
Inasmuch  as  these  stratagems  and  signs  can  be  isolated  as  such,  and  thus  make  it 
possible  to  identify  the  different  appearances  of  the  Confidence  Man,  Overmeer  very 
subtly  maintains  a  significant  level  of  characteristic  stability  in  spite  of  his  objections 
to  isolating  a  correspondent  essence. 
For  Edward  Mitchell,  too,  'the  attempt  to  define  or  describe  the  confidence 
men,  or  their  victims  either  for  that  matter,  in  terms  of  their  essence  is  an  Impossibility 
in  this  novel.  ""  Rather,  he  continues,  there  are  two  types  of  characters  in  The 
Confidence-Man,  confidence  men  and  victims,  and  they  are  distinguishable  only  in 
terms  of  their  actions;  that  is  to  say,  there  is  'constancy  of  activity  rather  than 
constancy  of  character  ""  On  the  one  hand,  anyone  who  puts  confidence  in  another 
452  'This  is  why',  O\crmeer  concludes,  'in  the  no\  el  he  [the  Confidence  %laill  is  often  likened 
to  the  serpent  of  the  allegory,  for  his  role  is  also  a  consc,  ous-creatng  role'  ('Something  Further',  5  1). 
For  three  often  neglected  but  profound  readings  in  this  vein  see  R.  W.  B.  Lc\\  is,  Aftem  ord  to  The 
Coi!  fi(lencc-Man:  His  Masquermle  (Ne\v  York:  Signet,  1964).  261-76,  Wadlington,  Pie  Confidence 
Game  mAnicrican  Literature,  137-70. 
45  "  0%  crnicer,  'Something  Furthcr',  49-50. 
454  Mitclicll,  Trom  Action  to  Fssciice',  12. 
455  \1  litclicil,  Troni  Action  to  Essence',  30. 138 
person  is  a  potential  victim;  on  the  other  hand,  anyone  who  solicits  confidence  from 
another  is  a  potentlai  confidence  man.  "'  Moreover,  inasmuch  as  'essence  is 
determined  by  action'  and  the  social  exchange  of  confidence  is  rarely  one-directional, 
the  roles  of  conman  and  victim  are  interchangeable. 
In  Melville's  novel  we  see  this  most  clearly  in  the  example  of  the  ostensibly 
pure-hearted  country  merchant,  Henry  Roberts.  In  Chapter  Four,  a  mournful-looking 
stranger  with  a  long  weed  in  his  hat  approaches  Roberts,  insisting  that  he  is  an  old 
acquaintance. 
'Can  I  be  so  changed?  Look  at  me.  Or  is  it  I  who  am  mistaken?  - 
Are  you  not,  sir,  Henry  Roberts,  forwarding  merchant,  of  Wheeling, 
Virginia?  Pray,  now,  if  you  use  the  advertisement  of  business  cards, 
and  happen  to  have  one  with  you,  just  look  at  it,  and  see  whether  you 
are  not  the  man  I  take  you  for.  ' 
If Why,  a  bit  chafed,  perhaps,  'I  hope  I  know  myself.  ' 
'And  yet  self-knowledge  is  thought  by  some  not  so  easy.  Who  knows, 
my  dear  sir,  but  for  a  time  you  may  have  taken  yourself  for  somebody 
else?  Stranger  things  have  happened.  ' 
The  good  merchant  stared. 
'To  come  to  particulars,  my  dear  sir,  I  met  you,  now  some  six years 
back,  at  Brade  Brothers  &  Co.  's  office,  I  think.  I  was  travelling  for  a 
Philadelphia  house.  The  senior  Brade  introduced  us,  you  remember; 
some  business-chat  followed,  then  you  forced  me  home  with  you  to  a 
family  tea,  and  a  family  time  we  had.  Have  you  forgotten  about  the 
um,  and  what  I  said  about  Werter's  Charlotte,  and  the  bread  and  butter, 
and  that  capital  story  you  told  of  the  large  loaf  A  hundred  times  since, 
I  have  laughed  over  it.  At  least  you  must  recall  my  name  -  Ringman, 
John  Ringman.  ' 
'Large  loaP  Invited  you  to  tea?  Ringman?  Ringman?  Ring?  Ring"' 
'Ah  sir',  sadly  smiling,  'don't  ring  the  changes  that  way.  I  see  you  have 
a  faithless  memory,  Mr.  Roberts.  But  trust  in  the  faithfulness  of 
mine.  14S7 
'56  Mitchell,  'From  Action  to  Essencc',  33. 
157  Mck  ille,  Ae  Coi!  fidence-Alon.  19, 139 
As  soon  as  Roberts  hesitatingly  trusts  the  memory  of  Ringman  over  his  own, 
however,  thus  aligning  him  squarely  within  Mitchell's  designation  above  as'potential 
victim',  the  roles  are  seemingly  reversed.  Seeing  that  Roberts  is  not  at  all  comfortable 
with  his  request  for  a  shilling,  Ringman  reverses  the  roles  and  begs  for  patience  and  a 
friend  in  whom  he  might  confide  his  sorrowful  state: 
'For  God's  sake  don't  leave  me.  I  have  something  on  my  heart  -  on 
my  heart.  Under  deplorable  circumstances  thrown  among  strangers, 
utter  strangers.  I  vi,  ant  affiend  in  ýt,  honi  I  ina 
- 
N,  confide.  Yours,  Mr. 
Roberts,  is  almost  the  first  known  face  I've  seen  for  many  weeks....  I 
need  not  say,  sir,  how  it  cuts  me  to  the  soul,  to  follow  up  a  social 
salutation  with  such  words  as  have  just  been  mine.  lknowthatl 
jeopardize  your  good  opinion.  But  I  can't  help  it:  necessity  knows  no 
law,  and  heeds  no  risk.  1459 
Of  course,  in  keeping  with  the  reflective  complexity  of  The  Coiifidetice-Mati, 
the  story  of  Ringman's  plight  itself  can  be  accepted  only  through  faith.  It  is,  after  all, 
not  actually  narrated  for  the  reader  at  all  until  Chapter  Twelve,  and  even  then  only 
after  certain  details  have  been  filled  in  for  Roberts  by  yet  another  character  (the  'man 
in  the  gray  coat'  introduced  in  Chapter  Six,  who,  according  to  the  standard-line 
interpretation,  may  be  the  same  character  as  Ringman  in  disguise)  seeking  the 
confidence  and  charity  of  other  passengers  on  behalf  of  widows  and  orphans  of  the 
Seminole  Indian  tribe.  "'  Nevertheless,  this  serves  only  to  strengthen  Mitchell's  point 
151  Melville,  The  Confidence-Man,  2  1.  (emphasis  mine) 
4SI)  Melville,  The  Confidence-Man,  60-63.  As  noted  above  with  regard  to  the  reading  of 
Overmeer,  the  novel's  eponymous  Confidence  Man  is  traditionally  regarded  as  appearing  in  a  variety  of 
avatars,  most  of  who  are  foreshadowed  in  Chapter  Three  by  the  crippled  beggar,  Black  Guinea.  When 
accused  of  faking  his  deformity  for  the  sake  of  procuring  the  charity  of  others,  Guinea  affirms  his 
innocence  by  appealing  to  the  testimony  of  other  passengers,  should  they  find  them  on  board: 
'Oh  yes,  oh  yes,  dar  is  aboard  here  a  werry  nice,  good  ge'mman  wid  a  weed,  and  a 
ge'mman  in  a  gray  coat  and  a  white  tie,  what  knows  all  about  me;  and  a  ge'mman  ýý  Id 
ýi  big  book,  too;  agd  a  yarb-doctor-,  and  a  ge'mman  in  a  yaller  west,  and  a  gc'mman 
\\  Id  a  brass  platekwiolet  robe;  and  a  ge'mman  as  is  a  sodjer;  and  ever  so  many  good, 
kind,  honest  ge'mm,  4i  more  aboard  what  knows  me  and  wIll  speak  for  me.  God  bress 
lem;  yes,  and  \\  hat  Vno\\  s  me  as  well  as  dis  poor  old  darkie  knows  hisself,  God  bress 
him'  Oh,  find'cm 
.-.  and  let'em  come  quick,  and  show  you  all,  ge'mmen,  dat  dis 
poor  ole  darkic  is  \\crry  well  wordy  of  all  you  kind  ge'mmen's  kind  confidence' 
(NIel\  ille,  The  Coiýfidence-Alan,  13). 
-1V 140 
regarding  the  inevitability  and  the  interchangeable  malleability  of  confidence  in  social 
exchange.  A  character's  coherence  or  constancy,  his  or  her  essence,  then,  is  available 
to  the  reader  only  by  way  of  repetition  or  constancy  of  a  certain  type  of  action  -  e.  g., 
whether  one  consistently  solicits  confidences  from  others  or  one  places  confidence  in 
others.  "' 
Nevertheless,  it  is  precisely  this  essential  coherence  qua  constancy  that  David 
W.  Maurer's  classic  study  of  the  confidence  game  deeply  undercuts.  Indeed, 
according  to  Maurer,  for  one  to  be  conned,  he  must  already  have  'larceny  in  his  veins': 
In  other  words,  he  must  want  something  for  nothing,  or  be  willing  to 
participate  in  an  unscrupulous  deal.  If  a  man  with  money  has  this  trait, 
he  is  all  that  any  con  man  could  wish.  He  is  a  mark.  'Larceny',  or 
'thieves'  blood',  runs  not  only  in  the  veins  of  professional  thieves;  it 
would  appear  that  humanity  at  large  has  just  a  dash  of  it  -  and 
sometimes  more.  And  the  con  man  has  learned  that  he  can  exploit  this 
human  trait  to  his  own  ends;  if  he  builds  it  up  carefully  and  expertly,  it 
flares  from  simple  latent  dishonesty  to  an  all-consuming  lust  which 
drives  the  victim  to  secure  funds  for  speculation  by  any  means  at  his 
command.  "' 
There  is  no  end  to  the  problems  of  accepting  Guinea's  list  alone  as  definitive  evidence  of  any  one 
character  being  a  confidence  man  or  in  cahoots  with  Guinea,  not  least  of  which  being  its  ambiguity.  In 
Chapter  Six,  for  example,  we  find  a  short  conversation  between  'a  well-to-gentleman  in  a  ruby-colored 
vest'(i.  e.,  'a  ge'mman  in  a  wiolet  robe'?  )  and'a  man  in  a  gray  coat  and  a  white  tie'(i.  e.,  'a  ge'mman  in  a 
gray  coat  and  a  white  tie?  ).  Using  the  perspective  offered  by  Mitchell,  the  essential  difference  is  that 
the  man  in  the  ruby-colored  vest  disdains  the  giving  or  accepting  of  charity,  whereas  the  man  in  the 
gray  coat  clearly  does  not.  The  fact  that  the  former  is  presented  as  'hard-hearted'  would  seem  in 
keeping  with  Mitchell's  concluding  claim  that  humanityis  itself  distinguishable  in  terms  of  the  one, 
single,  constant  activity  which  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  its  existence,  which  in  turn  suggests  that  any 
individual  who  can  neither  solicit  nor  place  confidence  is  outside  the  realm  of  humanity'  (Mitchell, 
'From  Action  to  Essence',  36). 
460  For  a  similar  emphasis  upon  thematic  repetition  in  The  Confidence-Man  see  Walter  Dubler, 
'Theme  and  Structure  in  Melville's  The  Confidence-Man'American  Literature  33  (November  1961): 
307-19.  John  Bryant  presents  Melville's  ruptured  repetition  as  the  key  to  any  discussion  of  Melville's 
breakdown  of  allegory  in  'Allegory  and  Breakdown  in  The  Conflidence-Man:  Melville's  Comedy  of 
Doubt'  Philological  Quarterly  61  (Winter  1986):  113-30. 
46  1  David  W.  Maurer,  The  Big  Con:  The  Story  of  the  Confidence  Man  (rev.  ed;  New  York: 
Anchor  Books,  1999),  117.  We  again  see  this  exemplified  in  The  Confidence-Man  by  Mr.  Roberts.  In 
gratitude  for  his  charity,  Ringman  tells  Roberts  that  the  transfer-agent  of  the  Black  Rapids  Coal 
Company  is  also  aboard  the  steamer,  and  that  Roberts  would  be  wise  to  purchase  the  currently 
depreciated  stock  immediately: 
'A  month  since,  in  a  panic  contrived  by  artful  alarmists,  some  credulo 
i 
us  stock-holders 
sold  out;  but,  to  frustrate  the  aim  of  the  alarmists,  the  Company,  prev,  ously  advised 
of  their  scheme,  so  managed  it  as  to  get  into  its  own  hands  those  sacrificed  shares, 141 
The  effectiveness  of  many  cons  is,  thus,  dependent  not  only  on  the  greed  of  the 
victim,  but  his  or  her  desire  to  scheme  and  connive  against  those  who  introduced  the 
potential  for  easy,  illicit  fortune.  The  aim,  then,  is  to  empower  the  victim  as  a 
potential  victimizer,  whereby  the  giver  of  confidence  feels  like  its  recipient. 
While  I  am  sympathetic  to  efforts  such  as  those  of  Overmeer  and  Mitchell  to 
disrupt  the  basis  for  (if  not  the  manifestation  of)  stable  identification  of  character  in 
The  Confidence-Man,  their  shared  inadequacy  is  that  neither  takes  seriously  enough 
the  complex  interplay  between  reader,  interpretive  circle  /  agenda,  and  text  as  itself  a 
play  of  confidence.  Much  is  to  be  gained  from  their  rejection  of  unequivocally 
following  vanous  strands  of  the  standard-line  interpretation,  and  thus  avoiding  all 
manner  of  ingenious identifications  of  the  Confidence  Man  -  e.  g.,  as  God,  "'  or 
Satan,  "'  or  Death,  "'  or  even  Melville"  -  but  this  is  only  the  first  step.  Such,  then,  is 
the  value  of  Gustaaf  van  Croumphout's  philosophical  assessment  of  the 
'theatrical  i  zation'  in  The  Cmifidence-Man.  "  There  is,  Cromphout  contends,  a  strained 
resolved  that,  since  a  spurious  panic  must  be,  the  panic  makers  should  be  no  gainers 
by  it.  The  Company,  I  hear,  is  now  ready,  but  not  anxious,  to  redispose  of  those 
sharesl  and  having  obtained  them  at  their  depressed  value,  will  now  sell  them  at  par, 
though,  prior  to  the  panic,  they  were  held  at  a  handsome  figure  above.  '  (Melville,  The 
Confidence-Man,  22) 
Per  the  standard  line  interpretation,  while  the  sure-bet  tip  may  be  spurious,  and  the  transfer-agent  yet 
another  disguisc,  the  point  we  are  making  is  simply  that  the  motivation  set  before  Roberts  is  that  of 
unnaturally  easy  money. 
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'cognitive  relationship  of  the  subject  (reader,  narrator,  character-as-perceiver, 
Melville)  to  others,  which  takes  the  form  of  depersonalisation.  "'  He  wntes: 
Melville  repeatedly,  on  the  level  of  characterization,  draws  his  readers' 
attention  to  the  utter  inaccessibility  of  the  characters  to  each  other  and 
to  the  narrator.  Melville's  perceivers  cannot  interpret  the  facts  because 
they  cannot  get  hold  of  the  facts  in  the  first  place.  They  are  prevented 
from  doing  so  by  the  impenetrable  thicket  of  mystery,  incongruity,  and 
alienness  isolating  every  character.  "' 
It  is,  then,  no  accident  that  the  word  'stranger'  is  used  over  fifty  times  in  the  no%,  el.  "' 
Melville  can  sustain  this  level  of  characteristic  estrangement,  Cromphout  continues, 
through  his  use  of  dialogue: 
In  a  novel  largely  made  up  of  dialogues,  Melville  repeatedly  resorts  to 
dialogue  as  a  means  of  blocking  the  reader's  access  to  the  characters 
and  the  characters'  access  to  each  other.  Melville's  interlocutors  do  not 
achieve  meaningful  identity,  and  hence  mutual  knowability,  because 
their  dialogues  never  allow  them  to  do  what  dialogue  at  its  best 
requires  of  its  participants,  namely,  to  engage  their  true  self  and  to  be 
willing  both  to  reveal  their  true  self  and  to  recognize  the  true  self,  that 
is,  the  real  humanness,  of  the  other(s).  "' 
In  Cromphout's  estimation,  the  Confidence  Man  takes  advantage  of  this 
theatricalization  by'remain[ing]  throughout  the  man  of  many  masks,  the  unrivaled 
obfuscator.  Like  God's,  his  essence  remains  "past  finding  out.  "  From  beginning  to 
end,  his  "Masquerade"  conceals  him,  and  ultimately  the  concealment  was  as 
impenetrable  to  Melville  as  it  is  to  his  readers.  "" 
Again,  though,  this  notion  of  an  advantage  gained  seems  problematic.  The 
Cromphout,  'The  Confidence-Man  and  the  Problem  of  Others',  38. 
""  Cromphout,  'The  Confidence-Man  and  the  Problem  of  Others',  38. 
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world  into  it  stage  that  wc  (only)  \  ic\\'  (N/lIchael  Fisher,  Stanle.  v  Cavell  and  Li*terarY  Skepticism 
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tother',  as  descnbed  by  Cromphout,  does  not  simply  stand  against  the  Subject,  but  also 
withiii.  That  is  to  say,  the  Subject  itself  has  been  made  the  stranger.  In  this  way  the 
identification  /  differentiation  of  Subject  and  Object  is  a  necessarily  masked,  and  thus 
theatrical,  affair  -  whereby  essence  is  not  concealed  by  the  mask  but  is  itself 
precisely  only  insofar  as  it  is  masked.  As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  Three,  it  is 
Cromphout's  assumption  of  an  ineffable  essence  or  Truth  on  the  far  side  of  realitv 
deception  that  I  contend  Melville  ultimately  comes  to  find  deeply  problematic. 
Consequently,  even  the  common  identification  of  the  Confidence  Man  as,  if 
nothing  else,  a  swindler  is  all-too-easily  rendered.  "'  It  is  this  tendency,  however,  that 
lends  an  early  commentator  like  Philip  Drew  -  who  was  bucking  the  standard-line 
interpretation  long  before  it  was  common  to  do  so  -  such  an  important  place  in  our 
thinking  about  The  Confidence-Man,  and  perhaps  even  Melville's  career  as  a  whole. 
Of  the  novel  he  writes:  'Every  incident  narrated  is innocent  in  itself  and  innocent  to  a 
trusting  eye,  but  filled  with  dubious  circumstance  to  the  reader  who  is  himself  [sic] 
without  confidence.  ""  In  other  words,  the  reader  of  The  Confidence-Man  does  not 
have  the  privileged  view  of  the  past  or  the  future  -  the  twin  conditions  of  the 
constancy  Mitchell  seeks  above  -  that  would  bear  out  his  or  her  suspicion  that 
anybody  in  the  novel  is  ever  actually  deceived.  As  a  result,  the  degree  to  which 
Melville  deceives  the  reader,  through  his  ironic  manipulation  of  her  confidence  in 
472  Other  identifications  of  the  title  character  include:  the  Devil,  God,  Christ,  Antichrist, 
ti-ickstcr  god,  avatar  of  Vishnu,  and  a  host  of  other  less  specific  appellations.  The  common  thread  of 
cach  (be  it  of  an  insidious  or  ultimately  benevolent  identity,  'essence',  or'function')  is  duplicity.  For  a 
dated,  though  helpful  rc\  lew  of  identifications,  see  Mary  K.  Madison,  'Hypothetical  Friends:  The 
Critics  and  the  Confidence  Man'Melville  Societv  Extracts  46  (May  1981):  10-14.  For  two  examples 
that  propose  a  problcinatised  sense  of  identity  but  in  the  end  fail  to  own  up  to  the  implications  of  their 
insights  scc  Leon  Seltzer,  'Carnus's  Absurd  and  the  World  of  Melville's  The  Confidence  -Man' 
PubliCation  qf  the  Modern  Language.  Issociation  82  (March  1967):  14-27;  and  John  G.  Ca\N  elti,  'Some 
Notes  on  the  Structure  ol'The  Confidence  Man'Anierican  Literature  29  (NoN.  1957):  278-88. 
473  Philip  Drew,  'Appeai-ances  and  Reality  in  Mek  ille's  The  Confidence-Man'  ELH:  I  Journal 
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both  her  capacity  as  a  discerning  reader  and  in  Melville  as  a  coherent  author,  remains, 
as  it  were,  undecidable.  "' 
Nevertheless,  as  noted  in  Chapter  Three,  the  undecidable  is  decidedýy  opposed 
to  indecision.  In  characterisation,  as  much  as  in  consciousness,  one  cannot  escape 
identification;  a  coherent  role  (if  not  a  stable,  correspondent  identity)  Is  necessarily 
and  retroactively  assumed.  What  I  contend  is  that  the  undecidability  of  Melville's 
theatrical  role-play  marks  the  aesthetico-theological  intensity  and  freedom  of  the 
decision  to  become.  Indeed,  what  Cromphout  (amongst  others)  regards  as  Melville's 
passive  acceptance  of  uncertainty,  we  find  instead  to  be  a  creative  awareness  that 
carries  the  potential  of  recasting  theology  from  its  traditional  transcendental  repose  to 
the  materialistic  evaluation  of  its  aesthetic  /  poetic  immanence  in  the  Masq1terade. 
3.  The  Character  of  Theology 
In  much  the  same  way  as  in  The  Conjidence-Man,  then,  the  operative  question 
of  a  truly  modem  theology  is  not  'Who  is  the  character  (or  Subject)  of  theologyT  On 
the  contrary,  for  reasons  that  are  parallel  to  Melville's  concerns,  it  is  'What  is  the 
character  of  theologyT  Of  course,  the  poly-valence  of  the  question,  i.  e.,  identifying 
where  it  might  begin  and  end,  is  as  dizzying  as  its  profound  implications.  Such  is  the 
inten-ninable  depth  of  the  question  of  beginnings  and  endings  that  has  loomed 
throughout  the  preceding  chapters.  One  may  well  wish  to  reach  the  heavens,  so  as  to 
extend  one's  purview,  and  thus  to  afford  a  divine  vantage  from  which  to  ascertain 
where  the  truth  of  all  character-isation  begins  and  invariably  ends;  but  the  lesson 
474  For  a  similar  ýisscssnient,  in  regard  to  Melville's  final  novels,  see  Yvor  Winters:  'In  Pierre 
and  The  Coiýfidence-Man  alike  it  is  assumed  that  valid  judgment  is  impossible,  for  eN  ery  c\  ent.  c\  ery 
fact,  cvery  person,  is  too  fluid,  too  unbounded  to  be  kno\ý  n'  (Maide's  Curse:  Seven  Studies  fit  the 
lhsioný  ofAinerican  Obscurantism  [Norfolk,  Conn.:  New  Directions,  1983],  79). 145 
taught  by  Melville  is  that  when  neither  depth  nor  height  escapes  the  dialectical 
circularity  that  renders  one  dizzy,  the  assumed  vantage  point  of  a  transcendent  or 
symbolic  meaning  is  as  rent  and  elusive  as  the  breath  or  the  echo  of  a  dead  god's 
laughter. 
While  reflecting  on  the  Jewish  proverb,  'Man  thinks,  God  laughs',  Milan 
Kundera  cannot  help  but  wonder  why  God  might  be  laughing.  His  conclusion  is 
appropriate  to  the  dilemma  described  above:  because  'man  thinks  and  the  truth 
escapes  him.  Because  the  more  men  think,  the  more  one  man's  thought  diverges  from 
another's.  And  finally,  because  man  is  never  what  he  thinks  he  is'.  "5  Which  to  say,  in 
its  expectations  of  beginnings  and  endings  that  stabilise  meaning  and  significance, 
and  thus  seek  to  fill  an  absence,  humanity  misses  the  joke,  and  thus,  too,  the  'sudden 
transfon-nation  of  a  strained  expectation  into  nothmg'  that  Kant  ascribes  to  laughter.  "" 
As  we  will  see,  though,  the  intensity  of  this  excessive  'nothing'  is  a  joke  that  gets  out 
of  hand.  The  punch  line  of  reality  is simply  too  much,  leaving  us  in  stitches  on  the 
floor  with  our  most  insane  of  laughs,  screaming'No!  Stop!  No  more!  '-  unsure 
whether  we  mean  it  or  not. 
For  Charles  Winquest,  the  most  proper  characterisation  of  theology  attuned  to 
such  intensity  is  that  of  a  'lover's  discourse.  He  writes: 
Love  is  an  intense  valuation  of  specificities  in  the  finite  display  of 
experience.  It  is  precisely  because  finite  experience  is  highly 
variegated  that  the  "yes"  to  the  importance  of  any  specific  person  or 
object  is  meaningful.  In  Love,  we  are  making  life  meaningful,  but  it  is 
a  meaning  that  can  be  neither  contained  nor  controlled.  Love  makes 
475  Milan  Kundera,  for  one,  is  plcýiscd  by  the  thought  'that  the  art  of  the  novel  came  into  the 
orld  as  the  echo  of  God's  laughter'('Jerusalem  Address:  The  Novel  and  Europe'  in  TheArt  of  the 
Novel  [London:  Faber  S-,  Faber,  1988],  158). 
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life  unsafe.  This  is  its  frightening  and  wonderful  transformational 
power.  "' 
Inasmuch  as  this  is  true,  theology  is a  kind  of  engagement  -a  violent  battle  as  much 
as  it  is  a  formal  promise  of  marriage  -  but  with/to  whom?  Might  we  then  strip  it 
bare,  this  question  theology  asks  and/or  is  asked,  to  get  beneath  its  textual,  textile 
surfaces,  and  behold  it  in  its  natural  glory?  Moreover,  might  we  yet  behold  the 
question  of  theology's  character,  for  us  the  fundamental  problem  of  theology,  in  its 
essential,  naked  truth  and  origin,  as  it  strives  to  understand  all  it  can  of,  and  indeed  to 
fashion  the  very  categories  of  thinking  about,  God? 
And  yet,  we  cannot  stop  here  -  for,  indeed,  what  would  be  the  character  of 
this  undressing?  Would  it  be  rape  or  consensual;  would  this  act  of  love  be  violence  or 
foreplay?  When  surfaces  are  compound,  when  theology's  flesh  is  textual  and  textile 
(i.  e.,  published,  bound,  and  disseminated  in  an  endless  array  of  monographs),  its 
undressing  cannot  go  simply  skin-deep.  Like  the  instrument  of  torture  in  Kafka's 
harrowing  fable,  'In  the  Penal  Colony',  where  vibrating  needles  engrave  into  the  skin 
of  the  convicted  his  or  her  transgression,  the  piercing  of  theology  is  a  sort  of  tattooing 
andjudgment  that  unveils  its  very  truth.  As  in  Kafka's  tale,  the  result  of'the  Harrow' 
is inevitably  death,  but  just  before  death  comes  understanding: 
It  begins  around  the  eyes.  From  there  it  radiates.  A  moment  that 
might  tempt  one  to  get  under  the  Harrow  oneself  Nothing  more 
happens  than  that  the  man  begins  to  understand  the  inscription,  he 
purses  his  mouth  as  if  he  were  listening.  You  have  seen  how  difficult 
it  is  to  decipher  the  script  with  one's  eyes;  but  our  man  deciphers  it 
with  his  wounds.  To  be  sure,  that  is  a  hard  task,  he  needs  six  hours  to 
accomplish  it.  By  that  time  the  Harrow  has  pierced  him  quite  through 
and  casts  him  into  the  pit,  where  he  pitches  down  upon  the  blood  and 
477  Charles  Winquest,  Pchrilig  Theology  (Chicago:  UniNcrsity  of  Chicago  Press.  1995),  149- 
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the  water  and  the  cotton  wool.  Then  the  judgment  has  been  fulfilled, 
and  we,  the  solider  and  1,  bury  him.  "' 
In  the  words  of  Freud,  the  theological  Subject,  as  it  were,  in  its  attempt  to  assess  and 
to  judge,  'wants  to  incorporate  [its]  object  into  itself,  and  ...  it  wants  to  do  so  by 
devouring  it.  ""'  Unable  to  escape  the  limits  of  its  ontological  and  perspectival 
dilemma,  the  Subject's  most  ingenious  and  meticulous  attempt  at  theology's  dissection 
/  analysis,  i.  e.,  to  bring  it  into  accordance  with  the  Subject's  rule  and/or  method,  be  it 
through  systemising,  narrating,  or  even  deconstructing,  is  also  a  verdict  and  a 
sentence. 
Tyler  Roberts  is  to  be  credited  for  recognising  this  tendency  in  the  seminal 
works  of  two  of  America's  most  prominent  contemporary  theologians,  Stanley 
Hauerwas  and  Mark  C.  Taylor.  "'  Each  thinker,  he  argues  persuasively,  falls  prey  to 
the  metaphysical  recalcitrance  of  narrative.  For  instance,  while  Hauerwas  claims  that 
self-identity,  or,  in  his  apposite  tenn,  'character',  is  derivative  of  one's  knowledge  of 
and  submission  to  God,  one's  knowledge  and  trust  are  always  already  deeply 
embedded  in  a  preexistent  Christian  narrative  in  which  humanity  recognises  itself  as 
'contingent',  'historical',  'sinful'  creatures  of  God.  "'  According  to  Roberts,  this  is  the 
very  sort  of  'master  narrative'  postmodem  theologians,  those  who  have  been  made 
wary  by  those  most  incredulous  insights  by  the  likes  of  Friedrich  Nietzsche,  Frederic 
478  Franz  Kafka,  'In  the  Penal  Colony'  in  The  Penal  Colony:  Stories  and  Short  Pieces  (trans. 
Willa  and  Edwin  Muir;  New  York:  Schocken  Books,  1961),  204. 
479  Sigmund  Freud,  'Mourning  and  Melancholia'in  The  Pelican  Freud  Library  [On 
MetapsYchology:  Die  TheorY  of  PsYchoanal.  vsis]  (vol.  11;  trans.  James  Strachey-,  ed.  Angela  Richards, 
HarniondsN\  orth.  Penguin,  1984),  258. 
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and  Haucr\\  as',  Motlern  Theology  9  (April  1993):  181-200. 
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4ýý2  Jameson,  and  Franýois  Lyotard,  are  instinctively  wary  . 
Nevertheless,  even  Mark  C.  Taylor  -  who  is  as  suspicious  as  they  come, 
especially  of  beginnings  and  endings,  and  who  is  delighted  by  the  notion  of  a 
fnomadic  self  who  endlessly  errs  and  sempiternally  puns  in  carnivalesque  discourses 
that  would  make  Bakhtin  blush  and  Zarathusa  proud  -  is  unden-nined  by  an  'Internal 
narrative': 
Once  there  was  a  pre-modem  subject  who  embraced  faith  in  God.  But 
in  itsJoumey  to  modemity  the  subject  overturned  the  God-human 
relationship,  making  God  its  own  creation  as  well  as  dominating  others 
and  hoarding  possessions  in  a  futile  attempt  to  secure  a  foundation  for 
itself  and  escape  from  death.  But,  when  the  subject  recognized  this 
futility  and  embraced  the  difference  at  the  core  of  its  identity,  it 
emerged  into  postmodemity,  an  etemity  of  play.  There  the  subject 
threw  off  lacerated  consciousness,  entered  the  divine  milieu,  and  erred 
happily  ever  after.  484 
What  makes  Roberts's  essay  so  compelling  is  not  simply  that  he  questions  whether 
Hauerwas  adequately  addresses  the  disruptive  implications  of  the  interplay  between 
'history  and  the  world'  and  the  'unity  and  plot  of  the  Christian  narrative,  "'  nor  that  he 
calls  out  Taylor's  slippage  back  into  the  metaphysical  moonng  of  narrative.  Rather,  it 
492  1  Is  it  not  important,  then,  to  think  about  how  theology  interprets  and  even  constructs  (and 
reconStl-LlCtS)  the  Christian  narrativesT  (Roberts,  'Theology  and  the  Ascetic  Imperative',  188). 
493  Mark  C.  Taylor,  Erring:  A  Postinodenz  AlTheology  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press, 
1984),  149-65. 
484  Roberts,  'Theology  and  the  Ascetic  Imperative',  186.  Roberts  rounds  out  his  critique  ýý  Ith 
much  the  samc  conclusion  as  Walter  Lowe:  'Taylor  purports  to  end  narrative  (and  metaphysics,  the  self, 
history)  only  by  telling  a  story  that  will  end  all  stories  -  one  that  has  been  told  for  millennia'  (A 
Deconstructive  Manifesto?:  Mark  C.  Taylor's  Erring',  Journal  of  Religion  66  [July  1986],  324-3  1). 
Criticisms  of  Taylor  are  nothing  new.  As  with  Jacques  Derrida,  the  academe's  reception  has  often  been 
either  love  or  hate.  Interestingly,  most  of  the  negative  theological  appraisals  aimed  at  Taylor  and 
Derrida  have  been,  and  are  still,  levelled  upon  earlier,  ostensibly  more  'play'-affirming,  writing. 
Indecd,  one  might  easily  substitute  his  name  and  works  in  Graham  Ward's  c\aluation  of  an  inadequate 
assessincrit  of  Derrida:  'He  concentrates  upon  [Taylor's]  earlier  \\ork  and  does  not  see  how  [Taylor's] 
work  has  developed.  [Taylor]  has  moved  from  the  discursive  style  of  ... 
[Erring],  through  the  mix  of 
eenres  in  [Tears],  to  the  essays  in  [About  Religion]  which  deepen  the  questions  of  his  earlier  ýýork  both 
in  terms  of  form  and  thenie'  (Barth,  Derrida,  anel  the  Language  of  Theology  [New  York:  Cambridge 
Uni\crs1ty  Prcss.  1995],  227  n.  21). 
Robcrts.  'Thcoloov  and  the  Asectic  ImperatIN  c',  188. 149 
is  in  his  insistence  that  disruption  and  narrative  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  and  that 
disruption  is  as  structurally  necessary  to  narrative  as  narration  is  to  disruption. 
Unable  to  free  itself  fully  from  the  beginnings  and  endings  of  narrative,  or  the 
contingencies  of  life,  the  peculiarities  of  what  Gordon  Kaufman  has  described  as  its 
Imaginative  construction'  cannot  be  lost  on  or  in  our  theology.  Kaufman  writes: 
Although  it  may  be  obvious  to  us  that  the  constructive  work  of  the 
imagination  has  in  this  way  always  been  constitutive  of  theological 
activity,  theologians  have  seldom  understood  themselves  to  be  engaged 
primarily  in  imaginatively  constructing  a  theistically-focused 
worldview;  on  the  contrary,  they  have  largely  regarded  themselves  as 
attempting  to  express  in  human  words  and  concepts  what  the  divine 
King  had  objectively  and  authoritatively  given  the  church  or 
synagogue  in  revelation.  The  fact  that  their  work  was  thoroughly 
imaginative  and  constructive  in  character  was  simply  not  recognized.  "" 
On  the  contrary,  has  not  the  more  common  modem  tendency  been  for  the  theologian 
to  peek  inside  and  g(r)asp,  as  though  an  exact  science?  Eschewing  aesthetics  and 
embracing  the  methods  of  the  natural  sciences,  post-Cartesian  theology  became, 
according  to  Hans  Urs  von  Balthasar,  yet  another  'special  isati  on'  devoid  of  sensits 
spiritualis.  "' 
Consequently,  traditional  theological  discourse  has  become  not  unlike  an 
infant,  as  observed  by  Friedrich  Schlegel  in  his  erotic  novel  Lucinde. 
Unquestionably  there  lies  deeply  rooted  in  the  nature  of  man  a  desire  to 
eat  everything  he  loves  and  put  every  new  object  he  encounters 
immediately  into  his  mouth  in  order  to  break  it  down.  A  healthy 
hunger  for  knowledge  makes  him  want  to  apprehend  the  objects 
completely,  to  penetrate  and  bite  through  to  its  inmost  core.  488 
496  Gordon  D.  Kaufman,  'Theology  as  Imaginative  Construction'  Journal  of  the  American 
A  cademi,  o  Method  (3  rd  ed., 
. 
ýf  Religion  50  (March  1982),  78;  also  see  his  An  Essay  on  Theological 
Atlanta:  Scholar's  Press,  1995)  and  In  the  Face  of  Aývstei-Y:  A  Constructive  Theology  (Cambridge: 
Harvard  University  Press,  1993). 
497  Hans  Urs  \on  Balthasar,  The  Glor 
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ý,  of  the  Lord:  A  TheologicalAesthetiCs  (vol.  1  -1  trans. 
Erasino  Leiva-Mcrikakis;  eds.  Joseph  Fessio  S.  J.  and  John  Riches.  -  San  Francisco:  Ignatius  Press, 
1982),  74-70. 
Schlegel.  Tucinde'and  the  Fragments,  5  1. 150 
Indeed,  in  the  Christian  tradition,  the  theologian's  desire  to  'know'  God,  i.  e.,  what  lies 
beneath  the  fleshly  masquerade  of  the  Incarnation,  has  often  taken  on  overtly  sexual 
tone.  In  his  study  of  depictions  of  the  Crucifixion  in  medieval  Europe,  for  instance, 
Richard  Trexler  notes  that  it  was  customary  for  Jesus'  crucified  body  to  be  regarded  as 
a  'volume  to  be  penetrated'.  "'  Thus  one  might  find  Jesus  appearing  and  quickly 
embracing  Rupert  von  Deutz  in  a  dream,  kissing  him,  and  then  opening  his  mouth,  'so 
that  I  could  kiss  him  more  deeply  1.490  Battista  Varani  is even  more  literal  with  his 
desired  penetration  when  he  expresses  the  wish  to  wriggle  into  Christ's  dying  body  in 
search  of  his  heart.  491  In  this  way,  theology  becomes  as  though  a  sacrament,  upon  and 
into  which,  traditionally,  the  theologian  cannot  help  but  attempt  to  gaze  or  probe; 
furthermore,  from  which  the  theologian  cannot  be  fully  differentiated.  492 
489  Richard  C.  Trexler,  'Gendering  Jesus  Crucified'  in  Iconography  at  the  Crossroads:  Papers 
from  the  Colloquium  Sponsored  by  the  Index  of  Christian  Art,  Princeton  University,  23-24  March  1990 
(ed.  Brendan  Cassidy;  Princeton:  Department  of  Art  and  Archaeology,  Princeton  University,  1993), 
108-09. 
490  Cited  in  Trexler,  'Gendering  Jesus  Crucified',  109. 
491  Cited  in  Trexler,  'Gendering  Jesus  Crucified',  109..  Also  see  Jean  Wirth,  L'image 
midijvale:  naissance  et  d&eloppements,  Vl'-XV'  sikle  (Paris:  M6ridiens  Klincksieck,  1989),  323;  and 
Ta  naissance  de  J6sus  dans  le  coeur:  6tude  iconographique',  Publications  du  Centre  europ9en  ditudes 
bourguignonnes,  XIV-XVIe  sikle  24  (1989):  149-58.  Citing  Wirth  once  again,  Trexler  notes  also: 
'Long  before  modem  psychoanalytic  insights,  the  genital  implications  of  such  penetrations  were  clear 
among  late  fifteenth-century  German  printmakers,  who  might,  for  instance,  provocatively  place  the 
crucified  Jesus'pierced,  externalised  heart  over  the  space  where  his  genitals  belonged'  (Trexler, 
'Gendering  Jesus  Crucified,  109;  also  see  Wirth,  LImage  mMiivale,  323). 
492  While  Robert  Smith  is describing  Hegel's  philosophical  method,  he  may  just  as  well  be 
describing  the  sacramental  desire  of  theology  when  he  writes: 
Its  method,  tacitly  supposed  to  be  plastic  or  protean,  adaptable  and  therefore  free  a 
priori,  sacrifices  itself  in  taking  on  as  exactly  as  possible  the  imprint  of  what  it  helps 
to  describe,  its  'object',  in  order  to  maximize  the  object's  phenomenon  unto  nournenal 
reception.  Like  any  power  of  mediation  philosophical  method  invites  being  thought 
of  as  a  virtue,  since  it  gives  itself  up  for  the  sake  of  what  it  mediates,  as  though  it  had 
a  free  will  and,  as  such,  one  that  might  have  been  less  altruistically  trained.  .... 
Hence  the  oblique  ontological  make-up  of'method',  existing  only  to  the  extent  that  it 
vanishes  in  fulfilling  the  task  that  makes  it  what  it  is  -  disappearance  it-ould  be  the 
greatest  scope  of  its  being.  (Derrida  and  Autobiography  [Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1995],  14  [emphasis  mine]) 15  1 
4.  When  Repression  is  Creation 
As  we  have  already  alluded,  wnting  about  The  Confidence-Man  has  also  taken 
on  a  character  strangely  resembling  its  composition.  Upon  examining  the  tweim  -six 
handwritten  fragments  of  The  Confidence  -Man,  "'  the  only  such  fragments  available 
for  any  of  Melville's  novels  after  1850,  Elizabeth  Foster  concludes  that  Melville's 
style  indulges  in 
understatement,  underemphasis,  litotes,  and  complexity  that  looks  like 
simplicity.  As  we  see  him  in  his  revisions  moving  always  in  these 
directions,  and  away  from  the  loose  structure,  open  clarity,  and 
directness  of  his  earliest  versions  of  passage,  we  watch  many  ideas 
growing  less  and  less  obvious.  "' 
By  clustenng  qualifiers  in  a  doggedly  elusive  attempt  to  diffuse  meaning  through 
apparent  understatement  and  clausal  subordination,  Melville  insinuates  a  'syntax 
[that]  abets  the  hinting  and  whispering  which  are  the  language  of  this  novel',  and 
which  have  proven  constitutive  of  most  of  its  commentaries.  "'  Steven  Kemper 
notices  this  same  dynamic  in  the  novel's  first  chapter,  in  the  barber's  sign  that  reads 
'NO  TRUST,  which  the  narrator  describes  as: 
An  inscription  which,  though  in  a  sense  not  less  intrusive  than  the 
contrasted  ones  of  the  stranger,  did  not,  as  it  seemed,  provoke  any 
corresponding  derision  or  surprise,  much  less  indignation;  and  still 
less,  to  all  appearances,  did  it  gain  for  the  inscriber  the  repute  of  being 
a  simpleton.  "' 
Kemper  astutely  notes  that  the  description  here  is  entirely  negative;  that  is,  the 
493  The  fragments  consist  of  various  versions  and  emendations  to  chapter  fourteen,  a  list  of 
possible  chapter  titIcs,  and  an  unused  section  entitled  'The  River'.  The  fragments  are  discussed  and 
prcsented  in  the  NW-NB  edition,  401-499;  cf.,  Foster,  'Textual  Notes'm  The  Confi-dence-Man  (1954), 
373-78. 
494  Foster,  'Textual  Notes'  in  The  Cmifidence-Man  (1954),  376.  Some  of  Foster's  examples  of 
this  con%ersi  on  are  quite  tell  Ing:  'proof  sufficient'  first  became  'proof  presumptiNe',  and  then  'some 
pi-csumption',  'prove  otherwise'  ýýas  diluted  to  'prove  not  so  much';  'many  characters'  was  obscured  in 
I  no  feN%  charactcrs'.  'it  NN  ould'  was  qualified  to  'it  ought  to'-,  and  'a  fatal  objection'  was  made  ambiguous 
by  'an  adequate  objection'. 
5 
405 
Foster,  'TcxtLial  Notes'  Ae  Confidence-Man  (  19,54),  377. 
496  NýI&  I  Ile, 
Onfidence-man, 152 
narrator  provides  details  as  to  what  the  sign  and  audience  are  not,  but  offers  no  hint  as 
to  what  they  actually  are. 
497 
The  composition  of  the  book,  as  proposed  by  the  three  main  genetic 
theories,  "'  for  the  most  part  builds  upon  the  foundation  laid  by  such  indeterminacy. 
While  the  differences  between  the  theories  are  substantial,  and  the  specifics  regarding 
each  are  highly  conjectural  and  often  fraught  with  problems,  they  remain  united  in 
their  assumption  that  Melville  substantially  and  for  a  vanety  of  reasons  altered  his 
original  text.  "'  Most  commentators  agree,  for  example,  that  the  order  in  which  one 
now  reads  The  Confidence-Man  does  not  come  close  to  the  order  in  which  Melville 
wrote  it.  Though  Watson  G.  Branch's  theory  is  the  only  one  that  explicitly  displaces 
the  first  chapter,  the  arrival  of  the  deaf  mute  aboard  the  Fidýle,  "'  the  standard  line 
interpretation  as  a  whole  agrees  that  the  book's  ending  was  not.  what  Melville 
originally  had  in  mind.  "'  For  one  reason  or  another,  they  argue,  he  deviated  from  his 
497  Steven  E.  Kemper,  'The  Confidence-Man:  A  Knavishly-Packed  Deck'  Studies  in  American 
Fiction  8  (Spring  1980):  30.  For  a  similar  development  of  related  issues,  see  Cecelia  Tichi,  'Melville's 
Craft  and  Theme  of  Language  Debased  in  The  Confidence-Man'ELH:  A  Journal  of  English  Literary 
History  39  (Dec.  1992):  639-58. 
498  Cf.,  Leon  Howard,  Herman  Melville,  227-32;  Watson  G.  Branch,  'The  Genesis, 
Composition,  and  Structure  of  The  Confidence-Man'  Nineteenth-  Century  Fiction  27  (1973):  424-48; 
and  Tom  Quirk,  Melville's  Confidence  Man:  From  Knave  to  Knight  (Columbia:  University  of  Missouri 
Press,  1982).  For  a  summary  of  the  theories,  though  one  that  leans  towards  Branch's  -  not  surprising, 
since  he  is  one  of  the  contributing  editors  of  the  volume-  see  Branch,  et  al,  'Historical  Note',  294-3  10. 
499  For  a  logical  and  an  aesthetic  critique,  respectively,  see  Hershel  Parker,  'The  Confidence- 
Man  and  the  Use  of  Evidence  in  Compositional  Studies:  A  Rejoinder'Nineteenth-Century  Fiction  28 
(June  1973):  119-24;  and  Michael  S.  Kearns,  'Interpreting  Intentional  Incoherence:  Towards  a 
Disambiguation  of  Melville's  Pierre;  or,  The  Ambiguities'  Bulletin  of  the  Midwest  Modem  Language 
Association  16  (Spring  1983):  35-54. 
500  Thomas  P.  Joswick  was  one  of  the  first  poststructuralists  to  get  his  hands  on  The 
Confidence-Man,  and  he  too  homes  in  on  this  most  enigmatic  of  beginnings,  arguing  that  it  in  fact 
displaces  itself.  'Figuring  the  Beginning:  Melville's  The  Confidence-Man'  Genre  II  (Fall  1978):  389- 
409. 
50  1  To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  the  'standard  line'  of  interpretation,  because  of  its  historical- 
critical  approach  to  the  book,  is  the  only  branch  of  scholarship  to  broach  this  particular  issue  with  any 
significant  fervour. 153 
path,  and,  for  better  or  worse,  embarked  on  a  different  course.  'O' 
In  this  reading  of  the  novel,  The  Confidence-Man  flowed  forth  not  unlike  the 
Mississippi  River  on  which  it  is  set.  Perhaps,  one  might  even  suggest,  like  'The 
River',  Melville's  excised,  silenced  (possible)  first  chapter: 
[T]he  unhumbled  river  ennobles  himself  now  deepens  now  purely 
expands,  now  first  forms  his  character  &  begins  that  career  whose 
majestic  serenity  if  not  overborne  by  feirce  [sic]  onsets  of  torrents  shall 
end  only  with  ocean.  "' 
Melville's  text,  too,  so  the  compositional  theories  go,  at  first  glided  on'glad  and 
content',  ostensibly  innocuous  and  well  on  its  way  to  becoming  a  fine  novel,  until  it 
reached  St.  Louis,  its  purportedly  misplaced  beginning,  where  the  raging  torrent  of  the 
Missouri  awaited  in  ambush.  "' 
But  at  St:  Louis  the  course  of  this  dream  is  run.  Down  on  it  like  a 
Pawnee  from  ambush  foams  the  yellow-painted  Missouri.  The 
calmness  is  gone,  the  grouped  isles  disappear,  the  shores  are  jagged  & 
rent,  the  hue  of  the  water  is  clayed,  the  before  moderate  current  is  rapid 
&  vexed.  The  peace  of  the  Upper  River  seems  broken  in  the  Lower, 
nor  is  it  ever  renewed.  506 
The  Missouri  River,  as  such,  'dethrones  his  sire  and  reigns  in  his  stead',  usurping  the 
'benign  name  Mississippi'  until  its  ineffable  entry  into  the  sea,  'long  disdaining  to 
502  This  deduction  is  based  mostly  upon  Black  Guinea's  description  of  those  passengers  who 
can  apparently  substantiate  his  claims  to  truly  being  a  poor,  black  cripple.  It  is  surmised  by  most 
standard  line  commentators  that  because  Guinea  is  one  of  the  guises  of  the  Confidence  Man,  his  list  is  a 
telling  outline  for  Melville's  originally  intended  progression  of  the  subsequent  guises.  The  degree  to 
which  it  adheres  to  the  novel  has  been  debated  ad  nauseam.  For  some  of  the  more  interesting 
discussions  see  the  following:  Foster,  Introduction  to  The  Confidence-Man  (1954).  Ixx-Ixxi  1,  Irwin, 
,,  linerican  hiierogývj)hics,  334-35;  Peter  Bellis,  'Melville's  The  Confidence-Man:  An  Uncharitable 
Interprctation'Anierican  Literature  59  (Dec.  1987),  557-59;  and  H.  Bruce  Franklin,  The  Wake  of  the 
Gottv.  -  Melville's  Mythology  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  1963),  157-65. 
5113  Branch,  'The  Genesis,  Composition  and  Structure',  438-39;  'Editorial  Appendix: 
Manuscript  Fragments'  in  71ze  Cotifidence-Man:  His  Masquerade  (1984),  490-99. 
504  'Editorial  Appendix:  Manuscript  Fragments'in  The  Confidence-Man:  His  Masquerade 
(1984),  497. 
5oi  ,  Editorial  Appendix:  Manuscript  Fragments'In  The  Confidence-NIan.  -  His  Masquerade 
(1984),  497. 
506  'Editorial  -\ppendix.  Nlanuscript  Fragments'  in  The  Cotifidence-,  Van:  His.  Vasquerade 
(1984),  497-99. 154 
yield  his  white  wave  to  the  blue'.  "'  As  we  have  already  seen,  especially  in  Chapter 
Three,  Melville  is  not  instinctively  content  with  the  notion  of  serene  union,  of 
mystical  peace,  or  of  tranquil  nature.  For  him,  rather,  the  tendency  Is  toward  an  ironic 
destructivity  that  is also  creativity.  Although  the  destructive  rage  of  'The  River'  is 
ultimately  silenced  by  the  deaf  mute  in  Chapter  One  of  The  Confidence-Man,  the 
observations  of  Foster  and  Kemper  above  inform  us  of  the  possibility  that  the  silence 
is  but  a  show. 
Insofar  as  it  is  a  fictive  put-on,  the  repression  of  destruction  paves  the  way  for 
Melville's  most  consciously  creative  novel,  wherein  characteristic  malleability  and 
potential  are  privileged  over  essence.  Which  is  to  say,  the  deaf  mute  that  supplants 
the  Missouri  River  screams  the  possibility  of  a  truly  living  Subject  existing  precisely 
as  character.  It  is  this  concem  with  subjectivity  qua  characterisation  that  links 
Melville,  undoubtedly  in  ways  even  he  was  unaware,  to  the  post-Kantian  theoretical 
developments  of  the  nineteenth-century.  Moreover,  it  is  in  this  refracted  light  that 
Melville's  contribution  to  our  thinking  about  theological  discourse  emerges,  within 
and  as  the  radical  theatricality  of  his  Masquerade.  Only  in  this,  we  will  see  below,  is 
the  creative  apocalypticism  of  Moby-Dick  and  Pierre  most  fully  reallsed  -i.  e.,  in  the 
aesthetico-theological  immanence  of  materialism. 
As  rehearsed  thus  far,  my  contention  is  that  insofar  as  modem  theology  is 
necessarily  concerned  with  itself  (dialectically)  as  both  Subject  and  Object,  it  is  not 
distinct  from  the  imaginative  enquiry  of  Herman  Melville.  Their  linkage,  however, 
,  10es  beyond  the  popular  professional  desire  for  interdisciplinarity,  and  is,  in  tact, 
bound  by  their  complex  engagements  with  what  Michel  Foucault  in  The  Histoty  of 
507  'Editorial  Appendix:  N13111.1script  Fragments'  in  The  Confidence-Alan:  His  Masquerade, 
(1984),  499. I  -ý  Z, 
Sexuality  calls  the  genealogy  of'deep  subjectivity.  Indeed,  what  Foucault  savs  here 
of  the  individual  is,  I  would  argue,  as  applicable  to  theology  as  is  to  Melville  and  his 
Masquerade: 
For  a  long  time,  the  individual  was  vouched  for  by  the  reference  to 
others  and  the  demonstration  of  his  ties  to  the  commonwealth  (family, 
allegiance,  protection);  then  he  was  authenticated  by  the  discourse  of 
truth  he  was  obliged  to  pronounce  concerning  himself.  "' 
In  keeping  with  my  aim  here,  Foucault  relates  this  shift  to  the  emergence  of  the 
literature  and  philosophies  of  self-consciousness,  those  'long  discussions  concerning 
the  possibility  of  constituting  a  science  of  the  subject,  the  validity  of  introspection, 
lived  experience  as  evidence  of  the  presence  of  consciousness  to  itself.  "....  For 
Foucault,  of  course,  this  is  especially  problematic  because  it  is  built  around  a 
forgotten  /  repressed,  and  sometimes  forced,  confession.  510  in  this  way,  he  actually 
longs  for  the  self-present,  apocalyptic  anonymity  that  he  resists  as  an  illusion 
provoked  in  and  by  language  and  power. 
I  would  really  liked  to  have  slipped  imperceptibly  into  this  lecture,  as 
into  all  the  others  I  shall  be  delivering,  perhaps  over  the  years.  I  would 
have  preferred  to  be  enveloped  in  words,  borne  way  beyond  all 
possible  beginnings.  At  the  moment  of  speaking,  I  would  like  to  have 
perceived  a  nameless  voice,  long  preceding  me,  leaving  me  merely  to 
enmesh  myself  in  it,  taking  up  its  cadence,  and  to  lodge  myself,  when 
no  was  looking,  in  its  interstices  as  if  it  had  paused  an  instant,  in 
suspense,  to  beckon  to  me.  There  would  have  been  no  beginnings: 
instead,  speech  would  proceed  from  me,  while  I  stood  in  its  path  -a 
slender  gap  -  the  point  of  its  possible  disappearance.  511 
By  the  end  of  his  life,  in  a  manner  reminiscent  of  Melville,  Foucault  attempted  to 
508  Michel  Foucault,  The  Histoi-y  of  Sexuaht.  v-,  Volume  One:  An  Inti-oduction  (Ncýý  York: 
Pantheon  Books,  1978),  58. 
509  Foucault,  -1he  HistorY  of  Scxualit.  v;  Volume  One,  64. 
.f 
Sexualit-v;  Volume  One,  59-60.  Cf,  Michel  Foucault,  Politics  5  10  Foucault,  Die  Historv  q 
Philosophy  Culture:  Interviews  and  Other  Writj'ngs,  197TIVN4  (trans.  Alan  Sheridan;  ed.  La\ýrence  D. 
Kritzman,  New  York  and  London:  Routledge,  1988),  14,50,95. 
51  1  Michel  Foucault,  AeArchaeology  (?  f  Knowledge;  and  The  Discourse  on  Language  (trans. 
A.  N1.  Sheridan  'Smith-,  New  York:  Vinta-c.  1982),  2  15. 156 
come  to  terins  with  his  ambivalence  regarding  autonomy  and  anonymity,  and 
ultimately  settled  on  an  'aesthetics  of  existence',  which  he  defined  as  'an  analysis  of 
the  relation  between  forins  of  reflexivity  -a  relation  of  self  to  self  -  and  hence 
between  forms  of  reflexivity  and  discourse  of  truth,  forms  of  rationality  and  effects  of 
knowledge.  ""  It  is,  he  concluded,  only  in  this  critical  act  of  ascesis,  the  active 
engagement  with  the  formation  of  oneself,  that  the  self-becoming  of  a  free  Subject  is 
possible.  "' 
While  Foucault  is  almost  certainly  correct  when  he  relates  the  emergence  of 
personal  identity  to  modem  literature  and  philosophy,  we  should  not  necessarily  be  so 
quick  to  follow  his  scepticism  about  the  subjectivity  derived  from  either.  In  his 
appeal  for  an  authentic,  'pure  self-stylization,  which  would  not  be  imposed  as  a 
universal  norm,  but  would  rather  be  open  to  the  choice  of  the  individual',  "'  Foucault 
is  deeply  under  the  influence  of  a  conception  of  subjectivity  qua  presence  that  is  as 
inadequate  as  it  has  been  pervasive.  "'  He  would  often  have  done  well  to  recall  his 
512  'Structuralism  and  Post-  Structuralism:  An  Interview  With  Michel  Foucault'  in  Essential 
Works  of  Foucault,  1954-1984  [Aesthetics,  Method,  and  Epistemology]  (vol.  2;  ed.  James  D.  Faubion; 
New  York:  The  New  Press,  1994),  444.  Cf, 
, 
Marli  Huijer,  'The  Aesthetics  of  Existence  in  the  Work  of 
Michel  Foucault'  Philosophy  and  Social  Criticism  25.2  (1999):  61-85. 
513  For  further  elaboration  on  the  related  themes  of  critical  philosophy  and  ascesis  see  Michel 
Foucault,  'What  is Enlightenment?  '  in  Essential  Works  of  Foucault,  1954-1984  [Ethics:  Subjectivity 
and  Truth]  (vol.  1;  ed.  Paul  Rabinow;  York:  The  New  Press,  1997),  315-17;  'Self  Writing'  in  Essential 
Works  of  Foucault,  1:  207-09;  The  History  of  Sexuality;  Volume  Two:  The  Use  of  Pleasure  (trans. 
Robert  Hurley;  New  York:  Vintage  Books,  1985),  72-77;  'Technologies  of  the  Self  in  Essential  Works 
of  Foucault,  1954-1984,1:  223-5  1. 
514  Peter  Dews,  'The  Return  of  the  Subject  in  late-Foucault'  Radical  Philosophy  51  (Spring 
1989),  40.  Foucault's  inspiration  in  this  regard  is  clearly  Nietzsche,  who  writes  in  The  Gay  Science: 
'To  give  style  to  one's  character  -a  great  and  rare  art!  It  is  practised  by  all  those  who  survey  all  the 
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  their  nature,  and  then  fit  them  into  an  artistic  plan  until  every  one  of  them 
appears  as  art  and  reason  and  even  the  weaknesses  delight  the  eye'  (The  Gay  Science  [trans.  Walter 
Kaufman;  New  York:  Vintage  Books,  1974],  §290). 
515  Cf.,  Andrew  Bowie's  persuasive  criticism  of  Heidegger's  myth  that  the  modem  Subject  has 
always  oppressively  laid  claim  to  truth  as  self-certainty.  Bowie  contends  that  while  Heidegger's 
subversion  of  the  cogito,  ergo  sum  is  correct,  he  does  not  adequately  own  up  to  his  philosophical  debt 
to  the  repressed  subjectivities  -of  Romanticism,  and  thus  paints  a  reductionistic  picture  (From 
Romanticism  to  Critical  Theory:  The  Philosophy  of  German  Literan.  Theory  [London:  Routledge, 
1997],  182-92. 15  7 
own  characterisation  of  the  late  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centuries,  when  the 
literature  and  philosophy  of  the  profoundly  paradoxical  self-positing  self  truly  took 
hold  in  the  wake  of  post-Kantian  idealism.  For  indeed,  such  was  the  emergent  age  of 
modem  aesthetics,  Foucault  points  out  elsewhere,  'when  words  ceased  to  intersect 
with  representations  and  to  provide  a  spontaneous  grid  for  the  knowledge  of  things'.  "' 
Consequently,  we  might  note,  neither  should  we  reject  Hegel  as  quickly  as  has 
been  the  postmodern  tendency.  Hegel,  of  course,  sought  a  systernatisation  of  identity- 
in-difference,  and,  therefore,  the  culmination  (or'end')  of  all  philosophical  reflection. 
Personal  subjectivity,  he  thus  argues,  is  'pure  self-recognition  in  absolute  otherness',  in 
which  the  Subject  'relates  itself  to  itself  and  is  detenninate,  is other-being  and  being- 
for-self,  and  in  this  determinateness,  or  in  its  self-externality,  abides  within  itself,  in 
other  words,  it  is  in  and  for  itselr.  "'  The  Subject,  then,  is  never  self-present.  On  the 
contrary,  subjective  identity  becomes  itself  only  in-and-through  difference,  and 
difference  becomes  itself  only  in-and-through  identity.  In  other  words,  to  affirm 
itself,  identity  must  negate  itself  and  become  its  very  opposite,  that  is,  difference,  for 
'identity  is  different  from  difference'.  "'  At  the  same  time,  because  identity  is in- 
difference,  its  relation  to  its  other  is  naturally  a  subjective,  redemptive  relation  to 
itself"' 
516  Michel  Foucault,  The  Order  of  Things:  Archaeology  of  the  Human  Sciences  (London: 
Tavistock,  1970),  304-05.  For  an  elaboration  on  the  development  of  philosophical  aesthetics  in  this 
period,  see  Andrew  Bowie,  Aesthetics  and  SubjectivitY:  From  Kant  to  Nietzsche  (Manchester: 
Manchester  University  Press,  1990). 
517  Hegel,  Phenomenology  of  Spint,  14,18. 
518  G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Science  of  Logic  (trans.  A.  V.  Miller;  London:  George  Allen  &  Unxý  in, 
1969),  413-17.  Hegel  explains  that  'Identity  is  the  reflection-into-self  that  is  identity  only  as  Internal 
repulsion,  and  is  this  repulsion  as  reflection-into-self,  repulsion,  which  immediately  takes  itself  back 
into  itself.  Thus  it  is  identity  as  difference  as  difference  that  is  identity  \N  ith  itself  (413). 
519  'Difference  in  itself  is  self-related  difference,  as  such  it  is  the  negativity  of  itself.  the 
difference  not  of  an  other,  but  of  itself  from  itself,  it  is  not  itself  but  its  other.  But  that  which  is 
different  from  differcrice  is  identitv.  Difference  is.  therefore,  itself  and  identity.  Both  together 
COIIStItUtc  difference,  it  is  the  whole  and  its  moment'  (Hegel,  Sciencc  of  Logic,  417). 15  8 
it  is,  of  course,  no  coincidence  that  in  developing  the  al  I  -encompassing 
implications  of  his  System,  with  regard  to  subjectivity,  that  Hegel  also  incorporates 
the  three  classical  arguments  for  the  existence  of  God:  the  cosmological,  teleological, 
and  ontological  proofs.  First,  with  the  cosmological  proof,  Hegel  demonstrates  that 
the  finite  is  not  simply  self-identical,  but  inherently  and  self-contradictorily  needs  the 
infinite.  "'  With  the  teleological  proof,  he  continues,  God's  purposeful  wisdom  and 
activity  are  demonstrated.  Purposefulness,  he  writes,  'marks  the  beginning  and  end  of 
the  process  ... 
hence  it  is  the  final  end.  ""  That  is,  it  demonstrates  the  consequences 
of  the  cosmological  argument,  and  is  the  identification  of  individuals  by  virtue  of  the 
self-realising  ends  of  his  dialectic.  "'  Furthennore,  the  reunion  of  beginning  and  end, 
of  subjectivity  and  objectivity,  Hegel  continues,  is  demonstrated  in  the  ontological 
proof,  which  essentially  replays  the  double-negation  at  work  in  his  System.  This 
unity  of  subject  and  object,  in  sum,  is  truth  (or  the  Absolute  Idea);  "  and  the'pure 
being'  of  God,  in  turn,  is  the  self-realised  eschatological  'essence  of  all  reality.  024 
Such  is  the  symmetry  of  thought  I  have  been  developing  throughout  these  pages 
between  the  formation  /  becoming  of  the  Subject  and  formation  /  becoming  of  God. 
The  two  finally  cannot  be  distinguished. 
520  'Humanity  rises  from  the  finite  to  the  infinite,  rises  above  the  singular  and  raises  itself  to 
the  universal,  to  being-in-and-for-self.  Thus  religion  consists  in  this,  that  human  beings  have  before 
them  in  their  consciousness  the  nothingness  of  the  finite,  are  aware  of  their  dependence,  and  seek  the 
ground  of  this  nothingness,  of  this  dependence-in  a  word,  that  they  find  no  peace  of  mind  until  they 
set  up  the  infinite  before  themselves'  (G.  W.  F.  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  [trans.  R. 
F.  Brown,  P.  C.  Hodgson,  and  J.  A  Stewart;  Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1987],  2:  254- 
55). 
52  1  Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Philosopky  of  Religion,  2:  405. 
522  qt  [teleological  purposefulness]  is  something  fixed  that  is  exempt  from  the  process-,  it  is  not 
determined  by  anything  else,  but  has  its  ground  in  the  subject  -  it  is  determined  by  the  free  self- 
determining  of  the  subject'  (Hegel,  Lectures  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  2:  405;  cf.,  2:  404-21,703- 
719,748-52). 
523  Hegel,  Science  of  Logic,  756. 
524  Hegel,  Science  of  Logic,  86.  Or,  to  return  to  the  body  metaphor:  'When  we  grasp  this  life- 
force  in  its  true  nature,  it  is  seen  to  be  one  principle,  one  organic  life  of  the  universe,  one  living  system. 
All  that  is.  simply  constitutes  the  organs  of  the  one  subject'  (86) 159 
Importantly,  though,  we  must  not  fail  to  recognize  that  even  Hegel's  'pure 
being',  the  self-creative  end  of  self-emptying,  is  itself  always  already  an  act  of 
autopoesis.  That  is,  self-becoming  is  ultimately  a  self-creative  projection  of  the 
possibility  and  desire  of  the  very  subjective  immediacy  it  must  also  avoid  and 
disavow.  Indeed,  Hegel  admits  as  much: 
But  this  pure  being  is  not  an  immediacy,  but  something  to  which 
negation  and  mediation  are  essential;  consequently,  it  is  not  v"hat  we 
mean  by  'being',  but  is  'being'  defined  as  an  abstraction,  or  as  the  pure 
universal;  and  our'meaning',  for  which  the  true  [content]  of  sense- 
certainty  is  not  the  universal,  is  all  that  is  left  over  in  face  of  this  empty 
or  indifferent  Now  and  Here.  "' 
Inasmuch,  then,  as  Hegel  shows  a  kind  of  perspectival  inadequacy  (and  thus,  we  will 
say,  duplicity)  itself  to  be  constitutive  of  the  Subject,  he  provides  the  ontological 
grounds  for  the  vitality  of  Melville's  literary  recasting  of  the  aesthetics  of  existence  as 
that  of  the  Masquerade  par  excellence. 
Admittedly,  this  language  of  'aesthetics'  and  'becoming',  and  thus  of  'existence' 
and'Ilfe',  would  seem  far  removed  from  the  systematically  redemptive  fetish  that,  its 
cries  of  protest  notwithstanding,  still  grips  traditional  theology.  And  yet,  in  keeping 
with  the  self-creative  poetics  of  Melville's  Masquerade,  only  when  theology  takes 
seriously  the  unthought  autopoesis  of  its  self-becoming  that  it  fully  realises  its  radical, 
creative  potential.  Indeed,  such  is  the  supplementary  relationship  of  Melville's 
apocalypticism  in  Moby-Dick  with  the  creative  duplicity  of  the  Masquerade  in  The 
Confidence-Man,  that  the  possibility  of  a  radical  theology  is  ultimately  unthinkable 
525  Hegel,  Phenomenology  of  Sjnrit,  61  [para.  99].  Cf.,  'What  we  encounter  here  is  again  the 
ultimate  ambiguity  of  Hegel.  According  to  the  standard  doxa,  the  telos  of  the  dialectical  process  is  the 
absolute  form  that  abolishes  any  material  surplus.  If,  howc%  cr,  this  is  truly  the  case  \ý  ith  Hegel,  hoýk 
are  we  to  account  for  the  fact  that  the  Result  effectively  thro\\  s  us  back  into  the  \\  hirlpool,  that  it  is 
nothinlZ  but  the  totality  of  the  route  \ý  c  had  to  travel  in  order  to  arri\  e  at  the  Result'?  In  other  ýý  ords,  is 
not  a  kind  of  leap  frorn  "not-yct"  to  "always-already"  constitume  of  Hegelian  dialectics:  we  endeavor 
to  approach  the  Goal  (the  absolute  form  dc\  old  of  any  matter),  when,  all  of  a  sudden,  \\  c  establish  that 
all  the  time  we  were  alreadý  there'.  '  Is  not  tile  crucial  shift  in  a  dialectical  process  the  reversal  of 
anticipation  -  not  into  ful  fill  111clit,  but  -  retroaction'.  "  (Zi2ek,  Tarrying  With  the  Negative.  156) 160 
without  an  aesthetic  theology;  that  is  to  say,  a  theology  attuned  both  to  the  constitutive 
inadequacy  and  miraculous  potential  of  theology  as  a  fully  incarnate  theological 
Subject.  "' 
Contra  Balthasar,  though,  the  aesthetically  aware  theology  in  view  here  is not 
simply  an  appropriation  of  aesthetic  concepts,  such  as  that  of  beauty;  and  neither  is  it 
only  'the  attempt  to  do  aesthetics  at  the  level  and  with  the  methods  of  theology',  thus 
'betraying  and  selling  out  theological  substance  to  the  current  viewpoints  of  an  inner- 
worldly  theory  of  beauty.  "  And  yet,  following  his  important  distinction,  neither  is 
an  aesthetic  theology  necessarily  the  same  as  theological  aesthetics.  For  the  latter, 
Beauty  is  the  transcendental  deten-nination  of  Being  that  can  only  be  known  in  full  by 
a  theology  guided  by  faith.  "'  In  contrast,  the  aesthetic  theology  insinuated  by 
Melville's  Masquerade  attends  to  the  suffering  /  ressentiment  wrought  by  the 
sovereign  presence  of  some  Ding  an  sich  or  transcendental  deten-nination  of  Being 
beyond  the  limits  of  phenomenal  expenence,  and  thus  also  to  the  attendant  desire  that 
maintains  subjective  attachment  to  the  status  quo  and  existing  horizons  of  expectation. 
There  is,  in  short,  for  aesthetic  theology  truly  nothing  behind  or  beyond  the 
mask  of  phenomenal  experience;  and  this  is  why,  paradoxical  though  it  may  seem, 
something  new,  something  miraculous  because  it  was  previously  impossible,  is  made 
526  Cf.,  especially,  Thomas  J.  J.  Altizer's  important  reminder  of  apocalypse  as  both  a  beginning 
and  an  end:  'Ultimately  apocalypse  is  the  apocalypse  of  God.  If  ancient  Christianity  could  reýerse  an 
original  Christian  apocalypse  by  knowing  the  absolute  immutability  and  the  absolute  transcendence  of 
God,  a  reversal  of  that  transcendence  and  immutability  is  surely  an  apocalyptic  reversal,  one  giving 
witness  to,  if  not  embodying,  a  new  apocalypse  of  God.  Certainly  the  Christian  can  knoýk'  an 
apocalypse  of  God  is  having  occurred  in  the  crucifixion,  for  if  the  crucifixion  is  finally  the  crucifixion 
of  God,  it  unquestionably  embodies  a  truly  and  even  absolutely  neNý  realization  of  the  Godhead.... 
rm  .,,, 
pse,  is  Thus  an  absolute  transformation  of  the  Godhead,  a  transfo  ation  which  is  apocal- 
simultaneously  an  apocalyptic  ending  and  an  apocalyptic  beginning.  It  is  an  apocalýptic  ending  of 
God,  and  thus  truly  the  death  of  God,  and  the  apocalyptic  beginning  of  an  absolutely  new  Godhead' 
(1he  Contemporary  Jesus  [Albany:  State  Unk  ersity  of  New  York  Press,  1997],  xxv-xxý  1). 
527  Balthasar,  The  Glory  (f  the  Lord,  1:  38,  cf.  1:  79-117. 
ý;,  g  -5(  1972),  565. 
John  Riclics.  'The  Theology  of  Hans  Urs  \on  Balthasar.  p,,  jrt  1',  Tilf,  olog)  4. 
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possible  in  the  immanent  materiality  of  lived  experience.  This  Is  not,  however,  a 
philosophical  denial  of  theological  discourse,  of  its  possibility  or  its  content; 
moreover,  neither  does  it  ignore  the  differences  between  theology  and  philosophy.  It 
is,  rather,  the  creative  recasting  of  theological  grounds  in  general,  whereby  theological 
discourse  is  fundamentally  an  imaginative  reflection  upon  the  problematic  desire  and 
attempts  for  an  impossible  cognisance  of  its  own  incognisance,  i.  e.,  the  necessary 
excessiveness  or  repressed  remainder  of  its  self-becoming  or  character,  sati  on  (is 
theology. 
5.  Theology  as  Aesthetic  Intensity 
It  should,  of  course,  go  without  saying  that  this  aesthetic  theology,  due  in  part 
to  the  unabashed  debt  it  owes  modem  literature  and  philosophy,  is  not  in  concert  with 
'the  aesthetics  of  Christian  truth'  professed  by  the  guardians  of  ecclesiastical 
theology.  "'  Neither  is  it,  though,  an  apophatic  exercise  in  mystical  silence,  "'  a 
deconstructive  affinnation  of  'hyperbolic  alterity',  "'  nor  a  confessional  'sacralizing'  of 
its  discourse  /  liturgy.  "'  When  theology  betrays  some  necessary,  immaterial  essence 
529  E.  g.,  David  Bentley  Hart,  The  Beauty  of  the  Infinite:  The  Aesthetics  of  Christian  Truth 
(Grand  Rapids:  William  B.  Eerdmans  Publishing,  2003).  Hart  (alongside  John  Milbank)  is  the 
undisputed  heir  to  Balthasar's  aesthetic  project,  forcefully  carrying  It  into  the  new  century  alongside  an 
(overly?  )  aggressively  polemic  attack  on  (primarily  postmodem)  philosophical  encroachments  into 
theological  territory.  For  Hart,  the  'engagement'  between  philosophy  and  theology  is  only  ever  a  fight 
to  the  death. 
53  0  The  best  contemporary  representatives  of  this  position,  one  an  analysis  and  the  other  an 
actualization  are,  respectively,  Denys  Turner,  The  Darkness  of  God:  Negativity  In  Christian  M.  vsticism 
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1995).  and  David  Jasper,  The  Sacred  Desert:  Religion, 
Literature,  Art,  and  Culture  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  2004). 
531  John  D.  Caputo  is  certainly  the  most  prolific  philosopher  cum  theologian  today  writing 
about  deconstruction  and  theology.  For  representative  examples,  see  his  'God  is  Wholly  Other 
Almost:  Di 
, 
'fl()-ancc  and  the  Hyperbolic  Alterity  of  God'  in  Ae  Otherness  of  God  (ed.  Orrin  F. 
Surnmerell,  Charlottes\  dle,  Va..  University  Press  of  Virginia,  1998),  190-205,  On  Religion  (Ne\k 
f  God.  York:  Routledg,  200  1),  as  N\  A  as  his  forthcoming  work  The  tleakness  o 
532  1  ýini  thinking  here,  in  particular,  of  Radical  Orthodoxý.  Cf.  James  K.  A.  Smith, 
Introducing  Radical  Orthodo-vy:  11opping  a  1"ost-Secular  Theology  (Grand  Rapids.  Mich:  Baker 162 
that  is  to  be  unveiled,  the  Good  or  the  True  behind  (or  analogously  transcendent  to) 
the  phenomenal  mask,  its  character  is  that  of  a  phenomenological,  teleological  or 
liturgical  revelation.  On  the  contrary,  aesthetic  theology  cannot  abide  in  the 
immediacy  or  immateriality  of'pure  being',  the  analogia  entis  of'theological 
5,4  metaphysics',  "'  nor  can  it  be  in  the  interest  of  a  'structurally  deferred'  presence.  ,  For, 
indeed,  as  Theodor  Adorno  memorably  wrote  in  Minima  Moralia,  any  such 
authenticity,  be  it  immediate,  analogical,  or  as  a  hope  deferred,  'Itself  becomes  a  lie 
the  moment  it  becomes  authentic,  that  is,  in  reflecting  on  itself,  in  postulating  itself  as 
genuine,  in  which  it  already  oversteps  the  identity  which  it  lays  claim  to  in  the  same 
breath.  1535 
By  the  time  he  wrote  The  Confidence  -Mai  i,  Melville  seems  to  have  understood 
this  point  well.  Deftly,  he  situates  his  reader  into  the  same  predicament  as  the  old 
man  at  the  end  of  the  novel,  who,  while  examining  a  banknote  with  his  newly 
purchased  'Counterfeit  Detector',  laments:  ...  there's  so  many  marks  of  all  sorts  to  go 
by,  it  makes  it  a  kind  of  uncertain.  """  To  make  matters  even  more  complex,  the  old 
man  recognizes  that  some  signs,  such  as  red  marks,  which  by  their  absence  hint  at  a 
counterfeit,  also  cannot  always  be  trusted  because  ...  some  good  bills  get  so  worn,  the 
red  marks  get  rubbed  out.  And  that's  the  case  with  my  bill  here  -  see  how  old  it  is 
or  else  it's  a  counterfeit,  or  else  -I  don't  see  right  -  or  else  -  dear,  dear  me  -I 
Academic, 
-1004), 
John  Milbank,  Catherine  Pickstock,  and  Graham  Ward,  eds.,  Radical  Orthodox-v:  A 
Nen,  Theology  (London:  Routledge,  1999). 
5  13  Cf.,  John  Milbank,  'Only  Theology  Overcomes  Metaphysics'  Neiv  Blackfi-lars  76.895 
(July/August  1995):  352-43. 
-S"4  Cf.,  once  again,  Foucault:  'this  rather  weak  identity  that  NN  e  try  to  preserve  behind  a  mask  is 
in  itself  merely  a  parody'('Nietzsche,  Genealogy,  History',  386). 
5  '5  Theodor  Adol-no,  Minima  Moralia  (London:  Nc\N  Left  Books,  1974),  154 
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don't  know  what  else  to  think.  """  His  search  for  the  bill  unsullied  by  falseness,  and 
thus  for  a  clearly  marked  identification  of  authenticity,  is  paradigmatic  of  the  desire  of 
the  reader  of  The  Confidence-Man  to  identify  the  contours  of  its  network  of  deception 
-that  is,  the  differences  between,  and  thus  the  identity  of,  conned  and  con  man.  Botli 
are,  as  we  have  seen  above,  wild-goose  chases. 
'Stay,  now,  here's  another  sign.  It  says  that,  if  the  bill  is  good,  it  must 
have  in  one  comer,  mixed  in  with  the  vignette,  the  figure  of  a  goose, 
very  small,  indeed,  all  but  microscopic;  and  for  added  precaution,  like 
the  figure  of  Napoleon  outlined  by  the  tree,  not  observable,  c%  en  if 
magnified,  unless  the  attention  is  directed  to  it.  Now,  pore  over  it  as  I 
will,  I  can't  see  this  goose.  ' 
'Can't  see  the  goose?  why  I  can;  and  a  famous  goose  it  is.  There' 
(reaching  over  and  pointing  to  a  spot  in  the  vignette). 
J  don't  see  it-dear  me-I  don't  see  it.  Is  it  a  real  goose'.  " 
'A  perfect  goose;  beautiful  goose.  ' 
'Dear,  dear,  I  don't  see 
it.  t538 
The  old  man's  concern  about  bank  notes  of  uncertain  value  and  authenticity  reaches 
beyond  the  obvious  ambiguities  of  a  nascent  nineteenth-century  American  capitalism. 
More  provocatively,  it  engages  and  participates  in  the  thoroughly  theological 
assumption  of  /  desire  for  authenticity;  an  authenticity  that,  in  the  process,  is  betrayed 
as  a  confidence  game  par  excellence. 
The  theological  confidence  game  of  The  Confidence-Man,  as  it  were,  is 
characterized  on  one  level  by  the  subtle  intertwining  of  duplicity  and  sacrifice  in  its 
unsubtle  biblical  and  eschatological  allusions,  which  culminate  in  the  novel's 
prophetic  conclusion:  'Something  further  may  follow  of  this  Masquerade.  '  And  yet, 
like  the  apocalyptic  return  of  a  sacrificed  Christ  and  the  forgiveness  wrought  by  the 
-S. 
17 
McIville,  Pie  Cotifidence-Alan,  248. 
N/Icl\  ille,  The  Confidencc-Alan,  248. 164 
blood  of  a  bull,  both  of  which  are  often  believed  to  be  evoked  in  the  final  act  of  the 
novel,  "'  that  which  was  sacrificed  remains  just  beyond  the  clouds  or  behind  the 
temple's  veil,  an  infinite  object  of  theological  desire.  Is  perhaps  something  similar 
occurring  in  the  Gospel  of  St.  Matthew,  where  the  resurrection,  from  which  Jesus 
ostensibly  claims  his  identity  and  authority  (Matt.  28.18-20),  is  also  presented  and 
regarded  by  some,  even  amongst  the  disciples  (Matt.  28.17),  as  a  'deception'  (Matt. 
27.63-66;  28.11-15),  a  counterfeit?  Does  not  the  Gospel  of  Matthevv  quickly  conclude 
with  an  affirmation  -'And  remember,  I  am  with  you  always,  to  the  end  of  the  age' 
(Matt.  28.18)  -  that  Jacques  Derrida  might  paraphrase,  'There  is  no  secret  as  such;  I 
deny  it.  ""  Much  like  sacramental  wine,  the  presence  and  memory  of  Christ, 
affirmation  and  denial  continually  bleed  into  one  another,  confusing  the  sacred'good 
news'  with  -the  indeterminate,  deferred  desire  of  a  secret,  sacrificial  passion. 
What,  then,  can  one  possibly  say  of  theology  in  the  midst  of  the  Masquerade? 
If,  as  above,  it  betrays  some  essential  truth  or  identity  or  essence  that  is  to  be 
(impossibly)  unveiled,  something  behind  the  mask,  the  character  of  the  Masquerade  is 
that  of  a  revelation  -  i.  e.,  a  miraculous  unmasking.  But,  of  course,  as  we  have  seen, 
this  unmasking  neverhappens'  as  such  -  or  at  least  is  deferred  to  the  inaccessible 
horizons  of  a  'messianic'  self-presence  and/or  nestled  safely  away  in  the  'sacralized' 
immanence  of  its  discourse  /  liturgy  -  for  where  there  is  no  mask,  there  is  no  truth  or 
identity  to  disclose.  The  reflective  economy  of  theology's  self-becoming  in  view  here, 
i.  e.,  where  the  Subject  of  theology  is  that  of  a  self-characten  sing  return  to/of  itself, 
poses  a  dual  threat.  On  the  one  hand,  there  is  the  (retroactively)  imposed  sovereignty 
of  systematic,  transcendent  order,  in  the  guise  of  coherence,  beauty,  and  efficiencý',  on 
539  cc  c,  "I'l  L  137-70 
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the  other  hand,  there  is  the  confused  nihilism  of  deified  immanence.  Which  is  to  say, 
the  transcendental  Subject  of  theology  can  but  loathe  the  matenal  immanence  of  its 
embodied  reflection,  which  knows  not  what  it  does  or  is  without  the  transcendental 
criteria  of  the  Subject.  The  Object  of  theological  reflection,  then,  in  the  name  of  the 
sovereign  Subject,  suppresses  and  hates  the  sovereign-shattering  surplus  of  freedom 
and  autonomy  without  criteria  that  emerges  from  the  dialectic  of  the  Subject's  self- 
becoming  but  cannot  itself  be  contained  by  it. 
To  return  to  the  language  of  Schelling  and  dialectical  materialism  of  Chapter 
Fhree,  then,  the  unconscious  state  of  theology  is  the  pursuit  of  that  which  m,!  ould  fill 
the  void  left  by  the  Subject-Object  split  of  its  'sinful'  condition.  Of  course,  as  seen 
throughout  our  analysis  of  Melville,  such  a  pursuit  is  self-deceptive  insofar  as  it 
chases  that  which  it  cannot  actually  want.  That  is  to  say,  without  its  reflective  split, 
there  would  be  no  theology.  Its  lack  of  wholeness,  its  own  original  sin,  makes  it  what 
it  is.  The  transcendental  ambition  for  sovereign  wholeness,  the  pure  night  of 
'theology  without  theology',  is  theology's  end:  its  purpose  for  being  and  its  impossible 
suicide  /  annihilation.  Therefore,  its  real  aim  is  to  pursue,  in  the  insane  circularity  of 
unrequited  desire,  wholeness  without  truly  wanting  it,  in  order  that'the  vomit  of  its 
loathed  identity'  (i.  e.,  the  autonomous  excess  that  emerges  from  and  paradoxically 
sustains  the  desire  of  its  suicidal  self-violence)  might  be  effectively  held  within.  ý" 
The  objects  of  its  desire,  from  the  Christian  significance  of  the  historical  Resurrection 
to  the  universal  possibility  of  justice,  are  the  means  by  which  the  anticipation  of  and 
passion  for  wholeness  are  given  their  faces,  but  actually  function  as  the  forestalling 
obstacles  /  masks  to  it. 
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The  complex  relationship  between  the  transcendent  ambitions  and  immanent 
materiality  of  theology  is  not,  though,  that  of  a  balanaced  co-cletermination.  At  its 
root,  rather,  is  a  desire  fraught  with  an  inherent  undecidability,  which  Slavoj  Zi2ek 
describes  well: 
Two  characteristics  of  this  paradoxical  causality  should  be  retained:  a 
cause  is  inherently  undecidable  -  it  can  enhance  the  feature  it  stands 
for  or  its  opposite;  and  above  all,  there  is  no  'proper  measure'  in  the 
relationship  between  a  cause  and  its  effect  -  the  effect  is  always  in 
excess  of  its  cause,  either  in  the  guise  of  the  upward  spiral 
(aggressivity  leads  to  more  and  more  aggressivity)  or  in  the  guise  of 
the  counteraction  (awareness  of  aggressivity  brings  forth  a  fear  of 
'overreacting'  that  deprives  the  sub  .  ect  of  the'normai'measure  of 
aggressive  self-assertion  ).  542 
Consequently,  the  aesthetico-theological  awareness  of  Melville's  Masquerade,  in  its 
rethinking  of  self-becoming  as  self-creation,  is  just  as  concerned  with  the  apparently 
chaotic  freedom  of  shape  and  mask  as  it  is  with  the  unexpected  order  and 
homogeneity  of  self-organisation.  My  argument  here  is  that  the  conscious 
constituents  of  its  network  of  confi  dence-  seekers  and  con  fi  dence  -givers,  are 
necessarily  in  the  precarious,  creative  state  of  becoming,  and  thus  do  not  preexist  the 
game  /  duplicity  itself...  Indeed,  such  has  been  the  'undecidable'praxis  and  character 
of  theological  discourse  and  confidence  games  (i.  e.,  their  communication  and 
maintenance),  forever  performed  as  though  on  a  precipitant  point  in  which  a  small, 
seemingly  isolate  change  has  the  potential  to  push  it  into  chaotic  madness  or  lock  it  in 
54  2  212ek,  'The  Abyss  of  Freedom',  80. 
543  In  writing  about  the  flexibility  and  fluidity  of  the  'big  con',  David  Maurer  notes  the 
seemingly  infinite  variations  any  given  con  game  might  take  depending  on  the  situation.  The  best  con, 
as  such,  is  infinitely  adaptable.  Maurer  writes.  'Whenever  a  mark  objects  at  any  stage  of  the  game.  his 
arguments  are  met  immediately  by  one  or  the  other  of  the  con  men,  for  instance,  if,  after  the 
convincers,  tile  mark  N\  ants  to  back  out,  the  roper  professes  to  be  so  thoroughly  convinced  that  he 
offers  to  sign  an  agreement  by  which  he  will  buy  out  the  mark's  interest  in  the  deal  for  a  liberal 
consideration;  usually,  after  one  of  these  "chills"  the  mark  comes  back  into  the  deal  \ý  ith  greater 
confidence  than  lie  has  c\  er  had  before.  Any  one  play  maNI  in\  ol\  ea  great  number  ot'dc\  lations  ot'thi,, 
impossible  to  include  in  a  written  \ersion  of  the  ganic  because  it  is  impossible  to  determine  \ý  here 
,  iily  p\  cri  mark  may  balk.  and  it  is  c\cn  more  difficult  to  foresee  how  the  con  men  might  meet  hk 
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an  inert  stasis  -  there  being,  in  the  end,  very  little  functional  difference  between  the 
two. 
The  performance  of  theological  discourse  qua  confidence  game,  then,  is  as 
epic  as  it  is  tragic,  for  the  transcendental  ambition  for  sovereign  wholeness  qua 
adaptive  order  cannot  ultimately  quell  the  spontaneous  eruption  of  creative  / 
imaginative  autonomy.  The  idiosyncratic  character  of  theology  becoming-itself  we 
are  unfolding  here  is,  thus,  not  unlike  what  Gilles  Deleuze  has  described  in  one  of  his 
final  essays  as  'a  life': 
We  will  say  of  pure  immanence  that  it  is  A  LIFE,  and  nothing  else.  It 
is  not  immanence  to  life,  but  the  immanent  that  is in  nothing  is itself  a 
life.  A  life  is  the  immanence  of  immanence,  absolute  immanence:  it  is 
complete  power,  complete  bliss....  it  is an  absolute  immediate 
consciousness  whose  very  activity  no  longer  refers  to  a  being  but  is 
ceaselessly  posed  in  a  life....  The  transcendental  field  is  defined  by  a 
plane  of  immanence,  and  the  plane  of  immanence  by  a  life.  "' 
For  Deleuze,  the  potency  of  immanence  lay  in  the  indefinite  article  because  a  life  is 
not  the  same  as  the  one  who  lives  it.  On  the  contrary: 
A  life  is everywhere,  in  all  the  moments  that  a  given  living  subject  goes 
through  and  that  are  measured  by  given  lived  objects:  an  immanent  life 
carrying  with  it  the  events  or  singularities  that  are  merely  actualised  in 
subjects  or  objects.  This  indefinite  life  does  not  itself  have  moments  . 
. 
but  only  between-times,  between-moments;  it  doesn't  just  come  about 
or  come  after  but  offers  the  immensity  of  an  empty  time  where  one 
sees  the  event  yet  to  come  and  already  happened,  in  the  absolute  of 
immediate  consciousness.  115 
In  this  way,  too,  the  aesthetic  theology  embodied  by  Melville's  Masquerade  is  that  of 
a  living  discourse  attuned  to  the  self-becoming  of  expenence,  and  thus  to  the  intense 
potential  of  making  all  things  new.  Such  'a  life',  Philip  Goodchild  writes  of  Deleuze, 
is  no  longer  modelled  simply  on  'the  true',  but  is  'an  attempt  to  generate  an  ethos  of 
544  Gilles  Deleuze,  Pure  Immanence.  -  Essqvs  on  A  Life  (trans.  A.  Boyman;  NeNý  York:  Zonc 
Books,  200  1  )ý  27-28. 
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thought  that  expresses  an  intensification  of  life';  in  this  way,  he  continues,  the  unity  of 
thought  and  being,  i.  e.  'the  true',  'is  replaced  by  an  aspiration  for  the  unity  of  a  living 
thought  and  the  unthought  which  gives  life 
to  It.  1546 
In  close,  then,  theology  gains  its  comprehensibility  in  the  midst  of  the  self- 
reflection  of  its  discourse  and  discipline;  but,  vitally,  remains  altogether  inadequate  to 
explain  why  this  is  so.  It  is  precisely  in  his  embodiment  of  something  not  unlike 
Deleuze's  description  of  'pure  immanence',  which  we  have  cast  here  as  aesthetic 
intensity,  that  Melville  emboldens  theological  thinking  to  reimagine  the  possibilities 
of  a  non-sovereign,  materialistic  holiness  in  non-dualistic  terms.  "' 
546  Goodchild,  Capitalism  and  Religion,  165. 
547  This  is  wholly  at  odds  Nvith  the  presentation  of  immanence  as  nihilism  in  Radical 
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CONCLUSION 
My  contention  in  the  previous  pages  has  been  two-fold:  (1)  it  is  only  when 
theology  takes  seriously  its  unthought  self-becoming  (i.  e.,  as  theological  Subject)  that 
it  has  any  chance  of  thinking  itself  radi  III  ically;  and  (2)  that  any  vision  of  radical 
theology  is  ultimately  unthinkable  without  an  attendant  'aesthetic  theology'  sensitiVe 
to  both  the  coiistitutii,  e  inadequacy  and  the  creatliv  potential  of  the  theological 
Subject  becoming-itself  I  have  contended,  moreover,  that  radical  theological 
thinking,  that  rethinking  which  occurs  after  the  death  of  God  which  unthinks  all 
established  theological  ground,  is not  sufficient  simply  as  an  apocalyptic  silence,  but 
is it  itself  only  when  given  its  creative  voice  by  the  aesthetic  genius,  i.  e.,  the 
autonomous  one  who  'gives  the  rule  to  art',  "'  whose  word  and  work  continually  do 
and/or  create  something  new,  perhaps  even  miraculous,  out  of  the  existing  structures 
of  a  discourse  and  discipline.  "'  Of  such  a  genius,  Horkheimer  and  Adomo  write: 
The  greatest  artists  were  never  those  who  embodied  a  wholly  flawless 
and  perfect  style,  but  rather  those  who  used  style  as  a  way  of  hardening 
[Hdrte]  themselves  against  the  chaotic  expression  of  suffering,  as  a 
negative  truth.  The  style  of  their  works  gave  what  was  expressed  that 
force  without  which  life  flows  away  unheard.  Those  very  art  forms 
which  are  known  as  classical,  such  as  Mozart's  music,  contain 
objective  trends  which  represent  something  different  to  the  style  which 
they  incarnate.  "' 
That  is  to  say,  the  aesthetic  genius,  perhaps  even  in  the  manner  of  a  prophet,  at  first 
ý4111  Kant,  Ae  Critique  of  Judgement,  150. 
549  Cf.,  Carl  Dahlhaus'  essay  on  Arnold  Schoenberg's  'aesthetic  theology',  in  which  he  quotes 
the  composer's  'inner  biography':  "This  is  also  the  place  to  speak  of  the  miraculous  contributions  of  the 
subconscious.  I  am  conN  inced  that  in  the  xN  orks  of  the  great  masters  many  miracles  can  be  discovered, 
the  extreme  profundity  and  prophetic  foresight  of  which  seem  superhuman'  (Schoenbei-,  q  and  the  New 
Music:  Essa 
, 
%'s  b*v  Cai-I  Daldhaus  [trans.  Derrick  Puffett  and  Alfred  Clayton,  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
Uni\crsity  Press,  1987],  81). 
550  Max  Horkheimer  and  Theodor  W.  Adorno,  DialectIC  of  Enlightenment  (trans.  John 
Cumming-,  Nc\ý  York:  Herder  'ý,  Herder,  1944),  130. 170 
must  breach  the  existing  horizons  of  possibility  in  any  given  language,  genre,  artistic 
style,  as  well  as  religious  or  political  order,  in  order  then  to  broaden  the  realm  of 
thought  with  that  which  had  hitherto  remained  unthought.  "'  Although  such  a  genius 
is  not  necessarily  a  theologian,  and  perhaps  precisely  because  of  his  or  her  earnestly 
irreligious  intentions,  the  theological  significance  of  the  genius  lies  in  the  seemingly 
miraculous  surplus  of  his  or  her  freedom  and  autonomy,  and  the  embodied  avvareness 
of  an  aesthetico-theological  intensity  of  life.  It  has  been  my  contention  here  that 
Herman  Melville's  conception  of  subjectivity  is  precisely  such  an  embodiment. 
While  my  intention  has  not  been  to  cast  Melville  as  a  theologian,  per  se,  my 
use  of  Melville  certainly  has  theological  intentions.  I  have  argued  here  that 
theological  thinking  is  a  self-reflective  thinking  conditioned  by  the  evolutionary 
complexity  of  its  pragmatic  adaptability  and  its  reified  systernisation.  In  reading 
theology  through  Melville,  then,  I  have  sought  to  highlight  the  interdisciplinary  stage 
on  which  this  complex  self-reflectivity  is  enacted  (that  is,  as  a  kind  of  perfonnance). 
Although  it  should  be  noted,  my  use  of  Melville  is  but  one  way  of  unpacking  the 
implications  of  this  refined,  radical  sense  of  self-identification  for  theological 
discourse. 
We  have  noted  that  it  is  a  commonplace  of  contemporary  Melville  studies  that 
in  The  Confidence-Man:  His  Masquerade,  Melville  himself  is  the  novel's  title 
character.  As  I  illustrated  in  Chapter  One,  though,  it  is  necessary  that  we  go  even 
further  and  suggest  that  his  entire  career  as  a  professional  author,  from  its  very 
beginning,  bears  the  dubious  marks  of  that  which  has  secrets  to  tell  and  faces  to 
55  1  For,  indeed,  as  William  Blake  concludes  in  'There  is  No  Natural  Religion':  'If  it  Nverc  not 
for  the  Poetic  and  Prophetic  character  the  Philosophic  and  Experimental  would  soon  be  at  the  ratio  of 
all  things,  &  stand  still  unable  to  do  other  than  repcat  the  same  dull  round  over  again'.  Thomas  Altizer 
expands  oil  William  Blake's  prophetic  role  as  the  first  'Christian  atheist'  in  his  The  Vcýi  Apocal.  ysc: 
Die  Radical  Christian  Visioii  of  lVilliam  Blake  (East  Lansing,  Mich.:  Michigan  State  Unkersity  Press. 
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disclose,  and  is  thus  a  con  game  par  excellence.  As  such,  we  find  that  the  genius  of 
Melville's  complex  theatricality  is  that  it  marks  a  significant  discursive  model  for 
thinking  the  aesthetics  of  theological  self-becoming:  namely,  as  a  kind  of  confidence 
game.  The  confidence  game,  we  have  seen,  co-opts  desire  and  the  fluid  possibilities 
of  identity  and  narrative,  and  adaptively  manipulates  the  social  /  discursive  networks 
in  which  they  are  related,  quite  often  in  shocking,  spontaneous  ways.  I  ha-ve 
suggested  that  the  self-organizational  economy  of  theology  is  always  already  a 
counterfeit  dependence  upon  the  intimate  miscegenation  of  the  Subject  of  theological 
sovereignty  and  the  Object  of  theological  materiality.  My  point  is  not,  however,  that  a 
true  theology  finally  unmasks;  on  the  contrary,  it  is  that,  as  with  Melville's  complex 
presentation  of  subjectivity,  the  coherence  of  the  confidence  game  qua  theological 
discourse  is  beset,  indeed  retroactively  (i.  e.,  dialectically)  sustained,  by  the 
structurally  excessive,  incomprehensible  freedom  of  its  untold  possibilities  and 
unactualized  adaptations. 
Ultimately,  the  aesthetic  fecundity  of  a  theological  self-becoming  which  is  a 
self-creation  cannot  be  limited  to  the  interplay  between  (or  analogy  between)  the 
productivity  of  its  material  immanence  (i.  e.,  of  its  discourse)  and  the  transcendence  of 
its  sovereign  ambitions  to  unmask,  but  actively  emerges  as  a  subversively  creative 
symptom  of  the  duplicitous  dialectic  between  the 
two.  552  It  is  my  closing  conviction 
that  without  the  creative  genius,  such  as  exemplified  in  Hen-nan  Melville,  the  radical 
implications  of  theological  thinking  are  too  readily  appropriated,  in  order  that  they 
might  then  be  ultimately  repressed,  by  the  intellectual  /  political  /  economic 
552  My  casting  of  this  dialectic  as  'counterfeit'  and  'duplicitous',  but  fraught  ýý  ith  exccs,  is 
highly  influenced  not  only  by  Bruno  Latour's  characterisation  of  modernity  descnbed  above,  but  even 
more  importantly  by  the  description  of  the  subtle  SLIýjW4,1t]011  of  immanence  bv  so\  ereignty, 
particularly  that  of  Capital,  in  Michael  Hardt  and  Antonio  Negri,  Enipi*i-e  (Cambridge:  Har-Nard 
Unkersitv  Pre,  ýs,  2000).  p.  69-90. 172 
confessional  regimes  of  the  status  quo.  "'  In  short,  then,  it  is  in  its  awareness  of  the 
profound  intensity  of  that  unthinking  that  emerges  as  the  excess  of  thinking  that  the 
radical  theological  vision  (i.  e.,  after  the  death  of  God)  is  for  the  first  time  fully  freed 
to  resist  its  repression  and/or  pacification;  and  in  so  resisting,  freed  to  create-itself 
anew. 
553  While  many  of  my  reflections  regarding  the  adaptive  order  of  the  aesthetico-theological 
vision  are  deeply  inspired  by  the  network  and  complexity  theories  made  most  accessible  by  the  likes  of 
Bruno  Latour,  Murray  Gell-Mann,  Illya  Prigogine,  and  Roger  Lewin,  I  remain  deeply  disappointed  at 
the  degree  to  which  the  emergent  structure  of  freedom  and  excessiveness,  not  to  mention  intensity,  has 
been  repressed  by  sovereign  models  of  adaptation,  most  evident  in  the  incorporation  of  complexity 
theory  in  and  by  the'biopolitics'  of  contemporary  globalism.  As  it  relates  to  theology,  this  frustrating 
development  is  most  clearly  evident  in  the  recent  work  of  Mark  C.  Taylor,  especially  his  Confidence- 
Games:  Mone 
'v 
and  Markets  in  a  World  Without  Redemption  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press. 
2004).  Michael  Hardt  and  Antonio  Negri's  alternative  reading  of  network  culture,  and  its  reN  olutionary 
import,  has  proven  to  be  an  invaluable  supplement.  See  their  Multitude:  War  and  Democracy  in  the 
Age  of  Empire  (New  York:  Penguin,  2004). 173 
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